Introduction
This chapter draws on the foundation of the moral attitude and objective attitude cognitions that are held to modulate between anger and rage. In order to substantiate this theory, we begin with an analysis of prevalent theories of emotional genesis, before moving onto insights on aggression and violence from the neurosciences. Following the Appraisal Theory on Emotions, I introduce the moral foundation of negative emotions, which stresses that negative emotions parallel negative moral judgement. The quality of the suffered mistreatment, that is whether the subject feels her moral worth undermined, then dictates the relevant cognition in the emotional appraisal. Finally, I use Franz Fanonâs concept of emancipatory violence as a prototypical example of an objective attitude rage that is primarily defined by a reactiveness toward a preceding mistreatment that forces the subject to view the lack of moral restraint towards the victim as necessary and virtuous. First, however, I will briefly comment on how emotions have entered the field of International Relations.
The Enlightenment consensus based on the Cartesian distinction between emotion and reason has faded. As an early pioneer in the scientific study of emotions, the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio explained in Descartesâ Error how emotions are integral to decision-making processes, affecting cognitive elements such as information selection or risk-discounting.1 These findings overhauled the idea that emotions were nothing but unthinking and irrational impulses. Since then a new wave of âneuro-philosophersâ have fortified these insights with the help of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans to understand how the brain processes information and makes decisions.2 These findings have invariably made their way into IR scholarship through the works of Rose McDermott, Ned Lebow or Renee Jeffery among others.3
Historically, however, emotions are not a new event in the study of politics. In the works of the Greeks, prevalent emotions such as fear and anger were prime political movers. Thucydides spoke of fear as a cognitive disposition that could increase concerns for security and defence, while Homerâs epic the Iliad described in great detail how angry rulers would plunge their nations into wars for the pettiest of insults. A considerable break in this tradition of viewing emotions as integral to interstate conduct came about in the Enlightenment, when emotions were relegated to the ranks of primitive impulse at best, and catastrophic distractions at worst. With the Enlightenment originated the idea that reason was a separate and superior mode of cognition that would improve humanity and lead to limitless progress. This familiar celebration of reason still resonates through much of economic theory today by way of the Rational Actor Model; as the thought goes, emotions are irrational and lead to bad decisions. In the words of the Nobel Prizeâwinning psychologist Daniel Kahneman, emotions are not suited for slow thinking.4
But even within the Enlightenment, this hierarchical outlook was not entirely uncontested. The Scottish Enlightenment Theorists, notably David Hume and Adam Smith, acknowledged the importance of esteem in their analysis of economic behaviour.5 Humeâs now-famous intuition that reason is passionâs slave appears vindicated. The view that emotions and reason are somehow separate has been debunked, as reason and emotion not only occur in tandem but might, in fact, be inseparable from one another.6 As Damasioâs research indicated, rational deliberation, which Enlightenment scholars would refer to as reason, was shown to be totally inept and useless without emotional impulse. The orbitofrontal cortex, the mainstay of emotions, Damasio argued, was integral to successful decision-making processes. The distinction between passion and reason was, in the end, an Enlightenment fiction.
In International Relations, the use of emotions has mirrored this scientific development. The notion that emotions are somehow irrational, or only occur in extreme situations, has faded. Today, International Relations scholars engaged in the study of emotion are moving towards a neuroscientifically informed view of emotions that merges the traditional motivational aspect of emotion with a new cognitive element. As mentioned in the introduction, Bleiker and Hutchison offer a useful division for the study of emotions in International Relations.7 So-called Macro Approaches focus on how emotions operate within the group â how collectives like states or nations can be expected to feel. We know that individuals can feel sad or angry, but how exactly does a corporal entity like a state or a nation feel human emotions? When we say that the US is angry, whom do we mean exactly? Are we just counting a collection of individuals feeling the same emotion and packaging them into a group? And if so, are they really feeling the same thing? How can we be certain? The other approach, a so-called Micro Approach, takes these questions for granted and creates protocols for distinct emotions, such as fear, anger, empathy or trust. These protocols follow a causal logic: a specific trigger leads to an emotional reaction, which, in turn, results in a defined action tendency. These approaches build on research in social psychology and group dynamics first established in the 1970s. According to these protocols, anger leads to revenge, humiliation and slights to counter-humiliation and shame to lashing out.8 These early contributions are important, especially viewed within the wider field of modern International Relations where emotions are still somewhat of a new event; at the same time, however, they are limited by the scientific framework of the 1970s, which viewed emotions as endogenous stimuli for specific âaction tendenciesâ rather than central cognitive processes.9
Against this, but still within the Micro Approach, a second group emerged that pays close attention to neuroscientific insights to uncover underlying cognitive processes for specific emotions rather than simply rely on visible âaction tendenciesâ. In this vein, Neta Crawford, Ned Lebow and Rose McDermott have explored the cognitive processes found to operate within emotions like fear, anger and empathy, to show how these emotions register first and foremost through a change in cognition.10 In other words, the presence of emotions like anger or fear is no longer defined primarily by the presence of a recognizable anger or a fear response but by refined changes in perception, values and future expectations.11 Abrupt changes in morality, as inscribed in the objective attitude, follow the cognition reading in emotions. Rage manifests first and foremost through a change in moral judgement toward the offender, allowing the ensuing action tendency of punishment to break free from any notion of moral restraint.
Theories of emotions
This segment acts as a build-up towards the construction of an emotional paradigm for the objective attitude emotions, where we will situate the emotion of rage. The point is to understand that emotions indeed rely on cognitive appraisals, which are gained by knowledge of social rules and expectations. So even the emotion of rage must rely on a distinct set of social cues, but in order to understand this, I wish to go back to the foundations of emotions and show how scholars have tried to understand emotions, and, more important, how these understandings have been refined and contrasted. By way of a basic definition, âemotionsâ, explains the neuroscientist Elaine Fox, âare discrete and consistent responses to an internal and external event which has a particular significance for the organismâ.12 Emotions are caused by perceived changes in the environment with direct impact on our social and material well-being; emotions, in other words, help to detect and manage change. The noted neuroscientist Antonio Damasio refers to emotions as bio-regulatory devices, always âpromoting the maintenance of life, and always poised to avoid the loss of integrity that is a harbinger of death or death itselfâ13 These perceived changes to our social and material environment may arise from external events, like a sudden appearance of a grizzly bear, or from internal representations through a triggered elicitation of a memory.14 There exist three main interpretations on how emotions arise in relation to perceived changes to the environment, and although these interpretations are not inherently mutually exclusive, they make different claims on the salience of the emotional process.
Biological Theory
The American psychologist William James offered the first systematic approach to the genesis of emotion as early as the 1880s. James believed that emotions were biologically determined and inherited from generation to generation to maximize the possibility of gene selection. Consequently, emotions, rather than explaining human feelings, were equated with so-called action tendencies, a primed physiological response elicited by a biologically determined stimulus. In Jamesâs famous example, the sudden appearance of a grizzly bear would lead to perceived physiological changes such as sweaty palms, heart beating and adrenaline rushes, gearing the body for the action tendency of flight. The conscious perception of these physiological changes would register as fear. In other words, âyou did not run because you were afraid, but rather, you were afraid because you ranâ.15 Because Jamesâs theory pertained to all animals, this notion of innate emotional process found further support in zoological studies. For instance, young monkeys would fear snakes after a single display of fear by adult monkeys, while a similar single display of fear by an adult monkey at a flower would not elicit the same fear response in young monkeys. Equally, rats raised in laboratory settings without any experience of the dangers in the outside world immediately show signs of distress when cat urine is introduced into their habitat.16 Jamesâs notion that emotional primers are inherited along with their respective action tendencies in humans, however, has come under critical scrutiny. By way of an example, the sight of a grizzly bear will not elicit the same emotion, if the human subject is trained to cope with the possibility of grizzly bear; instead, this is an example of cognition modulating the emotional response.
Against this first criticism, however, the psychologist Paul Ekman has shown somewhat conclusively that so-called base emotion, such as joy, disgust, contempt, anger and surprise, have automatic and instant action tendencies expressed through facial cues and that these cues are recognized across all cultur...
