Few scholarly works on pacifism in general feature Japan, despite the countryās pacifist image. The main reason is that Japanese pacifism is widely considered a recent, post-World War II phenomenon. Our image and understanding of Japanese pacifism are closely linked with the post-World War II context, even though some scholars have pointed out that pacifist thought in Japan did not begin in 1947 and that post-war pacifism cannot be properly understood without considering its earlier precursors (Banba & Howes 1978: x).
Beyond that, exploring pacifism in any country requires understanding its deeper roots or inspirations and its effects on society. Martin Ceadel, who undertook a thorough study of pacifism in Britain in the era of the two world wars, emphasized the importance of distinguishing the inspiration or basis of pacifism from its orientation or attitude towards society (Ceadel 1980: 11). This section thus explores pacifism and its various definitions, inspirations and orientation in reference to the ethical and moral philosophies developed in Europe and North America. The purpose of this exploration is to help us more precisely grasp pacifism in other social and cultural contexts, providing a foundational framework to use when investigating Japanese pacifism in the subsequent chapters.
Variations of pacifism
Whilst we recognize the existence of pacifist thinking from the ancient time around the world, the precise meaning of such thoughts is unclear: whether or not they can be considered as pacifism. No precise distinction might have existed among such expressions as pacifism, peace thoughts and the philosophy of peace even after the term pacifism was introduced.
One of the major obstacles when analysing pacifism in any country is the imprecise definition of its scope. In fact, there are many views of what pacifism means.2 Apparently, there is no agreed-upon categorization of the various forms of pacifism. Daniel Hucker (2007: 437) states that āPacifism is simply a single term used to describe multifarious attitudesā. Even historically pacifism was ānot intended to cut such fine distinctions as scholars of the peace movement today struggle to doā (Clinton 2001: 3). Thus, from its inception, the meaning and usage of pacifism or pacifist have never remained static. Even within Europe, where abundant literature on pacifism exists, there are various categorizations and terminologies that explain certain types of pacifism. For example, pacifism in Britain is said to be quite distinctive from continental peace activists.3
Despite ambiguities in its definition and usage, there were attempts to categorize or identify varies positions of pacifism. For example, Cady (2010: 313ā316) raised five forms of pacifism, including absolute, collectivist, fallibility, technological and pragmatic one. Brock (1972: 471ā473) also categorized distinctive positions of pacifism, such as vocational, soteriological, eschatological, separational and integrational pacifism. There are many other terms and expressions employed to explain distinctive positions of pacifism. Although terms or expressions may not necessarily identical, there are some common points among some forms of pacifism. The following part of this section shows several categories of pacifism in order to explain varying positions and views existing in the literature.
The most extreme form of pacifism (expressed in various terms, such as absolute, integrational or maximal pacifism) entails a universal and maximal rejection of war and violence, declaring that war and violence can never be morally justified in any circumstance. Absolute pacifism holds that war and violence are always wrong. Its moral principles are absolute, eternal and unchanging, acknowledging no exceptions. This pacifism applies to those Christians who refuse to participate in war or war-making activity, such as the historic peace churches of Quakers.4 Brock (1972: 475) explains that integrational pacifism represents the most characteristic expression of the twentieth century, although it developed fairly late in the history of pacifism. Even so, absolute pacifism was not inevitably dominant in Europe. In France, for example, the number of absolute pacifists was always relatively small (Hucker 2007: 438). One obvious dilemma among absolute pacifists is that for them, āeven military action aimed at protecting people against acute and systematic human-rights violations cannot be justifiedā (Fox 2014: 126).
Unlike absolute pacifism, forms of contingent pacifism admit some extent of violence, certain means of violence, or war and violence under certain conditions.5 Contingent pacifists appeal to moral principles, such as the principle against killing the innocent, but the application of the principle is contingent on certain facts being true (May 2014: 11). Some who consider themselves pacifists do not categorically deny the legitimacy of taking lives or using force, and they may thus endorse police enforcement actions and support the death penalty. Whereas absolute pacifism allows no exceptions to its prohibition of war and violence, contingent pacifism permits war in some circumstances or may accept a particular military system. For example, some people supported the war against Nazi Germany, even though they considered themselves pacifists.
Pacifism in France in the early twentieth century also exhibits certain contingent elements. French pacifists believed that the Quaker and absolute religious position against having arms was adversative to the interests of their movement and to France (Cooper 1991a: 381). Siegel (2011: 227) called this attitude āpatriotic pacifismā as it encapsulates a disdain for war without undermining loyalty to the state (Republic). In France in the early twentieth century, pacifists willingly participated in the national war effort against the central power (Clinton 2001: 14). According to Cooper (1991a: 381), āpacifist belief in the equality of all persons before the law included military serviceā in France. Cooper states that the pacifists in Europe normally qualified his or her anti-war and pro-peace position with numerous exceptions for self- and national defence (1991b: 10).
In Europe, continental peace activists developed specific versions of pacifism, but ānone of them usually pleased British and American absolute religious pacifists nor, for that matter Leo Tolstoy, who had developed his anarchist and absolutist Christian pacifist positionā¦ā (Cooper 1991b: 10). David S. Patterson (2014) indeed argues that in the history of Europe, the peace advocates on the continent mostly came from middle-class backgrounds, but they could not avoid authoritarian traditions of political supremacy and war they had inherited.
As is illustrated pacifism in Europe, there are variations regarding those who are against war and aspire for peace. Numerous variations of contingent pacifism can be distinguished when we precisely examine diverse positions on the use and means of violence, the acceptable justifications for war and conceptions of peace. Clinton (2001) identified variations of pacifism even within France in the early twentieth century, such as patriotic pacifism, juridical pacifism and integral pacifism.6 Juridical pacifism is distinguished from the absolute pacifism or integral pacifism and expressed the agenda of peace through justice. Broadly both patriotic and juridical pacifism can be considered a contingent type of pacifism as both of them allow violence or war under certain conditions. Integral pacifism is similar to absolute pacifism and came to be called so in the 1920s (Clinton 2001: 16).7
Even in the contemporary world, perhaps contingent pacifism is more commonly observed than absolute pacifism in reality. Larry May, for example, argues that the UN Charter is a contingent pacifist document, or nearly so, as it embodies the idea that wars should not be fought by states (Article 2ā4) except when sanctioned by the UN or in emergencies that require self-defense (Article 51) (May 2014: 13). Many pacifists generally hold the position that waging war is morally wrong, which is often called anti-warism. In this view, limited violence, such as self-defense or the defence of loved ones, is accepted.
As Kant argued, pacifism and realization of peace would be guaranteed through the mechanism of human liability. The human liability exists in both our sense of belligerence and, more than that, that of war-wariness. When thinking about peace and pacifism, although variations exist in terms of meaning and the scope, the most important issue would be war-wariness and anti-war thinking. However, the history of pacifism in Europe illustrates that the line that distinguishes pacifism from, for example, anti-warism or war anxiety is not clear-cut as many French, according to Hucker, desired to avoid war but such attitudes derived from war anxiety rather than pacifism as many people considered that in 1939 to avoid war, it is necessary to fight (Hucker 2007: 449).