The White House and White Africa

Presidential Policy Toward Rhodesia During the UDI Era, 1965-1979

Eddie Michel

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9780429843297
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: African History
• Index: History

This book offers an insightful analysis of presidential policy towards Rhodesia during the UDI era of 1965-1979. Michel provides an informative account of the stance adopted by the differing presidential administrations towards Salisbury and highlights the shifting alignment of the global and domestic dynamics that shaped decision-making. The book also explores the complex relationship between pragmatism and morality in formulating policy, and Michel considers intriguing questions over the competing visions within Washington of what constituted pragmatism or morality during the era of decolonization.

1 Measured Hostility

President Lyndon B. Johnson

On November 11, 1965, the day of UDI, President Lyndon B. Johnson and his senior advisers were gathered at his ranch near Austin, known as the Texas White House. The immediate reaction of the Johnson administration to UDI was one of criticism and condemnation. In a press statement, Secretary of State Dean Rusk declared unequivocally that the White House deplored UDI and as a result the United States would not recognize the rebel regime and would furthermore immediately recall its Consul General from Salisbury. For the remainder of the Johnson era, the White House remained privately and publicly critical of continued white minority rule in Rhodesia and sought to undermine or force concessions from the pariah regime through financial pressure and trade embargoes. The administration, however, was not prepared to countenance more extreme measures that could threaten U.S. interests or inflame domestic politics and racial tensions.¹

President Johnson, widely known by the acronym LBJ, had been vice president under John F. Kennedy and ascended to the White House following the assassination of Kennedy on November 22, 1963. While Johnson was in many ways an intimidating and ruthless career politician from rural Texas whose administration was dominated by the escalating conflict in Vietnam, he also possessed an idealistic and compassionate nature and held a firm commitment to aiding those groups, notably the poor and the African-American community, which he felt needed the aid and protection of the U.S. Government. His dedication to his beliefs is demonstrated by a domestic legacy which included the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting racial segregation in public facilities, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Great Society legislation designed to end poverty and improve the quality of life for all Americans.

The position developed by LBJ regarding Rhodesia was shaped by a number of significant factors. First, Johnson and many of his key advisers, including Rusk, viewed the Rhodesian issue as primarily a British responsibility but equally one in which America would support the United Kingdom both bilaterally and in international forums such as the UN. As observed by Lake, the so-called “special relationship” between London and Washington mattered deeply to Johnson, who felt it a basic American interest to continue to develop close political, security and economic ties with Britain. The administration was also aware that London no longer possessed the economic or military power to achieve its goal of ending UDI without active tangible U.S. assistance.²

Leading figures in the administration, however, including Rusk, under Secretary of State George Ball and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, expressed reservations about taking measures beyond those adopted by the British. It was felt that London was trying to push Washington to take the lead on the Rhodesian issue, which could mean the United States sharing the blame for the failure of any initiatives and furthermore could prove potentially damaging to geopolitical and economic interests. The White House while remaining supportive of Britain, nevertheless, acted according to what the Johnson administration saw as its own geopolitical, economic and domestic interests.³

Secondly, it is important to note that Johnson held a deep personal interest in ending white supremacy, whether it existed in the Mississippi delta or in a distant African country. After taking office he told a White House staff member that “I’m going to be the best friend the Negro ever had.” On March 15, 1965, in a speech to a joint session of Congress entitled the “American Promise,” LBJ stated unequivocally that if America proved incapable of the task of achieving equal rights for African-Americans then “we will have failed as a people and a nation.” This commitment to racial equality was not merely domestic in scope. In a less than subtle gesture, LBJ dispatched a copy of the “American Promise” to South African Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd, the so-called “architect of apartheid.”⁴

LBJ was also influenced by the need to retain prestige and protect interests in the newly independent African states. As noted by Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, G. Mennen Williams, not only did Africa’s huge land mass and air space have great strategic importance but African nations possessed a large free-world percentage of certain minerals critical to American interests. Africa also offered lucrative markets for export, and Washington had both a strategic and humanitarian interest in promoting democracy and encouraging economic and social improvements.⁵

The White House was well aware that the extent of U.S. influence in black Africa was intrinsically linked to the stance that Washington took on the issues of primary interest to the Africans themselves. The president and his advisers were also cognizant of the fact that the ending of white minority rule in southern Africa was of paramount importance to the black African states. In December 1965, Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert W. Komer informed LBJ that the Africans viewed Rhodesia as a straight anti-colonial issue and U.S. actions on UDI would greatly affect American influence on the continent.⁶

The changing power dynamic at the UN also affected the response to UDI. As observed by Glenda Sluga, at the time of its establishment the UN was comprised of fifty-one member states, the majority of which were either European or part of the ‘White British Commonwealth.’ By the Sixties, however, the postcolonial bloc had become increasingly powerful; indeed by 1960 the number of newly independent colonies meant it had become impossible for the United States and Western allies to muster enough votes to deprive the Afro-Asians of the two-thirds majority needed for resolutions. This Afro-Asian bloc further sought to mobilize the power and resources of the UN to achieve their own objectives. High on the agenda was the increasingly volatile issue of the white minority governments in southern Africa. As early as December 1960, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 1514, the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,” which demanded a swift end to colonial rule.⁷

The increasing power of the Afro-Asians forced the West to rely on Third World diplomatic support for their geopolitical goals at the UN. This salient fact was noted not only by U.S. UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, but also by officials at the State Department and the White House. If the United States did not take a strong line on Rhodesia then this would adversely affect American objectives at the UN. It is important to note, however, the Johnson administration did not allow the UN to simply dictate policy on Rhodesia. At the UN Security Council, U.S. representatives opposed far-reaching measures including the use of military force, and together with London sought to preempt or moderate the demands of the more extreme Afro-Asians and replace them with more practical and peaceful solutions.⁸

The White House position on UDI was also heavily influenced by disquiet with the growth of communist interest in and effect on African affairs. As early as the 1957 Bermuda Conference both Britain and the United States had expressed strategic concerns about Soviet and Chinese influence in Africa. By April of 1965, the CIA observed that the USSR had cultivated diplomatic relations with twenty-one states in sub-Saharan Africa, and Communist China had relations with twelve countries in the region. The early Sixties also witnessed a startling increase in communist economic and military aid to the newly independent black nations, as well as funds, covert arms shipments and guerrilla training to the liberation movements fighting white minority rule.⁹

Intelligence reports at the time indicated that there was little danger of a broad communist takeover of the African continent and most newly independent African nations were unlikely to develop more than token relations with the communist bloc. The African desire for non-alignment in the Cold War, the massive amounts of aid received from Western sources and the inapplicability of key parts of communist ideology to the African political milieu reduced the chances of communist penetration.¹⁰

The ‘White Redoubt’ in southern Africa, however, provided an opportunity for communist meddling and exploitation. The Soviets and Communist Chinese were unburdened by a colonial legacy and unlike London or Washington were not encumbered by close political or economic ties to the white regimes. In the words of National Security Council Staffer (NSC) staffer Robert Komer, the communists were able to pose as “the apostles of decolonization.” Moreover, the longer the minority governments remained in power the greater the opportunities for communist sway over the leadership of the liberation groups. A widespread racial conflict in the region could lead to a sharp decrease in Western influence and a growth in power of pro-communist and other indigenous radicals.¹¹

The Johnson administration, however, was also cognizant of the need to avoid actions which would damage relations with the other members of the ‘White Redoubt.’ During the LBJ era, the United States retained close strategic and economic ties with both Portugal and South Africa, both of whom were key allies and trading partners of the isolated regime in Salisbury. Both Lisbon and Pretoria were vehemently anti-communist and the United States benefited from close military ties with both nations. Portugal was a key NATO ally while South Africa monitored Soviet activities in the south Atlantic as well as provided facilities for both U.S. aircraft and naval vessels. The apartheid state also hosted an important NASA tracking station at Hartebeesthoek, near Johannesburg.¹²

Washington also possessed substantial economic ties with South Africa and the Portuguese Territories. In terms of direct assets, U.S. companies invested approximately $650 million in South Africa along with a further $10–20 million in South West Africa, which was controlled by Pretoria. Portuguese Africa was also a major receipient of capital; the Mozambican economy alone possessed $25 million of American investments. South Africa was also a major supplier of minerals, including chromium and uranium, which were vital components of a number of U.S. industries, including nuclear power generation, chemical manufacturing and the space program.¹³

The Rhodesian UDI also occurred at a key point in U.S. political history. By the mid-1960s the domestic conservative movement was transitioning from a primarily Sunbelt social movement into a national political driving force. In 1964, only one year before the Rhodesian UDI, Barry Goldwater, a U.S. Senator from Arizona and an uncompromising conservative, triumphed in the Republican presidential primaries. Despite his defeat in the national election his victory in the primaries was indicative of the increasing power of social conservatism. Indeed, Goldwater’s book entitled The Conscience of a Conservative, which offered an explanation of conservative theory, became a national bestseller.¹⁴

Domestically, Rhodesia enjoyed considerable support among the American public, notably white Americans and conservatives. Presidential correspondence reveals widespread backing for Salisbury and criticism of the U.S. Government’s hostility towards a ‘friendly’ nation. A plethora of pro-Rhodesian interest groups also sprung up post-UDI, including most notably the Friends of Rhodesian Independence which by June 1967 claimed 122 branches with 25,000 members. These groups often possessed colorful and quite bizarre names including the memorable Rhodesian Gung-Ho Troops and Hooray for Ian Smith, Titan of Rhodesian Yearning.¹⁵

In Congress, while a number of liberal figures, such as Congressman Donald M. Fraser (D-Minnesota) and Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts), urged LBJ to take tough measures against Salisbury there also existed an influential pro-Rhodesia Lobby on Capitol Hill. This lobby included not only southern conservatives, such as Senator James Eastland (D-Mississippi) and Representative Joe Waggoner (D-Louisiana), but also figures such as Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), Congressman Harold R. Gross (R-Iowa) and Congressman Durwood G. Hall (R-Missouri). While race certainly played a role for some in explaining their support for the Rhodesians, others questioned American aggression against a non-hostile nation and wondered why LBJ appeared so eager to aid Britain when London was continuing to trade with Cuba and North Vietnam. Given the support that Salisbury enjoyed among the public and on Capitol Hill, including from conservative Democrats, Johnson feared that any radical steps taken against Salisbury which led to an intensification of the racial conflict in southern Africa could stimulate greater domestic support for the increasingly influential conservative movement.¹⁶

As pointed out by Horne, the White House also had grave concerns that an escalation of the situation in Rhodesia could further inflame political and social ethnic tensions in the United States itself in the aftermath of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts, and thus wished to avoid actions that would lead to a violent split along racial lines in southern Africa. In spring 1965, the meeting of the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa to create a permanent black pressure group to influence U.S. foreign policy was viewed with alarm and concern by the administration. It was feared that the appearance of an “ethnic lobby” on Africa could lead to a segregated approach to foreign policy.¹⁷

In the case of Rhodesia, therefore, the White House strove to tread ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures
• Chronology
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Measured Hostility: President Lyndon B. Johnson
• 2 The Luster of Chrome: President Richard M. Nixon
• 3 Laying the Foundations for Peace: President Gerald R. Ford
• 4 From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: President Jimmy Carter
• Conclusion
• Index