Inmate Radicalisation and Recruitment in Prisons

Clarke Jones, Raymund E Narag, Raymund Narag

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9780367663438
• eBook ISBN: 9781317510482
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Criminology
• Index: Social Sciences

It is traditionally viewed that vulnerable inmates form captive audiences for violent terrorist offenders who, in turn, are destined to turn prisons into training grounds for militant activities; all the while forming alliances with more hardened criminals to produce an even greater threat. However, there is limited empirical grounding to underpin these assertions.

Inmate Radicalisation and Recruitment in Prisons challenges existing perceptions about prison radicalisation. Whilst not downplaying the seriousness of the prison radicalisation threat, it seeks a more balanced interpretation of current discussion. Drawing on original research in the Philippines and case studies from Australia, the US, Canada, Indonesia, the UK, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium, the authors posit an alternative view that suggests that the imprisonment of a terrorist may mark the beginning of physical disengagement and psychological de-radicalisation.

Offering evidence-based insights to help determine how best to house terrorist offenders, this volume will appeal to students and researchers interested in fields such as Criminology and Criminal Justice, Terrorism, Prisons, and Organised Crime.

Chapter 1

Introduction

This book provides relevant evidence-based research to support pressing decisions about how to best house terrorist offenders, to reduce the chances of prison radicalisation and encourage rehabilitation. The evidence-base has been developed from over ten years of ethnographical, longitudinal studies in several prisons and jails holding terrorist inmates (referred to from here on as Violent Extremist Offenders (VEOs)) in the Philippines. Aside from spending time with VEOs and other inmates, our data collection has included discussion groups, unstructured interviews with inmates and correctional staff, and observations recorded during courses and training provided to prison and jail staff in the Philippines. We also undertook a comparative analysis of prison systems in eight different countries. Where possible, this included personal communication with domestic and overseas correctional officials, prison imams, inmates, and families. Because of the sensitivities involved with research around offenders and families, as well as the security considerations around correctional staff, we have ensured that those we have worked with remain anonymous throughout the book.

Through this combination of primary and secondary research, we challenge existing perceptions about the risk of prison radicalisation and recruitment from incarcerated VEOs. These perceptions commonly see prison radicalisation and recruitment as a growing problem because prisons serve as “ideal incubators” for terrorism (Ekici et al. 2016, p. 136). Prisons are also thought to be full of vulnerable inmates who form captive audiences for VEOs to radicalise and recruit from (Cilluffo, Cardash & Whitehead 2007; Hannah, Clutterbuck & Rubin 2008). It is also claimed that VEOs turn prisons into training grounds for militant or terrorist activities (Brandon 2009a; Quilliam Foundation 2009). It is also assumed that VEOs will form alliances with more hardened criminals, creating “a potential toxic mix of extremist ideology” (Spalek & El-Hassan 2007, p. 100) and criminal minds, resulting in more ingenious and deadly forms of terrorism (Neumann 2010).

This small sample of studies only echoes a much larger body of literature “that portrays prison radicalisation as one of the most serious security threats” since 9/11 (Illardi 2010, p. 2). To reach these conclusions, the studies often draw on only a limited number of high-profile international cases, such as Richard Reid, Kevin James, Levar Washington and Jose Padilla, all of whom are alleged to have become radicalised in prison (Brandon 2009a; Cuthbertson 2004). Not only are these cases still offered regularly “as irrefutable evidence of the dangers” of prison radicalisation (Illardi 2010, p. 2) (that is when VEOs are mixed with other prisoners), they also seem to provide a collective justification to develop special management strategies for VEOs.

The study of VEO management and prison radicalisation has recently become even more prevalent since the emergence and decline of the Islamic State (IS) (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) or Daesh) and the attacks that have been allegedly inspired by their ideology and group aspirations. This has resulted in the arrest and detention of a significant number of new VEOs incarcerated in the prisons examined in the following chapters. There have also been several new cases of alleged prison radicalisation emerging, raising concern about the challenges regarding the spread of radical Islamic teaching inside prisons holding VEOs. For example, two of the Charlie Hebdo offenders are said to have become radicalised in French prisons. One of the planners of the Bataclan mass shooting in November 2015, Fabien Clain, was also allegedly radicalised in the French prison system. The perpetrator responsible for the series of attacks in Paris on the same day, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, was released from a Belgian prison with supposed radicalised intentions. It is also claimed that the effects of prison time were reasons behind Ibrahim al-Bakraoui motivations to conduct one of the suicide bombing attacks at the Brussels airport in 2016. Anis Amri, who ploughed a heavy truck into a Christmas market in Berlin on December 2017 apparently warmed to the idea of committing a terrorist act while incarcerated in an Italian prison (Bershidsky 2017). We are certain that there are other incidents not captured here in this book.

Typically, there is limited empirical grounding underpinning the assessments made about the role of prison in the radicalisation process in the above cases. To date, much of the analysis has originated from secondary sources, where “many studies substitute the perceptions of correctional personnel for those of inmates” (Decker & Pyrooz 2018). Many studies also lack social science methodologies, where there “are no interviews with prisoners and they offer only scant evidence on the perceptions of wardens, guards, chaplains and gang intelligence officers” (Hamm 2009, p. 669). Also, much of the so-called evidence-base appears to have been established from only a relatively small handful of cases. Yet, despite the lack of empirical grounding, correctional policy around VEOs has been built on “untested assumptions” (Decker & Pyrooz 2018). The subsequent common default practice by western governments has been to assign all VEOs to the highest levels of prison security (i.e. above probable risk), resulting in expensive, counterproductive, and harsh incarceration conditions in many correctional systems around the world. This common default practice has largely resulted from the proliferation of so-called “best practices” around the management of VEOs by transnational western security networks and actors. It is then often translated incorrectly and pushed into other country settings (Monaghan 2015, p. 382).

Equally, when it comes to rehabilitation or interventions for VEOs, programs should also be uniquely tailored to the specific conditions of the country and prison where the program is being conducted (International Crisis Group (ICG) 2007). For example, what works in the United Kingdom (UK) or the United States (US) might not work in Australia and is certainly unlikely to work in the Philippines or Indonesia. Often interventions (commonly referred to as de-radicalisation programs), that are developed overseas or by foreign actors, lack ecological validity because they fail to understand or factor in the cultural or religious sensitivities surrounding an offender. Programs that modify content to reflect the religion or culture of the participants may increase relevance and contribute to the overall success of the program (Al-Krenawi & Graham 2000; Dumas et al. 1999). Therefore, there is a need to tailor interventions to be sensitive to the offender, location of the program, and local circumstances.

There are no single “off the shelf” intervention models and it remains unclear what aspects of current programs successfully lead a VEO to disengage from terrorism, de-radicalise, and remain so after release. Therefore, we consider the role of individual adaptation to the prison environment and its different regimes, cultures, and settings. VEOs can be quite different from that of the general inmate population, in terms of ethnic, cultural and religious characteristics and, therefore, may have specific needs. However, due to the default practice of segregation and isolation in many jurisdictions, specific needs are seldom met. Some offenders may experience increased suffering due to the harshness of the prison environment, which has the potential to exacerbate their existing problems. Furthermore, in these types of harsh environments, specialist care may not be available (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 2009). Thus, programs need to be modified to meet offender needs wherever possible. Thorough assessments can enable treatment providers to determine what modifications to interventions are required. However, to explain different types of intervention modifications and the need for those modifications, it is necessary to classify offenders according to certain socially defined categories that mark their relationship to a dominant offender identity. Aside from VEOs, other special needs offenders can include women; juveniles; Indigenous; violent offenders; gay, lesbian, and bisexual offenders; mental, physical and sensory disabilities; older adults; people with co-occurring substance use disorders; people with infectious diseases; and sex offenders (Rainey 2013).

In most of the countries studied in this book, unsubstantiated assertions around VEO behaviour in prison have resulted in costly (and potentially unnecessary) correctional service policy that typically classifies all VEOs as “high-risk”. As a result, they are subjected to strict security regimes and segregated and/or isolated from other mainstream prisoners, under the assumption that this prevents or reduces the chances of prison radicalisation. However, prison radicalisation is quite ill-defined and not very well understood (Mulcahy, Merrington & Bell 2013). This is because many studies have failed to gain a true understanding of prison radicalisation, as many researchers do not have first-hand experience of prison settings and the inmate interactions within these specific settings. As a result, many fail to grasp how VEOs experience different prison regimes or how they respond or react to these regimes (Ilardi 2010).

While we do not downplay the seriousness of the potential risk of prison radicalisation, we provide a more balanced interpretation to the current discussion on the subject. Until now, very little primary research has been devoted to examining how VEOs are affected by different environmental settings in prisons and the associated inmate cultures. Furthermore, classic penological theory, such as the “pains of imprisonment” described by Sykes (1958), the cultural characteristics of prisons and “prisonisation” depicted by Clemmer (1940) or the factors related to inmate adjustment and behavioural change identified by Driscoll (1952), has seldom been applied to examine whether prison time and the correctional environment changes VEOs’ beliefs and behaviour. Also, very little attention has been given to see whether prison time in specific correctional environments inhibits or promotes a VEO’s efforts to radicalise or recruit mainstream prisoners. Rarely, until now, have alternative strategies been considered or tested under local conditions, to see whether different methods of incarceration, such as integration or dispersal, contribute to changes in the beliefs and behaviours of VEOs (Jones 2014; Jones & Morales 2012).

As prisons are often dangerous places, it is common for inmates to seek protection through joining gangs or other social groupings. Because of stereotyping, racism, and prejudice, many Muslim prisoners incarcerated in non-Muslim countries experience greater feelings of insecurity while in prison. In these circumstances, joining forces with a cohesive and sometimes powerful group can address their physical and psychological needs and help them cope with the harsh realities of prison life. Even for those that join a so-called radical or extremist prison gang, the pathway from gang involvement to radicalisation, to being released from prison and then carrying out an act of terrorism, is far from straightforward. Although there may be a very small number of cases of individuals taking this path, the story is always more complex than it first appears. To understand this complexity, there are many variables that need to be considered. For example, the risk would depend on whether an inmate is Muslim or non-Muslim (and there are many differences between beliefs, norms, and values), whether they entered prison on terrorism offences, and a whole range of personal, social and political dynamics. Even when someone expresses a commitment to a radical or potentially violent ideology while in prison, it does not mean that they will act on those beliefs. In fact, on release, most prisoners who have been involved in extremist or radical prison gangs return to their previous social settings without any further involvement in terrorism (Marsden 2015).

Therefore, even though inmates may adopt new codes of behaviour and social norms from the prison environment, it is possible that this socialisation may only be temporary and that these inmates may revert to original attitudes toward the end of their sentence or upon release. Naturally, their level of socialisation (or prisonisation) would depend heavily on their length of time in prison. For offenders who are incarcerated for long periods, prison becomes their home. They develop coping mechanisms and survival strategies to last out their time behind bars (Thomas & Zaitzow 2006). To examine this view, several early criminological studies, including Sampson and Laub (1990), Garabedian (1963), Wheeler (1961), and Clemmer (1958), used several varying approaches to measure inmate prisonisation. Prisonisation can be defined as the extent to which inmates assimilate to a prison environment, and the effects of various social bonds on inmate behaviour and adaptation. For example, Clemmer (1958) examined the changes inmates undergo during their terms of imprisonment, resulting from the impact of an inmate’s code or system of norms requiring loyalty to other inmates. Similarly, Wheeler (1961) examined the “socialization” of inmates but classified these changes according to the “phase” of their sentence. For example, Wheeler posits that inmates at the start and end of their sentences were less assimilated to the prison environment than in the middle phase of their sentences.

The ethnographic research behind this book is among the first dedicated to bridging the gap between the fields of classic penology and countering violent extremism in prisons, to bring us a step closer to understanding the true nature of the risk of prison radicalisation and recruitment. This book is also unique, as it is based on ten years of longitudinal participant observation research conducted in the Philippines correctional system (from 2008 to 2018). In this research, we examined whether the “pains of imprisonment” (Sykes 1958) and certain prison and jail environments acted to inhibit or encourage the radicalisation of mainstream prisoners by VEOs (Jones 2014; Jones & Morales 2012). Based on Clemmer’s (1958) theory of “prisonisation”, we examined “whether VEOs who were integrated into the prison population in the maximum-security compound of the Philippine’s largest prison, New Bilibid Prison (NBP), exhibited more “prisonisation” (i.e. adjustment to imprisonment) than VEOs who were incarcerated with fellow terrorists and segregated from other inmates, in a specialised maximum-security jail complex, called the Special Intensive Care Area (SICA), and the Metro Manila District Jail (MMDJ) in Bicutan. Through primary research, we examined whether VEOs, when dispersed and integrated into the general prison population, adopted the norms and beliefs of the various gang subcultures found throughout the Philippines correctional system. We established that the dominant gang subculture acted to inhibit VEOs from radicalising other inmates in several ways and, over time, encouraged some of them to disengage from their militant pasts (Jones 2014; Jones & Morales 2012).

For VEOs in NBP, the changes they experienced could be explained as functional or pragmatic adaptations to the dangers of prison (Clemmer 1958), such as from illicit gang activities, or allegiance to the inmate code and gang rules. As VEOs often attracted a lot of surveillance or security attention, their presence was “bad for gang business”. Therefore, any suspicious VEO activity detected by the gangs was often passed on to prison administrators or specialised intelligence groups by an informal network of informants. However, this was never for free. Much of the passing of information was organised under various deals or compromises, which aimed to remove the focus from the illicit activities of the gangs, such as the drug trade. Also, the gang leaders feared that if they left the VEOs unchecked, “they could become a formidable force inside the prison if numbers increased”. VEOs were thought to have had considerable military training or, alternatively, were known to be shrewd businessmen from Mindanao. Survival inside the NBP was extremely problematic for the VEOs unless they became active members of the prison gangs. Therefore, VEOs often actively participated in the gangs, with some taking on the position of mayores (or inmate leadership) due to their business acumen or militant reputation.

We contribute the involvement of VEOs in the gangs as reacting specifically to the inmate culture. However, without pursuing and monitoring offenders after release, it is difficult to determine whether gang membership had a more permanent effect on their perspectives or motivations around the use of violence or whether they simply reverted to militancy once back in their original social settings. Certainly, while in prison, Sykes (1958) suggests that inmate behaviour changes as a coping mechanism to deal with the pains of imprisonment. Inmates may also be stripped (ritual degradation) of their outside identities upon entering prison and be influenced while confined to small congested spaces, with limited resources or outside social contact to support them. Therefore, p...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• Chapter 1
• Chapter 2
• Chapter 3
• Chapter 4
• Chapter 5
• Chapter 6
• Chapter 7
• Chapter 8
• Index