Contemplating Climate Change

Mental Models and Human Reasoning

Stephen M. Dark

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781138600003
• eBook ISBN: 9780429895814
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Sciences biologiques
• Subtopic: Écologie

Global climate change policy has failed us all, but what is the reasoning that underlies this failure? Why are some people more disposed to reflect on confounding issues like climate change, recognise the danger, seek a solution, and act accordingly, more than others?

This book is concerned with how we think and act in response to climate change. In particular, faced with deep uncertainty and the multifaceted complexities that characterise the climate change conundrum, how the various actors and institutions involved in the policymaking process make decisions that both aid and impede in the design and implementation of climate change policy. This book focuses on how these actors and institutions frame and use the knowledge available – under conditions of competing ideologies and interests – and synthesise it to form often-disparate mental models, or worldviews, that inspire them to become firm advocates of meaningful climate change action or indeed, sceptics that continue to downplay the threat, and hence the need for urgency. By exploring how we think about climate change and the disparate mental models we hold as a result, this book explores why humankind has thus far failed in its endeavours to solve the climate change problem.

This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of climate change, environmental policy and environmental psychology.

1 Introduction

Contemplating climate change

Thus contemplation enlarges not only the objects of our thoughts, but also the objects of our actions and our affections: it makes us citizens of the universe, not only of one walled city at war with all the rest. In this citizenship of the universe consists man’s true freedom, and his liberation from the thraldom of narrow hopes and fears.

(Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy ([1912] 2001, p. 93))

A preface to a crime

A disposition for contemplation, and the actions that flow from it, of the kind described by Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) above, is the essence of this story. More to the point, how certain thinking and acting, or lack thereof, can lead to the zombification of society and the greatest and most duplicitous crime of all – the demise of our planet. In this story, humankind is both the protagonist and the antagonist. Climate change is the object of interest – how we humans think and act in response to it. My intent was to establish why climate change policy has failed us all. The extensive cast of actors and institutions herein, that more, or less, contribute to this failure, was taken from the realms of science, politics and media, and economics and the publics. Explicitly, those actors and institutions engaged in the design and implementation of climate change policy. And actors they indeed are; our Mass Media Age would settle for nothing less.

It is presumed that these actors and institutions make climate change policy decisions and choices in response to empirical knowledge about the implications of climate change. The plot of this story revolves around how these actors frame and use this knowledge under conditions of competing ideologies and interests, synthesise it to form often-disparate mental models (or worldviews), and how these disparate mental models either aid or impede the design and implementation of climate change policy. Who prevails is the subject of monumental importance to planet Earth and all its inhabitants.

Climate change needs no introduction. Books, documentaries, and journal articles are replete with scientific data that bear testament to its scientific reality. The climate system is warming, and since the mid-twentieth century, human activity is the dominant cause (IPCC, 2013). Climate change inaction to this scientific reality is a contemporary and global problem of ominous implications. Despite the need for meaningful action, climate change mitigation and adaptation policy per se remains the subject of a spirited debate dating from the 1960s. The debate over human-induced climatic change, however, dates from the late 1800s. This is my story as to why global climate change inaction and its protracted inquisition persists in the face of such overwhelming validation.

This book is dedicated to students of learning – those with an inquisitive mind – from experts to non-experts. It is written from a Western perspective and is therefore limited by that perspective. It is purposefully interdisciplinary for the reason that climate change impacts on every aspect of life: succinctly, climate change is a complex environmental, cultural, social, economic, psychological, and political hazard of ‘larger than life’ proportions. A truly interdisciplinary approach is therefore required to successfully identify solutions and genuinely confront the climate change conundrum (Naznin, Hossain, & Huq, 2017). Notably, I have focussed on the thoughts of individuals more so than schools of thought, for the reason that schools of thought are in effect schools of groupthink in which like-minded people deliberate with one another in general agreement because they all think in much the same way (see for example Sunstein, 2000). Finally, if only one thing can be gleaned from this book, it is learning to think and reason for one’s self – for diversity of thought is the true spice of life. Moreover, contrary to popular opinion, the future prosperity of humankind rests heavily on reinventing the wheel, probably several times over.

The investigation: a brief synopsis

Tim Mayers (2017), although not referring to climate change directly, sums up the climate change conundrum pretty much perfectly: ‘Sometimes things are difficult to see when they are right in front of you. And sometimes, if the things themselves seem clear, the nature of the connections between them is difficult, if not nearly impossible, to see’ (p. xi). Such is the nature of climate change.

Solving the climate change conundrum is indubitably complex and multifaceted (Incropera, 2015; Visschers, 2018; Young, 2017). Fathoming this complexity has inspired a mélange of competing worldviews. Competing worldviews about climate change have consequences for climate change policy. The successful design and implementation of global climate change policy are rare indeed. In light of this, I began by asking the question: what caused climate change policy to fail or what prevented it from succeeding? Early research pointed to two likely propositions: politico-media framing and the formation of disparate mental models – in effect, nurture (politico-media framing) versus nature (the mental models we form and hold). These two propositions arguably exist among multifarious others of considerable social, political, and economic bearing, but this book was not meant to be a comprehensive survey of all the variables that have derailed a meaningful global response to climate change. Nor was it meant to be a comparison of the multitude of theories that might have contributed to that derailment.

From the two likely propositions proffered foregoing, I developed a theoretical argument and deduced three hypotheses (or questions) to test my theory: (1) To what extent is the politico-media framing of climate change associated with the failure of climate change policy? (2) To what extent is the mental-modelling of climate change associated with the failure of climate change policy? (3) If there are relationships within and/or between (1) and (2) above, how do they combine to either aid or impede the successful design and implementation of climate change policy? I subsequently present an argument to support my theoretical conclusion to these three questions. I concluded that climate change policy per se fails, whether by design or implementation, for the same reason it succeeds: the human capacity and proclivity for a reflective mind mode which has a greater probability of validating an accurate mental model of the climate change problem and as such, acts as a blueprint for a commensurate action. I also submit the theoretical proposition that negativity bias is associated with a disposition for a System 2 mind mode, but this disposition is conditional upon, among other things, an individual’s capacity and proclivity for reflective thinking and reasoning.

This investigation was conducted by way of theoreticians’ theory. This was performed by arranging theoretical concepts as representative of social life. These concepts provide a vehicle for the generation of theoretical perspectives – a method to observe the social world from the perspective that best explains the proposed research theory. The theoretical perspectives comprise a number of ontological assumptions, such as the perceived dominance of rational choice over public choice. Theoreticians’ theory is approached, broadly, from the worldview of C. Wright Mills (1959) and his conception of ‘the sociological imagination’. C. Wright Mills was concerned with the limitations exacted on social research by the imposition of a dominant theory or method. He called this ‘abstracted empiricism’ and referred to abstracted empiricists as ‘methodologically inhibited’.

In summary, in order to explain/resolve the maladies of the social world, Mills (1959) argued that imagination was needed to enable one to move from one perspective to another – ‘from the political to the psychological; from examination of a single family to comparative assessment of the national budgets of the world; from the theological school to military establishment; from considerations of an oil industry to studies of contemporary poetry’ (p. 7). I submit that solving the climate change conundrum, due to its multidisciplinary nature and inherent complexities, requires an ample dose of the sociological imagination.

To add structure to this story, a theoretical framework of sorts, a general model and a series of hierarchical theoretical models in the form of diagrammatic representations were constructed to explain the interrelationships between concepts and ontological assumptions. The models encompass the hypotheses about the objects in the model and are broadly constructed in the frame proposed by David Willer (1967). Willer’s (1967) endeavour was to provide a ‘methodological framework within which the imaginative sociologist could work’ (p. vii).

The plot

Dark days approach. Global climate change policy has failed us all (see for example Doan, 2014; Dunlap & Brulle, 2015; Global Carbon Project, 2017; Head, 2014; Helm, 2010; Howlett, 2014; IPCC, 2014e; Jamieson, 2014; Pezzey, 2014; Roberts & Pelling, 2018; Rosenzweig, 2016; Stern, Bowen, & Whalley, 2014; Stoknes, 2015: Stoner & Melathopoulos, 2015). ‘Policy failure’ was defined by Michael Howlett (2014) as when a stated policy initiative does not correct or resolve a problem in purely programmatic terms, or when a policy innovation is not adopted in the first instance. Under this definition, in light of increasing CO₂ emissions and political procrastination, we can presume that global climate change policy has indubitably failed. As Ciplet, Roberts, and Khan (2015) observed:

Despite decades of activity by nations shuttling around the world to give speeches and participate in negotiations, setting up entirely new multibillion-dollar carbon markets to ‘efficiently’ reduce emissions, and developing a series of new institutions and funding agencies to address this problem [of climate change], overall, things have continued to get worse.

(p. 3)

In liberal democracies, public policy is the instrument of public opinion and politicians presumably work in the public interest. Thus, climate change policy is, theoretically, reflective of the general will of the people. Competing ideologies and disparate mental models of the climate change object, however, render this premise more complex than it might first appear. From the worldview of political pragmatism, climate change is a policy problem. In reality, however, it is a thinking and acting problem. Despite the need for a pragmatic approach, it cannot escape the complexity of its implications and the uncertainty of its prediction. As the former head of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), William D. Ruckelshaus (1992) remarked: ‘The difficulty of converting scientific findings into political action is a function of the uncertainty of the science and the pain generated by the action’ (p. 365). Nonetheless, scientific knowledge rests on its capacity to inform policy, and the efficacy of policy design and implementation is contingent on institutionalising the link between scientific knowledge and practice.

Policy is administered and enforced by the rule of law. Human activity operates within a legal and regulatory rule of law framework. This framework protects what is possible and endeavours to prevent what is not. Government bodies are charged with a ‘duty of care’ to ensure that the physical environment of communities and cities remains within acceptable parameters of safety and security, and that the built and natural environments enhance rather than detract from human wellbeing. With the advent of human-induced climate change, concern about the wellbeing of the Earth and its inhabitants has intensified. Environmental protocols have been established to allay this concern. The Precautionary Principle, for instance, is widely viewed as a universal judicial standard for climate change prevention and accountability (Dark & Burgin, 2017). It is regularly cited in cases that involve development in eco-sensitive locations such as flood plains and vulnerable coastal zones.

According to Robin Attfield (2014), the Precautionary Principle first appeared in German and European legislation, then British, and later in other countries around the world. A version of the Precautionary Principle was in practice in Germany in the early 1980s (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994), from which it entered into the English language as a translation of the German Vorsorgeprinzip (which pertains to the idea of enabling the government to take preventive action). The Vorsorge concept concerned ‘the protection, even defence, of the environment or literally the world around us’, and also advocated sustainable development (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994, p. 31). Its approximate translation from German to English reads as follows:

The principle of precaution commands that the damages done to the natural world (which surrounds us all) should be avoided in advance and in accordance with opportunity and possibility. Vorsorge further means the early detection of dangers to health and environment by comprehensive, synchronised (harmonised) research, in particular about cause and effect relationships …, it also means acting when conclusively ascertained understanding by science is not yet available. Precaution means to develop, in all sectors of the economy, technological processes that significantly reduce burdens, especially those brought about by the introduction of harmful substances.

(As cited in Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994, p. 37)

The meaning of ‘precaution’ in this instance is far-reaching. It not only involves acting in advance of a conclusively ascertained scientific understanding, but also developing (or modifying) all sectors of the economy (as a reference to sustainable development) and technological processes (to reduce harmful substances, such as CO₂ emissions).

It is presumed that Germany’s Vorsorge concept was the prototype for the United Nation’s more contemporary version, the Precautionary Principle. The Precautionary Principle emerged from the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. This was a gathering of minds with the stated intent, among others, to establish a protocol for environmental protection. It is worded as follows: ‘Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’ (Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992, Principle 15). It was operationalised under the premise that:

The guidance which science provides will seldom be so precise as to remove all uncertainty. In matters affecting our survival, we cannot afford to wait for the certainty which only a post-mortem could provide. We must act on the Precautionary Principle guided by the best evidence available.

(Strong, 1992, n. p.)

The Precautionary Principle has been adopted in many countries, although there are variations in its wording. There is, however, no consensus regarding a universal interpretation of the Precautionary Principle, nor a consensus that one is possible (Steel, 2014). For instance, the Precautionary Principle provides no clear guidance as to what degree of proof is necessary before its application is triggered. Gerry Bates (2013), a specialist in environmental law and policy, has suggested a conciliatory measure of probability (<0.05) as a way of legitimising the Precautionary Principle to a scientific standard. Scientific standards of probability, however, have little to do with social justice, moral accountability, and political feasibility (see for example Patterson et al., 2018).

Obfuscation surrounding the application of the Precautionary Principle is not new. In the mid-1970s Adrian Deville and Ronnie Harding (1997) argued that the Precautionary Principle emerged with no clear rules as to its use; to date, both the public and private sectors continue to grapple with a concrete framework for its application. Andrew Jordan and Timothy O’Riordan (1999) highlighted its inadequacies. They asserted that the Precautionary Principle was not a ‘well-defined principle nor a stable concept but the repository for a jumble of adventurous beliefs that questioned the status quo of political power, ideology, and environmental rights’. They further maintained that the concept had only marginal coherence except that it challenged the ‘authority of science, the hegemony of cost–benefit analysis, the powerlessness of victims of environmental abuse, and the unimplemented ethics of intrinsic natural rights and intergenerational equity’.

The ‘jumble of adventurous beliefs’ referred to by Jordan and O’Riordan (1999) above, might allow ‘the rule of thumb’ to be applied to the decision-making process rather than the rule of law based on empirical evidence. In this way, the Precautionary Principle might be interpreted as a heuristic for decision-making when some of the outcomes of the decision are unknown. Heuristics, commonly defined by their departure from scientific thinking (Osbeck, Nersessian, Malone, & Newstetter, 2010), sometimes yield reasonable judgements but might also lead to critical and systematic errors (Crupi & Elia, 2017; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Norman et al., 2017). This is because human judgement depends on one’s conceptual grasp of things in order to competently reason about the relations between them. In short, cognitive biases (heuristics) should not be confused with empirical evidence, which presents a tricky proposition.

In order to reform the Precautionary Principle, environmental health, which is analogous to human health, should be prioritised (Dark & Burgin, 2017). That is, the Precautionary Principle cannot achieve legitimacy if it is merely one option in a list of possible options arbitrarily subject to the discretionary powers of the politico-elite. Preserving the environment, and the associated ecosystem services that it provides, should be elevated to a position of precedence against which all other competing goals, such as economic growth, are measured in terms of their negative/positive impacts on the short- and long-run welfare of planet Earth and its inhabitants. Indeed, the efficacy of the Precautionary Principle is diminished by the uncertainty of the scientific framework within which it is contrived to operate, and the continued disputation over the short- and long-run socioeconomic costs and benefits associated with its design and implementation. Averting dangerous climate change should not be subject to the whims of discretionary powers.

Humans and the weather: the early years of discovery

Despite the human endeavour to control nature, to mould it to a preferred state of affairs, there is no escaping humankind’s often-stormy relationship with the weather. Edwin Grant Dexter (1899), for instance, reported that on cloudy and rainy days there were fewer bad marks given in schools, fewer arrests for assault, and even fewer suicides than on clear, dry days. Recent research by Zivin, Hsiang, and Neidell (2018) revealed that short-run changes in the weather resulted in a statistically significant decrease in math performance, but had no effect on reading. In c...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Fm
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of figures
• 1 Introduction: contemplating climate change
• 2 The stealthy art of framing
• 3 Mental-modelling: in search of a theory
• 4 The General Model of the Policymaking Process
• 5 The Institutions Process Model
• 6 The Mental Model Process
• 7 Deductions
• 8 Summary and conclusions
• Glossary
• References
• Index