The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping

Peter Nadin

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781138686861
• eBook ISBN: 9781351332460
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This edited volume provides a detailed and nuanced analysis of UN peacekeeping and the use of force, to inform a better understanding of the complex and interconnected issues at stake for the UN community. Peacekeeping is traditionally viewed as a largely passive military activity, governed by the principles of impartiality, consent, and the minimum use of force. Today, most large UN Peacekeeping Operations are only authorized to use force in defence of their mandates and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

Recently, with the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC, the UN has gone beyond peacekeeping and into the realm of peace-enforcement. These developments have brought to the fore questions regarding the use of force in the context of peacekeeping. The key questions addressed in this book examine not only the utility of force, but also the dilemmas and constraints inherent to the purposive use of force at a strategic, operational and tactical level.

• Should UN peacekeepers exercise military initiative?
• Is UN peacekeeping capable of undertaking offensive military operations?
• If so, then under what circumstances should peacekeepers use force?
• How should force be wielded? And against whom?

With chapters written by experts in the field, this comprehensive volume will be of great use and interest to postgraduate students, academics and experts in international security, the UN, peacekeeping and diplomacy.

Part I

Questions of doctrine

1 The case of East Timor

Ancient history or the shape of things to come?

Jim Della-Giacoma¹

• Deployment of InterFET

• From InterFET to UNTAET

• Resurgence of violence

• The legal debates

• Brahimi and HIPPO on the use of force

• Politics and the use of force

• Jakarta elites

• Indonesian military leadership

• Former East Timor militia

• Role of international institutions

• Conclusion

East Timor’s path from Portuguese colonialism to self-determination took some 400 years. When Lisbon lost interest in its farthest colony after the April 1974 Carnation revolution civil war broke out, a declaration of independence on 28 November 1975 came after the left-wing Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (FRETILIN) prevailed in this struggle. This act to assert a new national identity was quickly quashed by Indonesia’s 7 December invasion only nine days later. The penultimate chapter in this small country’s long struggle to independence was Indonesia’s twenty-four-year occupation resisted by armed, clandestine, and international diplomatic fronts. Those Timorese dreaming of seeing their independence restored hung on for long enough to see the tide of history turn unexpectedly in their favor.

Throughout this period of occupation, the “question of East Timor” remained on the UN’s decolonization agenda with the status of a non-self-governing territory. After the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 led to the downfall of President Suharto in May 1998, Indonesia’s new president was prepared to consider new governance arrangements for its then 27th province of East Timor. Long-stalled negotiations resumed and the UN Secretary-General appointed a new personal representative to oversee them. In January 1999, President Habibie offered the Timorese the previously unthinkable choice of either enhanced autonomy as part of Indonesia or to become their own nation. Jakarta and Lisbon concluded an agreement on 5 May 1999 to organize an internationally recognized plebiscite under the UN’s auspices to resolve the question of East Timor.²

On 11 June 1999, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1246 that sanctioned an unarmed political mission under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. This authorized the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to organize a referendum on self-determination that with unprecedented speed was held on 30 August that same year. In this plebiscite, after an extended period of violent intimidation by pro-Indonesian militia, the 78.5 percent of Timorese voters rejected an offer of greater autonomy as a province of Indonesia in favor of being guided to independence by the United Nations.

In a petulant reaction to the vote, Indonesia’s armed forces and their militia proxies burned much of what had been built for the province. On the way out, they killed hundreds of people deemed to be supporters of independence. The Indonesian military managed the often-forced deportation of hundreds of thousands to the western half of the island in an attempt to undermine confidence in the result. If they had hoped to weaken the international community’s resolve to follow through on the referendum result, it was a miscalculation. Haunted by the inaction in Bosnia and Rwanda, the member states in New York rallied behind its organization and upheld this act of self-determination. There was overwhelming support for a multinational force to be sent to restore order, address the humanitarian crisis, and enforce the result of the ballot.

Deployment of InterFET

With Resolution 1264, the UN Security Council on 15 September 1999 authorized under Chapter VII the Australian-led multinational force that became known as International Force East Timor (InterFET). Around the same time, arrangements were made for the deployment of the force in a series of meetings between Australian and Indonesian officials in New York, facilitated by the then Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Hedi Anabi.³ Four days later, the commander of the force being rapidly assembled, Australian Major-General Peter Cosgrove, made an advance visit to meet with Major-General Kiki Syahnakri, the Indonesian officer then overseeing martial law in the territory.⁴ The next day, 20 September 1999, the first troops in this “coalition of the willing” landed at Comoro Airport in the capital of Dili.

Being led by Australia gave InterFET the ability to respond quickly, but also wrapped the politics of the mission in the often-fraught bilateral relationship. Australia had been the only country to de facto recognize Indonesia’s control of East Timor, a pragmatic compromise intended to allow the two countries to sign a treaty to share oil and gas beneath the Timor Sea that divided them. At the time, many Timorese saw this as a betrayal. It was seen in similar terms by many Indonesians that Australia now led the charge, albeit with the blessing of the United Nations, to liberate the country. For some Indonesians, it was seen as an “oil grab” and an attempt to extend regional influence by stealth. InterFET’s commanding officer, Major-General Peter Cosgrove, had to balance high-level diplomacy with an aggressive response at the tactical level as his forces deployed to a chaotic city in flames still occupied by roaming bands of armed militia and large contingents of disgruntled Indonesian troops that had not yet withdrawn.

InterFET came prepared to use force, but applied it frugally. While in the end its troops encountered minimal resistance, they had prepared for the worst. It deployed to fight to uphold Resolution 1264 with a level of readiness described by one participating officer, and later historian of the mission, as “a potent deterrent to aggression”.⁵ Cosgrove had initially planned a surprise helicopter-led assault to seize the Comoro airfield. Instead, he was persuaded by the Australian military attaché on the ground in East Timor that this might provoke an unwanted response by the nervous Indonesian forces guarding it. Instead, the sentries were told exactly when the military transports would arrive.⁶ At the appointed hour, the Indonesian troops came out to greet and not attack the vanguard of Australian, British, and New Zealand crack troops.⁷ InterFET soldiers were even initially deployed to the port aboard Indonesian military trucks.⁸ They “met absolutely no resistance.”⁹ Despite it being “green hatted” and fully equipped for war, the mission’s day-one success relied more on the traditional peacekeeping principle of consent than the threat or actual use of force—bilingual military diplomats in dress uniform playing as important a role as heavily armed combat troops in fatigues.

InterFET had a diverse arsenal and deployed with a mindset very different from a UN peacekeeping force. Cosgrove himself reflected that a less robust “force optimized for peacekeeping would have in my view invited more adventurous behavior by our adversaries.”¹⁰ It deployed with air cover provided by fighter jets and submarines quietly escorting naval ships, themselves covered by surface warfare vessels. InterFET conducted what Australian military historian John Blaxland called information operations, relying as much on “tactics and television” to accomplish the mission with minimal fighting.¹¹

The multinational force set out to intimidate and unsettle the adversary rather than engage in armed contacts. To do this, it aggressively deployed equipment not as readily available to the Indonesian military and their militia proxies, often only armed with handmade weapons know as rakitan. The InterFET vanguard consisted of Australian, British, and New Zealand special forces equipped with an array of small arms, night vision goggles, laser sights, light anti-tank weapons, and other equipment that would have allowed them to outgun or outmaneuver their opponents. After the helicopters arrived on day two, they were directed to frequently, and at all hours, fly low and hard across the city generating an enormous amount of noise—a tactic intended to intimidate anyone likely to oppose his troops. When armored vehicles arrived, they were prominently driven around town at all hours knowing they scared the poorly armed militia. In the initial stages, the advantage of having night vision technology was used to conduct cordon-and-search operations around the clock.¹² The conclusion from this early stage of the campaign was that the threat of force was a strong deterrent. Australia’s “strategic corporals” were praised by their commanders for not using deadly force, especially during the early days of InterFET’s arrival in Dili. Weapons were often pointed at the departing Indonesian forces and many confrontations were defused without shots being fired.¹³

When attacked, InterFET forces without hesitation exercised their right to self-defense. On 6 October, on the southwestern border near Suai, Australian soldiers were ambushed with one shot in the neck and another in the leg. In an aggressive counterattack, the patrol commander and his men outflanked their assailants and killed three of them. On 10 October, at Motaain on the border between East Timor and the Indonesian province of Nusa Tenggara Timor, a misunderstanding over maps saw Indonesian forces fire upon an Australian patrol as it approached the border. Each force was operating with different maps, each showing different border markings—as the exact location of the border had never been precisely demarcated. Again, Australian troops under fire engaged without hesitation, killing one Indonesian policeman and seriously wounding two others. Like most rules of engagement (ROEs) for combat forces, those used by InterFET soldiers allowed the return of fire when under attack.

InterFET experienced no battle casualties, but was involved in some engagements. When fired upon, InterFET troops returned fire in self-defense. On 16 October, a six-man Special Forces patrol encountered a much larger group of well-armed militia near Aidabasalala equipped with modern military weapons and not rakitan. When shot at during multiple contacts over a few hours, they returned extensive fire while withdrawing, with several militiamen believed killed. On 20 October, in Beluluk Leten, members of a group of 30 armed militiamen shooting at InterFET helicopters were fired upon by an Australian patrol. In recounting these incidents, Australian military historians Breen and McCauley conclude this was a period when InterFET’s resolve was being tested. They cite intelligence sources as saying that as a result of these contacts word spread among militia groups that crossing the border was dangerous. By the end of the month, InterFET had “defeated” the militia.¹⁴ The use of even this limited force, even in self-defense, was concluded to be a deterrent.

From InterFET to UNTAET

As these minor events took place in the field, the political dynamics were dramatically shifting in Jakarta. The political script laid out by the 5 May Agreements was being followed. Under Article 6, if the Timorese voted against integration, Indonesia would take the “constitutional steps to terminate its links with East Timor”. The Indonesian legislature, now in the hands of newly elected democratic reformers, voted on 19 October 1999 to annul the law from July 1976 that had formally integrated East Timor as its 27th province. On the same day, President B.J. Habibie, who had overseen the referendum and consented to the arrival of the multinational force, withdrew from the race for reelection as president. The next day the electoral college unexpectedly choose Abdurrahman Wahid, or “Gus Dur,” as the next president, a prominent Muslim cleric, leading democrat, and open friend of East Timor.¹⁵ Wahid’s selection reset the relationship with East Timor, as he was an outsider. His main rival, and now vice president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, was seen as a nationalist figure, close to the military, and was reluctant to let East ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• List of contributors
• Non-UN acronyms
• UN acronyms
• Introduction
• PART I: Questions of doctrine
• PART II: Questions of practice
• Conclusion
• Select bibliography
• Index