Nuclear Command and Control Norms

A Comparative Study

Salma Shaheen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9780367585167
• eBook ISBN: 9780429790799
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book offers a new analytical framework for studying nuclear command and control (C2), based on a comparative study of four nuclear weapons states (NWS).

The subject of nuclear operations management has long been shrouded in secrecy, and whilst the importance of nuclear C2 cannot be disputed, there are few academic studies into how and why states develop these systems. This volume includes a comparative study of the development of nuclear C2 by four different NWS (Britain, China, India, and Pakistan) and demonstrates that, despite several differences, there is a central set of factors that remain constant. The analytical framework used in this study identifies key factors that can potentially shape the evolution and stability of nuclear C2. These factors include geostrategic (threat) environment, international norms, leadership, and control of nuclear operations (civil-military control). The book also analyses the interaction among different stakeholders within the nuclear C2 enterprise. It recognises that politicians, the military and scientists all have key but different roles to play, and the way these stakeholders have learned to co-exist with each other is explored. This volume offers a set of dynamics that could form a global norm for nuclear C2, serving as a standard for new entrants into the nuclear club.

This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, global governance, and International Relations in general.

1 Analytical framework

The effective management of nuclear weapons operations heavily depends upon robust and synchronised C2 so that nuclear operations can be effectively executed with the same level of confidence during both times of crisis and peace. Moreover, states strategize their resources keeping in view the worst-case threat scenarios for which nuclear C2 of a particular nuclear force is designed. Here, there exist complex linkages amongst the stakeholders involved and between the personnel and technologies associated with the C2. The stability within nuclear weapons operations aims at maintaining conditions whereby nuclear weapons are protected against unauthorised and/or accidental use, and to ensure combat readiness and survivability, necessary for achieving a state of credible deterrence. Gradually, the system evolves with continuous interaction with external threat environment and internal challenges. In order to do this the three key stakeholders, the military, political elite, and scientists, must establish systems for the effective maintenance of: positive and negative command controls, accurate warning and attack assessment, and proper delegation of authority. To analyse how the development of nuclear C2 is fostered in each of the case studies this chapter outlines an analytical framework. It starts with an exploration of evolution and stability in the context of nuclear command and control, before three key stages of nuclear C2 development are discussed. Finally, a detailed examination of the key independent variables that are tested in this research is performed.

Evolution and stability of nuclear command and control

Stability is commonly defined as ‘the strength to stand or endure’; thereby implying firmness. The concept of stability emanates from mathematics and engineering sciences and is applied to wide range of disciplines including political stability, social stability, strategic stability, and so on. Stability is generally defined as the ‘condition in which a slight disturbance in a system does not produce too disturbing an effect on that system’ (definition from Encyclopedia Britannica). Sometimes, the concept is referred to as the ability to restore a system after experiencing a small perturbation (see Pisano, 2012: p. 8). This indicates that stable systems or organisations ‘do not contain internal pressures for change and, therefore, will change only as a result of external pressure’ (Scott et al., 1967: pp. 112–113).

The concept of evolution, however, emanates from biological sciences and was later applied to the study of economic development and organisational growth. Organisational evolutionary theories suggest different stages in the organisational life cycle through which organisations respond to their environment through variation, selection and differential retention (Murmann et al., 2003: pp. 1–19; Nonaka et al., 2006: pp. 1179–1208; Richerson et al., 2006: pp. 201–211; Safarzynska van den Bergh, 2008: pp. 5–8; Nill & Kemp, 2009: p. 669). Here, variation implies the ability to create diversity in practices and/or technologies through a continuous process of innovation. In the presence of variety in terms of practices and technologies that make the external environment uncertain and challenging, an organisation enters into the selection mode and interacts with its environment in a particular way to adapt itself in order to reduce uncertainty. Selection occurs when an organisation chooses and imitates an existing practice or technology out of the diversity existing in the environment and generates differential replication of such practice and/or technology (Safarzynska & van den Bergh, 2008: pp. 5–8). For the purpose of this research, the three stages of the organisational life cycle include the inception stage, the growth stage, and the maturity stage. These stages are sequential in form and spirit, hierarchically progressive and not easily reversible, and they are complex involving a broad range of organisational activities, operations and structures (Gottschalk & Solli-Saether, 2009: p. 109).

As organisations evolve Schein (2010: pp. 73–92) suggests that they face two major problems including external adaptation and internal integration, and for which organisational culture provides a solution. Organisations address these problems during the evolutionary stages and subsequently achieve stability. The underlying assumption of organisational evolution and stability is that simple or infant organisations set their strategic goals in line with their strategic leadership and vision. Over time organisations evolve by adapting to their environment in order to achieve their goals and to increase in size. The number of relationships among the stakeholders grows exponentially making organisations complex. Within this time, organisations tend to develop and strengthen certain norms and routines that may become resistant to change. This resistance may slow down the growth of an organisation but evolution is a constant process of change and adaptation because the environment is constantly changing. It is also possible that organisations during evolution become stable.

Some scholars think that stability is likely to impede organisational adaptation (Leana & Barry, 2000: pp. 753–759). For instance, institutional theorists argue that when networks of relationships within organisations become established and dense then new information is not likely to penetrate rapidly (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996: pp. 1022–1054; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Lawrence, 1999: pp. 161–188). The organisational actors do not exhibit a strong desire for change and prefer the existing status-quo that suits their interests. This line of thinking renders stability a negative connotation as it tends to bring stagnation where members of the organisation stop thinking about or desiring change despite their environment constantly changing. Nevertheless, stability in the relationship among the organisational actors can help the organisation to build upon its strength and progress.

Pfeffer (1981), on the contrary, argues that over time the human resource of an organisation develops effective working relationships through stable interactions and these relationships can be destroyed or disturbed by an abrupt change and uncertainty. Likewise, the transaction costs theory posits that stability benefits both employers and employees by motivating employers to invest more resources in the development of stable employees, which in turn encourages employees to develop their organisational skills and knowledge (Coase, 1937: pp. 386–405; Williamson, 1975). This generates trust among employers and employees that motivates them to successfully achieve their targets collectively (Coase, 1937: pp. 386–405; Williamson, 1975). In order to develop an effective and stable working relationship, it is important that organisational actors share a common mindset and core values, which can be assessed if the behavioural norms of the organisational actors remain consistent (Senge, 1990). Here, leaders can play an important role in establishing and institutionalising the organisational core values.

In the context of military C2, the trust among different stakeholders is critical for the effective management of military operations. For instance, during the Iran–Iraq War Iraqi President Saddam Hussein maintained assertive control over the use of chemical weapons. This led to ineffective weapons planning and Iraqi forces response to changing tactical situations on the battlefield, resulting in serious Iraqi losses in the Al Fao and Mebran campaigns (McCarthy & Tucker, 2000: pp. 63–65). The reason for maintaining assertive control was that Saddam Hussein never trusted his senior air force officials, therefore, he did not allocate important weapons and missions to the Iraqi air force (McCarthy & Tucker, 2000: p. 72). Gregory F. Giles (2000: p. 98) observes a similar state of affairs in his study of Iranian C2 of chemical weapons. In order to contain the Iranian military’s desires to play pivotal role in politics, the mullahs in Iran created Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and multiple rather overlapping organisations such as Political Ideological Directorate (PID) and Imam’s Representatives (IR) to ensure tight political control over the armed forces and weapons. The IRGC has acquired the physical custody of chemical weapons because the IRGC is more politically reliable than the regular military and is influential among radical clerics. The Supreme Leader of Iran who is the commander-in-chief according to the constitution gives the consent to unconventional weapon use; however, in the case of a decapitation strike the regular military would be constrained to access and use chemical weapons leading to a ‘fail-safe’ C2 system. This mistrust is not healthy for establishing a stable working relationship among the civil and military authorities, which is critical for the development of C2.

The above discussion implies that stable working relationship among the organisational stakeholders does not impede organisational evolution to a better form; however, abrupt and unpredictable change may threaten to break the stable relationship within the organisation that may disturb or halt the organisational growth. The organisational growth is necessary to meet the changing requirements of the environment and stability is required for the effective working of an organisation. Therefore, there has to be a balance where change in the guise of growth should not threaten the stable working relationship within the organisation and these stable relationships should not become complacent about the existing way of life in the organisation. Another important driving factor of the organisation is its mission or leadership’s vision for the organisation according to which an organisation develops and any change in that mission or leadership’s vision would lead to change occurring throughout the organisation (Nielsen et al., 1995: pp. 35–59). However, the change in organisational mission is a planned change as opposed to an abrupt change that will not threaten the stability within the organisation. Therefore, maintenance of stability during organisational evolution is critical yet necessary in order to avoid uncertainty to an extent.

Nuclear C2 at different stages of development

When considering the stability of nuclear C2 it is also important to note that such systems do not spring into existence but instead undergo a process of evolution. Drawing on the organisational literature (Bruderer & Singh, 1996: pp. 1322–1349) three key stages inception, growth, and maturity are identified during the evolution of nuclear C2. When evaluating the stability of a nuclear C2 system it is important to consider which stage the programme is in.

1 Inception stage: In the context of nuclear C2, during the inception stage the state achieves an operational nuclear capability and develops structures to ensure deterrence. The organisations involved will likely be relatively small in size and relatively simple bureaucracies at this point. The prime concern will be survival, including the need to establish its position and to gain legitimacy within the state’s infrastructure as well as in the international system. Technical efficiency is another key requirement necessary at this stage. It is also important to secure financial resources, to have strong stakeholder motivations to cooperate and to keep informal communication and structures, and centralisation. Leaders are also likely to have a particularly influential role in shaping how the nuclear C2 system develops.

2 Growth stage: During this stage, nuclear C2 systems will increase in terms of size and complexity, which will make efficient communication between stakeholders more challenging. Greater emphasis will likely be placed on weapons production and diverse technological development, which requires greater planning within the nuclear C2 system. This requires establishing more formal rules and procedures within the nuclear C2 structure. A clear chain of command will likely be institutionalised, which will lead to functional specialisation and departmentalisation. This will place an onus on increased coordination and collaboration among the different stakeholders and the sharing of experiences in order to avoid stagnation.

3 Maturity stage: As the nuclear C2 system enters the maturity stage, existing rules and procedures will make the structure rigid and may inhibit its adaptability to environmental changes and slow down growth. By now, patterns of norms, organisational beliefs and working relationships among stakeholders have become institutionalised and the organisation will have developed high-levels of competence in certain practices and technologies. At this stage, it may become difficult for the nuclear C2 system to respond to significant strategic change and move from its developmental path. Here, there is a risk that the organisation may become irrelevant and move towards decline.

Being dynamic in nature, evolution continuously requires the organisation to undergo a process of change; however, organisations are composed of humans that tend to develop internal relationships that are strengthened over time. The routine interactions or standard operating procedures (SOPs) among organisational actors become their way of life in dealing with each other. Organisations also become familiar with their external environment and may foresee the changes likely to occur in the environment. This tendency brings stability within the organisation that may slow down the organisational growth but is not likely to impede the growth process. Over time the nuclear C2 becomes complex and so does the working relationship among its stakeholders; the stability of this is an important factor for the development and strengthening of nuclear C2. The nuclear C2 works around the dynamics of nuclear deterrence that requires a response to the threats and challenges emanating from its external environment. In order to respond or adapt to this environment, nuclear C2 requires establishing cohesion among its stakeholders and developing an appropriate nuclear force. In this context, the following section explores the relation between external and internal factors in order to identify independent variables for this thesis.

Being a strategic and state-run organisation, the nuclear C2 produces, maintains and operates devastating weapon systems that not only require expanded defence budgets but also advanced technological infrastructure. In order to maintain a technological niche to ensure national security, states are required to spend decades of hard work on the R&D related to nuclear weapons; once they develop nuclear warheads and their delivery systems then it becomes relatively easy to continue the subsequent production and pursue technological advancement.

The external environment in terms of threatening geo-strategic environment and nuclear weapons norms developing and/or developed at international level including technological developments is, to a great extent, stable with regards to rapid changes. In other words, nuclear C2 can predict changes in its external environment because any change, either geo-strategic or nuclear weapons norms, will take a significant amount of time to surface. Developments such as procurement of parts or whole delivery systems, development of nuclear plants, training of strategic forces, release of official documents or statements, deals or agreements signed between states, negotiations/development at international level are significant enough for the nuclear C2 to predict change in its environment. However, the uncertainty and complexity in terms of technological advancement and associated force posture and doctrines developed by NWS indigenously remain, to a great extent, unpredictable. Moreover, uncertainty increases with the lack of trust in adversary’s plans for conducting nuclear operations in times of crisis.

The nuclear C2, nonetheless, faces a challenging environment because of constant development and maintenance, sometimes reactive and sometimes competitive, of strategic forces by adversaries. More so, the uncertainty in external environment to which it tries to generate an effective response in order to ensure its own survival and to gain legitimacy from the environment, differs for every state. However, any challenge or uncertainty in environment depends on the perception of organisational stakeholders. Therefore, generating an effective response depends on the way stakeholders of nuclear C2 perceive the challenges, opportunities and threats in the environment. Also, the interaction among stakeholders will define the nature of control over nuclear operations – either military or civilian, or a combination of both.

Factors affecting nuclear C2

Geo-strategic environment

The geo-strategic environment of a nuclear weapon state entails the impact of geography at two levels. First, it encompasses the physical environment within which the NWS exists including the broader international system, its immediate neighbourhood and the terrain that influences the state’s national security policy, posture and weapons development. Second, it involves the NWS’s beliefs and values that originate from its specific neighbourhood and terrain. There exists a deep connection between the physical environment of a state and its beliefs. As Colin Gray (2006: p. 167) notes, ‘The physical characteristics of each distinctive geographical environment, …, yield noticeably distinctive strategic cultural attitudes and beliefs’. For instance, as Naoko (1999: pp. 69–70) notes, Japan and the United Kingdom enjoy significant autonomy in terms of the development of their own culture because of their island status.

Geography influences a state’s strategy. For instance, the strategic depth of a state shapes its thought processes. A lack of strategic depth is likely to induce sensitivity towards the threat of surprise attack or territorial loss of any nature however insignificant. In the case of the Arab–Israeli conflict, Israel predominantly lacked strategic depth prior 1967 as the distance from the border with Jordan to Mediterranean was a few kilometres and the majority of the Israeli population lived in this area (Tal, 2008: p. 136). This type of geographical setting can induce a strong sense of national vulnerability which, if subsequently reinforced by stringent threat perception through recurrent wars and crises, can become consistent and persistent over generations.

In the case of a lack of geographical depth for an NWS, Peter Feaver (1992–1993: p. 175) argues that the enemy would know the weapons of the NWS and locations and this provides an incentive to such NWS to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict before the enemy can destroy them. This early nuclear use requires delegative nuclear C2. With a lack of strategic depth, for instance, Israel possesses the only advantage of having shorter lines of supply and communication. However, the presence of shorter lines of communication and logistics can convince the command authority to keep the system centralised as transportation and the deployment of weapon system can occur in less time. It is also possible that if the civil and military forces share similar perceptions and beliefs vis-à-vis enemy and the conventional/nuclear forces then the consensus or agreement can be reached among the civil and military forces about the purpose of the particular weapons and contingencies for the use of such weapons. This homogeneity of attitudes within the system may be conducive for delegation but not the necessary condition.

Taking a cue from organisational literature, when organisational stakeholders are faced with an uncertain environment that induces anxiety or fear of survival, then such a situation can motivate them to work together closely to generate an effective response in order to reduce environmental uncertainty (Shein, 2004). Organisations will continue to use such a response repeatedly if it has effectively avoided the anxiety or fear of survival in the past (Shein, 2004). This can result in the development of a certain type of framework or prism, according to which environment is perceived by the organisations. Likewise, the path-dependency perspective suggests that past events and their sequence in the organisational history influence the processes and events in later periods (Fear, 2001: p. 162). The baseline argument is that history matters; what actors do today is influenced by what they did yesterday (Fear, 2001: p. 162).

Organisati...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 Analytical framework
• 2 British nuclear command and control
• 3 Chinese nuclear command and control
• 4 Indian nuclear command and control
• 5 Pakistan’s nuclear command and control
• 6 Comparative analysis of case studies
• 7 Building nuclear command and control norm
• Bibliography
• Index