Corruption and Public Administration

The Italian Case in a Comparative Perspective

Francesco Merloni

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9780429772146
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

Corruption and Public Administration looks at public sector organizations and what they have achieved since signing the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) Agreement in Merida in 2004. It examines how the signee countries engaged in the set-up of institutions to contain corruption in public administration, and how these governments and institutions have progressed. The book compares several developed countries, and undertakes an especially detailed examination of Italy. It highlights strengths and weaknesses, and proposes organizational means of addressing the issues, which include diversity in organizational structures and systems, and a focus on prevention rather than repression.

The book shines a light on anti-corruption practices and aims to foster open discussion about this pressing topical issue among peers in all relevant fields of the social sciences.

Part I

The international landscape of anti-corruption efforts

Chapter 1

Varieties of approach and country cases

1.1 The nature of corruption

Corruption is not automatically associated with developed countries. However, to imagine that corruption is exclusive to developing countries would be wrong, and developed countries also need to face up to it, albeit on a different scale. The situation implies that there are causes yet to be explored and solutions yet to be put on the table. This study focuses on developed countries and aims to play a part in efforts to address corruption, even if the expectations are as ambitious as those expressed by Kofi Annan: “to eliminate the scourge of corruption from the face of the Earth”.¹

Corruption is unfortunately a widespread phenomenon. International rankings, based on citizens’ perceptions (Carloni, 2017), paint a bleak a picture which the empirical experience from daily life only serves to confirm. This is especially true when corruption is defined in a broader sense to include “maladministration”. In developed countries, it is a phenomenon that has been underestimated for too long: even in reports by public bodies as recent as the early 2000s, the very existence of corruption was questioned and public concern was attributed to biased media reports.

Today, the underplaying of corruption is, at least to some extent, behind us, not least because of the 2003 UNCAC. Awareness has been raised that the damage it causes goes beyond the scope of any single public contract or individual action. Corruption has a far-reaching impact on society, as stated in this book’s introduction. It undermines government effectiveness and the capacity of the state to fulfil its citizens’ expectations of economic and social governance. Indeed, containment of corruption can be seen as an end in itself.

In examining the anti-corruption efforts of developed countries, this study assesses their current status in order to speculate about the future of such efforts, especially by those countries—such as France and Italy—that have begun their journey as a consequence of the UNCAC. With this study’s overriding comparative approach in mind, this chapter begins by describing the landscape of a handful of countries’ approach to corruption. In order to do this, we begin by identifying a set of countries to be studied. This is followed by the definition of a framework within which each country’s effort is going to be analysed and described. The subsequent core of the chapter is a discussion of cases of corruption containment on an individual country basis.

1.2 The set of countries under observation

The first step in this chapter is to identify which countries comprise our sample. Since our focus is developed countries, and Italy in particular, we are looking for countries of comparable size and with similar institutions. As such, France and the UK were selected: both are European and both are similar to Italy, from a worldwide perspective. To position this sample in a global framework, we chose two further countries: the USA and Australia. The USA was chosen because it has a long record of institutional efforts towards corruption containment and because it also represents a benchmark from an academic point of view. Australia was chosen for its positive record of corruption containment but also because it is smaller than the USA (in population, GDP, etc.), and in this regard closer to the three European countries. All five countries are members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Three are of Anglo-Saxon culture and two of a Latin culture.

Variations in the countries’ timelines should be noted. The USA’s initiative began in the 1970s, well before the Merida Convention (aka the UNCAC); the UK’s and Australia’s in the early 2000s, in parallel with the Convention’s initial steps; Italy started in 2009 and accelerated in 2012; France started in 2016.

It is not our intention to attach any statistical significance to this selection of countries. A blended method of document analysis, comparative analysis and case study analysis has been employed in this chapter.

1.3 The dimensions of the country analysis

This section outlines a framework for analysis of each country in pursuit of comparable information. The chapter will go on to focus on one public anti-corruption organization in each of the observed countries. Each organization will be described according to seven dimensions:

1 The institutional setup;

2 The scope of the organization;

3 The definition of corruption being used;

4 The character of the anti-corruption effort (preventative or repressive);

5 The anti-corruption organization’s relationship with the actual administrative situation (macro vs. micro);

6 The focus of its measures (objective vs. subjective);

7 The relationship between the anti-corruption effort and the government’s transparency effort.

Below we describe each dimension in more detail.

1.3.1 The institutional setup

The fundamental information about each organization is its degree of independence from the branches of power. Thereafter there is a brief discussion of its organizational arrangements, followed by an illustration of its modus operandi.

The independence from the branches of power of a specialized anti-corruption institution is a fundamental requirement for the effective exercise of its functions (OECD, 2008–2013). The basic question to ask is whether the organization is an independent agency or whether it is positioned within the executive branch. These two possibilities are not exhaustive but they cover most cases. When an anti-corruption organization is positioned within the executive branch, it is seen to be less independent than when it is autonomous from all three branches. However, the details of the organizational arrangements must be taken into account. The advantages of independence are clear, but it would be interesting to identify any advantages of non-independence.

Organizational arrangements refer not only to the anti-corruption organization’s structure. They also concern the systems that it uses in pursuit of its own mission, and the relationship between the anti-corruption organization and the organizations it supervises. One specific item to look for is the nature of the link between the anti-corruption organization and “the field”, i.e. public administration and private business organizations.

The anti-corruption organizations will also be described according to their modi operandi. How do they imagine they are going to contain corruption? What is the underlying anti-corruption strategy in their mission?

1.3.2 The scope of the organization

The breadth of an anti-corruption organization’s mandate is of interest. The key question is: which organizations are subject to the organization’s oversight? This could be called the “perimeter” of the anti-corruption effort. It could be public administration narrowly defined, i.e. government employees only, or a subset of these, or it could include SOEs, or it could be a combination of these criteria.

1.3.3 The definition of corruption

The key element in a definition of corruption is whether the focus is the public or private sector. The UNCAC mostly concerns public administration and government operations but, in reality, government operations might also include SOEs. We might still speak of public corruption even when the private sector is involved to some degree: corruption in public administration often occurs in relation to its dealings with the private sector, such as in procurement practices.

A further element is the depth of the phenomenon that is implied by the term. A basic understanding of corruption is that it is a criminal activity, but it could also imply sub-criminal behaviour. As such, “corruption” could simply refer to inefficient or ineffective public administration. The appropriate term to use here is “maladministration”.

1.3.4 Prevention vs. repression

Repression is characterized by an anti-corruption organization that focuses on or is specialized in a more judicial approach. Prevention means a focus on the removal of the causes and the organizational arrangements that may lead to opportunities for corruption. This item is related to the measures the anti-corruption organization either enacts itself or sets forth in its recommendations. Repression is mostly based on existing mandates, whereas prevention emphasizes managerial change in overseen organizations. The latter can be effected via general organizational measures, such as personnel rotation. Organizational measures are also linked to an area that has been developed in the private sector: risk management. Change can also take the form of measures to remove certain individuals and install replacements.

1.3.5 Macro vs. micro relationships in the field

Contact with “the field” is an important consideration. The basic dichotomy here is whether an anti-corruption organization entertains direct contact and reporting from the field, which we would call a “micro” approach, or whether it concentrates its operations on a few big issues. The meaning of “big” in this context has to be defined, of course, but the idea is clear: the latter type of organization leaves the overseen organizations to deal with micro-reporting from the field or else it leaves it to other overseen organizations—such as the judiciary—to deal with cases that it does not consider of interest in the fulfilment of its mission.

1.3.6 The focus of measures: objective vs. subjective

Whether through direct action or via recommendations, the types of measures an organization adopts also go towards defining its overall approach to anti-corruption. These can be of two different types. “Objective” measures are those geared to change the organization of overseen public administrations. With this term we are not encompassing the whole structure of a public entity, but we are referring to managerial systems, its strategy and its personnel management. As mentioned above, risk management is part of organizational management. Organization-specific corruption prevention plans are objective measures. “Subjective” measures, on the other hand, are designed to target the characteristics of individual members of the organization. For instance, they aim to ensure the impartiality of managers and to define and avoid conflicts of interest. This objective–subjective dichotomy is of most relevance to the prevention type described in point four above.

1.3.7 The role of transparency

Transparency is undeniably a companion of anti-corruption. Many sources attest to this. It should be made clear that an important part of tackling corruption through administrative measures and from the preventative perspective involves the enhancement of transparency mechanisms, adhering to the old adage that “sunlight is the best disinfectant” (Brandeis, 1914; Cordis and Warren, 2014).

Transparency measures operate on different levels, and with different aims (Birkinshaw, 2006; Heald, 2006; Merloni, 2008; Arena, 2008; Cerrillo Martinez, 2011). Above all, they guarantee the rights of citizens affected by administrative action, through the right of access to documented information on the activity of public administration and other institutions; thus, they essentially operate within the “due process” paradigm.

Its democratic and participatory dimension is also traditionally thought of as an important aspect of the role of transparency (Carloni, 2014).

The pursuit of transparency began independently of anti-corruption measures, with freedom of information legislation. Thus the promotion of transparency was formalized within public administrations before the advent of anti-corruption action. It is therefore interesting to note how the conceptual link between transparency and anti-corruption has been resolved within the framework of anti-corruption action and institutionalization.

This seven-dimensional framework for analysis is not, in fact, easy to implement in practice. The dimensions are far from mutually exclusive or collectively exhaustive. It may not be possible to stick rigidly to the framework; nonetheless, it represents a good starting ...