1 Introduction
Common Security and Defence has drawn much attention from a wide array of politicians, military officers, academics, researchers and policy-makers during the last two decades. Although much debate regarding its underlying causes and future prospects has taken place, there is little discussion as to the driving forces behind this progress.
Such is the case with respect to the signing of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the field of defence, by 23 European countries (EU Council, 2017) at the end of 2017. This Treaty-based framework, characterised as ‘a truly historic day for the EU’ (Mogherini, 2017), signifies a major breakthrough due to the fact that it is viewed as the foundation of a future European defence. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg also welcomed this agreement as an important defence-strengthening factor for the EU, which could facilitate NATO-EU cooperation and increase coherence when it comes to capabilities development (European Western Balkans, 2017).
Although most of the media depicted France and Germany as the ‘driving forces behind [the] push for greater defence cooperation’ (Barigazzi, 2017; Hunko, 2017; Mauro, 2017; Schwarz, 2017), there have been several factors and earlier conjunctures that helped bring about this result. Hence, following Strange’s approach, which transcends beneath political platitudes, investigates the ‘right’ questions, in search of ‘the effective entities of world politics, whatever they may turn out to be’ (Cox, 1996: 183), we raise certain significant questions, which we try to answer in this book. Hence, one may ask: How such a fragile consensus among the defence ministers and NATO was achieved? What were the key (facilitating) factors that underlay the new attitude of EU defence ministers concerning the need for cooperation to be brought to a new level (Lilleväli, 2017)? How does this change and CSDP relate to Europeanisation? What are the dynamics of Europeanisation and why is it important? Why did it take about a decade since the signing of the Lisbon Treaty for PESCO to occur? In fact, several scholars argue that this process was facilitated by UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU and the weakening of the transatlantic relationship (Tardy, 2017). Clearly, such developments have a very important impact not only on the evolution of Common Security Defence Policy, but also on other spheres, especially in the post-Cold War period.
The purpose of this book is to provide a wider perspective on Europeanisation, with emphasis on CSDP, taking into account areas hitherto neglected. As a result, this book assesses the extent to which the end of the Cold War led to Europeanisation in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and attempts to account for the development of Europeanisation and related mechanisms. These mechanisms incorporate all major relevant factors identified in the literature (i.e. a common Strategic Culture, new security identity, domestic political decision-making, industrial base and defence-spending decline) as contributing to the realisation of the CSDP.
The relevance of these factors for CSDP Europeanisation is examined through the lenses of historical and empirical analysis. Furthermore, the relationship between CSDP and NATO is explored. This approach facilitates the critical evaluation of the debate concerning the emergence of CSDP and throws light on the political shift that led EU leaders to support CSDP. Given that a number of changes, which took place in the European defence sector, facilitated the emergence of CSDP, this study incorporates an empirical analysis of the dynamics and limitations of this sector. Hence, these changes are analysed in view of globalisation issues, economies of scale, economic crises, military autonomy, new security strategy and R&D impact, in the post-Cold War period.
The official end of the Cold War in 1990, the Gulf War in 1991 and the Yugoslav crisis in 1990s have considerably influenced the debate within Europe concerning the need for a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). A key policy development occurred in 1998 with the St Malo declaration, which signalled Anglo-French policy convergence – which in turn, marked a major shift in the UK’s traditional position towards European security and defence (Ferreira-Pereira and Groom, 2010). The US engagement in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan showed the demand for a coordinated European response and the attendant need for resources. This led to German involvement in CSDP in the 2000s (Berenskoetter and Giegerich, 2010).
Scholars writing on CSDP have recognised the importance of these events. Howorth underlined the importance of ‘powerful historical forces’ that have had ‘a transformational effect’ on European security policy (Howorth, 2001: 767). Mörth went a step forward by arguing that European security policy is a pivotal issue and should be analysed in relation to other areas where European integration is already taking place (Mörth and Britz, 2004: 959). Mörth considered the defence industry as an important element of the CSDP Europeanisation in terms of a ‘cooperation game’ that involves multiple actors in the European integration process, namely; the EU, NATO and WEU (Mörth, 2003: 164). Ojanen also argued that integration in security and defence has linked European integration to other factors (i.e. economic and sovereignty) and follows the principle that (overall) gains should exceed losses (Ojanen, 2006: 61, 71). Beyers and Kerremans link European integration and Europeanisation to the action of rent-seeking groups (interest groups) including defence and defence industries (Beyers and Kerremans, 2007: 461, 476). Richardson notes the key role of national interest groups which affected an important shift of focus on to the EU level and influenced the Europeanisation process according to their perceived needs (Richardson, 2012: 347–348). Smith also notes the utilisation of the institutional learning process – in a top-down approach – by policy elites in an attempt to safe-guard and expand their interests and links Europeanisation to the elites’ ‘collective mind-set or value system’ in the CSDP (Smith, 2012: 257). Koutrakos identifies CSDP as an emerging policy, which incorporates different approaches that reflect the influence of diverse interests emanating from different Member States (Koutrakos, 2013: 92, 247). For Koutrakos, European security is linked to a wide range of threats and ‘a growing understanding of the connections’ between internal and external EU security (Koutrakos, 2013: 83). Thus, the conclusion in the literature is that CSDP is just evolving. In the same spirit, Gnesotto underlined that major differences in defence issues between EU Member States have prevented EU-level coordination (Gnesotto, 2000). Burgess argues that the value-ridden nature of security policy has led to a fragmented approach and resulted in multiple European security arrangements instead of a single European security (Burgess, 2009: 310). Howorth concluded that any signs of Europeanisation in terms of CSDP were ‘premature’ as it is a ‘work in progress’ (Howorth, 2001: 766; Howorth, 2014: 1).
Although Biscop identifies the European Security Strategy (ESS) as a milestone inasmuch as it defines objectives and tools of policy evaluation (Biscop, 2005: 129), much of the literature has criticised ESS for failing to outline a credible alternative mechanism to governmental decision-making and failing to determine what security policy is about (Toje, 2005: 132–133). Dorman (2011) criticises the ESS for not providing a sufficient response to the most serious threats to Europe such as a resurgent Russia, terrorism or economic crises. In addition he argues that the EU’s inability to decide on threats and priorities and therefore on the direction of CSDP generally confirms the existing literature in its view of EU Member States as being unable to agree on which direction Europe is or should be heading (Dorman, 2011). Other authors have pointed to sovereignty issues (Mitsilegas, Monar and Rees, 2003), NATO historical relations with EU Member States (Cottey, 2013: 82, 100–120; Cornish, 1996) and lack of political will as hindering deeper integration and as being responsible for severe delays in the development of the EU technological and defence industrial base (Mölling and Brune, 2011: 52–53; Moustakis and Violakis, 2008: 429). In view of the aforementioned arguments one could reasonably ask the question whether there is actually Europeanisation in defence and security policy?
The issue of Europeanisation of the ESDP is an area of further research (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010: 1352). The fact that CSDP is a relatively new and evolving institution (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010: 1360) presents a unique opportunity to identify and study the forces behind the integration and its impact. Indeed, the introduction of CSDP altered the security and defence attitudes of the EU Member States and created a dynamic that points to the need for a debate on strategy (Biscop, 2005: 8).
Compared to studies in other areas of Europeanisation, research on CSDP appears limited. That is mostly due to the fact that there has been little by way of EU-level CSDP policy in the second half of 1990s. As Waever notes, European cooperation on security has accelerated from this time on (Waever, 1996: 111). During the Cold War, security provided cohesion within a divided Europe (Ham, 2002: 36; Cornish, 2004: 68). EU states were united in opposition to the communist Eastern Block. However, when it came to EU-level security and defence policy, despite enormous achievements in other areas of cooperation, European Community (EC) states did not operate under a single strategy. European-level policy did not get under way until after the establishment of the second pillar of Maastricht (post-1992). Currently, defence is organised under the 2016 ‘Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’ (Mogherini, 2016), based on the ‘European Security Strategy’ (EUROPA, 2003) which was established in 2003 by the European Council.
There is a vast literature on Europeanisation. Olsen in his analysis argues that Europeanisation encompasses a variety of phenomena and processes, with emphasis on the extension of political unification and combines both internal and external aspects of European dynamics (Olsen, 2002: 921, 943). Buller and Gamble decompose Europeanisation into three stages: the development of institutions of governance at the European level, the creation of distinct European forms of organisation and governance, and the achievement of the political unification of Europe (Buller and Gamble, 2002; Radaelli, 2004: 2). There are many ways of defining Europeanisation, but for the purposes of this investigation (which explores the domestic consequences of European integration on defence and security) ‘Europeanisation consists of processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles […] incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse’ (Radaelli, 2004: 3, 4).
Main argument and scope of research
The present study contributes to the Europeanisation literature in four ways: First, it examines CSDP through the analysis of the relevant processes. In this way, it goes beyond existing institutional accounts of CSDP in terms of correlating several distinct but interrelated areas of investigation. Second, it provides new insight into the Europeanisation by arguing that substantial Europeanisation has taken place in terms of CSDP. Third, it looks into a number of additional factors relevant to Europeanisation, rather than simply recording key historical events and political integration via formal institutional arrangements. These factors include: domestic political decision-making (Börzel, 2002: 195, 208; Ladrech, 2002: 390; Peters, Wagner and Deitelhoff, 2010: 18), creation of a common defence industrial base (Kollias, Manolas and Paleologou, 2004: 568), single market creation (Mitsilegas, Monar and Rees, 2003: 38), defence spending decline (Howorth, 1997: 37; Kupchan, 2000: 20; Irondelle, 2003: 219; Kollias, Manolas and Paleologou, 2004: 557; Dorman, 2011), the new security identity establishment (Zwolski, 2012: 69; Koutrakos, 2013: 318), globalisation (Bale, 2008: 22–23; Biscop, 2008: 10), the US and NATO influence (Ojanen, 2006: 62; Kaunert, Léonard and MacKenzie, 2012: 476; Blockmans, 2013: 243–267), the common Strategic Culture (European Council, 2003; Howorth, 2007: 178–179), neo-corporatism and special interest groups (Lavdas, 2005: 312; Beyers and Kerremans, 2007: 461; Afonso and Papadopoulos, 2013: 9) and R&D (Kuhlmann and Edler, 2003: 24; Lungu, 2004: 59). Fourth, an examination of the mechanisms underlying Europeanisation will be undertaken in order to gain a better understanding of the aforementioned factors’ impact on the emergence of CSDP.
Knill and Lehmkuhl distinguished between three categories of Europeanisation mechanisms: positive integration, negative integration and framing (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999; Radaelli and Exadaktylos, 2010: 200). In the same spirit, Bulmer and Radaelli identified the following key patterns of EU governance that interact with policies to produce different mechanisms of Europeanisation: governance by negotiation, governance by hierarchy and facilitated coordination (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2013). These mechanisms, the patterns of governance and the patterns of adjustment will be further analysed in Chapter 2.
The first of these is the Europeanisation-learning-pattern of adjustment (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2013: 369–371). The learning-pattern-of-adjustment seems to have an important impact (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2013: 368–369) on setting goals, guidelines and timetables of national and regional action plans. Conzelmann also notes the importance of policy learning processes, especially when it comes to cross-border policy and change (Conzelmann, 1998: 9–10), while Radaelli identifies learning as a unique force ‘that is supposed to bring about Europeanisation’ (Radaelli, 2008: 240). Thus Europeanisation of the CSDP will be examined from the learning mechanism perspective. A second factor is reciprocity. Several academics argue that shared interests are a requirement for interaction (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2013: 210). For example, the European Single Currency (ECU) is an area where Member States do not seem to share strong motives for integration (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2013: 212; Wang, 2007: 96). However, the introduction of the ECU (Medvedev and Ham, 2002: 4) and especially the economic crisis of late 2008 (European Commission, 2009), increased integration (Dabrowski, 2010; European Commission, 2009: 85–86; Bulmer and Radaelli, 2013: 358–359). This research will show that a similar process has occurred in the area of common security (Mölling and Brune, 2011: 47). An important, but not a stand-alone factor in this process was the financial pressure on EU Member States...