1
Nationalist ideology, militarization and human rights in the Northeast1
Kamal Mitra Chenoy
The intervention by the armed forces in Northeast India is long-standing, and the facts are fairly well known. These will not be the focus of this chapter. Instead, this chapter will seek to raise, in a very preliminary form, some basic issues that arise from the militarization of the Northeast. The history of human rights violations in these states will not be the focus of enquiry, though the interaction between militarization and human rights violations in the Northeast will be examined. But certain ideological, political and legal issues, which may also be of relevance to other countries in South Asia, will be sought to be raised.
India and ethnic minorities
The dominant nationalist ideology does not accept the concept of ‘ethnic minority’ as relevant for India. Attempts to use this term in the Indian context have always been officially rebuffed. It has repeatedly been argued that in India, there are linguistic and religious minorities, but no ethnic minorities. Partly as a reaction to British imperialist propaganda, the dominant nationalist discourse is also profoundly homogenizing. Though cultural variations are recognized, and within limits celebrated, there is a notion of a ‘composite culture’ incorporating strands from India’s diverse cultures. Instead of recognizing the existence of a multiplicity of cultures, a composite culture which implies a process of homogenization is theorized. But, within this composite whole there is a privileging of the elite Hindu tradition.
To cite just one instance of this cultural elitism, we can look at the constitutional basis of India’s linguistic policy. Though a number of regional languages have been listed in the Eighth Schedule, and Article 350A guarantees adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue for linguistic minorities, Article 351 stipulates that the Union
promote the spread of the Hindi language … as a medium of expression for all the elements of the composite culture … by drawing, wherever necessary or desirable, for its vocabulary, primarily on Sanskrit and secondarily on other languages.
Thus Sanskrit, an ancient language, which was traditionally restricted to a tiny Brahminical elite, is privileged as the primary source for the medium of expression of the composite culture.
Minority cultural assertions are like minority political assertions therefore subordinated to elitist, upper caste/class ideologies. Such instances could be multiplied and discussed at much greater length, but this is not the focus of this chapter. Here we would merely seek to indicate that these ideological features shape the Indian state’s response to movements for autonomy or self-determination. The use of the armed forces in the Northeast and the dominant national media’s response to popular assertions which are perceived as threatening India’s integrity are shaped by this same nationalist ideology. There is therefore a cultural and ideological basis to Indian militarism which makes the phenomenon so pervasive and resilient.
Ideological patterns, self-determination movements and the judiciary
The legitimation of various repressive laws and their judicial sanction are based on similar movements being defined as anti-national, terrorist and disruptive. Thus a statist understanding of national interest governs the judicial scrutiny of such laws. The judicial judgments on such draconian laws invoked the alleged threats to sovereignty and national security, which was evidently accepted as widespread. Thus, for instance, the areas notified under the erstwhile Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 (TADA) as terrorist affected were expanded from the original four states and two union territories to cover almost all the states in the country (PUDR 1994).
The major act that governs military action in the Northeast is the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 (as amended in 1972) or AFSPA, which confers special powers upon members of the Armed Forces in the disturbed areas in the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura. The Act gives no definition of ‘disturbed area’. The declaration of any area as ‘disturbed’ under Section 3 of the Act is the prerogative of the governor of the state, or the administrator of the union territory, or the central government. The state legislature has absolutely no jurisdiction, though under the Indian Constitution (Entry 1, List 2 Seventh Schedule), ‘public order’ is a state subject.
Under Section 4(a) of the Act, any armed forces officer, warrant officer, non-commissioned officer or any person of equivalent rank may ‘if he is of the opinion that it is necessary to do so for maintenance of public order, after giving such due warning as he may consider necessary, fire upon or otherwise use force, even to the causing of death’ of persons not only disobeying any law, but even those disobeying orders prohibiting the assembly of five or more persons or carrying of weapons or ‘of things capable of being used as weapons’. This gives very wide discretion to even junior officers, as the necessity to use force including lethal means is left to their ‘opinion’, as is the nature of the ‘due warning’. Further, ‘things capable of being used as weapons’ can include objects like stones, bricks and so forth. Moreover, five people can assemble for innocuous purposes like a religious ceremony, family gathering or visit to an ailing relative.
Similarly, Section 4(b) of the Act allows such military personnel to destroy any shelter from which, in his opinion, armed attacks ‘are likely to be made’ or which has been utilized as a hideout by absconders ‘wanted for any offence’. This latitude would permit the destruction of any shelter or structure, including in several instances, places of worship like churches, apart from educational institutions like schools and colleges. Section 4(c) permits the arrest without a warrant, with whatever ‘force as may be necessary’ of any person against whom ‘a reasonable suspicion exist that he is about to commit a cognizable offence’. This has provided the basis of indiscriminate arrests, and the use of brutal force including firing against innocent civilians.
Section 4(d) of this special law authorizes the entry and search without warrant of any premises to make arrest as sanctioned under Section 4(c), or to recover any person ‘believed to be wrongfully restrained or confined’ or any property ‘reasonably suspected’ to be stolen property or any arms, ammunitions or explosive substances ‘believed to be unlawfully kept in such premises’. For this purpose also, all ‘force as may be necessary’ is authorized. For military personnel operating in a culturally alien terrain, beliefs and reasonable suspicions are often wholly unfounded, leading to horrendous abuses as we shall see below.
Though Section 5 explicitly states that ‘Any person arrested and taken into custody under this Act shall be made over to the officer in charge of the nearest police station with the least possible delay’, this has been repeatedly violated. Apart from all these caveats, Section 6 (the last section of this short Act) rules that ‘No prosecution, suit or legal proceeding shall be instituted, excepts with the previous sanction of the Central Government against any person in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of powers conferred by this Act’. The exemption from prosecution is not only for what is done under this Act, but also for what is ‘purported to be done’.
This Act therefore provides the legal cover for the militarization of the Northeast and the consequent terrorization of the civilian population. Experts in the UN Human Rights Committee which met in Geneva in March 1991 were categorical that this Act is violative of several articles in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as of the Indian Constitution. Article 2(1) lays down that each state party will ensure to all individuals (not only citizens) the rights laid down in the Covenant. Article 2(3)(a) directs the state to ensure that any person whose rights have been violated ‘shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity’. Article 26 talks of the equality before the law, the equal protection of the law and the fact that the equal protection of the law itself shall prohibit any discrimination in the rights guaranteed to all persons in the Covenant. All these articles have been violated by the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act.
Article 4(1) permits state parties to take measures derogating from their obligations under the Covenant in the time of national emergency. But Article 4(3) lays down that any state party availing itself of the right of derogation must inform other state parties through the secretary-general of the UN. The Indian government made no such communication. In any case, as an expert in the UN Human Rights Committee pointed out, such an emergency must be a temporary measure and cannot continue for decades as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act has. Further, Article 4(2) stipulates that no derogation from various articles including Article 6 (right to life) may be made under this provision. But Section 4 of the Act empowers firing which may result in death merely on the basis of a relatively junior officer’s opinion of suspicion. This violates Article 6(1) which inter alia states that ‘No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life’.
This Act, like the erstwhile TADA, is violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution and is a derogation from Entry 1, List II of the Seventh Schedule. The Act also infringes Article 13 which voids all laws inconsistent with the fundamental rights. Article 19 which protects the freedoms of speech and expression, of peaceful assembly, and the right to form associations and unions is also violated. However, though various civil liberties groups and others challenged the constitutionality of this law in the Supreme Court in 1982, the matter has not yet come up for hearing.
The Punjab Security of State Act, 1953 came into force in Manipur on 26 January 1971. This Act also has draconian features similar to those analysed above. For example, the Act debars any court from requiring production of documents or particulars contained in any correspondence between the lieutenant governor of Manipur and his advisory council set up under the Act. Any speech, statement, rumour or report which undermines friendly relations with foreign states, decency and morality, apart from more serious charges, is punishable with three years’ imprisonment. The Act provides for collective fines to be levied on the order of a district magistrate. All offences are non-bailable.
Section 13(1) rules out all legal proceedings against any person ‘for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be one under, or in pursuance of this Act’. Section 13(2) provides for similar immunity for the central government and the lieutenant governor of Manipur.
Militarization and violation of human rights
Any discussion of the role of the Indian armed forces in the Northeast should begin with an introduction to the specificities of this region and its dissimilarities to the rest of the country. More than 220 hill tribes live in the 250,000 km2 region of Northeast India comprising the seven states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura. They feel ethnically, economically, socially and culturally quite different from the rest of India. These perceived differences along with feelings of exploitation and oppression have fuelled movements of autonomy and independence, some of which have resulted in armed struggle (Arambam 2007).
As early as 1929, some Naga representatives made a plea for self-rule when the reorganization of India was being discussed. Nagas led by the Naga National Council (NNC) asserted their demand for independence, which they declared on 14 August 1947. In 1951, the NNC claimed 100 per cent support for independence in a plebiscite. The Indian state reacted strongly. In 1953, the Assam Maintenance of Public Order (Autonomous District) Act, 1953 was enacted. In April that year, armed police from Assam entered the Naga Hills to arrest NNC leaders. In 1954, a special army officered force, the Assam Rifles, entered the Naga Hills. On 27 November that year, Chingmei village was bombed. In 1955, the Assam Disturbed Areas Act was introduced. On 2 April 1956, the Naga Hills and Tuensang were handed over to the army, and the commander of the armed forces set up the headquarters in Kohima. In 1958, the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Regulation was introduced, which on 11 September was converted into an Act (NPMHR 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994).
In Mizoram too, militarization occurred in the mid-1950s, and villages were strafed and bombed. The pattern in Assam and Tripura was different. Militarization in the Northeast Frontier Agency, which later became Arunachal Pradesh, was initially directed against an external threat, China. But there are commonalities in the manner in which the armed forces tackled the civilian population in Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura.
Armed forces and human rights
The Indian armed forces in Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura appeared to have little knowledge or acquaintance with the customs and culture of the local people. This, given the Hindi-Sanskrit-centrism of dominant nationalist culture, briefly indicated above, was to be expected. Intelligence was poor, and the counter-insurgency forces had problems of communication with the people. With these forces armed with sweeping powers, often without civilian control, with sympathetic governments and an uncritical media, there was in the initial decades in the Naga Hills and Mizoram little check on excesses by the armed forces. Thus Prime Minister Nehru could report to the Lok Sabha on 5 September 1959 that between December 1958 and July 1959, Nagas had suffered 1,568 casualties compared to 334 casualties for the armed forces.
Repeatedly in affected districts in this region, armed forces personnel have violated even the extensive powers granted them under the special laws in their search for an elusive enemy. Civilians have been detained illegally and tortured. In other instances, they have been handed over to the local police and then taken into illegal army custody again. The Gauhati High Court repeatedly directed the army during Operation Rhino and other counter-insurgency campaigns not to interrogate detained civilians after their arrest under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, and not to take into custody such persons after they were handed over to civilian authorities.
The patterns of human rights violations have been fairly consistent (Amnesty International India 1990). In Nagaland and Manipur these have included:
- Extra-judicial killings.
- Extra-judicial deprivation of the liberty of people especially in villages due to (a) grouping of villagers and villages; (b) illegal imposition of curfew; (c) detention for long periods at arm...