Chapter 1
The problem: Will the real ātranslationā please stand up?
Nowadays, in both contemporary scholarly writings and popular discourse, the term ātranslationā (ātranslateā) appears to be increasingly employed in a secondary, rather than its primary dictionary, sense: āto render a written or spoken text from one language to anotherā (Agnes 2006: 1521). According to many theorists, āTranslation has become a fecund and frequent metaphor for our contemporary intercultural worldā¦. Translation is poised to become a powerful epistemological instrument for reading and assessing the transformation and exchange of cultures and identitiesā (Arduini and Nergaard 2011: 8, 14). The preceding assertion is typical of a new open-endedness in translation studies, one that endeavours to metaphorically magnify the traditional, text-based understanding of āTranslation Rigidly Conceivedā (Reynolds 2016: 18) into āan epistemological principle applicable to the whole field of humanistic, social, and natural sciencesā (Arduini and Nergaard 2011: 14). For example, āwhatever a writer writes is to some extent a kind of translation, because that work will be the product that has emerged out of readings of other peopleās writingā (Bassnett 2011: 164; italics added). What is here referred to as ātranslationā used to be termed āintertextualityā in literary studies, and this statement is simply a specification of George Steinerās equally overgeneralized notion that āhuman communication equals translationā (1975, as cited in Reynolds 2016: 23). But how useful is such a flexible, expansible notion of translation to those of us who are actually engaged in the narrower business of text-based interlingual communication?
At the very least, the current elasticity of usage leads to a certain degree of misunderstanding and a lack of clarity with regard to what is being done when translating and what is consequently offered as an end-product,1 for example:
The preceding quotation seems to reflect a very different understanding or definition of ātranslationā than some of us may be familiar with, and yet it goes back to 1994 ā over 20 years ago ā so where have we been, or what have we been reading in the meantime? This is typical of approaches and proponents of the so-called cultural turn in translation. As part of an initial overview of such a culture-focused view of translation studies in his popular textbook, Jeremy Munday observes that its proponents more or less ādismissā linguistic approaches to translation āand focus on the way in which culture impacts and constrains translationā (2008: 125; cf. Bassnett 2002: 136). Many of these theorists seek to promote such a cultural turn, for example, as they āmove from translation as text to translation as culture and politicsā (125; cf. Bassnett and Lefevre 1990: 79ā86). But one might question whether such a metaphorical approach represents rather too great of a āturnā, for is not translation most explicitly about texts and the messages being transmitted thereby from one language (the āsource languageā, SL) and sociocultural setting to another (the ātarget languageā, TL)?
However, that is not how recent theorists are thinking; rather, they seek to broaden the horizons of ātranslationā considerably:
One begins to wonder, however, within this ānew paradigmā, sometimes termed ātranslationalityā (Reynolds 2016: 23), does the notion of translation actually āmeanā anything specific ā other than some sort of general sociocultural transformation as viewed from the perspective of a certain individualās (or groupās) ārhizomaticā reconceptualization (Arduini and Nergaard 2011: 9)?2 And what are the reasons for asserting that āit becomes less important to distinguish and define clearly what translation is and what it is notā (9)? Is its theory and practice not in danger then of gratuitously entering the purview of disciplines that are much more experienced and capable of dealing with the varied ethnographic and sociocultural issues being referred to?
Perhaps we should turn instead to a philosophical approach for some direction in the search for a more modern definition and associated application of ātranslationā:
Unfortunately, there is not much enlightenment available in the preceding opaque observation, which seems to delight in the āimpenetrableā interplay of complicated terminology rather than in any coherent meaning. In the case of popular ādeconstructionā theory then, we reach the limits of comprehension (or incomprehension), as we must ā[suspend] all that we take for granted about language, experience, and the ānormalā possibilities of communicationā (Munday 2008: 170; cf. Norris 1991: xi). āIts leading figure is the French philosopher Jacques Derridaā, who employs terminology that is ācomplex and shifting, like the meaning it dismantlesā (170) ā or seeks to destabilize. Accordingly, there can be no ārelevanceā in translation ābecause, in Derridaās view, a relevant translation relies on the supposed stability of the signifiedāsignifier relationshipā (171; cf. Derrida 2004: 425). Such a philosophical perspective promotes an āabusive fidelityā that āinvolves risk-taking and experimentation with the expressive and rhetorical patterns of language, supplementing the ST, giving it renewed energyā¦[tampering] with usageā (172). The result is inevitably a new text, one that reflects the image of its creator ā and hence cannot be called a ātranslationā in the usual sense at all, certainly not where the scriptures are concerned.
As Munday astutely concludes: ā[S]āuch a translation strategy demands a certain āleap of faithā from the reader to accept that the translatorās experimentation is not just facile wordplayā, which may in fact ābe easier if the text in question is philosophicalā (177). āFacile wordplayā indeed ā so much so that when attempting to read and comprehend the writings of some modern translation philosophers, one requires the assistance of an intralingual ātranslatorā to help decipher them. Back to Bhabha (2011: 24) again for another egregious example:
Indeed, one wonders if it is possible to translate the preceding quote into any language by any means ā except perhaps by a machine that does not know what it is thinking!
The preceding observations illustrate the warning issued by translation theorist Andrew Chesterman that ātranslation studies has been importing concepts and methodologies from other disciplines āat a superficial levelā which tends to lead to āmisunderstandingsā since translation-oriented researchers often lack expertise in the other field and may even be borrowing outdated ideasā (2005: 19). To give one example: āRobert Youngās lecture at the 2013 Nida Research Symposium was devoted to how Freud can be considered a theoretician of translation and how his psychoanalysis can be seen as a form of translationā (translation 2013). To be sure, the Freudian practice of āfree associationā would probably not result in a very āfaithfulā rendition of any given source text, but on the other hand it might at least transform ātranslatingā into some manner of beneficial therapeutic exercise ā self āempowermentā, for example, which rather mystically āinvolves a three-stage procedure that includes the experience of being translated, then of de-translation, and finally of retranslation of the selfā (ibid., italics added).
In any case, one of the reasons that Bible translation consultants and practitioners need to keep abreast with the new developments and debates in translation studies, including a workable definition of the field itself, is to avoid what Chesterman refers to as superficial or extraneous āconsilienceā in their own specialized field (as cited in Munday 2008: 197). How might this be done? One method for establishing a firmer conceptual frame of reference would be to revisit our translation ārootsā in order to reassess some of the older standard definitions along with related principles and practices that some of us may still be familiar with, including a few updates. As Anthony Pym has recently concluded (2016: 15ā16):
A selective survey of definitions: Where have we come from?
In his masterful survey, Munday defines the āprocess of translationā rather basically as āthe translator changing an original written text (the source text or ST) in the original verbal language (the source language or SL) into a written text (the target text or TT) in a different verbal language (the target language or TL)ā (2008: 5; cf. Reynolds 2016: 18). Although Munday decides āto focus on written translation rather than oral translationā, or āinterpretationā (5ā6), the issue of orality and the soundscape of texts is still relevant ā for all translators. In any case, one is led to speculate as to what all is involved in this act of intertextual āchangingā. Similarly, translation may be understood as referring to āthe process of transferring a written text from SL to TL, conducted by a translator, or translators, in a specific socio-cultural contextā (Hatim and Munday 2004: 6), where again we note a certain degree of ambiguity inherent in the activity of ātransferringā. Hatim and Mason (1997: 1) view ātranslationā more specifically as āan act of communication which attempts to relay, across cultural and linguistic boundaries, another act of communication (which may have been intended for different purposes and different readers/hearers)ā. Compare the preceding with these definitions by two literary translators: āTranslation denotes the attempt to render faithfully into one language (normally, oneās own) the meaning, feeling, and, so far as possible, the style of the piece written in another languageā (Landers 2001: 10); āthe most fundamental description of what translators do is that we write ā or perhaps rewrite ā in language B a work of literature in language A, hoping that the readers of the second languageā¦will perceive the text, emotionally and artistically, in a manner that corresponds to the aesthetic experience of its first readersā (Grossman 2010: 7). The important emotive-affective and artistic motives of the latter two perspectives are obvious.
Bible translation theorists tend to pay much more attention to the semantic notion of āmeaningā in their definitions; for example: āTranslating consists in reproducing in the receptor language the closest natural equivalent of the source-language message, first in terms of meaning and secondly in terms of styleā, that is, formal features of note (Nida and Taber 1969: 12). According to Beekman and Callow, āthe translation process involves (1) at least two languages and (2) a message ā these two essential components of a translation may be called, respectively, (1) form and (2) meaningā¦[the] formal linguistic elements of a language are what is meant by form ā the meaning is the message which is communicated by these features of formā (1974: 19ā20, original italics). De Waard and Nida (1986: 14, 36, 25) describe the translation operation in some detail as follows: