Western Society in Transition

Volker Bornschier

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9781351293105
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Social History
• Index: History

An enormous acceleration of history has occurred in the current decade, thereby radically changing world society in many respects. The core countries - grouped around the triad formed by the United States, Japan, and the European Union - have experienced successive waves of change marked by phases of ascent, unfolding, and decay of societal models. What seemed stable and predictable in past decades came close to collapse or broke down entirely. As a result, we are now living through a crisis of legitimation characterized by acute contradictions. A new order, with a fresh, basic consensus around an overarching set of norms that allows problems to be solved efficiently, has not yet crystallized.Western Society in Transition examines the succession of societal models of the Western world and indications of its probable shape in the future. Bornschier characterizes the 1985-1995 period as a decade of Third World debt and depression; continued economic decline in the United States; a steady ascent of Japan; Western Europe's move toward political union, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Against this background, he sketches various elements of a theoretical perspective he calls evolutionary conflict theory. The primary focus of interest of this theory is not on single societies, but on measures of social transformation at the core of world society. Western Society in Transition deals with fundamental questions: How does social order arise and why does it dissolve? What provides social cohesion? What makes society progress? Institutional spheres of Western society such as technology, firms, the market, state building, education, power, conflict, and social movements are analyzed in detail.Peter Lengyel, editor emeritus of the International Social Science Journal says of Western Society in Transition, "I have never seen such a succinct, clear, and persuasive treatment which adroitly draws together elements from economics, history, sociology, and technology into a strictly contemporary kind of political economy." This timely assessment of the Western world will be of interest to social scientists, historians, economists, and international relations scholars.

1
Introduction and Overview

The Problem

The past few years have witnessed such dramatic changes in Western and world society that it is appropriate to refer to the end of the postwar era. During the 1980s an enormous acceleration of history occurred, thereby radically changing world society in many respects. What seemed stable and predictable over decades came close to collapse or broke down spectacularly toward the end of the decade.

At the decade’s outset Third World debt became acute; this resulted in vast immiseration and a veritable depression in large portions of the Third World, leading to the conclusion that, from a developmental point of view, the 1980s were a “lost decade.” In the nation-states at the core, this period was marked by technological evolution and political turning points.

Core society found itself caught between the formation of a new technological style and the ongoing disintegration of its politico-economic regime. The consensual worldview that had solidified over decades dissolved, without any new frameworks having gained acceptance. In economic terms this decade was characterized by a short interim recovery that ended in a persistent recession at the beginning of the 1990s.

If the previous era had been marked by the economic doctrines of Keynes, the 1980s were dominated by those of Schumpeter. Against the background of the continued relative economic decline of the United States—the hegemonic power of the postwar era—the steady ascent of Japan was noteworthy. Furthermore, after years of “Eurosclerosis,” the momentum toward further integration of the European Community picked up significantly and unexpectedly towards the mid-1980s, which compensated for the decline of the middle economic powers.

Finally, even more spectacular for Europe and the world were the consequences of the series of freedom movements in the revolutionary year of 1989. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the stable coordinates of the bipolar postwar world disappeared overnight. With the end of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw Pact, the two means of domination over East Central Europe were abandoned.

Political orders that seemed to be rigidly fixed dissolved almost overnight. Such sensational examples of discontinuous social transformation astonished observers and drove home a severe lesson in humility to social scientists. A theoretically sound analysis of the events of the 1980s that puts them into an historical perspective has yet to be provided.

How does social order arise and why does it dissolve? This old puzzle is gaining new and special significance as a result of discontinuities and phases of revolutionary transition. A well-founded analysis would have to start by positioning the widespread instability within a recurrent pattern of social transition in Western society. Phases of crisis, like the one that started in the 1970s and continued into the 1980s, deprive societal institutions of their immediate acceptance. At the same time, the 1980s were characterized by a tentative search for alternatives, later on to be recognized as the beginning of “something new.”

The long-term process of societal transition toward “something new” is the subject of this book. The perspective that will be sketched out interprets societal transition as the discontinuous evolution of societal models, which triggers long-term cyclical processes in different spheres of society. Therefore, societal transition is interpreted not only as continuous change but also as a discontinuous sequence of societal models. Even though new societal models are conditioned upon earlier ones, they are sufficiently different to justify both conceptions of evolution as well as of discontinuous social transition. Societal models are formulated and established as a result of persistent and deep crises. In the course of their unfolding they generate growing tensions, eventually leading to their dissolution and the search for a new model. Societal models may thus be identified as the basic units of social transition.

Two types of social transition will be distinguished. The first type encompasses the unfolding of a societal model, i.e., social change within a given order. The second type refers to the change of the order itself, i.e., a change of program that involves structural transformations in the organization of social life. We use the term evolution for this latter type of social transition.

The perspective we develop here avoids one-sided answers to the classic questions: What provides social cohesion? and What makes society progress? Such one-sided answers were suggested by the two predominant theories of postwar sociology: structural-functionalism and conflict theory. These two principal theoretical perspectives are commonly recognized as distinct in their answers to the question of what provides social cohesion. In structural-functionalist theory the importance of shared values and norms is stressed, whereas in conflict theory power relations are responsible for the integration of social entities. Both perspectives are of rather limited use in the study of social transformations. In opposition to such “absolutist” approaches, our view centers around the recurring transition from conflict to basic consensus, from basic consensus to conflict, and so on. The trajectory of a societal model is characterized by the change from basic consensus in its first phase to conflict in its second phase. It should be stressed, however, that the notion of basic consensus does not exclude disagreement and struggles within the accepted order in any way. Our approach combines elements drawn from both structural-functionalist and conflict theory and thus reconciles both research paradigms to a certain degree. As Seymour Lipset (1985) points out, conflict and consensus are just two faces of the same social process. Seen from this vantage point, it is hardly useful to exaggerate the differences between the two paradigms.

The Argument

This book sketches out various elements of a theoretical perspective that we would like to call the theory of conflictive evolution. The primary focus of interest of this theory is not society as a whole, but on societal models, these being the units of social transformation. At a general level, societal models comprise the predominant basic consensus at a certain point in time as well as the institutional arrangements created to settle conflicts between leading values representing universal human aspirations and demands that arise from vested power. In our perspective, social structure is the result of the interaction of such conflicting principles, namely the striving after power, the striving after efficiency (self-determination and economic progress) and security, and the claim to equality. Societal models, on the other hand, represent the historical compromise among those principles. Against this background, a societal model can be interpreted as a renewed social contract that aims at producing legitimacy and thus social stability by realizing basic values. Because of the contradictions between leading values and power interests this is only possible for a limited time, however. Once it has been established, a societal model does not persist eternally without being changed. Rather, it runs through a particular trajectory that is characterized by a certain degree of regularity. Balancing and unbalancing processes as well as basic consensus and dissent mark the principal rhythms of this trajectory with the following stages: formation, unfolding, repletion, dissolution, and eventually decay and displacement by a new societal model.

Evolution is a feature of this process. Yet, rather than being a continuous phenomenon, evolution must be understood as long cyclical waves of structural construction and destruction. In each of these waves another societal model is spelled out. The societal model weaves together interpreted leading values (normative theories)—the most abstract components of culture—with two encompassing institutional complexes that differ in their functional logic: the technological style and the politico-economic regime. Originally coined by Cariota Perez (1983), the term technological style refers to a type of productive and administrative organization. The politico-economic regime, on the other hand, encompasses the shaping of the nation-state and the world market. On the basis of the above-mentioned principles and the institutional styles, the central institutions of modern times—i.e., the market, the firm, the nation-state and the educational system—are shaped, related to each other, and wrapped into a “package.”

The social frame of reference of these processes is the world system rather than particular, territorially bounded societies. The social processes we are dealing with in this book are embedded in a capitalist system that is understood as a world-encompassing arena of market and interstate competition. It is not only firms that engage in market competition: in addition, governments of sovereign states are also competing in a “market” for optimal locations in the world economy, an economic competition outside of politico-military rivalry, the classical form of interstate conflict.

On the basis of the organization of the political and economic realm, different societal types can be distinguished, the core type being characteristically different from the peripheral type. Furthermore, the type of organization is marked by different societal models in the course of time, i.e., models spelling out the political and economic realms under normative guiding principles and relating them to each other.

Societal models represent not only an historical compromise between the previously mentioned principles. Since the legitimacy of social order is an important basis of competitive advantage in the world market, societal models also offer solutions to the problems of competition in the world system and the striving to attain or consolidate core status. If a given societal model succeeds in establishing an advantage in the competitive world system, it unfolds over national frontiers. As a result of the competition among different models and in spite of national particularities, societal models may thus cause convergence.

Western Society as a Societal Type

By using the notion of Western society we are claiming the existence of a type of society within world social structure that is constituted by sufficiently similar component societies. The evolution of typical features as well as the kind and extent of variations are the subjects of this book. The terms “Western” and “modern” are inadequate yet practical metaphors for the societal type under discussion. Within world social structure Western society holds a position which we propose to call the core. Western society is only a part of a totality that must not be forgotten, even though this totality is not the subject of this book. In our perception world social structure also comprises the rival counter-core (up to the end of the 1980s), the semiperiphery that is dependent on the core and the counter-core to varying degrees, and the marginalized and dependent periphery. For the sake of clarity it would be appropriate to start with an historical and comparative analysis of this set of societal types and their interrelations. This task would go beyond the scope of this study, however, and consequently only “Western society” will be analyzed.

For the postwar era the societal type in question can be delimited without problems. Not counting the very small societies of Luxembourg and Iceland, the following 18 countries were part of Western society during the postwar era: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. These countries constitute the sample for the comparative analyses that follow. Greece, Portugal and Spain are not included because they are considered here to have only recently become members of Western society, since they did not exhibit all its typical features for the whole of the postwar era. Another candidate, Israel, will be excluded as a special case because it has been in an almost permanent state of war since its forced foundation in 1948 and a large part of its population was not born in the country. Presently, some other non-Western societies are pushing forward into the perimeter of the core. Apart from some city-states, mention should be made of South Korea and Taiwan, rare cases of upward mobility in world social structure for which Japan was the model.

The Western societal type is deeply rooted in Europe from which it spread early to North America and in the second part of the twentieth century—after the defeat of Japan in the Second World War—to East Asia. In spite of the considerable success of the early proponents of the capitalist project—Venice in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and North Holland in the sixteenth and seventeenth—it remained confined to certain border regions in a very differentiated European environment for centuries. Only in the eighteenth century did the shift of leadership to England and the ensuing break-through of the English Industrial Revolution result in substantial adaptive pressure. Other European powers had to accept the superior institutions if they did not want to risk being outdone in the competition for core positions. Thus, the revolution of 1789 and even more so the liberal revolutions of 1830 and 1848 resulted in the constitution of a group of societies that promoted the project of the Western societal type.

This type of a society, which spread from 1830 and 1848 onwards, has two sociologically relevant and important features: 1) the constitution of market societies combined with an intense and complete unfolding of economic efficiency; 2) the political separation of power. The latter exhibits three additional features: 1) there is no full monopoly of territorial power in the overarching system; 2) different political power centers and parties exist within societies and compete for the same political power positions; 3) political dominion is forced to legitimize itself to non-elites, i.e., by means of elections non-elites dispose of at least one possibility to control leadership. This kind of political organization may be adequately described by Robert Dahľs (1971) term “polyarchy.” Currently, and as a result of gradual improvements in the separation of power in the political realm, the term “democracy” is also frequently used.

From an evolutionary perspective the historical success of this type can be linked to the separation of power and the differentiated institutionalization of countervailing power. This last aspect is stressed by John K. Galbraith ([1952] 1967). In addition, success is a function of the enhanced possibilities of generating legitimacy and the superior learning capacity of this type. Superiority in the competition of societal types became particularly obvious in the revolutionary year of 1989. Two institutional solutions made this possible. First, market society is able to delegate a large part of the ever present problem of distributional fairness and justice to the market. Second, the separation of political power and its democratic control (elections, voting) can exist without a rigid pattern of truths or even Truth itself. In contrast to competing political systems, decisions can be made in a pragmatic way and in accordance with empirical problems.

In the periphery and the semiperiphery the central institutions of core society are only present in an incomplete or crippled form. Closely linked to the economic and politico-military dependency on the core, this fact also is an important reason for underdevelopment.

In the counter-core things are different. Here, a powerful state apparatus—as a precondition for this status—provides the necessary means to counteract pressure from the core and even threaten it. The basic condition for counter-core status is a counter-ideology that challenges the core’s claim to cultural leadership. In the counter-core there is a tendency for the state, the economy, and the private spheres to amalgamate under the heading of a doctrine that claims to be absolutely true and attempts to regulate all realms of social life. In short, the counter-core is founded on the basis of the antithesis to the foundations of success in the core. In the postwar world system it was the state socialist model, with its claim to world leadership, that constituted the counter-core for over forty years until it succumbed and disintegrated in the competition of systems. Yet, counter-cores are a frequent phenomenon in decentralized world systems. For example, the absolutist projects of modernity were counter-cores to the outward-oriented economies of Venice, North Holland, and England, and presently, the revitalized Islamic fundamentalist model points to the possible formation of a new counter-core.

Market society and separation of political powers are two fundamental elements of the Western societal type. Together with the constitutional state they represent the basic social contract which was renewed at various times since 1830-48. On their basis and starting from general guiding principles, the political and economic realms are shaped and interwoven in a specific way. In our perspective, societal models are renewable social contracts. In this we agree with Ralf Dahrendorf’s (1992: 50) assessment of the social contract as the central subject of history and his argument: “The social contract is rewritten on the basis of social conflicts.” This is exactly the perspective advanced in our evolutionary conflict theory which aims at a more precise understanding and dating of the discontinuities in the renewal of the societal type. Two particularities of the theory merit some fu...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Preface to the American Edition
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction and Overview
• Part I The Argument Spelled Out
• Part II Discontinuities and their Links
• Part III Shaping Institutional Orders
• Part IV Convergence in the West?
• Part V Present Transformations and Future Competitive Edges
• List of Tables and Figures
• Bibliography
• Author Index
• Name and Historic Event Index
• Subject Index