Raymond Aron and International Relations

Olivier Schmitt

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9781317215967
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

At a time when the field of International Relations (IR) is diverting from grand theoretical debates, rediscovering the value of classical realism and exploring its own intellectual history, this book contributes to these debates by presenting a cohesive view of Raymond Aron's theory of IR. It explores how a careful reading of Aron can contribute to important current debates, in particular what a theory of IR can be (and thus, what is within or outside the scope of this theory), how to bridge the gap that emerged in the 1970s between a "normative" and a "scientific" theory of IR, and finally how multidisciplinarity is possible (and desirable) in the study of IR.

This edited collection offers a synthetic approach to Raymond Aron's theory of International Relations by bringing together some of the most prominent specialists on Raymond Aron, thus filling an important gap in the current market of books devoted to IR theories and the historiography of the field. The volume is divided into three parts: the first part explores Aron's intellectual contribution to the theoretical debates in IR, thus showing his originality and prescience; the second part traces Aron's influence and explores his relations with other prominent scholars of his time, thus contributing to the historiography of the field; and the third part analyses Aron's contemporary relevance. This comprehensive volume contributes to current debates in the field by showing the originality and breadth of Aron's thought.

This book will be of great interest to academics and students interested in IR theories, strategic studies and the historiography of the field.

1 The classical foundations of Raymond Aron’s theory of international relations

Bryan-Paul Frost

Although Raymond Aron is considered by many to be a towering figure in International Relations theory in the twentieth century, it must be recalled that this is not how many individuals would have predicted his intellectual trajectory: given his background and accomplishments, many if not most of his friends, colleagues, and admirers would have claimed that he was to become one of France’s leading philosophical intellectuals of his generation. After graduating first in his class from the Ecole Normale Supérieure, Aron went on to write a highly original and provocative dissertation that broke decisively with the neo-Kantianism (and passivism) of his teachers. Indeed, during a sojourn in Germany before the completion of his dissertation, Aron also wrote two books that many claim introduced the French intellectual community to the emerging theories of German historicism, sociology, and historical philosophy. Of course, this sojourn in Germany did more than acquaint Aron with modern German philosophy – it also, and perhaps most decisively, allowed him to observe the rise of Hitler and fascism in the 1930s, and to surmise accurately what this might portend for the future of Europe, in particular, and the world, in general. Aron’s philosophical trajectory was now merging with a decidedly political one as well. After World War II, the political trajectory tended to trump the philosophical one, although Aron never abandoned philosophy in any real sense. It would be most accurate to state that Aron always brought philosophy to bear in all of his writings, but that the issues and events that France faced in the post-World War II era more or less forced Aron, as one of the leading liberal and conservative thinkers of his time, to turn to politics, as his numerous books, articles, and editorials attest. Aron was, in the best sense of the words, a genuinely public or civic intellectual, educating and thus trying to guide the French to its best and therefore true interests (Aron 1938, 1961, 1964).¹

The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to limn some of the philosophical sources and influences that underlie Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations – in other words, to highlight some of the great thinkers and learning that is contained in this book. It should go without saying that there can be no question of doing justice to all of Aron’s philosophical references: to do this would require a book in itself, which would in many ways be a history of political philosophy (the index to Peace and War amply supports this idea)! Nor will this chapter discuss how Aron deepened his reflections on some of these thinkers over the course of his lifetime: this too would require a separate book (especially considering the fact that Peace and War was originally published in 1962, and that Aron still had two decades of productive scholarship ahead of him). Instead, we will examine Peace and War on its own terms, a book that Aron had thought about for some ten years as he tried to concretize his understanding of international relations and the new emerging international order. Finally, it should be emphasized that we use the term “classical” in the broadest possible sense, namely to identify the many philosophers, historians, and scholars (both ancient, modern, and contemporary) from which Aron drew in his exhaustive analysis of international politics, and how he managed to weave them together into a coherent whole. In sum, this chapter hopes to demonstrate how and why Aron rejected a narrow or even parochial approach to IR theory, even at the risk of writing a book whose conclusions, as more than one scholar has pointed out, were disappointingly modest (Aron 2003).²

In the style and substance of Montesquieu

Aron begins Peace and War with an often quoted passage from Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws (I, 3): “International law is based by nature upon this principle: that the various nations ought to do, in peace, the most good to each other, and, in war, the least harm possible, without detriment to their genuine interests.” Critics of Aron might argue that he begins with this quotation because his book is similar to Montesquieu’s: both are massive, sprawling, and ultimately disorganized works that lack internal coherency. But just as Montesquieu cautioned readers against making such a hasty judgment about his book, so readers of Aron’s great tome should do the same. What might appear as bedlam at first glance is a carefully constructed and organized synthesis of all the major aspects of international relations: theory, sociology, history, and practice (or praxeology). One may disagree with whether Aron’s book is orderly (as many have done with Montesquieu), but one cannot deny his ultimate intention.

More to the point, why does Aron begin the book with this quotation from Montesquieu? Three overlapping reasons suggest themselves. First, and perhaps ironically, one might claim that Aron’s book is fundamentally about peace, and not war. Of course, Aron could hardly have called the book War and Peace unless he wanted to tread upon a previous, illustrious title; but even if Tolstoy had not written that magisterial novel, one might suspect that Aron would have entitled his book just as he had. There is no doubt – absolutely no doubt – that Aron understands that war has been, is, and probably will remain, an inherent aspect of human relations; but Aron’s concern, like Montesquieu’s, is how to mitigate that often inevitable catastrophe. Peace is the proper relation between states; but understanding how and why war occurs might help to bring about more peaceful relations (the last line of the above quotation suggests this very idea). At the very least, war-like nations should be as peaceful as possible in war. Aron is fully aware of the sometimes horrible extremes to which war ultimately leads, especially in the twentieth century. Second, in stark contrast to modern-day positivists and behavioralists, Aron denied that there could be a value-free social science. Indeed, at the beginning of Part Four of Peace and War, Aron forthrightly admits that all theories in the social sciences have inherent normative implications, and Aron spells out his own over the course of some 200 pages in the section titled “Praxeology” (Aron 2003: 575). And finally, third, the character of these normative implications betray a Montesquieuian moderation in both thought and practice. To take but one example – and one that might be quite discordant to American sensibilities – Aron argued that the demand for unconditional surrender by the Germans during World War II betrayed a disjunction between “strategy and policy,” in that (among other reasons) it “incited the German people to a desperate resistance” (Aron 2003: 27). Whatever one might think of Aron’s conclusion here, the humanity and compassion of Montesquieu is on full display throughout the book – although this never prevents Aron from making some very hard-headed judgments. In short, philosophy can never be divorced from theory or history or practice. Montesquieu helps us to see this key insight.

In addition to the above reasons, we can recognize a further affinity with Montesquieu when we turn to Part Two of Peace and War, “Sociology.” Aron claims that sociology investigates two kinds of causes or determinants: “the material or physical causes on the one side, the moral or social causes on the other, to use Montesquieu’s vocabulary.” The material or physical causes are space (geography), population (demography), and resources (economy); moral or social determinants are “the nation, the civilization, humanity” (Aron 2003: 179). These are hardly the typical or ordinary variables that one encounters as the hallmarks of modern social science – in other words, variables that are at once readily quantifiable, easily defined, discreet, narrow, and specific, and that yield parsimonious, demonstrable, and falsifiable propositions. It should be emphasized that Aron is not at all against such kinds of propositions or theories, and he often offers his own throughout Peace and War; rather, it is to say that Aron categorically rejected unilateral or unidimensional explanations of international relations: just as Aron rejected Marx’s singular explanation of the historical process, so too did he reject singular explanations for the cause(s) of peace and war. The variables that he examined might better be described as “eternal” or “permanent” causes or determinants, all of which contribute something to understanding the complex tapestry of international relations, but none of which explain those relations fully. The seemingly sprawling nature of Aron’s analysis is similar to Montesquieu’s in that both canvassed an array of ideas for understanding their subject matter. In Aron’s case, although none of the variables discussed in Part Two succeeded in giving a comprehensive explanation of international relations, each one of them certainly illuminated enduring characteristics of those relations that must be seriously considered by thinkers at all times and places.

It is also worth mentioning that the section on “Sociology” further illuminates and reveals Aron’s classical foundations – for almost every chapter in Part Two is a detailed examination not only of a particular variable but also of an author(s) closely associated with promoting or exploring it. For example, in chapter 7, Aron turns to (not surprisingly) Montesquieu’s discussion of the influence of geography and climate; in chapter 8, he highlights Gaston Bouthoul’s “demographic theory of war”; and in chapter 9, he offers a trenchant critique of the Marxist–Leninist economic theory of imperialism and colonialism. Such discursive explorations occur repeatedly throughout Peace and War (for example, see the discussions of Heinrich von Treitschke, Hans Morgenthau, and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon in chapter 19 alone). Aron’s approach is sometimes critical, sometimes appreciative, and sometimes combative – but it is always informative as these discussions help to frame the enormous task Aron has set for himself, namely to understand the “implicit logic” of international relations.

Let us restate all of the above observations in this section in the following way. The style and substance of Montesquieu was a clear corrective to the prevailing trend among so many academics, pundits, and even politicians as to how to comprehend international relations. Theirs was an attempt to explain international relations in the hopes of making it a predictive science akin to economics in character and scope. But Aron rejected both this approach and ideal – his was an attempt to understand international relations and thereafter to suggest normative principles that were at once both moderate and prudent (Davis 2009).³ There could be no theory of international relations in any strict sense. As Aron concluded early on in Peace and War:

The diplomaticus of theory, who would have as his goal the maximization of resources, of actual forces, or of power, would not be an idealized portrait of the diplomats of all ages, he would be a caricatured simplification of certain diplomatic personages at certain periods …

If diplomatic behavior is never determined by the relation of forces alone, if power does not serve the same function in diplomacy as utility in economy, then we may legitimately conclude that there is no general theory of international relations comparable to the general theory of economy. The theory we are sketching here tends to analyze the meaning of diplomatic behavior, to trace its fundamental notions, to specify the variables that must be reviewed in order to understand any one constellation. But it does not suggest an “eternal diplomacy,” it does not claim to be the reconstruction of a closed system.

(Aron 2003: 91, 93)

One might suggest that the more social or political scientists strive in the direction of explaining, the more the desire for predictive outcomes will dominate their scholarship; by contrast, a theory of understanding will tend in the opposite direction, rejecting grand theories, oversimplified paradigms, and unidimensional explanations in favor of partial, complex, and provisional conclusions. Aron did not limit himself or subscribe to the trademarks of contemporary, positivistic social science. Aron will not offer easy solutions; but by the same token, he will help us to see the right philosophical questions to ask.

Vulgar Machiavellianism, naive Kantianism, and Aristotelian prudence

As suggested above, Montesquieu’s influence extends throughout the book, and in particular into Part Four, titled “Praxeology.” Aron here begins to delineate his understanding of the principles of true statesmanship.

[T]he moment one shifts from observation to precept, the paradox of international relations is clearly revealed: relations between states are social relations controlled by the possible and legitimate recourse to force. Now, the use of force is not in itself immoral (might in the service of right has always been considered moral). But each of the actors, if he be the judge, and the sole judge, of the legitimacy of his cause, must feel threatened by the others, and the international game becomes a struggle in which the player who abides by the rules runs the risk of being victimized by his (relative) morality. At this point two sorts of questions arise: Is foreign policy in and of itself diabolical? What means may be legitimately employed, it is being understood that the states are jealous of their independence? Further, is it conceivable, and if so is it practicable, to go beyond foreign policy? To subject states to one law, that of collective security or of a universal empire? Can we put an end to what we call international anarchy, that is, the claim of states to take law into their own hands? In other words, the essence of inter-state relations raises two praxeological problems that I will call the Machiavellian problem and the Kantian problem: that of legitimate means and that of universal peace.

(Aron 2003: 577)

Aron eschews such stark, Manichean distinctions, and instead advocates what he calls a morality of “prudence.”

To be prudent is to act in accordance with the particular situation and the concrete data, and not in accordance with some system or out of passive obedience to a norm or pseudo-norm; it is to prefer the limitation of violence to the punishment of the presumably guilty party or to a so-called absolute justice; it is to establish concrete accessible objectives conforming to the secular law of international relations and not to limitless and perhaps meaningless objectives, such as “a world safe for democracy” or “a world from which power politics will have disappeared.”

(Aron 2003: 585)

It is tempting to assume that Aron views Machiavellianism as worse than Kantianism, especially given the time in which Aron lived and his repeated reflections on totalitarianism, both from the Left and the Right. But the quotation above seems to suggest the opposite in some ways, as both examples are from, or refer to, the modern Kantian par excellence, namely Woodrow Wilson and his disciples. It may be that a morality and diplomacy of avowed purity and good intentions is the greater threat to peace in the Cold War era, and not its opposite (although Aron, of course, saw both as a threat fundamentally). The self-conscious and self-proclaimed Kantian, it is assumed, cannot be evil or have any ulterior motives; the dastardly Machiavellian is wholly the opposite. But what Aron may have seen, especially in light of the inter-war period, is that Wilsonianism can raise expectations, inflate hopes, and create impossible dreams that will never be realized, at least in this lifetime. And when these expectations, hopes, and dreams are deflated and destroyed, then people may begin to look for different, and more ugly, solutions, especially from those who might promise the same but who are not at all afraid to use methods Wilson and others abhorred. Machiavellians, as Aron well knew, can cloak their intentions in melodic Kantian verses.

To see the fears that Aron may have envisioned, one can turn to his critique of a certain advocacy and/or understanding of nuclear weapons policy, namely the categorical rejection of the use of nuclear weapons.

The original aspect of our age of thermonuclear bombs is the propensity to give an air of responsibility to decisions made for motives of conscience and without calculating the risks and advantages. For that matter, why should this be so surprising? Never has the statement “none of the evils men claim to avoid by war is as great an evil as war itself” seemed so true as it does today: and yet it is not true. Thermonuclear weapons make it possible to exterminate the enemy population in the course of hostilities. But extermination after capitulation has always been one of the possible expressions of victory. The capitulation of one of the duopolists would not necessarily mark the end of the danger. This capitulation being out of the question, it is futile to transfigure a partial measure which may be opportune or which may be more dangerous than useful, and to pretend that it alone opens a path to salvation.

(Aron 2003: 634–665)

Although it is certainly more comforting to deny in this era the necessity or use of (nuclear) force in politics than its continued existence, Aron argues that the former belief would likely lead to the opposite – a possible increase in the use of force, precisely because aggressors will use such moral scruples or naivety against those who profess them. As states have not renounced being the final arbiters in the use of force when it might be in their perceived interest, a prudential diplomat must consider the balance of force and the survival of the state. In other words, a prudential diplomat must renounce all “Christian virtues” that condemn or are in tension with the actions required to protect their state in the bellicose international arena (Aron 2003: 579–580). As long as states remain what they are, Aron does not believe that the Machiavellian and Kantian antinomy can ever be fully ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright page
• Table of Contents
• Notes on contributors
• Foreword
• Introduction
• 1 The classical foundations of Raymond Aron’s theory of international relations
• 2 Pilgrims’ progress: the disenchanted destinations of Raymond Aron and Georges Canguilhem
• 3 A theory of international relations or a theory of foreign policy? Reading Peace and War among Nations
• 4 Aron’s oxymorus international ethics
• 5 Raymond Aron, war and nuclear weapons: the primacy of politics paradox
• 6 Raymond Aron and the idea of Europe
• 7 Beyond Soviet and American models of industrialization: Aron’s third way approach to global development
• 8 Raymond Aron’s heritage for the International Relations discipline: the French school of sociological liberalism
• 9 Raymond Aron and the ethics of current global affairs
• 10 The diplomat, the soldier, and the spy: toward a new taxonomy in International Relations
• Index