Financing Roma Inclusion with European Structural Funds

Why Good Intentions Fail

Joanna Kostka

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN:
  9780367582951
• eBook ISBN:
  9781351728751
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

This book provides an analysis of the highly politicized field of Roma inclusion and addresses the controversies surrounding the effectiveness of funding initiatives derived from European Cohesion Policy. It confronts the widely held notion that European financial transfers (Structural Funds) are highly suitable instruments to address the systemic causes of poverty and to facilitate changes towards substantive equality for Europe's largest ethnic minority. Shedding critical light on the Structural Funds programme, it offers an innovative approach to thinking about the value of European funding schemes and efficacy of national Roma inclusion strategies. Multidisciplinary in approach, it draws on rich interview material and literature from fields including policy implementation, new public governance, equality studies, and political representation, Financing Roma Inclusion with European Structural Funds examines the implementation of European funding in Spain and Slovakia, two countries with contrasting policy outputs, and offers a nuanced picture of the way European Cohesion Policy interacts with intricacies of domestic policy-making. It thus sheds light on the key challenges facing Roma inclusion strategies in contemporary Europe and will be of interest for for scholars interested in European studies, equality policy, new public governance and minority studies.

1 Introduction

In the last decade, the European Union (EU) has placed Roma inclusion on its political agenda, demonstrating its willingness to take a leadership role in addressing the marginalization of the largest European ethnic minority.¹ Interest in the Roma people as a ‘policy problem’ has accelerated dramatically since 2004 when the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, which house the majority of the Roma population, joined the EU.² The mass impoverishment and disenfranchisement of Roma people in the post-communist countries not only had dramatic implications for economic development in the region but also bluntly clashed with the wider EU values of equal opportunities and non-discrimination.³ A growing concern with the deteriorating socio-economic standing of the Roma communities, combined with a growing fear of the accelerated East–West migration, heartened the calls for innovative policy responses and greater reliance on EU interventions. While some advocates put faith in EU conditionality, others demanded modification of the anti-discrimination frameworks and pressed for a pan-European Roma integration strategy. A common denominator in these discussions, however, was the assertion that fostering integration requires governments to set down their commitments in respect of Roma or disadvantaged people in general and to monitor and report on their progress. This meant that the EU’s role should be one of supporting national governments to deliver on their commitments, but without the EU itself being responsible for the activities of initiated states (Kovats, 2012; Andor, 2018). The EU’s ‘added value’ was thus to be anchored in the public commitments of governments, EU funding for projects and programmes, and linkage with the EU policy process (notably the EU’s Europe 2020 growth strategy).

In line with this reasoning, the EU called upon all member states to create an institutional framework that would complement and reinforce the EU’s equality legislation. The European Commission (EC) pressed member states to ensure that national, regional, and local integration policies focused on the Roma in a clear and specific way, and addressed the needs of Roma people with explicit measures to prevent and compensate for the disadvantages they face. To safeguard such developments, the EC has advised the member states to make full use of the EU’s instruments, in particular, the system of financial transfers known as Structural Funds (SF). In 2010, the Progress Report on Economic and Social Cohesion for the first time made an explicit reference to the Roma – ‘deemed especially susceptible to social exclusion’ (EC, 2010b), and denoted the SF as a key instrument for addressing Roma exclusion.⁴ In effect, ‘Roma ethnicity’ has become an organizing principle for EU cohesion policy, with funds being targeted at Roma specific initiatives (through ‘explicit but not exclusive’ targeting⁵ ). Consequently, during the 2007–2013 SF programming period, the EU allocated close to €26.5 billion to Roma inclusion initiatives, an amount exceeding any previous financial support.⁶

In times of rapidly shrinking welfare provisions and the unravelling economic crisis, the multimillion-Euro investments in programmes and projects targeted at the Roma people have appeared to warrant a sliver of optimism for marginalized and impoverished minorities. However, today the actual impact of European funding schemes is difficult to account for. In fact, the question that haunts decision-makers, both in Brussels and in other EU capitals, is stark – what has the money invested in Roma inclusion achieved?

Paradoxically, the increase in expenditure and consolidation of the targeted approach has corresponded with the deteriorating socio-economic standing of the majority of Roma communities⁷ and an escalation of violent anti-Gypsyism across Europe (McGarry, 2017). Indeed, the situation of Roma communities appears more precarious today than it has ever been with the ongoing economic crisis and the rise of the far right contributing to this predicament. The absorption of SF proved extremely low (particularly in countries and regions with a larger Roma population) while many of the implemented SF projects had problems demonstrating any real achievements. In 2010, the report prepared by the European Commission Roma Task Force, Roma Integration: First Findings of the Roma Task Force and Report on Social Inclusion,⁸ asserted that strong and proportionate measures were not in place and SF were largely mismanaged at the national and sub-national level. The meritocracy-based and competitive funding mechanisms (similar to domestic grant schemes) were criticized for disadvantaging the most isolated and impoverished Roma communities. At the same time concerns were raised about funds being notoriously redirected towards other priorities (Hurrle et al., 2012). In 2010, the European Parliament (EP) called the use of SF a ‘policy failure’ in need of critical examination and immediate action by the national and regional polities (EP, 2010), a statement quickly backed by László Andor, the EU Commissioner for Social Affairs, Employment and Inclusion.

Three years after the 2007–2013 funding period came to an end, we still do not have much data which could fully explain this consistent policy failure. The long-awaited audit of the use of EU funding for Roma projects in 2007–2013 led by the European Court of Auditors (ECA, 2016a) generated surprisingly generic and disheartening conclusions. Henri Grethen, the Member of the European Court of Auditors responsible for the final report, admitted that a pervasive lack of data made the attempts to systematically evaluate the effectiveness of SF deficient:

As things stand, we don’t really know how well Roma are being integrated because we don’t have robust data; we don’t even know how many Roma there are. Unless the data problem is resolved, policymaking will soon be hampered all the way to 2020.

(ECA, 2016b)

An increasing number of situational reports, toolkits, and ad-hoc SF evaluation schemes continue to recycle ‘common truths’ based on assumptions rather than far-reaching empirical research. The feeling of frustration seems omnipresent, fuelled by the sentiment among activists that all initiatives are failing and EU commitments to Roma inclusion are merely a decorative frame without substance or force (Nicolae, 2012). Such gloomy perceptions effectively mask instances where the utilization of SF has proven more effective, as well as scenarios where it generated and sustained suboptimal practices. Not surprisingly, those who want to understand the real ‘added value’ of European funding seem to be groping around in the dark for clues. The question of why generous funding schemes continue to fail remains unanswered.

This book fills this astounding knowledge gap and brings the use of SF out of the realm of presumptions and interest-driven anecdotes. In doing so, it revitalizes and reworks theories on policy implementation, creating a tenacious theoretical framework for analyzing the performance of EU funding in a specific policy domain. Empirically grounded, the book not only challenges standard arguments embedded in implementation research but also confronts the widely held notion that European financial transfers are highly suitable instruments for addressing the systemic causes of poverty and facilitating changes towards a substantive equality for European Roma communities. While this book focuses on a specific ethnic group, the analytical framework captures dynamics that are not unique to Roma policies but relate to how categories of deservingness are built and sustained within the European anti-poverty and anti-discrimination agenda.

Constructing Spanish success and Slovak failure

Over the last decade, European stakeholders have generated countless strategic documents, compendiums of ‘good practices’ and reports pointing out inconsistencies in funding management and implementation (Harvey, 2008; Ringold et al., 2005; EC, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2012; EP, 2011; EURoma, 2010, 2011; Brenner, 2012; Kóczé et al., 2014; Kullmann, 2015). The descriptive and technocratic nature of these reports has since been widely criticized by academics invested in Romani studies, who argue that the accumulated knowledge tends to complement or reinforce the dominant political discourses on the ‘Roma problem’, offering limited critical input (Surdu, 2016; Timmer, 2010). While the politicization of Roma issues has sharpened the criticism of strictly policy-driven research, and the calls for a conceptually rich analysis of established assumptions do echo across the academic community, knowledge of the socio-economic and cultural situation of the Roma is predominately presented through a policy-driven perspective. Similarly, in the area of cohesion policy, Roma issues are discussed inside snug expert circles, led by EC representatives, SF managers, and members of thematic networks (with headquarters in Brussels). Although, the scattered efforts at ­post-ante evaluations and monitoring have been able to demonstrate the heterogeneous performance of SF programming at the national level (i.e. through comparing the aggregated absorption rates, and the co-financing of various Operational Programmes), the picture of the actual exploitation of the funding in different policy areas and targeting of funds at delineated groups remains elusive. Even less is known about the way implemented projects have contributed to the overall strategic objectives, and how many quality projects reached Roma communities and individuals. Despite methodological catches, the policy discourse on Roma inclusion and SF continued to thrive during the 2007–2013 funding period. Amidst various high-level discussions, Spain emerged as a model to emulate while Slovakia established itself as an emblem for things going awry.

The EU has presented Spanish implementation of SF as a ‘best practice’ example and a model for other countries to follow (Tarnovschi, 2012). During the 2nd European Summit on Roma Inclusion held in Córdoba, Spain, in 2010, Viviane Reding, the EU Commission Vice President and Justice Commissioner, stated that: ‘the Spanish model shows how to use EU funding most effectively and how to use it to promote social cohesion and combat poverty in the Roma communities’.⁹ In the concluding session of the 2011 High-Level Event on the Structural Funds Contribution to Roma Integration in Bratislava, Nicholas Martyn, a Deputy Director General of the Directorate General for Regional Policy, once again highlighted Spain’s achievements, affirming that: ‘Spain has already developed good solutions, and the examples are worth following’.¹⁰ Similar views were expressed by the representatives of the Decade of Roma Inclusion Secretariat Foundation, Open Society Foundation (OSF), and other major Roma stakeholders including the UNDP and FRA during the 2011 Conference, Improving Access to Housing for Roma: Good Local Practices, Funding and Legislation, held in Prague.¹¹ The fervent belief that there is finally a place where the funding is working has silenced the flow of valid concerns and criticisms raised by numerous Spanish scholars and activists.¹²

At the same time, testimonies coming out of Slovakia, disseminated by international stakeholders (e.g. the OSF, Roma Education Fund), pointed out the severe underuse of available funding and rampant mismanagement at the national and local level. The criticism of the ‘Slovak approach’ echoed across Europe, with Viviane Reding calling Slovak SF allocation to Roma inclusion a ‘strictly tokenistic endeavour’, and Rudolf Niessler, a Director of the Directorate General for Regional Policy, expressing his disappointment with the persistent reluctance to put political will behind Roma integration programmes. During the High-Level Event held in Bratislava in 2011, Nicholas Martyn, a Deputy Director General of the Directorate General for Regional Policy, stated that: ‘Slovak authorities are unable to establish links between inputs and outcomes and even outputs’, and stressed that: ‘new approaches are indispensable if SF are to make any concrete impact’.¹³ Criticisms were also intensifying at the local level, as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Roma representatives complained about the rampant practice of redirecting funding away from those who need it the most. Activists insisted that while EU-funded projects looked ‘good on paper’, the money has had little real effect in addressing the Roma circumstances (Grambličková, 2010).

The reasons for such divergence in performance have never been comprehensively analyzed, thus many of the explanations provided are backed up purely by anecdotal accounts, or grand assumptions about inadequate governance practices of the new member states. As Roma activists talk about the ‘lack of political will’ to channel money towards the most disadvantaged communities, policy experts point fingers at the limited administrative capacities and resources to exploit the complex funding schemes. Some voices continue to insist that the money made available is simply not enough for addressing the multidimensionality of Roma exclusion (Guy, 2011). Interestingly, there has been very limited critical discussion on the alleged success of Spain, with commentators pointing to abstract notions of a stronger civil society and less racial cleavages inside Spanish society (Daley and Minder, 2010; Cala, 2010; Smith, 2011). Overall, we know little about the factors driving SF performance, and even less about the contribution of the SF to the integration of Roma.

The conflicting and highly superficial accounts of Roma inclusion strategies within one of the most potent distributive policies developed by the EU inspired the research presented in this book. While Financing Roma Inclusion with European Structural Funds is primarily concerned with explaining the causes of the diverging performance in two member states, Spain and Slovakia, by doing so it also seeks to understand the wider power dynamics and legitimacy claims embedded in cohesion policy. Thus, the book develops a methodology that brings together structures and agency in an effort to unveil ‘who-gets-what’ out of inclusion policies, how integration is carried out and by whom, and most importantly who is deemed ‘worthy of’ or ‘in need of’ viable financial support.

Measuring success and failure

Before any analysis can begin, it is important to first operationalize the term ‘success’ and ‘failure’. In fact, when analyzing political statements against the actual data, the picture of Spanish success and Slovak failure is not necessarily clear. The existing quantitative data on the implementation outputs of SF in different countries is often measured against an indigenous and highly diverse set of indicators. Comparing the amounts of money devoted to social inclusion across various Operational Programmes (OPs) is hardly possible given the structure of the priorities and types of measures are different. Similar measurement problems arise when comparing OPs from one programming period to the next. It is not unusual to come across enormous inconsistencies in data. For example, data collected in Slovakia via ITMS¹⁴ shows that more than €132 million was allocated (contracted out) towards the horizontal priority, Marginalized Roma Communities (MRC). At the same time, data collected by the Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services (2011a) points towards €183 million. In Spain, the amount of European Social Fund (ESF) funds assigned to the National OP Fight Against Discrimination (OP FAD) remains unclear even today, depending on whether one consults the national database or regional annals. Controlling for time and co-financing rates, the allocation is recorded either as €545 million or €381 million. Hence, it is fair to say that the continued absence of standardized monitoring mechanisms (at the EU level in particular) for the cross-country or...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Theorizing cohesion policy
• 3 Theorizing implementation
• 4 Policy designConstructing problems and solutions
• 5 Working through partnershipWho, how, to what effect?
• 6 Safeguarding programmatic synergies
• 7 A successful project has many parents but a failure is always an orphan
• 8 Concluding remarks
• References
• Index