Letter 1: Mill to Comte
I donāt know, Sir, whether someone completely unknown to you may take a few moments of time as precious as yours, to tell you about himself and the great intellectual debt he owes you; but with the encouragement of my friend, Mr. Marrast,1 and believing that, in the midst of your great philosophical enterprises, you would perhaps not be entirely displeased to receive an expression of sympathy and support from abroad, I dare hope that you will not judge my present letter inappropriate.
It was in the year 1828, dear Sir, that I read your short essay on Positive Polity for the first time,2 and this reading gave my ideas a strong jolt which, along with other causes but much more than they, was responsible for my definitive leaving the Bentham section of the revolutionary school in which I grew up; I can almost say in which was born. Although Benthamism has doubtless remained very far from the true spirit of the positive method, this doctrine appears to me even today the best preparation for true positivity, applied to social doctrines: be it on account of its tight logic and the care it always takes to understand itself, be it above all because it categorically refuses all attempts to explain any kind of phenomenon by ridiculous metaphysical entities, the essential worthlessness of which it taught me to feel from earliest youth.
I believe that I can say that ever since the time when I learned of the first sketch of your ideas on sociology, the seeds sown by this small volume did not stay fruitless in my mind. However, it was only in 1837 that I came to know the first volumes of your Course. Fortunately I was rather well-prepared to appreciate its importance, since none of the basic sciences were entirely foreign to me. I had, incidentally, always concentrated on the methodology that they might provide. Since the happy moment when I came to know these two volumes, I am always looking forward to each additional volume with keen impatience; I read it and reread it with true intellectual passion. I can say that I was already embarked in a direction rather akin to yours; but I still had to learn from you many matters of the utmost importance, and I hope to give you new proof in the near future that I have learned them well. There remain some questions of secondary rank, where my opinions do not agree with yours; one day this disagreement may well disappear. At least I believe that I do not flatter myself excessively when I say: I hold no ill-founded opinion so deeply rooted as to resist thorough discussion, such as it would encounter if you do not mind my submitting my ideas to you periodically and asking for explanations of yours.
You know, dear Sir, that religion has so far had deeper roots in our country than in the rest of Europe, even though it has lost, here as elsewhere, its traditional cultural value, and I consider it regrettable that the revolutionary philosophy, which a dozen or so years ago still was in full swing, today has fallen into neglect before completing its task. It is all the more urgent that we replace it by embarking on the path of positive philosophy: and it is with great pleasure that I can tell you that, in spite of the openly antireligious spirit of your work, this great monument of the truly modern philosophy begins to make headway here, less however among political theorists than among various kinds of scientists. Incidentally, we now come to notice for the first time, among those who cultivate the physical sciences, a rather pronounced tendency toward scientific generalities, which appears as a good omen to me and leads me to believe that we can expect more of these scientists than of political thinkers, be they theorists or men of action. Indeed, the latter have fallen as low as those in France since 1830, and everyone understands that we can undertake new things only with a new doctrine; only, most of them do not as yet believe in the advent of such a new doctrine, and consequently remain in their skepticism, which becomes ever more enervating and discouraging.
Please excuse this somewhat presumptuous attempt, dear Sir, of entering directly into intellectual communication with the one great mind of our time, whom I respect and admire most And please believe that the realization of this wish would be for me of immense value.
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Letter 2: Comte to Mill
Much to my regret, countless tasks have prevented my replying immediately, Sir, to your honorable and interesting letter which I had the pleasure of receiving from you on the twelfth of this month. I am anxious to seize the first moment of leisure to express, however inadequately, my deep gratitude for such a communication; your rare modesty has kept you from appreciating its full merit.
By preference and by rational design, I live in extreme isolation from the common crowd, even from our intellectuals. My only customary diversion is to attend the Italian opera assiduously during our musical season. For more than three years I have been systematically increasing this isolation, scrupulously abstaining from all reading of any newspapers or journals whatsoever, even monthlies and quarterlies. This system of cerebral hygiene suits me too well to change now, especially since it facilitates my rising to and operating without effort in the sphere of what are usually the most abstract generalizations as well as the purest and most unbiased feelings; but, in spite of such discipline, which I deem essential to the full realization of my life as a philosopher, I am far from indifferent to the influence of my work on our intellectual milieu, even though nowadays I rarely have the time or the means to become aware of it.
From the early days I have been so fortunate as to harbor no serious illusions concerning the degree of popularity which my philosophical work was really capable of achieving in our day. I never intended to exert direct influence on more than about a hundred thinkers, dispersed here and there throughout Europe. However, because of this very limitation in my ambitions, you can imagine, Sir, how much importance I must attach to receiving, from time to time, such spontaneous expressions of interest, as precious, decisive, and encouraging as the one with which you have just honored me. They make me feel vividly that the most advanced minds vibrate in essential unison with mine. Of necessity such rewarding moments are very few, but without them I would perhaps have great difficulty mustering up the unceasing and indispensable dedication to the long and arduous task that I have undertaken since the days of my early youth. Here I owe a special debt of gratitude to the English thinkers who, it seems to me, have accepted my work more readily than their colleagues elsewhere, even in France. The only favorable appraisal which has yet appeared, so far as I know, is the one in the Edinburgh Review of July 1838. Your honorable fellow countryman, Mr. Grote,1 in so amiable a manner, made me take note of it, in spite of my strong reticence to read such things. Even though this critical discussion concerns only my first two volumes, its perfect spontaneity showed me with what decency and nobility your great critics conceived their mission.
Today I attach even more importance to such signs of encouragement, because the nature of my philosophical enterprise has steeped me in a necessary and permanent struggle with all the theological and, particularly metaphysical thinkers, and because my sixth and final volume, to appear next spring, will also attack, though in a different way, but in a manner my opponents will perhaps be even less likely to forgive, the rudiments of positive thought already officially established in our country: I am speaking of the learned societies whose empiricism and ego-centricity constitute today, especially in France, what may be the most dangerous obstacle to a definitive renewal of philosophy, for they blindly oppose all general principles whatsoever! Most unfortunately they prolong the system of provisional findings limited to narrow specialities, which for a long time has directed the preparatory development of modern science. You will understand, Sir, how comforting it is for me, surrounded as I am by all kinds of natural enemies, to feel, even though at a distance, that I am in spontaneous agreement with some eminent thinkers. Though your scrupulous modesty has led you, Sir, to overemphasize the influence of my work on your philosophical development, it comes to mind immediately that, in thinkers of true worth, such influence can only stimulate at an opportune moment an impulse in which spontaneity must be the essential element.
The Benthamism, in which you were bred, is manifest evidence of the natural conformity of our intellectual tendencies, quite apart from any direct contact; for this doctrine, the most important product of what we call political economy, appears to me, as it does to you, as a direct precursor of sociological positivism, especially in England. If I, myself, have avoided this phase, it was doubtless due to the particular circumstances of my education. Ever since childhood, I have absorbed the rudiments of the true positivist method. Thus I was able to apprehend in time how imperfectly Bentham understood this method in spite of his clear attempt to establish its overall predominance.
These summary explanations will easily make you see, Sir, how highly I value your noble offer to establish relations between us. I should welcome every opportunity to do so either through letters or, even better, by conversing personally with you, which would permit me to pursue matters, i.e., reply to your judicious objections and examine your interesting communications.
Your letter reached me just as I had put the final touches to an important philosophic plan which I propose to present in my last volume: it calls for the spontaneous organization of a European committee, whose function would be to oversee permanently and in all parts our common movement of philosophic rebirth, once positivism has at last planted its standard, or rather lighted its torch in the midst of the disorder and confusion of our century. This will, I hope, be the natural result of the completion of the publication of my work. This permanent committee will, at least initially, include at most some thirty members representing the different peoples of Western Europe who, since Charlemagne, have always advanced with a greater or lesser degree of solidarity, whether in the temporary development of the Catholic and feudal system and later during its decline, or in the progress of industry, esthetics, science and philosophy which has formed the basis of our modern society. All the rest of Europe and the world will, it seems to me, have to remain, for a long time to come, outside of this association which makes up the elements of the great European commonwealth of which we both are citizens.
You will understand, Sir, what deep satisfaction your letter must have brought me in the midst of these thoughts; it proved to me most unequivocally how ready England is, in spite of its state of philosophic despondency, to provide its noble representatives to such a union of elites. I had already learned with great satisfaction from an incidental comment of Monsieur Marrast, that your wisdom and energy had fortunately resisted the blind obsession of your friends to push you into parliamentary life. Excellent reasoning alone can have convinced you how infinitely more useful your philosophical career would be if you removed yourself from the all too mundane parliamentary debates, which tend directly to prevent any methodical dedication to general perspectives, in this day when general conceptions are precisely our greatest social need. As rational as your decision may be, it runs so much counter to prevailing custom, where everything impels to immediate action, that it can spring only from superior judgment and courage. For this, my sincere congratulations! I hope that the evolution of mankind, today quite separate from the vain clamor of our demagogues, will derive substantial benefit from it.
It seems to me that our greatest need now, in England as in France, is the organization of a broadly conceived philosophic action, distinct from all political activity. The political decline, which we are now also experiencing, is due only to the recognized inadequacy of the negative philosophy which has, up to now, alone directed the great revolutionary movement. There is no way out, except through the rise of another philosophy, which will spontaneously assure order as well as progress and even alone will today be able to contain effectively the imminent spread of metaphysical theories which threaten to subvert our entire society. [This new philosophy alone] can establish an uncompromising but calm analysis of the duties pertaining to the various social classes, instead of the useless and stormy discussion of individual rights.
I find, as you do, Sir, that the purely negative philosophy has been arrested in our time, especially in England, before it could complete its task. This was surely inevitable, since the need of a new philosophy was made plainly evident everywhereāfor society cannot live on mere negation. Indeed, its spontaneous decline must become one more stimulus for the rise of positivist philosophy whose rule, alone, can truly bring the revolutionary process itself to fruition, though this is but a secondary function. This new philosophy alone can enable us to eradicate politically the last vestiges of the old regime, beginning with the theological establishment. I have always desired a direct confrontation between the frankly reactionary forces, represented today by traditional Catholicism, and our burgeoning school of positivist philosophy. Although I have little hope of leading this battle directly onto such clear and decisive ground, I admit that it gives me pleasure to find, among the natural consequences of contemporary events, anything that may tend to bring us closer to such a settling of the question through the gradual elimination of metaphysical intermediaries. [These spokesmen for the metaphysical view] are henceforth, in my opinion, the main cause of todayās prolonged confusion of ideas and indecisiveness of argument.
I infinitely regret, Sir, that my lack of familiarity with the English language does not permit me to return your compliment and transmit in your native tongue, as you did for me, this free and fast philosophic outpouring of my philosophy. Your letter gives evidence of such superior acquaintance with the true spirit of the French language, that I do not fear that I burden you by writing in this manner, as long as you can decipher my poor handwriting well enough; today it is made worse by poor quality pens.
With sincere and affectionate esteem, I remain your devoted
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Letter 3: Mill to Comte
My dear Monsieur Comte:
I am truly chagrined when I call to mind how much time has lapsed since I received your answer, as friendly as it was creditable to me, that you were good enough to send after my first letter. But if I have appeared so little inclined to profit from a relationship which I so eagerly desired, this was merely due to urgent occupations, the most important among which was precisely of the sort to establish, faster than any other way, the exchange of philosophic ideas in which I expect to find, for the remainder of my life, a most precious source of instruction and intellectual stimulation. I have just completed, these last days, a rather lengthy volume, which will be sent to the printer so as to appear in the spring, I believe.1 If after publication, you accept to take note of itāI so hope because of the high value you were kind enough to attach to the strong and marked concordance of our intellectual orientationsāthen the detailed exposition which I make of a rather considerable number of my ideas, will show you, up to a point, the questions where there is no further need of discussion [between] us, and those where I can still benefit from your philosophical conceptions.
I shall submit this work to you with so much greater anxiety, as its very purpose will certainly appear suspect to you, since it is, after all, a treatise on logic or philosophic method. I am certainly far from insensitive to the arguments which have led you to deny that it is possible, at least in the present phase of our science, to arrive at a theory of method without [having perfected] the doctrine, even at the condition which I have always faithfully accepted, of drawing the method only from the doctrine itself.2 For this reason I do not assign to the book I have written any permanent philosophic value, but at most a transitory one, which I do however consider quite real, at least for England.
As to the partial differences which still remain between the way I conceive of certain philosophical issues and the way you do, I am afraid that above all, if you judge them by this new work in question, you will imagine them to be greater than they are, for you might not sufficiently consider the concessions I felt forced to make to the prevailing attitudes of my country. You are doubtless aware that here an author who should openly admit to antireligious or even antichristian opinions, would compromise not only his social position, which I feel myself capable of sacrificing to a sufficiently high objective, but also, and this would be more serious, his chance of being read. I am already assuming great risks when, from the start, I carefully put aside the religious perspective and abstained from rhetorical eulogies of the wisdom of Providence, customarily made even by unbelievers among the philosophers of my country. I rarely allude to such notions and, even as I try not to awaken any religious antipathy in the common reader, I believe I have written in such a way that no reader, be he Christian or an unbeliever, can mistake the true nature of my opinions, though I admit I rather rely on that worldly prudence which, here in England, generally prevents religious writers from unnecessarily calling attention to the irreligion of any author of some scientific merit.
The same kind of motive, though less compelling, ...
