Norbert Elias and the Analysis of History and Sport

Systematizing Figurational Sociology

Joannes Van Gestel

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9781351212656
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

In times when the social sciences have become increasingly fragmented and more focused on 'the pieces of the puzzle', the puzzle, as a topic in its own right, has slowly been moved towards the background. Nonetheless, as humanity becomes ever more globalized, there is a greater need for in-depth discussion on the theory behind the direction of humanity in history and the interrelationships between the different areas in which humans associate, including that of leisure and sport.

At its heart, Norbert Elias and the Analysis of History and Sport explains both the course of history and how the roles that leisure and sport have occupied in it should be investigated. Exploring this from Norbert Elias' figurational (or process sociological) standpoint, the book offers a unique perspective as Van Gestel approaches the theoretical concepts and ideas by systematizing the views of the iconic scholar and offers new insights into his central theory. Furthermore, drawing upon theoretical principles that are universal to humans rather than relative to a case study, Van Gestel offers an applicable guideline which explains phenomena beyond specific cultures or circumstances that have so far been a customary practice by process sociologists.

Norbert Elias and the Analysis of History and Sport is a valuable title which will appeal to postgraduate students and scholars interested in fields such as social studies, leisure and sport studies, and history.

Chapter 1

Sociology as an academic discipline

Understanding Elias

Norbert Elias is one of sociology’s best-read protagonists and made his mark on the general sociological world with publications such as What Is Sociology? (1978), The Established and the Outsiders (with J. L. Scotson, 1965), The Germans (with Michael Schröter and Eric Dunning, 1996) and especially his most famous work, The Civilizing Process (1939). The stream of thought that characterized his work was termed ‘figurational sociology’ although, according to Johan Goudsblom, Elias himself was fonder of the term ‘process sociology’ (Jarvie, 2006, p. 26). Even though the term ‘figurational sociology’ is what is most widely used (and was therefore the reason for its inclusion in the title of this book), it will be referred to within the text as ‘process sociology’ because of Elias’s apparent preference for that term. This is not done in a discriminating fashion and is with all due respect for the term ‘figurational sociology’. Notwithstanding such fame within sociological circles, it is in the sociology of sport and leisure that Elias is perhaps most revered. Often in association with Eric Dunning, Elias made it clear that this area of investigation deserved to be treated with seriousness and that it deserved a place on the sociological curriculum. They were not wrong; and with problems such as burn-out, stress and depression at the heart of today’s sociological discussions, this is where the sociology of sport and leisure ought to be too.

For the duration of his lifetime, Norbert Elias was very much at odds with other perspectives that he and others invalidated. A breakaway from mainstream sociological and philosophical thought was already apparent in his early career with Richard Hönigswald and Karl Mannheim. Later, and through empirical research, Elias redefined the sociological discipline, breaking away from what he called ‘scientific atomism’ (1998, p. 114). Although Stephen Mennell (1992, p. x) correctly stated that the contents of Elias’s writings are quite brilliant, he admitted that the architecture of them is very complicated, and that this results in many scholars giving up on his work because it is intellectually difficult to work out and the consistency is hard to find. Mennell already successfully summarized Elias’s ideas in his publication, as have others like Van Krieken (2003, 2005) and Goudsblom (1987), but individuals require a unique approach to tackle a problem. I have therefore attempted to do so too, but from an approach that suited me best, and that is quite different from what has been done previously. What struck me is that the approaches that are used by the most eminent sociological theorists (including those who adhere to process sociology) presume a pre-existing knowledge on the subject on the reader’s part. Given the sense of importance attributed to such documents as The Civilizing Process and others, it is very logical to use them as the starting point for discussions of process sociology. Such an approach can leave many readers with a sense of discomfort, and hence there is a need for an exploration of this perspective from an analytical standpoint that permits a more obvious build-up. It is a given that remarks and criticism shall rise from such a publication, but perhaps some good will come from this, too. An unconventional approach does not necessarily equal an inconvenient approach. If it were only to raise interest in the subject matter, it will have been of benefit. Additionally, it is my wish that this outline may add knowledge on the process sociological perspective so that it may strengthen it, force changes to it, or possibly even lead me to refute it altogether. The way in which this book is written may give the impression that there is considerable agreement between process sociologists and that I may therefore treat the idea of process sociology rather dogmatically. It is certainly the case that not all followers of Norbert Elias agree with one another, nor do they agree completely with what Elias wrote. I do sympathize with readers who may get the impression that I am rather uncritical of the process sociological perspective as I have opted not to face such discussions head-on. I have instead attempted to provide a vision of process sociology that is my own, taking on board ideas with which I agree while leaving out those with which I do not. At times, some points of contention are also addressed.

When sociologists, or students of sociology or social sciences, attempt to grasp the core concepts of process sociology, they tend to use other often-classical frames of social thought. This may turn out problematic as initially it may seem to have similarities with a number of more ‘intercompeting’ traditions. This in itself is not surprising, as Norbert Elias was well-read in publications by such scholars as Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber and Sigmund Freud, among others. However, instead of simply ‘borrowing’ what he found useful, he transformed concepts which to him appeared useful but nevertheless incorrect, and added some of his own original ideas to arrive at a distinct sociological tradition. This was largely unintentional as he primarily wished to simply revise and restructure conventional sociological thinking. I believe the legacy of Norbert Elias to sociological thought is very much underestimated, and he deserves a greater appreciation than he has enjoyed up to now. Of course, Norbert Elias is not a background figure in sociological theory. I do believe though that his views have been largely misunderstood by sociological thinkers, among whom are both sympathizers and even other process sociologists. While process sociologists agree upon a number of fundamentals on which Norbert Elias’s framework is based, there are certainly also differences among them. Perhaps this can be exemplified by the arguments between Rojek (1995, pp. 54–55, in Dunning, 1999) and Dunning (1999, pp. 34–36) on the apparent claims of ‘object adequacy’ and ‘detachment’ in social research. In the years that I have been fortunate enough to study and read on process sociology, I have come to find Norbert Elias very much as a misunderstood man. It is as if he created a puzzle from pieces mostly borrowed from other sociologists but reshaped them so that they would interlink, or line up almost perfectly. To many sociologists, though, there are pieces missing. To me, it is not as if Elias did not create or reshape these pieces, but he sometimes put them ‘under the carpet’ or ‘dropped them somewhere’ and only he knew where to find them. His drive to continue writing into his elder years on sociology bears testimony to this, as did his urge to finish the picture of his idea of sociology before the inevitable was to overcome him. However much the puzzle seems to miss pieces to the sociologists of today and yesterday, to Norbert Elias the different parts of sociology and how they were connected made perfect sense. In the process of describing my understanding of process sociology, I hope to get across a concise version of the puzzle, as I believe Norbert Elias believed society and its developments should be analysed. In the process of addressing a number of issues (among which are several key issues of process sociology) I hope to also clarify their meaning a little more deeply and thus help provide an overall and coherent view of the theory of process sociology.

The point of origin when discussing process sociology is different with every author. One may start from the theoretical concepts of figurations or power balances, or from empirical material as Elias demonstrated the occurrence of long-term social processes. Some of Elias’s followers and sympathisers do start with explaining the misconception of the ideas of conventional frameworks that utilize the terms ‘macrostructure’ or ‘superstructure’, and place this as a dichotomy versus the term ‘microstructure’. Others begin by empirically discussing the change in manners that people have undergone. Both ways of introduction have their advantages as well as their disadvantages. They are both preoccupied with a certain sub-aspect of process sociology, and it proves difficult to later return to a more general picture of the theory of historical development. The work of Norbert Elias is characterized by a remarkable degree of unity, yet few authors have managed to portray this oneness in a coherent manner. The likes of Stephen Mennell, Johan Goudsblom, Robert van Krieken and Eric Dunning are among those few. In contemporary society it appears almost common sense to encounter research that deals exclusively with ‘a piece of the puzzle’. Much more uncommon on today’s agenda is the issue of the puzzle itself. Not only natural scientists but also human and social scientists, and even process sociologists, have often overlooked the contribution of their work to explaining the complete picture. In sociology, this would mean the explanation of the history of human societies. If asked what term is associated most with the study of Norbert Elias, it would be surprising to not hear the words ‘civilizing process’ and ‘figurations’, although some may even start out with the Eliasian idea of ‘interdependence’. This wouldn’t be abnormal either, as the two works for which Elias is best known are The Civilizing Process (first published in 1939) and What is Sociology? It is in this last publication that the idea of figurations is referred to extensively.

Contrary to the use of the abovementioned concepts that are inextricably linked to Elias, the introduction of the idea of ‘constraints’ to which humans are exposed facilitates maintaining sight over the total process-sociological framework, and prevents it from seemingly consisting of different theoretical ideas that are relatively independent. The most convenient point to start this discussion is Norbert Elias’s introduction of his views on the topic in an article in The Norbert Elias Reader (Goudsblom & Mennell, 1998). Conversely, what process sociologists describe as ‘constraints’ are at the same time enabling ideas. Why then focus on or use ‘constraints’ rather than ‘possibilities’? The idea of constraints is more ‘all embracing’ as one could say that a sports car can drive at 200 mph. This may be less effective in explaining the possibilities of the car in terms of speed as it is perhaps capable of driving even faster, and it would be better to state that the sports car is limited to a speed of 200 mph. It is perhaps not the most common approach, but focusing on constraints rather than possibilities certainly assists in defining the contours of the social aspects. The word ‘constraint’ defines a border around all of the properties of a concept, whereas the word ‘possibility’ may imply more, and therefore create confusion far more easily.

An overview of these constraints along with further elaborations on them is a convenient way of building up towards key features of process sociology, and will be addressed in subsequent chapters.

The uncertainty of the social scientist

The principal question of this chapter is which topics social scientists address and how they investigate them. The principal objects of sociology are the bonds that exist between the people. It studies how people are related to each other; furthermore, it investigates how such bonds between people change over time. While it has a historical dimension, it should not be confused with ‘history’ as a science. It uses historical facts or historical empirical data (among other factors) to determine the directions of the relationships that people have with one another. Sociology could be considered an anomaly within the social sciences in that it recognizes that the history of humans is shaped by ‘the behaviour of humans’. A ‘holistic’ approach is one that is not practiced widely within the ‘sectional’ or ‘subject specific’ trends that are evident in today’s schools of sociological thought, but such an approach deserves far better treatment. The issue of the principal subject matter of sociology is far from resolved simply because it seems to have recently ‘gone out of fashion’.

Science and knowledge

Science is a concept that is attuned to human capabilities. For centuries man has attempted to make sense of the world by witnessing events and formulating theories. It may be surprising to read that the differences between the sciences and humanities, or ‘arts’, are often just a matter of approach. For some, the natural sciences are considered to be the only ‘true sciences’; they also rest on the assumption of the truth of manmade theoretical concepts or models. This does though present us with several conceptual questions. Not only do we witness the changes in the structure of chemical compounds or the changes of the strength of the sun across the seasons, but mankind also makes observations on the behaviour of people and the differences between the ways in which they live together.

In tackling the issue of sociology on the abundance of scientific disciplines, I refer to Popper (1957, in Weyns, 2014, p. 13), who wrote that the social sciences have not yet found their Galilei. However, the adoption of the notion that knowledge is only scientific when it has been obtained through the application of certain methods, today largely borrowed from the natural sciences, is open to criticism on at least two accounts. First, such claims would approach the nature of current methodologies as perfect. Continuously, even from within the disciplines that themselves address the issues of scientific methodology (both quantitative and qualitative), criticisms are being ventilated on their own methods and improvements are constantly being made. Second, the philosophy of scientific investigation itself proclaims that science does not offer certainty through the possibilities of posing hypotheses that are either not falsifiable, or where alternative hypotheses can only be accepted with a certain degree of error. How then is it still defendable that the aim of science is to acquire knowledge only through the application of a certain set of methodological possibilities? One could argue that it is not science at all, but religion that offers certainty on the occurrence of phenomena of a natural or social nature. As I have already indicated, quantitative methods of investigation are not without their merits and should not be ignored in the social sciences. At the end of the day, indicators for the investigation of social processes have to come from somewhere and may be constituted from a multiplicity of data types, including quantitative data.

Despite the many frustrations of social scientists in their inability to predict social events with the same precision that natural scientists can predict theirs, both share a number of overlooked similarities. It has to be said that although Popper and his advocates, followers and sympathizers all stress the regularities of the natural sciences and the uniqueness of the human being and human societies, Elias was very critical of the statements of Popper with regard to social sciences (Dunning & Hughes, 2013, p. 71) on many aspects. It is sufficient here to state that the uniqueness of human beings and human societies is very relative. Popper stated that history could not be scientific because of the uniqueness of historical events. It would not be possible to formulate testable laws. Elias responded that uniqueness is not confined to history but is also to be found in the subject matter of other sciences. He was correct, as even the smallest of substance particles are unique; for example, atoms of the same type may possess a different number of neurons. In addition, uniqueness is a very relative concept depending on the level at which it is studied. Every human being is unique, yet “individual human beings are themselves repetitions of an unchanging form, and what differs between people now appears as a variation of the ever-recurring basic pattern” (Elias, in Dunning & Hughes, 2013, p. 71). Elias here points to the repetitive human form across generations, yet human biology caters for the creation of a unique human being that is the result of reproduction. It also addresses the issue of human historical events being repeated as, although human societies are unique, some characteristics of human behaviour, as well as certain types of events, are repeated throughout history. This is also largely dependent on the proximity with which one approaches such behaviour and events. For example, warfare has typified human history, yet every war is unique.

The complexity and simplicity of reductionism

Notwithstanding the historically longer academic traditions of the natural sciences (physics and chemistry) and mathematics, today humans are intellectually not capable of explaining observations such as economic crises or holy wars by studying them using the principal matters of the natural sciences. In order to comprehend and appreciate the developments, reductionist models are formulated in order to give a better understanding to these streams of thought. At first such a claim may read as quite extraordinary for a writer in the process sociological tradition, as process sociologists are known for their attempts to avoid the traps of reductionist thinking. The confusion may stem from the matter one tries to reduce. What Elias attempted to avoid were reductionist perspectives on the approach of the discipline that is sociology. This included the reductionism to the methodological ideas of the natural sciences, as well as reductionist explanatory approaches by employment of determinism, as these are evident in different strands of both Marxism and behaviourism, to name but two. The issue of reductionism within the human sciences, and the drawbacks it has, were already discussed in a previous publication (Van Gestel, 2007).

The enforcement of sociologists to reduce their subject matter to objects that are at the mercy of the ways of the natural sciences is quite problematic. This has been a cause of problems and concerns for sociologists as Norbert Elias famously claimed:

The difficulty which one encounters here, it seems to me, is closely connected with an uncertainty among sociologists about the aim of scientific research. This aim, as far as I can see, is the same in all the sciences. Put simply and cursorily, the aim is to make known something previously unknown to human beings. It is to advance human knowledge, to make it more certain or better fitting and, in somewhat more technical terms, to extend the fund of human symbols to areas not covered by it before. The aim is, as I have said, discovery.

(1986, p. 20)

Specifically, with the imperfection and the continuous development of the scientific models of the natural sciences borne in mind, what Elias means is that discovery itself is the aim of science, and not the application of scientific methodology. I do not claim that such methods of investigation are without their merits and should be disregarded, as I am sure Elias did not do either. In fact, in their own fields they have proven their worth manifold. In order to study other streams of thought, though, perhaps the models of the natural sciences may prove less effective and other measures should be considered. Philosophically I therefore do not disregard the employment of ‘traditional’ methods of investigation, but I agree with Norbert Elias that the legitimation of science is discovery itself.

In returning to the issue of the advocated employment of ‘reductionism’, perhaps the neglected question may then also concern what is comprehensible for humans, and to what level the human sciences should adopt reductionist perspectives. Moreover, if humans are to employ other models than those of the natural sciences, do they cover sufficient grounds for explaining the human world? Man does not simply behave at random, nor does he behave in the same way in different social contexts. As will be highlighted later, our social experiences are ‘lived’ in different social contexts that are relatively autonomous from each other. A number of these contexts are the principal surroundings of the sociology of sport and leisure, and what follows should be regarded as a contribution to the knowledge in this field of expertise. The employment of a ‘reductionist perspective’ deals with the way in which humans can ‘digest’ information and explain phenomena by pouring them into theories. It therefore deals with the reductionism of the plethora of (bio)chemical or ‘natural’ processes into changes that are of a behavioural way, and in time lead to the observation of processes that are of a social characteristic. Humans are acting biological beings but they are unable to explain social phenomena such as wars, stock market crashes or refugee migrations by referring to the individual biochemical processes that are involved. They are unable to digest such matters. Dan Dennett (TED, 2003) explained this issue relatively well, although the issue on which he was speaking was the philosophy of consciousness. It can easily be employed to refer to the issue of sociology and observable phenomena. In his presentation, Dennett discussed the philosopher’s approach to explaining how a magician can saw a person in two (a famous magic trick). The philosopher’s explanation is that he does not saw the person in half, it only appears that he does: it is an illusion. When the philosopher is subsequently asked how he does that, he answers that it is not his area of expertise or his department. This is also applicable to sociology. The question is: “Where does a sociologist’s expertise begin, or rather ‘should begin’, and where does it end?” In reducing their discipline to classifiable, large-scale events, many perspectives do not address the issue of human motivations, or just acknowledge the fact that humans have moti...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• Contents of this book
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Sociology as an academic discipline
• 2 Basic levels of integration – natural and physical constraints
• 3 Psychological constraints
• 4 Social constraints
• 5 On the civilizing directions of history
• 6 Spare time and deroutinization
• 7 The investigation of sportization processes
• References
• Index