EU-Japan Security Cooperation

Trends and Prospects

Emil J. Kirchner, Han Dorussen, Emil J. Kirchner, Han Dorussen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781138315808
• eBook ISBN: 9780429850752
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book assesses EU-Japan security relations, examining how they have developed in individual security sectors and how they could be affected by international developments.

The conclusions of the Economic Partnership Agreement and the Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2017 demonstrate the steady growth in EU-Japan political relations. Since the 1990s, dialogues between the EU and Japan have benefitted from extensive trade and investment ties and shared liberal values. Based on collaborative research by European and Japanese scholars, this book provides an in-depth, systematic and comparative analysis of the extent to which the EU and Japan have achieved concrete actions in the pursuance of security cooperation across a range of key areas such as nuclear proliferation, regional security, international terrorism, and energy and climate security. Further, it seeks to explain why some security sectors (such as economic and cybersecurity) have resulted in more extensive EU-Japan cooperation, while others lag behind (such as military and regional security). Common declarations and actions of shared interest and concerns have often led to only modest levels of security collaboration, and the book highlights factors that may be seen as intervening between intention and action, such as the role of external actors, for instance China and the US, and the constraints of internal EU and domestic Japanese politics.

This book will be of much interest to students of European security, Japanese politics, diplomacy studies and international relations.

1EU–Japan security cooperation in context

Emil Kirchner

Introduction

While intense economic interactions and perceived common values have been the drivers of EU–Japan security relations, different geographic security environments between Europe and Asia (for example, different threat perceptions over the rise of China), specific US–Japan defence ties, and structural differences (whereas Japan is a state, the EU is not) have acted as constraints on this relationship. But despite these constraints, EU–Japan security relations have developed gradually and steadily over a 45-year period. The evolution of the relationship has profited from the similar position both partners take on multilateralism and economic orientation and the relationship has also benefitted from the establishment of the Joint Declaration of 1991 (European Community 1991), the Action Plan of 2001 (MOFA 2001), and the introduction of the Strategic Partnership in 2003 (MOFA 2003), renewed in 2018. These have given rise to regular high-level contacts and extensive collaboration on such issues as non-proliferation and human security.

In part due to pressures from the international community to match economic strength with international security responsibility – for example, with regard to international terrorism – and in part because of perceived threats arising within the respective European and Asian neighbourhoods, both actors have, over time, strengthened their internal and external security capacity (the EU via the Lisbon Treaty and the European Global Strategy of 2016 (European Union 2016), and Japan via Article 9 of the constitution) and have thought of ways to promote bilateral and multilateral security cooperation (Keck et al. 2013; Tanaka 2013; Ueta 2013). The heightening of security threats since 2012, such as that of Russia on European security, China (maritime) and North Korea (nuclear) on Asian security, together with uncertainties surrounding US President Trump’s defence commitments to both Japan and the EU, will present additional opportunities and challenges for EU–Japan security cooperation. It is the aim of this chapter, and the book project more generally, to assess the scope of EU–Japan security relations in greater depth by examining more closely how these relations have developed in individual security sectors and how they are likely to be affected by the heightening of security threats and international developments.

By adopting a sector-wide approach rather than the widely prevailing macro (general) oriented security analysis, the aim will be to produce a more differentiated view of EU–Japan security relations and to offer comparisons of the sectors in which cooperation, either at the bilateral or multilateral level, has occurred and is likely to continue or discontinue, and areas in which cooperation has languished, and is likely to stagnate or progress. The simple assumption is that existing substantial economic interactions, shared political values, and outlooks on global governance do not necessarily affect cooperation between Japan and the EU across a range of security sectors in a uniform fashion. Rather, the way the two actors perceive levels of threats in a given security sector and seek to respond to them might be a more decisive determinant for cooperation. For example, given the rise of cybersecurity concerns and problems with terrorism in the international domain, it might be expected that these two security sectors are on an upward trajectory in EU–Japan security relations. By spanning across a wide range of security areas, including military and non-military issues, the proposed exercise will help to provide scope and comparisons in the overall assessment of EU–Japan security relations. As a consequence, a more in-depth as well as balanced view of EU–Japan security relations is likely to be achieved. The study will also provide information on the inter-actor EU–Japan relationship, that is, which actor is more proactive (initiating joint actions) in the security relationship, or which actor is more determined to extend norms, value patterns or standards to the other.

Central to the investigation is a systematic assessment of threat perceptions and associated responses by Japan and the EU on a number of security areas, such as non-proliferation, cybersecurity, energy security. Furthermore, the intention is not only to establish whether there is convergence or divergence in the levels of threat perception and response between the EU and Japan across a range of security areas, but also to examine whether the existing levels of convergence or divergence in threat perception and response correspond to similar levels of EU–Japan cooperation in given sectors. To explore which factors may affect whether levels of convergence/divergence in threat perception and response correspond to or deviate from levels of EU–Japan cooperation in given security sectors, the influence of four potential intervening factors will be examined. First, by tracing EU–Japan security cooperation over time, it might be the case that landmark EU–Japan decisions, such as the 1991 Joint (The Hague) Declaration (European Community 1991), or the 2001 Action Plan (MOFA 2001) have had some influence on the levels of EU–Japan cooperation in given security sectors. Second, in contrast to institutional influences, as put forward by the ‘path dependency’ approach, it is important to capture EU–Japan cooperation which occurs through exogenous events, such as after natural disasters like the Japanese Tohoku earthquake and tsunami of 2011. Third, individual EU member states may constrain EU–Japan cooperation in given security areas. This factor will be linked to influences arising from internal changes within the EU (such as Brexit) and Japan (constitutional changes). Fourth, likely influences from so-called ‘third actors’ (for example, the US, Russia or China) in promoting or constraining levels of EU–Japan cooperation in given security areas will be taken into consideration. In other words, as the EU (Global Strategy) and Japan (constitutional change) are at the cusp of re-defining their international engagements, their security relationship will be influenced by the policies of other actors such as the US, China, and Russia.

In terms of actual measurements of threat perceptions and cooperation, a basic classification of ‘high’, ‘low’, and ‘medium’ will be applied, assessing, on the one hand, the severity of the threat, and on the other, the extent of actual joint acts. We further identify four time periods that define distinct phases of intentionality in EU–Japan cooperation. Accordingly, the analysis evaluates patterns of cooperation over time as well as across issue domains. (Further details on the respective categorisations are provided below.)

In the following, attention will first turn to an historical overview of EU–Japan security relations. This will involve a review of the landmark decisions/actions and partnership agreements taken by the EU and Japan. It will continue with a treatment of conceptual issues which will guide the analysis in the chapter, and then provide some indication of how the substantive chapters of this book address the question of how and to what effect Japan and the EU are able to cooperate on a range of security matters at the bilateral and multilateral level.

Historical overview of EU–Japan security relations

Four periods can be distinguished for EU–Japan security relations: 1959–1990, 1991–2000, 2001–2010, and 2011 onward. Particularly from 2001, EU–Japan security relations were more formalised.¹ EU–Japan relations began in 1959, one year after the establishment of the then European Economic Community (EC). In a formal sense, the EC established its delegation in Tokyo in 1974 and Japan followed suit with the establishment of a Mission to the EC in Brussels in 1979. In 1987 the Japanese government conferred the title of ‘Ambassador’ to the EC Commission’s Head of Delegation in Tokyo. However, the period 1959–1989 consisted of turbulent trade interdependence, marked by numerous trade frictions, and very weak political links (De Prado 2014, 3).

EU–Japan relations took on a more formalised character in the period 1990–2000, particularly through the 1991 Joint Declaration on EU–Japan political relations in which the two partners confirmed having shared values, such as the rule of law and democracy, and promoting ‘negotiated solutions to international or regional tensions’ (European Community 1991, 1). It provided for annual summits, ministerial and parliamentary contacts and thematic dialogues. However, security only became a distinct feature in that relationship in the period 2001 to 2009 with the introduction of the Action Plan for EU–Japan Cooperation, entitled Shaping our Common Futures, in 2001 (MOFA 2001). Besides stressing the need to address international terrorism, environmental degradation, cyber attacks and secure energy supply, it also suggested the introduction of a strategic dialogue on East Asian security. The Action Plan was further reinforced with the establishment of the EU–Japan Strategic Partnership in 2003, which encompasses political and security aspects (MOFA 2003).

However, the record of translating these objectives into concrete action was patchy, if not modest. Berkofsky puts this down to the fact that the Action Plan had envisaged too many areas of cooperation (over 100, mostly non-military ones) that in the end could not be implemented (Berkofsky 2012, 265, 278). While acknowledging this point, Gilson also cites impeding causes emanating from ‘structural shifts in the global context within which Japan and the EU work and similar shifts in the very composition and nature of the two partners themselves’ (Gilson 2016, 797) which, over a period of ten to 20 years, have changed the context of earlier joint commitments as laid out in either the Foundation Declaration of 1991 or the Action Plan of 2001. Moving from the causes to the consequences of this implementation failure, Tsuruoka suggests an ‘expectations deficit’ due to Japan’s low expectations of Europe and concludes that ‘Tokyo has often disregarded the EU as its partner in international relations’ (Tsuruoka 2008, 113).

Developments in EU–Japan security relations since 2010, and especially 2014, can be deemed as a new period marked by attempts to address past failings more profoundly and to instil new life into the relationship. It also coincides with ongoing important geopolitical (involving China, Russia, and the US) as well as domestic changes in Japan and the EU. A start to these new attempts was made with the establishment of the EU–Japan High-Level Group (HLG) in 2010 and co-joined in March 2011 with the start of negotiations for an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) alongside the parallel development of a binding political agreement, including a Free Trade Area and a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA); all concluded in principle in summer 2017 and finalised in 2018. As pointed out by Reiterer, establishing a framework agreement with the EU, similar to the one concluded with the Republic of Korea, could facilitate EU–Japan defence cooperation (Reiterer 2015, 12). However, questions remain about the deeper meaning and substance of the term ‘strategic’: if relations are strategic, what is the strategy that is being pursued? It will be the task of this and the following chapters to explore whether and how progress is being made towards the implementation of these agreements. Chapter 10 of this volume on economic security will be particularly relevant in this respect.

Moreover, the heightening of security threats since 2012, such as that of Russia for European security, and of China (maritime) and North Korea (nuclear) for Japanese might give rise to closer EU–Japan security cooperation. But it is also possible that renewed Russian aggression in the Ukraine or other Eastern European states may drag European attention and resources to localised engagement. It remains to be seen what impact the ‘America First’ policy of President Trump will have on EU–Japan security relations. As both the EU and Japan adapt to their own new circumstances, their relationship is likely to be affected by the policies of other actors.

Besides paying attention to the historical and empirical context, it is also important to establish what theoretical and conceptual tools might help to guide the assessment of EU–Japan security relations, which will follow next.

Conceptualising EU–Japan security relations

Given the strong emphasis both Japan and the EU place on liberal-institutional values and rule-based governance, both domestically and internationally, and as both seek to secure the fruits of their economic success in international fora, a liberal-institutionalist framework provides some valuable orientation into EU–Japan security relations. Such an approach is further fostered by the fact that both actors are also large contributors to international aid and cooperation programmes,² pursue extensive multilateral actions, support UN activities – though less by Japan with regard to UN peacekeeping – and champion the concept of human security. However, while the EU has historically emphasised cooperation and de-emphasised the ‘use of force’, Japan tends to be turning towards a more assertive and militarily oriented national foreign policy and to be deviating from the ‘shared sovereignty’ concept of the EU (Tsuruoka 2008, 118). These deviations stem partially from Japan’s obligation under its alliance status with the US, but have also grown in intensity since 2015 with the perceived bellicose North Korean nuclear developments and the assertive Chinese maritime policy in the East and South China Seas (Hughes 2016). The latter involves disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands³ and the Chinese declaration of an Air Defence Identification Zone in the East China Sea.

As concerns grow over Russian involvement in the Ukraine and as Russia develops a more threatening posture towards the Baltic countries, and as questions are being raised about NATO’s credibility by President Trump, it might also be possible that the EU will adopt a more military oriented posture. But for the time being, while the EU espouses to a large extent post-Westphalian characteristics, Japan’s security culture is of a ‘hybrid’ kind, falling between a Westphalian and a post-Westphalian approach (Fukui 2010). However, while noticeable, these differences do not seem to adversely affect EU–Japan security relations, and therefore make a strictly neo-realist orientation of EU–Japan security relations less applicable.

While theoretical tools like liberal-institutionalism and historical institutionalism help to inform about the nature of EU–Japan relations, the extent to which Japan and the EU engage with each other cooperatively in the security domain or pursue different – and possibly even conflicting – strategies requires thorough empirical research across a number of dimensions, as provided in the contributions to this volume.

Key concepts in the analysis of EU–Japan security relations

This exercise will be guided by the use of a number of key concepts that serve as heuristic tools for subsequent empirical analysis that are linked in their practical applic...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of illustrations
• Preface
• Abbreviations
• List of contributors
• 1 EU–Japan security cooperation in context
• 2 Regional security
• 3 EU–Japan military relations
• 4 Non-proliferation
• 5 The EU and Japan in the fight against terrorism and organised crime
• 6 EU and Japanese climate and energy security policy
• 7 Human security: more potential for cooperation?
• 8 Civil protection: enhancing resilience through collaboration
• 9 EU–Japan cybersecurity cooperation
• 10 The economic security dimension in EU–Japan relations
• 11 The EU–Japan security dialogue and migration: a search for common ground
• 12 New horizons in EU–Japan security cooperation?
• Index