Western Military Interventions After The Cold War

Evaluating the Wars of the West

Marek Madej

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9781351175005
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book offers an examination of the effectiveness of Western military interventions in the post-Cold War era.

It constitutes a comprehensive, interdisciplinary analysis of the conditions, conduct and consequences of post-Cold War armed conflicts, in which Western states, acting as a multinational coalition, were engaged in a combat role as an intervening force, not as an impartial peacekeeper. The volume identifies and analyses the causes, justifications and goals of the interventions, as well as the results of such engagements. The main objective is to assess the effectiveness of the military actions of Western states in these armed conflicts. Apart from the chapters devoted to particular conflicts – such as the Gulf War, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya – it also includes chapters in which experts summarise the legal, political, military and economic implications of all such Western-led interventions. As a result, the book helps us to understand why these military interventions happened, how they were executed and what the results were. Taking into account the impact of these military expeditions on global security, the book offers an explanation for some of the central questions concerning the current shape of international order and power distribution on a global scale.

This book will be of much interest to students of military and strategic studies, conflict studies, foreign policy and International Relations.

1 The Gulf

The first Western war after the Cold War

Kamila Pronińska

1 Strategic context

1.1 The sources of the armed conflict in the Gulf

The Gulf War broke out in the broad strategic context of the end of the Cold War and the changing balance of power in the Middle East. The reduced role of the Soviet Union (USSR) provided the United States (US) with greater possibilities of influencing the Middle East and thus transforming the existing regional order. At the same time, the limited capability of the USSR in providing assistance to the ‘friendly’ regimes significantly upset the balance of power in the Middle East.¹ Yet, the West perceived the new security environment as ambiguous, and the US administration had no ‘clear and consistent Middle Eastern policy’.²

A highly significant factor in the new strategic context was the policy of the Iraqi regime and its relations with the Arab world. The Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein openly voiced his concerns regarding the possibility of a new balance of power unfavourable to Arab countries emerging in the region after the erosion of the USSR. Verbalising the concerns of the Arab countries, Saddam also offered an alternative: if these countries worked together and consolidated their resources and financial assets, the US would have to take heed of their positions and interests to a greater extent.³

The factors that induced Iraq to invade Kuwait were both of a geopolitical and an economic nature. On the one hand, Iraq never came to terms with the borders of Kuwait and had already challenged its border with Kuwait in 1938. Its territorial claims became even more significant when considerable oil deposits (the Rumaila field) were discovered close to the border. After Kuwait gained independence, Iraq consistently demanded that Kuwait return the territories given it in 1923 and regularly accused Kuwait of ‘illegally exploiting’ the oil and gas deposits in the borderland. On the other hand, Iraq’s financial problems caused by a changed situation in the oil market and by the debts from the time of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) were also a strong impulse for the aggression. In the 1980s, there was a considerable change in the oil market, involving a sudden decrease in oil prices. Kuwait decided to increase output from the contested Rumaila field from August 1988 onwards. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) increased their output as well. By effecting a decrease in oil prices, these actions were detrimental to the indebted Iraqi economy.

An important role in Saddam’s calculations concerning the success of the invasion was played by the conflict between Iraq and Iran, in which it was Iraq that received broad support from Western and Arab countries. This cemented the dictator’s belief in his own exceptionality and the power of his country, which was systematically equipped with modern arms. In addition, the regime took loans from Kuwait during the war, which it later found hard to repay in the new situation in the oil market.

A confrontation in the Gulf seemed likely already in May 1990, given Saddam’s attitude at the summit of Arab countries in Baghdad. He condemned the countries that maintained artificially low oil prices thus sabotaging the Iraqi economy.⁴ The dispute concerning income from oil sales escalated in mid-year. In July, after Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE agreed to decrease their production so that prices would go back to US$18 per barrel, Kuwait declared it might withdraw from the agreement. This spurred Iraqi authorities to make further claims towards Kuwait.⁵

In this period, the US administration kept assuring the Gulf countries of its support in the event of war. However, there was some ambiguity in the warnings given to Saddam,⁶ which weakened the preventive and deterring effect.

Iraqi forces were amassing along the border with Kuwait already in July 1990 and they crossed the border on 2 August. Within hours, the defence crumbled, the emir fled the country and Iraqi forces began the occupation. It was a textbook example of an illegal aggression, in violation of international law. On 8 August, Iraq officially annexed Kuwait. The international community condemned the invasion and the following annexation, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed a broad array of non-military sanctions and American troops were deployed in Saudi Arabia, but all these actions did not bring about the desired reaction from the Iraqi regime. Saddam made negotiations on the withdrawal of Iraqi forces conditional on the resolution of other Middle Eastern problems, such as the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights, the West Bank and Gaza, and the Syrian involvement in the internal policy of Lebanon. This, however, was most likely an attempt to obtain support from certain Arab countries or stalling for time rather than a sign of actual readiness to withdraw forces. The crisis in the Gulf further deepened the divisions among Arab countries. At the August summit of the League of Arab States (LAS) in Cairo on joining the US-led coalition, in a very tense atmosphere, they chose to support the coalition by 12 to 9 votes.⁷

Even greater escalation of the tensions took place when Saddam decided to bar Western citizens from leaving Iraq and Kuwait. On 13–17 August, in reaction to Operation Desert Shield, he announced that Western citizens staying in Iraq and Kuwait were prohibited from leaving these countries until US forces were withdrawn from Saudi Arabia.⁸ This crisis further stimulated the determination of US and British diplomacy and the effectiveness of their efforts towards organising an armed response of the international community to the Iraqi aggression. With the American diplomatic offensive (especially towards the USSR and the People’s Republic of China (PRC))⁹ combined with an increasing presence of coalition forces in the region, on 29 November the UNSC adopted a resolution (S/RES/678) that was key to ensuring the legitimacy of a military intervention against Iraq.

1.2 Kuwait’s strategic importance for the West

Due to its strategic location and rich energy resources, the Persian Gulf has traditionally been the site of competition for influence among superpowers and for access to energy resources. The West views the region as crucial for meeting the world’s energy demands and maintaining stability of the global oil market. Among the numerous international political agreements concerning Middle Eastern energy resources, the most important one was concluded at the meeting between US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the King of Saudi Arabia Abdulaziz Ibn Saud in 1945.¹⁰ It was to guarantee the stability of oil supplies, sales of oil in US$ and that the House of Saud would stay in power. Furthermore, American doctrines – especially that of President Jimmy Carter presented in 1980 – stressed that the protection of US vital interests in the Middle East, including those related to retaining unobstructed access to energy resources, could require the use of force. Apart from that, there was also a strong tradition of military presence in the region (British forces), including for the purpose of maintaining Kuwait’s independence. Until the 1970s, the British military presence was meant to rein in the expansionist ambitions of Iraqi authorities towards Kuwait, which had received military guarantees from the United Kingdom (UK) in 1961,¹¹ when it gained independence. With the withdrawal of British forces, there was growing conviction in the US that it was necessary to ensure stability in the region. National Security Decision Memorandum No. 92 sanctioned an increase in the American military presence in the Gulf in order to decrease the threat of a conflict. Their willingness to use force to maintain stability and the status quo was to be emphasised by the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in 1980 and of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in 1983, responsible for military operations in Middle East, among others.

In 1990, the security and stability of Middle Eastern West-friendly regimes (especially Saudi Arabia and its neighbours) was still considered crucial for maintaining the security of energy supplies. As one of the main exporters of oil from the Persian Gulf Kuwait was important for Western energy security interests.¹² Even though at that time the Persian Gulf countries were not the main source of US oil imports and despite the fact that the share of Middle Eastern oil in the Western European energy mix had decreased as well, these countries were still playing the key role in shaping the price of oil in the global market as well as in maintaining its stability.¹³ The West perceived the region as unstable, due to wars and the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 which had a significant impact on perception of the stability of Middle Eastern oil supplies. They also increased awareness of the vulnerability of the West to disruptions of supplies from this part of the world.

1.3 International response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait

In the initial phase of the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait, before ground forces entered Kuwait, there was a proposal to find a solution by Arab states. Saudi Arabia was a strong advocate of this option and delayed consent to possible deployment of US forces in the kingdom. Arab solutions, however, would consist of diplomatic efforts only; they would not include a joint military operation.

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait triggered a swift response from the international community. On 3 August, by 14 to 7 votes the LAS condemned the invasion and demanded immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. At the same time, it also requested that no external intervention be launched. On the same day, the US and USSR jointly imposed an arms embargo on Iraq and Kuwait, and the US additionally froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets. Following US diplomatic efforts, the PRC joined the arms embargo, while the European Community and Japan backed economic sanctions.¹⁴ The system of sanctions involved a ban on imports, export or transport of Iraqi goods and exports of any products to Iraq except humanitarian or medical supplies; states were also prohibited from providing Iraq with any financial assets.¹⁵ None of this, however, prevented Saddam from annexing Kuwait, which was followed by an immediate condemnation by the UNSC (S/RES/662). At this point, the Soviets explicitly cautioned the US against launching any military action without UNSC approval.¹⁶

In subsequent resolutions the UNSC called upon Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country; it also expressed hope that it would be possible to resolve the dispute peacefully (S/RES/674 of 29 October 1990). It was systematically condemning the effects of the invasion¹⁷ and tightening the sanctions, prohibiting states from, among others, allowing aircraft to depart to Iraq or Kuwait or cross their airspace on their way there unless they carried medical or humanitarian goods or supplies for the UN Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group¹⁸ (S/RES/670 of 25 September 1990). States were also obliged to make sure that private entities respect the sanction system, stop ships or prohibit them from entering ports, as well as effectively freeze Iraqi assets and prevent Iraqi authorities from gaining access to Kuwait’s resources (S/RES/665 of 26 August 1990).

Although implemented with unprecedented international support and cooperation, overall the sanctions had little impact on the risk of further Iraqi expansion. In this context, especially in the first days after Iraq’s aggression, the West’s greatest concerns regarded the possibility of an attack on Saudi Arabia. It therefore became necessary to employ military deterrence, as pointed out by Thatcher at her meeting with Bush in Aspen (2 August).¹⁹ The West was aware that even if Gulf States commenced joint military operations, they would still lack the means to counter the most powerful army in the region – the million-strong and well equipped armed forces of Iraq. Consequently, the US committed itself to organise the first military operation to deter any further aggression and defend Saudi Arabia. King Fahd accepted the offer of US Secretary of State Richard Cheney to ‘host’ US forces on 6 August, and on the following day Operation Desert Shield began.

With the development of the situation in the region (while Saddam was deterred from further aggression, Iraqi forces were not leaving Kuwait) international support for the idea of a military intervention was ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• Notes on contributors
• Introduction
• 1 The Gulf: the first Western war after the Cold War
• 2 Bosnia-Herzegovina: the West in the service of the UN
• 3 Kosovo: the first war for human rights
• 4 Afghanistan: the longest war, the greatest fiasco?
• 5 Iraq 2003–2010: a disastrous war of choice
• 6 Libya: when military success means state collapse
• 7 Liberal interventionism of the West after the Cold War: premises and consequences
• 8 Wars of the West: conflicts with no victory
• 9 Impact of Western military interventions on the evolution of law on use of force
• 10 International humanitarian law in the context of military interventions of the West
• 11 The significance of the resource and energy factor in military interventions of the West after the Cold War
• 12 Conclusions: on the effectiveness of Western interventions – the more we practice, the less we achieve?
• Index