International Regimes and Norway's Environmental Policy

Crossfire and Coherence

Jon Birger Skj�eth, Jon Birger Skj�rseth

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9781351155380
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Physical Sciences
• Subtopic: Geography
• Index: Geography

Since the former Norwegian prime minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, led the World Commission on Sustainable Development, Norway has played an important role in international environmental co-operation. This volume looks at how this one state engaged international regimes in order to pursue its own national goals in the following issue areas: climate change, biodiversity, ozone depletion, air pollution, marine pollution and whaling. In doing so, it offers an innovative new approach to the study of international regime effectiveness and on linkages or interactions between international regimes.

Chapter 1
Introduction

Jon Birger Skjærseth

The conventional approach to studying regime effectiveness is to look at how international regimes influence member states in their efforts to make and implement relevant decisions. Regime effectiveness is portrayed as a process of engaging countries in the objectives of the regime, whether this objective is the protection of the ozone layer, sustainable management of biodiversity, preservation of whales, or the prevention of hazardous releases into the marine environment.¹ National case studies, which have been the major means of gaining insights in this field, typically use regime objectives as a point of departure. Effectiveness has been measured by the extent to which regime objectives are met (or at least approached) and by the impacts that international rules have on relevant behaviour by regulatory agencies and, ultimately, target groups.

This book takes the opposite point of departure: instead of looking at regime objectives in the context of many member states, we look at national objectives in the context of many regimes. Our perspective is how states engage international regimes to pursue national goals within a particular issue area. Sometimes, as in the case of acid rain, there is a high degree of overlap between regime objectives and national goals: Norway's 'pusher' role within this regime stems naturally from the fact that the most relevant target groups are found outside of Norway. If the acidity of Norwegian lakes and forests is to be reduced, the behaviour of target groups in countries that are parties to the relevant protocols under the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) must be changed. At the other extreme, Norway's goals in relation to the International Whaling Commission (IWC) are clearly at odds with the objective of the international whaling regime: whereas the goal of the IWC for the past two decades has been preservation of whales, the key effectiveness criterion for Norwegian foreign whaling policy is whether this policy succeeds in removing (or at least reducing) the legal, political, and economic barriers to small-scale harvesting of minke whales in the North-East Atlantic. Somewhere in between we find Norway's engagement in international regimes where regime objectives figure prominently among Norwegian goals as well, but other and sometimes competing concerns also weigh heavily, such as the need to protect national industries from regulations that would put them at a competitive disadvantage.

How a state engages international regimes to pursue national goals depends first on how domestic political and administrative institutions operate. Who makes decisions about foreign- and national policy, and how are the decisions made and implemented? On the one hand, national authorities face a challenge when it comes to the task of developing national positions in an increasingly complex web of international environmental negotiations. This challenge requires a coherent and well coordinated foreign environmental policy across various issue areas. On the other hand, the same authorities face pressure from domestic target groups, environmental organisations and other interested parties linked to a wide range of domestic sectors, since most environmental problems arise as by-products of otherwise legitimate domestic activities, like production of energy, goods and food. This challenge requires effective domestic implementation of environmental policies. Thus our first main research question is, How does domestic institutionalisation of foreign and domestic environmental policy affect Norway's ability to pursue its environmental goals within specific issue areas?

How one specific state engages an international regime to pursue national goals depends not only on the efforts of that state, but also the efforts of other parties to the regime and the receptivity and strength of the regime. In other words, the endogenous characteristics of the regime itself determine to a certain extent how much influence an individual state may exercise. These characteristics can include the decision rules that apply, and how compliance is enforced. Our second research question is thus: To what extent and how is Norway's ability to pursue national goals within a given issue area affected by the characteristics of the 'core regime'? The term core regime distinguishes international institutions established to deal with specific problems within an issue area from linked regimes (see below). For example, Chapter 4 of this book looks at the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol as the core regime governing the ozone layer. In addition to the ozone regime, we focus on international core regimes established to deal with air pollution, marine pollution, climate change, biodiversity and whaling.

International regimes do not exist in isolation from each other. Linkages and interaction between international regimes is beginning to attract political and academic attention (see e.g. Young, 1996 and Gehring and Oberthür, forthcoming). The international society is populated by more than 200 major international environmental regimes, and this number is growing steadily (Beisheim et al., 1999). Norway is party to over 70 major international environmental agreements that may have a bearing on Norway's environmental policy (Ministry of the Environment, 2002).² It is thus reasonable to assume that the manner by which Norway engages an international regime to pursue national goals will depend on interaction between the regime and other linked international institutions.

Linkages between international institutions refers to a situation where individual regimes interact so that other regimes affect the functional scope of the core regime. Such linkages exist either horizontally or vertically (Gehring and Oberthür, forthcoming). Horizontal interaction refers to linkages between 'traditional' regimes, such as between the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) and the climate regime. Forests are important for biodiversity concerns and they serve as 'sinks' for carbon dioxide (C0₂) (see Chapter 8). In Europe, international institutions are also linked vertically between international regimes and 'supra-national' EU legislation. Such vertical linkage may have significant consequences for an individual state. For example, in 1994, Norway joined the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA), which means that about 80-90 per cent of EU environmental legislation now applies to Norway - even though Norway is not an EU member. Vertical linkage is also visible through international law. In the first half of the 1980s, only 1 per cent of the changes made in Norway's legislation were motivated by international law. In the latter part of the 1990s, this share had increased to 15 per cent.³ According to Weiss (1993), even industrial states with well-developed environmental regulatory mechanisms and bureaucracies show signs of being overwhelmed.

The consequences of these linkages, either horizontal or vertical, may be either positive or negative - depending on whether the linked institutions work together in line with national goals or contradict each other. Positive consequences occur from mutually reinforcing international commitments where more than one regime requires realisation of national goals in the same issue area. Some issue areas may even require contributions from different types of international environmental institutions and regimes to make international cooperation effective. For example, marine pollution in the North-East Atlantic is simultaneously regulated by international legal conventions, political declarations based on 'soft law', and supranational regulation in the form of EU directives (see Chapter 6). We should also note that divergence in regime objectives is not necessarily a disadvantage for individual states engaged in different regime processes. High regime density can provide good opportunities for 'venue shopping' whereby states can take advantage of linked regimes to promote their own agendas. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) has, for example, lined up with Norway's goals in the IWC by supporting the Norwegian proposal to down-list the North-East Atlantic minke whale from the threatened species list (see Chapter 3).

Conversely, negative links may stem from consequences flowing from contradictions between different international commitments. Divergence between regime objectives can expose national decision-makers to coordination problems, to such an extent that pursuing national goals in one regime may lead to lower goal attainment in another. For example, some substitutes for ozone-depleting substances are potent greenhouse gases. Ozone-depleting substances may thus be reduced at the expense of increasing emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) (See Chapter 4). Thus the third research question that will be addressed throughout this book is: To what extent and how have linked regimes affected Norway's ability to pursue its national goals within particular issue areas?

The discussion above, and our choice of research questions, implies that the crossfire of interests and regimes in developing and implementing environmental policy will require effective coordination of institutions at national and international levels. The focus on institutions is intentional, because we want to look at factors that are possible to manipulate by decision-makers. However, we should stress at the outset that institutions are not necessarily the most important determinant for the extent to which Norway succeeds or fails in pursuing its environmental goals. A state's success or failure in attaining its environmental goals through engaging international regimes may depend on the configuration of interests of other parties to relevant regimes as well as the distribution of costs and benefits among domestic target groups. The issue area itself may be so politically malign in terms of conflicting interests that it precludes effective international cooperation or domestic implementation. Thus we supplement the institutional approach of our case studies with an approach that looks at how problem types might also affect goal attainment.

A Snapshot of Norway in International Environmental Cooperation⁴

The main gist of Norway's approach to international environmental negotiations and commitments can be summed up as follows: Norway has since the 1970s endeavoured to assume the role of a pusher state in international environmental negotiations. At the same time, the aim has been to conduct a pragmatic environmental policy at the domestic level that would benefit its economic interests. Because Norway faces high abatement costs and contributes little to transnational environmental problems, these two considerations often come into conflict. Though Norway discharges only three per cent of the nutrient flowing into the North Sea, emits a tiny 0.2 per cent of world chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and C0₂, and is home to under 0.2 per cent of the world population, various OECD evaluations conclude that Norway's international role in environmental policy is formidable (OECD 1994, OECD 2001).

Norway's green international profile is, however, put to the test when international environmental agreements enter the implementation phase. Indeed, Norway stands out as a paradox for anyone interested in environmental politics. On the one hand, Norway's high profile in international environmental cooperation is closely linked to the magic formula of 'sustainable development' developed by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), led by the former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. On the other hand, and stated in its extreme form, Norway resembles a huge oil company that is integrated into the business of whale hunting. Norway is highly dependent on oil and gas production and has fought the entire world in order to hunt whales and export whale products.

For oil- and gas-rich nations such as Norway, regulating petroleum tends to maximise the conflict between the need for economic growth and the desire to maintain an environment-friendly reputation. The launching of the report of the WCED in 1987 and the start of a process of formulating a strategy for Norway's leadership ambitions in international environmental politics coincided with the start of a steady and strong increase in Norwegian oil and gas production. Indeed, oil production doubled between the early 1990s and 2001.⁵ At this time, the petroleum sector accounted for nearly half of the value of Norwegian exports. This development was accompanied by a steady growth of offshore atmospheric emissions both in terms of C0₂ and air pollutants such as nitrogen oxides (NO_x) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs). For Norway, these growing emissions have highlighted the dilemma of being both a big petroleum producer and at the same time holding ambitions of being a green frontrunner - not least in the field of climate change and international air pollution politics.

Main Policy Lines and Principles

Prior to 1980, global environmental cooperation was weakly institutionalised, and the majority of the regional agreements that did exist were relatively toothless. Traditionally, environmental policy consisted of national and local pollution control and nature conservation. The basic change in international environmental policy in the decades following the 1972 Stockholm Conference coincided with the visible consequences of transnational environmental problems. Forest damage in Germany and fish mortality in Scandinavia in the early 1980s, the discovery of the 'ozone hole' over the Antarctic in 1985, Chernobyl in 1986, the algae 'invasion' in the North Sea in 1988-89, and the Exxon Valdez accident in 1989 were made known through the media and influenced public opinion, particularly in the OECD region.

The WCED was established as a result of UN General Assembly resolution 38/161 in 1983, and the events mentioned above provided the necessary weight and impetus to enable the Commission to make headway. The report Our Common Future was the subject of debate in the UN General Assembly in October 1987, and the Assembly adopted a comprehensive follow-up process which led up to the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. If a single event should be recalled from that process, it must be introduction of the notion of sustainable development, which rendered an active environmental policy acceptable to the world at large.

In the shadow of the global process, regional cooperation also altered character, becoming more ambitious over time. Norway and the other Nordic states had actively participated in international cooperation on reducing ocean pollution since the early 1970s. Norway was also an active party in negotiating the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution of 1979. These agreements were strengthened by decisions for significant reductions in emissions in the course of the 1980s. At the North Sea Conference in London in 1987 for instance, a declaration was adopted to reduce discharges of nutrients in sensitive areas and hazardous substances by 50 per cent between 1985 and 1995. Norway has thus not only been obliged to adjust to new global and regional challenges, but also been a prominent participant in this process.

Norway's official foreign policy objectives in the area of the environment became stronger and more explicit as a result of the work of the Brundtland Commission. To quote the report Our Common Future, 'The governments not already having done so, would be advised to ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables and Figures
• List of Contributors
• Preface
• List of Abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Analytical Framework
• 3 Whaling: Peace at Home, War Abroad
• 4 Ozone: A Success Story on all Fronts?
• 5 Air Pollution: International Success, Domestic Problems
• 6 Marine Pollution: International Ambition, Domestic Resistance
• 7 Climate Change: Cost-effectiveness Abroad, Possibilities at Home
• 8 Biodiversity: International Bungee Jump - Domestic Bungle
• 9 Comparative Analysis and Conclusions
• Index