External Powers and the Gulf Monarchies

Jonathan Fulton, Li-Chen Sim, Jonathan Fulton, Li-Chen Sim

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781138087590
• eBook ISBN: 9781351615921
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica mediorientale

The Gulf monarchies have been generally perceived as status quo actors reliant on the USA for their security, but in response to regional events, particularly the Arab Spring of 2011, they are pursuing more activist foreign policies, which has allowed other international powers to play a larger role in regional affairs.

This book analyses the changing dynamic in this region, with expert contributors providing original empirical case studies that examine the relations between the Gulf monarchies and extra-regional powers, including the USA, Russia, China, India, Brazil, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, France, and the United Kingdom. At the theoretical level, these case studies explore the extent to which different international relations and international political economy theories explain change in these relationships as the regional, political and security environment shifts. Focusing on how and why external powers approach their relationships with the Gulf monarchies, contributors ask what motivates external powers to pursue deeper involvement in an unstable region that has seen three major conflicts in the past 40 years.

Addressing an under-analysed, yet important topic, the volume will appeal to scholars in the fields of international relations and international political economy as well as area specialists on the Gulf and those working on the foreign policy issues of the extra-regional powers studied.

1 Quo vadis? External powers in a changing Gulf region

Li-Chen Sim and Jonathan Fulton

This volume analyzes the changing dynamics of the Gulf monarchies’ (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) international relations with extra-regional powers. Perceived as status quo actors reliant upon the USA as a security provider, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states have pursued more activist foreign policies in response to regional events, especially in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring. This in turn has created opportunities for other international powers to play a larger role in the Gulf region. In order to understand the extent to which these extra-regional powers have taken advantage of such opportunities, contributors to this book provide original empirical case studies examining the relations between the Gulf monarchies and ten interlocutors, namely, the USA, Russia, China, India, Brazil, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, France, and the United Kingdom. At the theoretical level, these case studies explore the extent to which different international relations and international political economy theories explain change in these relationships as the regional security environment shifts.

An important point that needs to be emphasized at the outset is that this book’s focus is on how extra-regional powers approach their relationships with the Gulf monarchies. There is a vast literature from the other perspective, analyzing Gulf monarchies’ use of great power partnerships to navigate a challenging neighborhood.¹ This volume asks instead, what motivates external powers to pursue deeper ties in a region that has seen three major wars in the past 40 years, within a larger unstable Middle East region? In addressing this, two broad themes provide an analytical framework. The first is shaped by political and security concerns, and the second by economic ones.

The first broad theme examines the deepening of ties between external powers and the Gulf monarchies from an international relations perspective. What political, diplomatic, and security issues drive these relationships? Are these relationships indicative of a change in the Gulf regional order? Or are they a function of a larger transition process at the international level? Contributors addressed a series of questions: Does the country in question perceive the regional balance of power to be shifting, and if so, does this power shift influence its foreign policy toward the Gulf monarchies? Does the country in question consider its relationships with the Gulf monarchies as a core strategic interest, or an economic opportunity? Are these external powers responding to a shift in global politics in pursuing ties to the Gulf monarchies, or are they being driven by their own domestic political concerns? What are the tools of influence – economic, cultural, military – wielded by these extra-regional powers, and how effective are they? In the case studies that follow, we see three common trends.

First, external powers have long taken advantage of the US security architecture and its military preponderance in the Gulf to develop stronger ties to the Gulf monarchies. Each of the case studies demonstrates that US security commitments have provided a low-cost entry into the Gulf, allowing other states to enhance their regional presence without the need to take on a corresponding security role relative to their expanding interests. Leaders in Washington have complained of free-riding,² a charge rejected by Gulf leaders who emphasize the economic relations and intelligence sharing that support US interests,³ as well as leaders from other states who emphasize that they play important complementary or ­non-traditional roles in contributing to Gulf security. Hegemonic stability theory explains that these external powers, relatively satisfied with the norms of the existing international order, have thus far been willing to support the dominant power – the USA–in order to ensure that they continue to derive benefits from the continuity of this regional order. Instead of challenging US leadership directly, most have adopted a strategic hedging approach, in which they free-ride the benefits provided by the USA while steadily improving their economic and military capabilities within the Gulf. This is an effective strategic choice for second-tier states in a unipolar system that is demonstrating signs of possible power deconcentration.⁴ The USA’s relative disengagement from the region – whether in the form of ‘pull back’ or offshore balancing – and thus its ability to continue to deliver benefits to external powers in the Gulf, may alter the latter’s level of support for the existing regional order underwritten by the USA.

This leads directly to the second trend: in the absence of major security commitments to the region, the structure of relations between extra-regional powers and the Gulf monarchies have thus far largely been dominated by economic interests, including trade, investment, finance, and labor contracting. The Gulf monarchies have combined their centrality in global energy markets with deft political economic strategies, becoming active participants in international organizations, important sources of foreign direct investment, generous aid donors, and significant customers in arms markets. A wide range of economic partners has contributed to a correspondingly wide range of states and firms that have a stake in the continued stability of the Gulf monarchies. Gulf development plans, such as New Kuwait 2035, Saudi Vision 2030, and Abu Dhabi 2030 all offer substantial opportunities for international firms to win lucrative construction and infrastructure contracts, which political and business leaders from the countries in this book have aggressively pursued. This too is consistent with a hedging strategy, where second-tier powers often focus on developing an economic presence while gradually increasing military or security capabilities.⁵

The third trend is that these relations are, in many cases, beginning to move beyond the economic to incorporate strategic concerns for both the Gulf monarchies and the external powers. This is a natural development, building upon the first two trends. Growing economic interdependence has led to an increase in state and commercial assets and expatriate populations for each of the states studied in this volume; it stands to reason that they will need to devise plans to protect these interests, rather than relying on the munificence of the USA. With the Belt and Road Initiative, China has already begun to articulate a vision of a greater Chinese presence across Eurasia, including the Gulf. India’s Look West policy underscores the importance of the Middle East as a strategic consideration for Delhi. Russia’s return to the Middle East requires a stronger presence in the capitals of GCC states. South Korea’s considerable economic ties to the UAE have come with a limited but surprising military commitment. And the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey all have military installations on the Arabian side of the Gulf. It is important to emphasize that no other power offers a competing vision of Gulf order to challenge the USA, but as their strategic interests grow, it is likely that extra-regional powers will begin to pursue more assertive regional foreign policies. Hedging provides the space and time to increase a state’s interests, but in a system where hegemonic relative power appears to be decreasing, regions become arenas for competition. Yetiv reminds us that regions are part of a broader international system, and external powers intervene in them for any number of reasons, impacting regional dynamics.⁶

Taken together, these three trends indicate that events in the Gulf regional order reflect changes in the international order. In recent years, a substantial body of literature has been published dealing with the theme of a transition from the US-led liberal order toward a less centered, multipolar one. Payne describes an inextricable link between the decline in US relative power and an end to unipolarity.⁷ He believes that the rise of new powers, especially in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, are evidence that the ‘unipolar moment’ has ended, and with it, Pax Americana. Taking a longer view, Buzan and Lawson describe an ongoing transition that has its roots in the nineteenth century, which is leading to a decentered globalism where the “core will become both bigger (absolutely and relatively) and less Western.”⁸ This is leading to a more diffuse distribution of power, and the end of superpower dominance: “with many states becoming wealthy and powerful, no single polity will be able to accumulate sufficient relative power to dominate international society.”⁹ The consequence will be a return to multipolarity in a more regionalized world order. Acharya sees a similar trend, in what he calls a multiplex world, using a multiplex cinema as a metaphor for international order: “in a multiplex world, the making and arrangement of order is more diversified and decentralized, with the involvement of established and emerging powers, states, global and regional bodies, and transnational non-state actors.”¹⁰ Central to his thesis is the assertion that the unipolar moment has ended. American power remains an important feature of the nascent order Acharya describes, but it is one of many elements, including the power and interests of emerging powers and regional economic and security cooperation mechanisms. This is consistent with Reich and Lebow’s analysis, in which “we are witnessing a shift toward a world in which actors have differing forms of influence, contrasting balances between material and social resources that they use to effect in differing domains.”¹¹ Kupchan also describes an order in flux, portending an end of Western dominance, replaced by a system that “will exhibit striking diversity; alternative conceptions of domestic and international order will compete and co-exist on the global stage.”¹²

These visions of an international order in flux have serious implications for regional order in the Gulf, where regional ideological multipolarity has already resulted in fluid or ‘liquid alliances.’ Many have described the Middle East in general and the Gulf in particular as a ‘penetrated region,’ which Brown describes as one in which politics are not “adequately explained – even at the local level – without reference to the influence of the intrusive outside system.”¹³ At the same time, Gulf monarchies have long used relationships with these extra-regional powers to navigate a complex set of concerns at the domestic, regional, and international levels. David’s concept of omnibalancing provides a useful theoretical approach to understanding the relationships between Gulf monarchies and external powers, explaining that foreign policy decisions in developing states reflect a need to ensure regime stability, and threats to this must be considered at both the systemic and domestic levels. Omnibalancing “assumes the decision maker asks, ‘which outside power is most likely to protect me from the internal and external threats (as well as the combination of both) that I face’.”¹⁴ Alignment strategies are therefore chosen with the expectation that the external power (or powers) is willing to provide the security necessary to ensure regime continuity. A deeper pool of powers increases the likelihood of achieving this security.

For the Gulf monarchies, the primary external threats exist at the regional level, where they must navigate a dangerous neighborhood where Iran and Iraq have presented material and ideological threats to regional stability. As such, the Gulf can best be understood as a regional security complex, defined by Buzan as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.”¹⁵ Gause defines the Gulf as a security complex because the eight regional states (the six Gulf monarchies, Iran, and Iraq) “focus intensely on each other and devote the bulk of their security resources to relations with each other, and have done so for decades.”¹⁶ Consistent with the idea of the Gulf as a penetrated region, Buzan also emphasizes that “states outside the complex may play a major role within it, without the complex itself being central to their security conce...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Epigraph
• Half-Title
• Series
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of tables
• List of contributors
• 1 Quo vadis? External powers in a changing Gulf region
• 2 The evolution of US–Gulf ties
• 3 Russia’s return to the Gulf
• 4 Great Britain–Gulf relations
• 5 French policy in the Gulf
• 6 A rising economic agenda
• 7 Between geopolitics and economics
• 8 India and the Gulf states
• 9 Striking a balance between economics and security
• 10 South Korea–Gulf relations and the Iran factor
• 11 Technology for oil
• Index