Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture

John Glenn

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN:
  9780815390619
• eBook ISBN:
  9781351152785
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The debate between Neorealists and Strategic Culturalists centres on whether it is possible to explain/predict state behaviour without taking into account the particular characteristics of the state, such as its historical experiences, geographical context and cultural constitution. This informative debate is encapsulated in the first section of the book, which considers the theoretical issues raised by both Neorealism and Strategic Culture. These issues are then explored in the second section by assessing their relevance to six country case studies: Australia, Germany, India, Japan, Nigeria and Russia.

Part I
Theoretical Overview

Chapter 1
Introduction

In his analysis of ‘The Rise and Fall of the Cold War’, Richard Ned Lebow asks what can our theories tell us about these developments (Lebow, 1999)? It is in relation to this question that the end of the Cold War has been viewed both as an academic and an historical watershed. The period since then has thus been characterised by several theoretical debates in which scholars have re-evaluated their assumptions and positions. Throughout this period, the theoretical tenets of realism have come under particular challenge. This is especially the case for neorealism, the variant predominantly considered in this volume. When, at one point, the question of whether there were any ‘realists’ still out there seemed to elicit an almost expected negative response, the writing appeared on the wall for a theoretical tradition that had dominated the academic study of international relations during the Cold War (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999). So not only did the Cold War rise and fall, but so too, apparently, did neorealism. The challenge to neorealism rested on the proposition that its proclaimed potential for explaining, predicting and therefore prescribing behaviour at the international level, no longer seemed able to capture unfolding events. Some argued this was apparent even before the demise of the Cold War.

The inadequacy of this theory, whether real or perceived, not only opened the possibility for constructing new ways of thinking, but also allowed other theories and approaches that had languished in neorealism’s shadow to be reconsidered. It is in this light that the resurgence of interest in the potential of strategic culture to provide alternative accounts of strategic knowledge than those generated by neorealism, can be understood. But this resurgence of research attention on strategic culture has itself generated methodological and empirical issues, many of which were the subject of debate even when neorealism was at its academic zenith.¹ Because of this, it has become common to speak of successive ‘waves’ of strategic culture scholarship. This began with a chronology adopted by Alastair Ian Johnston who identified three waves of strategic culture research: the first relating to cultural analysis of United States-Soviet Union relations in the late 1970s; the second associated with writing on the instrumentality of culture in the 1980s; and the third pertaining to a more eclectic discussion of organizational and societal cultural analysis (Johnston, 1995a). Subsequent attempts to chronical the evolution of strategic culture research have offered variations on Johnston’s original thesis (Desch, 1998).²

It is noteworthy that the most recent, or third generation, of scholars share some of the concerns of earlier researchers on strategic culture: not least their desire to provide a richer account of the international environment than the one derived from neorealism. Moreover, just as earlier scholars had questioned neorealist assumptions about its predictive capacity, the third generation has produced alternative scenarios of the future that highlight the significance of the domestic cultural environment in influencing these outcomes. What this discussion also indicates, as others have commented, is that all alternative approaches ‘must of necessity engage with, and attempt to go beyond, Realism’ (Dunne and Schmidt, 2001: p. 142).

In essence, writers on strategic culture are seeking to ‘engage with’ and ‘go beyond’ realism by reasserting the importance of cultural, ideational and normative influences on the motivations of states and their leaders. Rather than interpreting behaviour solely as a result of constraints and opportunities imposed by the material environment, a principal assumption of neorealist thought, analysts of strategic culture emphasise the influence of the domestic cultural context on that behaviour. A prime example of this type of analysis is John Duffield’s argument indicating that the specific political culture within Germany since 1945 has engendered a predisposition for multilateral cooperation with its European partners (Duffield, 1999a). Similarly, Peter Katzenstein’s account of Japan highlights the way norms were institutionalised in that state after the Second World War, leading to a general aversion of power politics in favour of ‘influence abroad by markets’ (Katzenstein, 1996a: p. 207).

This volume is therefore seeking to explore the theoretical and empirical issues raised by both neorealism and strategic culture, and to consider their implications for the future strategic realm. It does this by considering these issues in the context of six country case studies: Australia; Germany; India; Japan; Nigeria; and the former Soviet Union (Russia). These countries have been included because of their geographical location, their historical experience, and the cultural context in which their identity as states has been formed. The editors were keen, however, to allow the contributors writing on particular countries to explore their case study without the constraint of a theoretically imposed framework, and for each to consider the merits of both neorealism and strategic culture as they deemed appropriate. In addition to these case studies, the volume includes two chapters that survey the literature associated with both neorealism and strategic culture, and this introductory chapter, which provides an outline of the main currents of thought we felt had a general impact on our focus of study.

Neorealism and the Perennial Patterns of International Life

It has been widely noted that one of the main reasons for neorealism’s traditional high standing as a theory rests on its parsimony and its potential to identify the recurring patterns of international life. Neorealism posits that the anarchic structure of the international system conditions inter-state relations and that conflict is an enduring possibility. In the absence of any supranational authority to ensure peace, states have no option but to adopt self-help strategies. According to the classical formulation presented in the writings of Kenneth Waltz, there are two means available to achieve this. States can seek to attain greater security by either ‘internal efforts (moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies) and external efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge one’s own alliance or weaken and shrink an opposing one)’ (Waltz, 1979: p. 118). This, Waltz argues, is why the balance of power between states is a recurring pattern of their inter-active behaviour and that, moreover, it re-occurs because the international environment generates the conditions for such behaviour. As Waltz characterises it ‘Balance-of-Power politics prevail where ever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive’ (ibid.: p. 121).

Another perennial feature identified in realist thought is the security dilemma, which has its origins in the anarchic structure of the international system. Writers in different decades, both during and after the Cold War, have noted that the security dilemma between states is a recurring pattern of international life. In its starkest form, a security dilemma exists when the military preparations of one state are viewed by another state as potentially threatening. In response, the latter state takes remedial action, usually in the form of its own military preparations, in an attempt to reduce the insecurity generated (Herz, 1950; Jervis, 1976; Roe, 2000). The dilemma, then, originates in the nature of the anarchic international realm as, for the initiating state, the military activity may have been only for defensive purposes. It is thus said to be the ‘unresolvable uncertainty’ inherent in this domain that creates such an ambiguous situation, and which inevitably compels other states to consider a response, often by adopting a worst case assessment of the former state’s intentions towards it (Wheeler and Booth, 1992: p. 30).

The issue of change has also been an aspect much debated in the context of neorealist thought. This was especially the case in the context of the ending of the East-West Cold War, at a time of uncertainty about the future contours and structure of the international system. In theoretical terms, this precipitated two specific questions: when does one international system become transformed into another; and what factors were significant in generating the change? (Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993). In seeking to address these questions many have followed John Ruggie in making a distinction between the deep structure, which shapes the ‘fundamental social quality’ of the international system (that is, anarchy), and the surface level structural change, which is generated through a change in the distribution of capabilities amongst states (Ruggie, 1986: p. 135).³ Thus, change within the international system may be created through the differential growth of power among states, resulting in the formation of a new polar or structural configuration over time. This presents, in simultaneous fashion, both a static and a changing system: states may come and go on the international stage but the deep anarchic structure endures. However, the relative power of states does change over time, leading to either a change in the polar configuration of the international system, or the same configuration in which states rise and fall according to their capabilities.

The international configuration that exists will depend on the number of great powers within the system at any given moment. One major power centre will yield a unipolar world; two major power centres, a bipolar world; more than two but less than ten, a multipolar world; and more than ten, will yield a polyarchic configuration in which there are multiple centres of power in the world (Brown, 1994: p. 71). Thus, although balancing is said to be a recurring pattern, the power configuration within the international system is not fixed and will vary with the rise and fall of great powers. As one writer has described it, the growth in a state’s capabilities may mean that the costs of changing the polar configuration and the beneficial social arrangements of the international system alter to such a degree that:

those actors who benefit most from a change in the social system and who gain the power to effect such change will seek to alter the system in ways that favour their interests (Gilpin, 1981: p. 9).

Closely associated with this debate over international systemic change and polar structure (and whether at any one time the system is unipolar, bipolar, multipolar or polyarchic), are the issues associated with stability and war-proneness (Rosenau, 1969; Brown, 1994). Inherent in this discussion are considerations related to whether one type of international system is more prone to instability and war between the great powers than others. It has been a common theme (though not accepted by all writers), that the ‘long peace’, which endured between East and West in the 1945–89 period, was a product of the bipolar configuration of the world and the accompanying distribution of nuclear capability into two centres of power (Gaddis, 1992). Also, at the time of the fundamental changes occurring in the East-West context in the late 1980s, and before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, some adopted a less sanguine view of the prospects for future stability, especially for developments in Europe. John Mearsheimer encapsulated this sentiment when observing:

the prospects for major crises and war in Europe are likely to increase markedly (if the Cold war ends) … The next decade in a Europe without the superpowers would probably not be as violent as the first 45 years of this century, but would probably be substantially more prone to violence than the past 45 years … This pessimistic conclusion rests on the argument that the distribution and character of military power are the root cause of war and peace (Mearsheimer, 1990a: p. 14).

In terms of identifying the perennial patterns of international life, then, neorealism has provided for many a benchmark that not only explains the strategic realm of state-interaction, but also gives guidance to those tasked with responding to the dilemmas that this realm inevitably generates. Equally significantly, neorealism also raises theoretical questions that have a distinguished heritage in writings on international peace and security, particularly those relating to the level of analysis issue.

The Level of Analysis Debate Resumed

It is well known that neorealist writers stress the importance of the international systemic level of analysis to explain outcomes. The preceding discussion highlights this, but the complexities surrounding the issue of which level of analysis to adopt have subsequently become familiar ones to analysts concerned with this aspect (Waltz, 1959; Singer, 1961; Moul, 1973; Yalem, 1977; Hollis and Smith, 1990). What is noticeable also is that these complexities are currently being revisited by those conducting research on strategic culture.

In the formulation outlined by J. David Singer in the early 1960s, the international systemic level was considered high on descriptive potential as it ‘produces a more comprehensive and total picture of international relations than does the national or sub-systemic level’ (Singer, 1961: p. 91). The national or sub-systemic level, in contrast, held greater explanatory potential than the international systemic level because it produced ‘richer detail, greater depth, and more intensive portrayal’ (ibid.). Both levels of analysis, however, were considered by Singer to have ‘a similar degree of promise’ in terms of prediction, depending on what was required. Moreover, he also suggested that although there were potentially more levels of analysis than those he outlined, the analyst should not shift orientation between levels at will in the midst of writing as this would have implications for the knowledge gleaned. In effect, Singer viewed the two levels of analysis as ‘mutually exclusive’ (Hollis and Smith, 1990: p. 204).

Later writings after 1961 would question Singer’s formulation of the problem. Some questioned the rigidity of a fixed level of analysis, proposing instead that researchers s...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Abbreviations
• Notes on Contributors
• Preface
• PART I: THEORETICAL OVERVIEW
• PART II: THE CASE STUDIES
• Bibliography
• Index