Poland's EU Accession

Sergiusz Trzeciak

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9781136622595
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Global Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book examines the process of Poland's accession negotiations to the European Union between 1998-2003. An empirical study based on Robert Putnam's two-level game model, it charts the influence and role of key domestic actors and groups on the negotiations especially in three critical, controversial, areas - areas where EU accession threatened to bring about a profound transformation to Polish life - agriculture, with particular emphasis on direct payments and production quotas; the purchase of real estate by foreigners; and the free movement of labour.

This book demonstrates the complex interaction between the domestic and international level of negotiations and furthermore, shows how critical this link can be to negotiation outcomes at the international level. It reveals how susceptible Poland's negotiation process was to domestic pressure, particularly public opinion and interest groups.

Drawing heavily on qualitative analysis – such as press releases, news wires, policy documents, as well as quantitative analyses, such as the use of opinion polls, and supported by in-depth, unrestricted interviews with key Polish decision-makers, this book examines the dynamics of policy formation in Poland and shows how this translated into the final conditions of accession.

1 Introduction

DOI: 10.4324/9780203801284-1

This book argues that Poland’s negotiating stances vis-à-vis the European Union and the overall negotiation process (1998–2003) were susceptible to domestic pressure, particularly public opinion, interest groups and political parties that often acted as interest groups. By using a country study of Poland, this book disputes systemic theories that assume decision-makers and negotiators operate in an environment isolated from domestic considerations.

This is an empirical study based on Robert Putnam’s two-level game model, with a particular emphasis on the concept of win-sets. It focuses on three case studies which have drawn considerable controversy and public attention within Poland: agriculture, with a particular emphasis on direct payments and production quotas; the purchase of real estate by foreigners; and the free movement of labour.

The question that puzzles most of the researchers using the two-level game model is whether the size of the domestic win-set is influenced by domestic pressure. But even more puzzling is the extent to which it is influenced and what are the determinants of the size of the win-set, specifically possible domestic coalitions, domestic political institutions and the role of negotiation strategies.

A perplexing dilemma is not only the question of whether domestic win-sets can be manipulated, but also how this happens (using strategies and tactics), under what conditions, and by whom (domestic groups). Another factor that will be explored is the interplay between public opinion and domestic groups. Internal dynamics of the political game on the domestic side, and the manner in which this game can influence the negotiation process and its outcome, are also of great interest.

Traditional systemic theories make the assumption that foreign policymakers operate in an environment that is relatively isolated from domestic considerations. This book questions that assumption by examining the extent to which Poland’s negotiating stances in relation to joining the European Union were susceptible to domestic pressure.

It has long been recognised that domestic considerations have played a role in accession negotiations. This has been a typical feature during the previous EU enlargements. However, the Polish case presents particularities that merit further study. What makes the Polish case different and interesting is the scope of issues that gained public interest during the process. Unlike the situation in most other acceding countries, freedom to purchase real estate became a significant issue. A second distinctive feature was the characteristic and influential nature of Polish domestic pressure and the extent to which Poland’s negotiators were influenced by it. One example is illustrated by the fact that one of the nation’s biggest and most influential political parties was acting as an interest group and seeking to protect farmers’ interests. Finally, the case of Poland confirms an argument derived from Robert Putnam’s work: a small domestic win-set, to accept initial EU conditions, became a bargaining advantage that helped the Polish side gain certain concessions from the EU.

Another characteristic feature of the 2004 enlargement was the fact that Poland (as well as some other CEEC) was, from the very beginning, in a much weaker position than its negotiating partners.¹ The Polish negotiation strategy was determined by the lack of a credible Best Alternative to the Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), since the key Polish foreign policy goal was to enter the EU and no other alternatives were seriously considered.² This created asymmetry between the negotiating sides and established further short-term strategies and tactics. As Ulrich Sedelmeier describes:

the case of eastern enlargement, the relationship between the EU and the CEEC’s is characterised by asymmetrical – rather than instrumental – interdependence. The CEEC depends far more on market access to the EU than vice versa. In other words, the bargaining power of CEEC governments is not sufficient to exact concessions from the EU member states.³

This made the case of Poland different from cases of some other countries facing EU accession during the previous enlargements, including the UK, Austria and Sweden.

The decision to expand on the part of the EU was guided by a wider strategic imperative to enlarge in order to overcome the divisions of Europe and to ensure stability, security and prosperity throughout the region. A wider strategic imperative played an important role, especially within the countries advocating for the enlargement process. Among these was Germany, which mobilised other EU countries to support the enlargement process.⁴

One could also agree with a liberal, intergovernmentalist argument and its ‘cost benefit analysis’. As Andrew Moravcsik pointed out, the geopolitical and economic benefits of enlargement for the ‘old members’ came at quite a limited cost to the EU-15, in large part because the existing member governments used their bargaining powers to limit their liability.⁵ However, given this asymmetry and the stronger bargaining power of the EU, in principle the EU expansion represented a general win-win situation and was recognised as such by the decision-makers from the candidate countries.⁶

With regards to these reasons, the question for both negotiating sides was not ‘whether to enlarge’, but rather ‘on what terms’ to enlarge. The strategic decision was made even before the negotiations started. If we bear this in mind, we can see negotiations as a two-level game in which both sides were going to benefit, but in which the distribution of the benefits depended upon domestic preferences and coalitions, institutions and ratification procedures, and in particular the strategies and tactics used by the players.⁷

The negotiation process was determined by the strategic imperative to enlarge. The major danger in this procedure was disillusionment concerning the opposing side’s approach to the negotiations. The EU was rather disappointed with the slow pace of accession and the sluggish acquisition of the aqua communautaire. On the other hand, the Polish side emphasised that the deal offered was less than generous and that the EU wanted to take advantage of its position as a stronger party, thereby to ‘dictate, not negotiate’. Thus, the real danger for both negotiating sides was not that the negotiations would collapse, but rather that the negotiations could conclude in major disappointment and disillusionment, producing a sense of frustration that could create a poor start for future cooperation within the EU. Indeed, both sides were teetering on the verge of such disillusionment, especially during the last negotiation round in Copenhagen in December 2003.

However, when we analyse the behaviour of both parties, the key observation is that the size of the domestic win-set could indeed determine the negotiation process and eventual outcomes. In this book, I will argue on the basis of the three case studies – agriculture, freedom of purchase of real estate and free movement of labour – that Polish domestic groups critically influenced the negotiation process and its outcomes. Each of the case studies shows the different dynamics of negotiations. Before continuing, however, we must define some terms.

Defining terms

The influence of domestic pressure on international negotiations need not be direct, since the very nature of the democratic process assumes indirect influence. Initially interest groups can influence the government and ultimately they can influence international negotiations by manipulating public opinion. But, public opinion may press the government to adopt policies that are favourable to it.

A sociologist might ask how one would identify and measure factors that constitute an influence. This book does not attempt to answer this question, but instead focuses on the capacity of Polish domestic groups to affect the negotiation process. To measure this, I will focus on three indicators that show this capacity: public opinion polls,⁸ journalists and media, and perceptions of the influence of domestic groups, as expressed by the major decision-makers.

None of these indicators is exclusive, nor can we rely on any one uncritically. When investigating opinion polls and press articles, or talking to negotiators and other decision-makers, one should allow for bias. Public opinion polls often show opposition to or support for issues, not the influence on the policy process. That being said, most decision-makers whom I interviewed⁹ admitted that the views of the general public were important factors in creating Poland’s negotiation stances and were studied carefully during the negotiation process. It is not a coincidence that the issues that arose most often in opinion polls (such as agriculture, purchase of real estate by foreigners and free movement of labour) became the key issues during the negotiation process.

Opinion polls should be treated with caution, and with this caveat in mind a careful analysis of these sources will allow us to draw more synthetic conclusions concerning the influence of domestic pressure on international negotiations.

This book will examine the actions of Polish domestic groups that changed Poland’s negotiation stances towards EU accession and the rhetoric used to express Poland’s position during the negotiation process.

The term ‘domestic pressure’ will be used to define the effect of public opinion, interest groups and political parties. The term ‘domestic groups’ will also be used, although this term is limited to interest groups and political parties. There is a clear distinction between the domestic group and domestic pressure. The term ‘domestic pressure’ seems to be a more accurate description of what is loosely called public opinion, because I do not describe a passive group of citizens, but rather the collective view of a specific population.¹⁰

In defining public opinion, one should avoid confusing sources of public opinion with channels for expressing opinion such as the press, demonstrations, elections and referenda. Many authors, such as Thomas Risse, distinguish between mass public opinion; the attentive public, which has a general interest in politics or foreign policy; and issue publics, which are particularly attentive to specific questions.¹¹ This problem will be discussed in the section on domestic pressure.

The term ‘interest group’ will be applied to any organisation that makes direct or indirect policy-related appeals to the government.¹² Using this definition, not all organisations constitute interest groups, but those that attempt to influence a government do. These interest groups can be identified as two distinctive types. One focuses on lobbying activities behind the scenes. They often represent a narrow sectoral interest and are not particularly interested in media and public opinion attention. Their goal is merely to influence the decision-makers. The second group, which I will focus on, is one where the leaders, instead of acting behind the scenes, want to express their aims in a public manner in order to gain media and public attention. Such interest groups often represent a larger group such as farmers’ unions. The clamour that such groups make is deliberately intended to be conveyed in the media. These groups want to show to their supporters, which often comprise a large part of the general public, that they represent their interests. Among these ‘clamorous’ interest groups, the focus in this book however will be on those that tried to influence the negotiation process relating to European Union membership in such issues as direct payments or production quotas within the Common Agricultural Policy, negotiations concerning land ownership and, last but not least, freedom of movement of labour.¹³ Indeed, as will be argued, the interest groups may not only directly influence decision-makers, as is usually suggested, but also mobilise citizens outside the policymaking community to contact or pressure policymakers.¹⁴ This process is known as outside lobbying.¹⁵

The term ‘political party’ seems to be rather simple. The most basic definition of a political party is found in the Encyclopaedia Britannica: it is a group of persons organised to acquire and exercise political power.¹⁶ Even though this definition, as will be argued, accurately describes a political party, some Polish political parties, the Polish Peasants’ Party in particular, even though they were organised to acquire and exercise power, act as an interest group representing narrow sectoral interests.

The term ‘negotiation’ refers to ‘a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present’.¹⁷ Briefly, negotiation is an ‘exchange of proposals designed to arrive at a mutually acceptable outcome in a situation of independent interests’.¹⁸ This definition, however, seems to be too general to be directly applicable to the case of Poland’s negotiations with the EU and hence requires further specification. Negotiations between Poland and the EU can be characterised as leading towards an innovation agreement,¹⁹ which is ‘meant to create a new relationship or new undertaking between parties’.²⁰ Obviously one may ask why Poland’s negotiations can be classified as an innovation agreement since the European Union already existed and Poland was merely joining the existing structure. In this case, the term ‘innovation’ applies only to the agreement between Poland and the EU, not to the existing EU structure. Thus, this agreement creates a new relationship between Poland and the EU.

When discussing negotiations I will focus on the political dynamics rather than technicalities of the negotiation process.²¹ This is because technical details were not of interest to the domestic pressure, or public opinion in particular. Dynamics of the political process were dependent upon public opinion and domestic group pressure as well as the political will of the government and political parties.

In all cases, the political dynamics surrounding the negotiation process are unique. Since each of the case studies is different, one cannot draw a universal conclusion of the political process. In the case of agriculture, the political negotiations were the longest and most complicated, with ups and downs and with a particular involvement of Polish domestic political elites, interest groups and public opinion. In the case of the free movement of workers, an issue which was actually vital for the public did not gain much attention from political parties and interest groups in Poland. This justifies why the three case studies should be discussed in separate chapters, because they show that the political dynamics of negotiations do not have to follow their technical stages. When examining the influence of domestic pressure on international negotiations, priority should thus be given to political processes of negotiations rather than technicalities.

In examining the theory of international negotiations and the practice of Poland’s negotiations regarding the EU, one should draw a clear line between the stages of prenegotiations and the negotiation process itself. According to one of the classical definitions:

prenegotiation begins when one or more parties considers negotiation as a policy option and communicates this intention to other parties. It ends when the parties agree to formal negotiations [. . .] or when one party abandons the consideration of negotiations as an option.²²

The first document that mentioned P...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of figures and tables
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Two levels of analysis in international negotiations: domestic versus foreign policy
• 3 Polish–EU relations 1990–2003
• 4 Negotiations concerning agriculture
• 5 Purchase of real estate by EU residents
• 6 Freedom of movement of labour
• Why the three case studies were important for the domestic context
• Appendix: list of interviewees
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index