![]()
1
Understanding the relationship between religious individualisation, community, and authority online
In order to investigate the relationship between religious authority, community, and individualisation in the context of mediatised religion, we must first ground the discussion in sociological reflection on the transformations of religion and religiosity. I chose to begin with the debate on secularisation, since while the aim of this book is not to affirm or challenge secularisation theories, they should nonetheless be addressed for two main reasons. First, the key topics of this study are also present in debates on secularisation: the process of the individualisation of religion (Bellah, 2008; Luckmann, 1967; Dobbelaere, 2002), along with the transformations of religious community (its form and meaning) (Luckmann, 1967; Martin, 1978), authority (Chaves, 1994), and the role of media in both (Turner, 2007; Turner, 2011) have been the object of investigation of several theorists and researchers. The results of my study will counter some of the claims made by the aforementioned studies and reaffirm others. Secondly, in my reading of the concepts of the mediatisation of religion, they also revise some of the assertions made by secularisation theorists, and, therefore, it is important to highlight this theoretical context before I move on to my proper analysis.
There are numerous concepts of secularisation, which link this phenomenon to such processes as institutional differentiation or segmentation (Luck-mann, 1967; Dobbelaere, 2011), pluralisation (Martin, 1978), rationalisation (Berger, 1967; Wilson, 1982), disenchantment of the world (Berger, 1967), privatisation of religion (Berger, 1967; Luckmann, 1967), bricolage (Hervieu-Léger, 2000), or the decline of Church religiosity (Luckmann, 1967), as well as the processes mentioned above. In an attempt to systematise the reflection on secularisation, Karel Dobbelaere introduced his concept of secularisation on three levels: individual, organisational, and societal. While Dobbelaere’s work has been critiqued by various scholars,1 his perspective on secularisation remains one of the most significant.
Dobbelaere defines secularisation as “a process by which overarching and transcendent religious systems of old are confined in modern functionally differentiated societies to a subsystem alongside other subsystems, losing in this process their overarching claims over these other subsystems” (Dobbelaere, 2011, p. 600). This definition refers to the macro (societal) level and emphasises the loss of control of institutionalised religion over such subsystems like education, family, law, etc. Let me briefly recapitulate Dobbelaere’s theses with regard to the societal, the organisational, and the individual level of secularisation.
The societal level of secularisation refers to entire societies becoming functionally differentiated and increasingly complex, which turns religion into one of the many spheres of society and relocates religious communities into the private sphere. With the development of functional rationality, the rules of efficiency and cost-benefit evaluation have taken over not only the economic system, but also permeated into other subsystems, such as politics, administration, or education. Following Max Weber, Dobbelaere argues that the dominance of rationality was bolstered by the use of science and its practical monopoly in explaining reality, which resulted in disenchantment with the world throughout entire societies (Dobbelaere, 2011, p. 602).
Secularisation on the organisational level describes the process of religious institutions changing their own structure, tenets, and practices in order to adjust to the growing religious marketplace and a pluralistic religious environment. This corresponds with Peter Berger’s claims that religious pluralism and competition on the spiritual market lead to the relativisation of religious contents and the “de-objectivating” of religious messages (Berger, 1967, p. 150). Thus, the Churches themselves also acquire a mundane orientation, focusing on and engaging in this-worldly affairs, and trying to compete for souls with secular institutions. The emergence of New Religious Movements (NRM) and “unchurched spiritualities” (Hamberg, 2011), many of which are world-affirming and adapting particular forms of rationality (like quasi-scientific or commercial), is another facet of secularisation on the organisational level. As a consequence, established Churches lose their power to provide all-encompassing explanations of the world, which has its profound effects on individuals.
The individual dimension of secularisation depicts a state in which religious authorities lose control over their followers’ moral principles, beliefs, and practices (Dobbelaere, 2011, p. 606). This results, on the one hand, in the empowerment of the followers, who become more influential in shaping their religious communities and spiritual beliefs, but on the other hand it effects in the diminishing number of followers attending mass, religious bricolage (eclecticism of beliefs), as well as in the separation of religion from other spheres of life, which can be defined as compartmentalisation, or “the secularisation of the mind” (Dobbelaere, 2002, pp. 141, 148, 153–155; Dobbelaere, 2011, p. 606). Thus, religious involvement is becoming weaker and more volatile, and its meaning becomes detached from institutional contexts and dogmas (see also Bellah et al., 2008). Dobbelaere has analysed compartmentalisation on the example of Belgium, but it can also be observed in countries with a monoreligious structure, such as Poland, where we observe a growing number of people declaring they “believe in their own way,” rather than follow the Church’s teachings (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, 2015, p. 6), or claiming that morality does not have to stem from religion (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, 2017, p. 4).
Focus on the changing religious community and individualisation
While appreciating the importance and comprehensiveness of Dobbelaere’s analysis, one must pay attention to two main problems arising from the author’s approach:
- Secularisation on the societal level determining the remaining levels of analysis,
- Insufficient elaboration on the transformation of religious communities with regard to each level.
Dobbelaere points out that the “religious situation” at the individual level cannot be explained only by the secularisation of the social system, just as manifestations of individual religiosity (or the lack thereof) cannot be regarded as a measure of secularisation in general (Dobbelaere, 1998). However, in his book Secularization. An Analysis at Three Levels, the author defines the societal level of this process as the one that determines the remaining levels. While Dobbelaere devotes considerable attention to the analysis of the connections between the societal and individual levels of secularisation, equally exhaustive investigations of the relationship between the organisational and individual levels of secularisation are not presented in the book. Mark Chaves, whose critique was mentioned earlier, draws attention to this problem and concludes that Dobbelaere’s concept does not meet the expectations it raises in explaining secularisation processes at the meso and micro levels.
The second problem is that while Dobbelaere does not address this issue directly, in fact all levels of secularisation are related to changes in religious communities: at the macro level as imagined communities (“we, Roman Catholics”), at the meso level – as local churches and parishes, and at the micro level – within families and small groups (such as prayer groups). Focus on the macro level turns the transformations of religious community and its dimensions into a marginal problem. Meanwhile, in light of the substantive definition of religion adopted by Dobbelaere himself (“a unified system of beliefs in practices relative to a supra-empirical, transcendent reality that unites all those who adhere to it into a single moral community”) (Dobbelaere, 2002, p. 52), the existence of a community is of fundamental importance to religion. These considerations should therefore be complemented by two key questions: how do the secularisation processes at all three levels affect the transformation of religious communities, and what are the implications of these changes for religion and its integrative functions? In order to offer more elaborate answers, one must look into the connections between the processes of individualisation and the changes of religious community and authority.
One such connection is the relationship between the followers and the religious institutions which is transformed due to the former being able to pick and choose their beliefs and gaining influence on the doctrines. According to Bryan S. Turner, these processes result in religion becoming a “low-intensity religion”: a set of rituals and services tailored to meet the demands of the faithful instead of the latter having to conform to the rules of a denomination (Turner, 2011, p. 279). Turner argues that this leads to the erosion of religious community, the disappearance of sacrum, and the dissolution of traditional authorities. Other theorists, such as Daniele Hervieu-Léger and Grace Davie, counter similar claims by arguing that religion in modern societies becomes a symbolic and cultural resource (Hervieu-Léger, 2000, p. 26; Hervieu-Léger, 2006, p. 67). Through the association with tradition, religion “may function as reawakened or invented memory for actual social groups” (Hervieu-Léger, 2000, p. 92). Collective memory is, however, by no means static: it is constantly re-enacted, re-evaluated, and transformed (Hervieu-Léger, 2000, p. 124; cf. Hałas, 2010; Kołodziejska, 2014). This dynamic involves “selective forgetting,” evoking active references, and making normative choices regarding religious heritage.
Grace Davie offers a similar perspective when she discusses vicarious religion, i.e., religion performed by an active minority on behalf of a more passive and less engaged majority (Davie, 2000, p. 59; Davie, 2006, p. 24). While members of the latter do not regularly practice, and often openly distance themselves from institutionalised religion, on special occasions they turn to religious institutions, which serve as repositories of tradition and memory, in order to celebrate rites of passage (Davie, 2000, p. 71). The availability of such resources, even if only potential or sporadic, is considered to have great value. This phenomenon can also be observed in Sweden, where the majority of citizens voted “yes” to religious services being broadcast on national television, despite the fact that only a fraction of them actually practice regularly or consider themselves religious (Linderman, 2016, pp. 75–76). In the much more religious Poland, it is customary to get married in a church, even if the future spouses do not identify as religious or practicing – according to 2015 data, over 62% of newlyweds were married in a religious rite, predominantly in the Roman Catholic Church (Główny Urząd Statystyczny [Central Statistical Office of Poland], 2016), although the number of Poles declaring regular practice is declining (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, 2015, p. 4). For many young people, opting out of a religious ceremony will involve insulting some members of the family, and therefore a church wedding can be considered part of tradition and of cultural and family heritage. Furthermore, Davie points out that vicarious religion (and vicarious memory) is associated with a shift from “obligation to consumption” when it comes to choosing practices and beliefs (Davie, 2006, p. 28). She stresses that the main drive behind making spiritual choices are private decisions and needs: with numerous religious symbols and world-views widely accessible, as well as due to pluralisation and the global media, the majority of followers become consumers of religion rather than strict adherents. Traditional ties with religious heritage do not disappear, but they are adopted to the needs of the individual: it is usually her decision how much time and effort she devotes to religious practices and what she chooses to believe in. This development goes beyond the variations of individual religiosity and defines the modes of belonging.
Secularisation on the micro level also has implications for the relationship between personal religion and the institutionalised canon. According to Thomas Luckmann (1967), mainstream sociological analyses have often equated religion with the Church, thus overlooking the place of the individual (and individual interpretations of religious doctrines) in society. Individual religiosity is naturally influenced by institutionalised, legitimised religion, which is created and guided by religious experts. By being part of a religious community, one internalises its norms, values, and morals, but also participates in practices and is subject to a certain regime of social control. However, even the most pious followers interpret religion in their own way: their engagement in practices may vary, just as their beliefs, intensity of commitment, and their eagerness to abide by the rules and norms. In other words, all followers translate institutionalised religion into an experience and practice of their own. This adaptation itself does not lead to secularisation, but when institutionalised beliefs and practices ossify and turn into routine fulfilments of specific duties, and when their interpretations are guarded by a group of experts whose discourse is impenetrable to the laity, religion turns into a specialised field and distances itself from other domains of social life. Churches as institutions become enmeshed with secular organisations, engage in worldly activities such as politics or the economy, and develop secular interests of their own. At the same time, they justify those engagements with references to the sacred in order to perform their functions as religious institutions. The interfusion of the sacred and the secular results in a decoupling of individual and Church-oriented religiosity. As religion becomes ossified within institutional and expert constraints, it changes at a much slower pace than society: new generations of believers come to live in a different world than that of their parents, and for many, their formerly traditional Churches fail to be a competent guide in the changing reality. Thus, religion becomes a worldview, or an element of a worldview referring to “the ultimate significance.” By engaging with secular affairs, the Churches become one of the providers of this “ultimate significance”, but must compete with secular institutions like psychotherapy, the media, and the market (Luckmann, 1967, p. 104). Furthermore, as Luckmann argues, religion as a worldview turns into a private affair, and, as such, it becomes easier to change and more adjustable to the challenges of modern life. The agency which is given to the individual means that she can have more freedom in deciding what aspects of religion she adapts as her own.
The aforementioned analyses show that while transformations of religion are indisputable, it must be pointed out that neither religious authority nor community has disappeared as a result of the processes of individualisation; instead, the meaning of both has changed. Thus, looking beyond the analysed concepts of secularisation, we can infer that competition on the religious marketplace on the one hand, and more agency and independence of the followers on the other, have relativised community membership and the oversight of authority. As I have shown in the Introduction, digital media have contributed to those transformations, as their use serves the manifestation of one’s religious agency. This process can be observed not only in pluralistic religious environments, but also in monoreligious milieus.
The transformations of religious authority in times of mediatisation2
Continuing the discussion on individualisation, I would like to address the issue of transformations of religious authority, including them in the context of mediatisation. In the study, I conceptualise religious authority following Mark Chaves (see the Introduction), who, in his seminal article on the decline of religious authority offers, the following understanding of authority structure:
[A]s a social structure that attempts to enforce its order and reach its ends by controlling the access of individuals to some desired goods, where the legitimation of that control includes some supernatural component, however weak.
(Chaves, 1994, pp. 755–756)
This definition has roots in the classical concept created by Max Weber and allows us to analytically compare religious authority to any other types of authority, as well as investigate the relationship between the institut...
