Chapter 1
The problem: Will the real âtranslationâ please stand up?
Nowadays, in both contemporary scholarly writings and popular discourse, the term âtranslationâ (âtranslateâ) appears to be increasingly employed in a secondary, rather than its primary dictionary, sense: âto render a written or spoken text from one language to anotherâ (Agnes 2006: 1521). According to many theorists, âTranslation has become a fecund and frequent metaphor for our contemporary intercultural worldâŠ. Translation is poised to become a powerful epistemological instrument for reading and assessing the transformation and exchange of cultures and identitiesâ (Arduini and Nergaard 2011: 8, 14). The preceding assertion is typical of a new open-endedness in translation studies, one that endeavours to metaphorically magnify the traditional, text-based understanding of âTranslation Rigidly Conceivedâ (Reynolds 2016: 18) into âan epistemological principle applicable to the whole field of humanistic, social, and natural sciencesâ (Arduini and Nergaard 2011: 14). For example, âwhatever a writer writes is to some extent a kind of translation, because that work will be the product that has emerged out of readings of other peopleâs writingâ (Bassnett 2011: 164; italics added). What is here referred to as âtranslationâ used to be termed âintertextualityâ in literary studies, and this statement is simply a specification of George Steinerâs equally overgeneralized notion that âhuman communication equals translationâ (1975, as cited in Reynolds 2016: 23). But how useful is such a flexible, expansible notion of translation to those of us who are actually engaged in the narrower business of text-based interlingual communication?
At the very least, the current elasticity of usage leads to a certain degree of misunderstanding and a lack of clarity with regard to what is being done when translating and what is consequently offered as an end-product,1 for example:
The preceding quotation seems to reflect a very different understanding or definition of âtranslationâ than some of us may be familiar with, and yet it goes back to 1994 â over 20 years ago â so where have we been, or what have we been reading in the meantime? This is typical of approaches and proponents of the so-called cultural turn in translation. As part of an initial overview of such a culture-focused view of translation studies in his popular textbook, Jeremy Munday observes that its proponents more or less âdismissâ linguistic approaches to translation âand focus on the way in which culture impacts and constrains translationâ (2008: 125; cf. Bassnett 2002: 136). Many of these theorists seek to promote such a cultural turn, for example, as they âmove from translation as text to translation as culture and politicsâ (125; cf. Bassnett and Lefevre 1990: 79â86). But one might question whether such a metaphorical approach represents rather too great of a âturnâ, for is not translation most explicitly about texts and the messages being transmitted thereby from one language (the âsource languageâ, SL) and sociocultural setting to another (the âtarget languageâ, TL)?
However, that is not how recent theorists are thinking; rather, they seek to broaden the horizons of âtranslationâ considerably:
One begins to wonder, however, within this ânew paradigmâ, sometimes termed âtranslationalityâ (Reynolds 2016: 23), does the notion of translation actually âmeanâ anything specific â other than some sort of general sociocultural transformation as viewed from the perspective of a certain individualâs (or groupâs) ârhizomaticâ reconceptualization (Arduini and Nergaard 2011: 9)?2 And what are the reasons for asserting that âit becomes less important to distinguish and define clearly what translation is and what it is notâ (9)? Is its theory and practice not in danger then of gratuitously entering the purview of disciplines that are much more experienced and capable of dealing with the varied ethnographic and sociocultural issues being referred to?
Perhaps we should turn instead to a philosophical approach for some direction in the search for a more modern definition and associated application of âtranslationâ:
Unfortunately, there is not much enlightenment available in the preceding opaque observation, which seems to delight in the âimpenetrableâ interplay of complicated terminology rather than in any coherent meaning. In the case of popular âdeconstructionâ theory then, we reach the limits of comprehension (or incomprehension), as we must â[suspend] all that we take for granted about language, experience, and the ânormalâ possibilities of communicationâ (Munday 2008: 170; cf. Norris 1991: xi). âIts leading figure is the French philosopher Jacques Derridaâ, who employs terminology that is âcomplex and shifting, like the meaning it dismantlesâ (170) â or seeks to destabilize. Accordingly, there can be no ârelevanceâ in translation âbecause, in Derridaâs view, a relevant translation relies on the supposed stability of the signifiedâsignifier relationshipâ (171; cf. Derrida 2004: 425). Such a philosophical perspective promotes an âabusive fidelityâ that âinvolves risk-taking and experimentation with the expressive and rhetorical patterns of language, supplementing the ST, giving it renewed energyâŠ[tampering] with usageâ (172). The result is inevitably a new text, one that reflects the image of its creator â and hence cannot be called a âtranslationâ in the usual sense at all, certainly not where the scriptures are concerned.
As Munday astutely concludes: â[S]âuch a translation strategy demands a certain âleap of faithâ from the reader to accept that the translatorâs experimentation is not just facile wordplayâ, which may in fact âbe easier if the text in question is philosophicalâ (177). âFacile wordplayâ indeed â so much so that when attempting to read and comprehend the writings of some modern translation philosophers, one requires the assistance of an intralingual âtranslatorâ to help decipher them. Back to Bhabha (2011: 24) again for another egregious example:
Indeed, one wonders if it is possible to translate the preceding quote into any language by any means â except perhaps by a machine that does not know what it is thinking!
The preceding observations illustrate the warning issued by translation theorist Andrew Chesterman that âtranslation studies has been importing concepts and methodologies from other disciplines âat a superficial levelâ which tends to lead to âmisunderstandingsâ since translation-oriented researchers often lack expertise in the other field and may even be borrowing outdated ideasâ (2005: 19). To give one example: âRobert Youngâs lecture at the 2013 Nida Research Symposium was devoted to how Freud can be considered a theoretician of translation and how his psychoanalysis can be seen as a form of translationâ (translation 2013). To be sure, the Freudian practice of âfree associationâ would probably not result in a very âfaithfulâ rendition of any given source text, but on the other hand it might at least transform âtranslatingâ into some manner of beneficial therapeutic exercise â self âempowermentâ, for example, which rather mystically âinvolves a three-stage procedure that includes the experience of being translated, then of de-translation, and finally of retranslation of the selfâ (ibid., italics added).
In any case, one of the reasons that Bible translation consultants and practitioners need to keep abreast with the new developments and debates in translation studies, including a workable definition of the field itself, is to avoid what Chesterman refers to as superficial or extraneous âconsilienceâ in their own specialized field (as cited in Munday 2008: 197). How might this be done? One method for establishing a firmer conceptual frame of reference would be to revisit our translation ârootsâ in order to reassess some of the older standard definitions along with related principles and practices that some of us may still be familiar with, including a few updates. As Anthony Pym has recently concluded (2016: 15â16):
A selective survey of definitions: Where have we come from?
In his masterful survey, Munday defines the âprocess of translationâ rather basically as âthe translator changing an original written text (the source text or ST) in the original verbal language (the source language or SL) into a written text (the target text or TT) in a different verbal language (the target language or TL)â (2008: 5; cf. Reynolds 2016: 18). Although Munday decides âto focus on written translation rather than oral translationâ, or âinterpretationâ (5â6), the issue of orality and the soundscape of texts is still relevant â for all translators. In any case, one is led to speculate as to what all is involved in this act of intertextual âchangingâ. Similarly, translation may be understood as referring to âthe process of transferring a written text from SL to TL, conducted by a translator, or translators, in a specific socio-cultural contextâ (Hatim and Munday 2004: 6), where again we note a certain degree of ambiguity inherent in the activity of âtransferringâ. Hatim and Mason (1997: 1) view âtranslationâ more specifically as âan act of communication which attempts to relay, across cultural and linguistic boundaries, another act of communication (which may have been intended for different purposes and different readers/hearers)â. Compare the preceding with these definitions by two literary translators: âTranslation denotes the attempt to render faithfully into one language (normally, oneâs own) the meaning, feeling, and, so far as possible, the style of the piece written in another languageâ (Landers 2001: 10); âthe most fundamental description of what translators do is that we write â or perhaps rewrite â in language B a work of literature in language A, hoping that the readers of the second languageâŠwill perceive the text, emotionally and artistically, in a manner that corresponds to the aesthetic experience of its first readersâ (Grossman 2010: 7). The important emotive-affective and artistic motives of the latter two perspectives are obvious.
Bible translation theorists tend to pay much more attention to the semantic notion of âmeaningâ in their definitions; for example: âTranslating consists in reproducing in the receptor language the closest natural equivalent of the source-language message, first in terms of meaning and secondly in terms of styleâ, that is, formal features of note (Nida and Taber 1969: 12). According to Beekman and Callow, âthe translation process involves (1) at least two languages and (2) a message â these two essential components of a translation may be called, respectively, (1) form and (2) meaningâŠ[the] formal linguistic elements of a language are what is meant by form â the meaning is the message which is communicated by these features of formâ (1974: 19â20, original italics). De Waard and Nida (1986: 14, 36, 25) describe the translation operation in some detail as follows: