The Political Economy of Brain Drain and Talent Capture

Evidence from Malaysia and Singapore

Adam Tyson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9780367584801
• eBook ISBN: 9780429773167
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Asian American Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

Brain drain and talent capture are important issues globally, and especially crucial in countries such as Malaysia and Singapore, which aspire to be innovation-driven advanced economies. This book provides a thorough analysis of the impact of brain drain on middle-income Malaysia and high-income Singapore, where the political salience of the problem in both countries is high. It discusses the wider issues associated with brain drain, such as when rich countries increase their already plentiful stocks of, for example, medical practitioners and engineers at the expense of relatively poor countries, examines the policies put in place in Malaysia and Singapore to counter the problem and explores how the situation is further complicated in Malaysia and Singapore because of these countries' extensive state interventionism and sociopolitical tensions and hierarchies based on ethnicity, religion and nationality. Overall, the book contends that talent enrichment initiatives serve to construct and secure privilege and ethnic hierarchy within and between countries, as well as to reinforce the political power base of governments.

1 Introduction

The political economy of brain drain and talent capture

Adam Tyson

Talented individuals are sought after in novel ways in today’s globalized economy because of their capacity to make ‘exceptional direct contributions’ in terms of economic productivity, innovations and scientific discoveries.¹ Global talent flows are shaped by factors ranging from the recruitment patterns of firms, to the migration policies of governments, to the preferences of individuals.² The political dynamics of brain drain and talent capture policies are examined in this book through a paired analysis of Malaysia and Singapore. The comparison is justified given the shared colonial experience, geographical proximity and cultural affinity in these two countries, as well as the interventionist and highly competitive nature of their respective talent capture policies. In 1963 Singapore became a constituent state of Malaysia, but after two stormy years the arrangement ended with Singapore’s expulsion from the federation.³ The expulsion forced Singapore to pronounce itself a republic, highlighting the ‘different imaginary versions of nation’ that leaders Lee Kuan Yew and Tengku Abdul Rahman sought to impose upon each other.⁴ Singapore’s exit from the Malay federal constitutional monarchy allowed for the emergence of ‘disciplinarian’ rule based upon a social reality constructed and reproduced by (and for) the political elite.⁵

Today the highly mobile citizens of Malaysia and Singapore are politically divided but economically interlinked, and both the physical and psychological distances between them are shrinking. While the one kilometre Johor Causeway and the newer two kilometre Second Link enable cross border linkages and create economic opportunities, these busy border crossings also discourage certain flows of goods and labour, and reveal significant ‘collision points’ between the different policy regimes in each country.⁶ Singapore is Southeast Asia’s global economic hub, with comparative advantages in talent, technology and innovation, although the Malaysian government is promoting Iskandar as a rival growth and innovation corridor. A review of the development master plans for Iskandar Malaysia (in Johor Bahru) and Singapore reveals divergent economic strategies and little effort to treat the two cities as ‘one integrated urban region’.⁷ Collision points occur as different policy regimes compete over investment and exchange opportunities. Local elites in Johor Bahru are caught between competing centres of power in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, with national-level policymakers in Kuala Lumpur attempting to impose their agenda on local authorities and residents in Johor Bahru, who benefit from the ‘voluminous transnational exchange of commuters and freight’ across the Causeway and therefore seek to capitalize on their natural location advantage.⁸

Malaysia and Singapore have the most comprehensive talent capture policies in Southeast Asia. The city-state of Singapore has a population of 5.6 million, with a roughly 75 per cent Chinese ethnic majority and a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of US$52,962 in 2016 (in current prices).⁹ Neighbouring Malaysia has a population of some 31.2 million, with an indigenous Malay majority of 67 per cent and a GDP per capita of US$9,508 in 2016.¹⁰ Given this wealth differential, Malaysians tend to consider Singapore as a possible destination when weighing career options. Singapore is the top destination for Malaysians, with 61 per cent of all Malaysian migrants bound for the neighbouring city-state (Table 1.1). By contrast, only 24 per cent of Singaporean emigres end up in Malaysia (Table 1.3). The Singapore Ministry of Manpower does not provide country specific data, although Malaysians clearly make up a considerable proportion of the 1.4 million foreign workers in Singapore, from professional employment pass holders, to semi-skilled S Pass holders, to lower skilled Foreign Domestic Workers such as construction workers and maids.¹¹ To appreciate the complexity of migratory flows across the Malaysia-Singapore corridor, attention should be paid to the ways in which particular Malaysians arrive in Singapore (the migration mechanism), the nature of their experience in Singapore, the extent to which foreign workers engage with (and are accepted by) their host society and the impact of shifting government policy that either encourages or discourages migration.¹²

The presence of foreign labour in Singapore has been ‘carefully orchestrated through state policies’ that are informed by an idealized vision of the ‘Singaporean family’, leading at times to the ‘social quarantine’ of less desirable (lower skilled) immigrant communities.¹³ Chapter 3 in this edited volume offers further analysis of desirability and the citizen–foreigner divide, as well as the history behind Singapore’s carefully constructed ethnic ratio that privileges the ethnic Chinese majority. Foreign Domestic Workers are needed in Singapore because of the country’s persistent labour shortages and low fertility rates, though this furtive class of migrant exists in stark contrast to the visible and relatively desirable class of professional migrants. Following the 2011 general elections the People’s Action Party (PAP), which has been in power since 1959, has been more attuned to the concerns of Singaporean nationalists and immigration sceptics and have adjusted their liberal immigration policies as a result. Tensions in Singapore centre on the identity and future of the corporate nation, sometimes referred to as Singapore Ltd. (see Chapter 4), where the demands of some citizens for closure (the protection of the ‘Singaporean core’) disrupt the image and functioning of a global city that is supposed to be ‘animated by transnational flows of people, commodities, and ideas’.¹⁴

Malaysia has experienced its own labour shortages since the 1970s, resulting in the arrival of large numbers of migrant workers from Indonesia that give rise to social tensions as well as calls for crackdowns against undocumented migrants. The complexities of migration and talent capture have produced a number of contradictions in the Malaysian policy framework. Efforts to regulate immigration emanate from the need to restrict labour flows and impose penalties when violations occur, while at the same time allowing degrees of flexibility for guest workers and the use of recruitment agencies that sometimes collude with employers, immigration officers and the police, in what is referred to as the ‘migration industry’.¹⁵ Efforts to limit the emigration of highly skilled Malaysians (particularly ethnic Chinese Malaysians), and to entice Malaysian experts to return from overseas, are led by Talent Corporation Malaysia. Talent Corporation is a quasi-government agency that serves to replenish the nation’s human capital stock, offering financial incentives in the hope of repatriating top talent from the Malaysian diaspora.¹⁶

Carefully designed talent capture policies are often constrained by the political situation in Malaysia. Longstanding ethnic and religious tensions impact on decisions to migrate, and often problematize such basic notions as rational choice. In the run-up to Malaysia’s 14th general election in May 2018, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) seemed determined to reinforce a ‘Malay first’ policy regime that combines Malay ethno-nationalism with Islamic supremacy and royal assertiveness (an empowered Malay monarchy).¹⁷ Malay first bumiputera policies seem to create the conditions for ‘differentiated citizenship’ to emerge, perpetuating experiences of exclusion and the curtailment of rights for some minorities.¹⁸ While the 2018 return of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad¹⁹ has broken the electoral monopoly enjoyed (and cynically engineered) by the UMNO since 1957, it is unlikely that drastic changes will be made to the bumiputera policy. For all of the dynamic policies that have been proposed by Talent Corporatio...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• List of contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Acronyms and glossary
• 1 Introduction: the political economy of brain drain and talent capture
• 2 Brain drain and talent capture in Malaysia: rethinking conventional narratives
• 3 Singapore’s quest for foreign talent: Chinese migrant workers and the growing citizen–foreigner divide
• 4 Overseas Singaporeans, coming-of-career narratives and the corporate nation
• 5 Ethnicity-based policies as the main factor of Malaysian brain drain? Re-examining the distribution of opportunities for education and employment
• 6 Talent and technological innovation in Malaysia, with lessons from China
• 7 Talent, teams and training: managing Muslim markets in Malaysia and Singapore
• 8 Conclusion: the comparative political economy of talent, identity and ethnic hierarchy
• Bibliography
• Index