Government–NGO Relationships in Africa, Asia, Europe and MENA

Raffaele Marchetti

• Publisher: Routledge India
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9781351117487
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Gouvernement américain

This volume brings together some of the most recent scholarship on government and civil society. It examines the axis of the relationship between national governments and civil society organisations (NGOs) by highlighting commonalities as well as differences among four key regions in the world. Using the stability vs. instability framework, the book explores a range of pertinent issues, including human rights, development, foreign policy, state-building, regime change, governance frameworks, wars and civil liberties. It studies diverse situations, from those entailing comprehensive cooperation to those involving politically contentious and revolutionary activities.

With case studies from Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), this volume will be useful to scholars and researchers of political science, global politics, international relations, sociology, development studies, global governance and public policy, as well as to those in the development sector and NGOs.

1
Dynamics of interaction between governments and civil society organizations

Raffaele Marchetti

The standard definition of civil society identifies it as the space outside of the government, the family, and the market in which individuals and collective organizations advance allegedly common interests in a competitive environment. A more encompassing definition understands civil society as referring to the sphere in which citizens and social initiatives organize themselves around objectives, constituencies, and thematic interests with a public nature, be it local, national, or transnational. Accordingly, civil society organizations usually include community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), social movements, labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, media operators, academia, diaspora groups, lobby and consultancy groups, think tanks and research centers, professional associations, and foundations (with political parties and private companies remaining the most controversial cases). An even wider definition of non-state actors includes also criminal networks, terrorists, and combatant groups. Analytically, four broad categories of civil society organizations (CSOs) can be distinguished: membership organizations, interest organizations, service organizations, and support organizations.

The term civil society was rediscovered after the fall of the Wall and was intensely deployed in the policies formulation in the laboratory in Central and Eastern Europe, but also in Latin America and East Asia. In this context, a particularly important dimension of the action of civil society organizations was its relation with the state. In general terms, this relation is seen alternatively as either competitive, or cooperative. According to the first perspective deriving from John Locke, popular control of political institutions requires an external, independent actor, and civil society constitutes a fitting functional counterpart to the institutional power. On the opposite, according to the tradition of cooperation inspired by Montesquieu and Hegel, civil society is seen in its integrative function either as cooperating with the institutions in terms of inputs (CSOs have an associative function that generate legitimacy of the state, close to communitarianism) or as a subcontractor for facilitating the outputs. From this perspective, the sense of community and solidarity is grounded in the life-world. CSOs have precisely the role of transmitting such sense into the public institutions: they are intermediaries, but at the same time they are also constitutive of the social cement underpinning any political endeavor.

In the past, during the rediscovery of the notion of civil society, its autonomy from the state was highly appreciated. Today the policy mood has moved into a higher appreciation of the principle of partnership between CSOs and public institutions, be they national governments and intergovernmental organizations. In this regards, an exemplar case is that of China where the government even created “NGO-incubators” to promote the growth of CSOs (Huang, Deng, Wang, and Edwards, 2014). The institutional uneasiness with square demonstrations, popular protests, and revolutionary movements goes hand in hand with this. Of course, from a different political angle, the appreciation might be inverted. The positions in the debate vary. What is common is the acknowledgment that CSOs do play an important role. As Salamon aptly put it some years ago: “The proliferation of these groups may be permanently altering the relationship between states and citizenship, with an impact extending far beyond the material services they provide” (Salamon, 1994, 109).

A similar pattern can be observed at the European and global level. There too, the engagement with CSOs is growing, as much as it is growing the level of contention politics that CSOs are developing visà-vis international institutions. A noteworthy feature of today’s global governance is the interaction between public institutions and private organizations, which include a significant number of civil society organizations. Cooperation between intergovernmental and civil society organizations takes many forms, including multi-stakeholder initiatives, private–public partnerships, subcontracting, political alliances, hybrid coalitions, multi-sectoral networks, pluralist co-governance, and even foreign policy by proxy. Both international organizations and states have developed close relationships with civil society organizations for reasons of effectiveness and legitimacy.

At the national level, a number of phenomena constitute the background within which the interaction between CSOs and governments has developed. They include the following: (1) the fusion of national and international dimensions; (2) the increased role of non-state players; and (3) the emergence of private governance.

First, national politics are increasingly influenced by international politics, but these, too, remain strongly dependent on national political dynamics, in a reciprocal link that seems difficult to resolve. The neologism “inter-mestic”, combining international and domestic, is often used in this regard. Already in the 1970s Keohane and Nye had begun to study the phenomenon of interdependence (Nye and Keohane, 1971). In the 1980s Putnam’s famous study marked a milestone in the debate about constantly balancing the two dimensions (Putnam, 1988). More recently Slaughter pointed to the importance of transnational networks (Slaughter, 2004). The globalization process generated a sense of common purpose among civil society actors, and led to both internal unification, by increasing the sense of solidarity among civil society organizations, and protest against the socio-economic consequences of globalization (Van Rooy, 2004). For the first time, a number of ad hoc coalitions and campaigns were organized on a trans-ideological basis, surmounting the traditional political barriers of previous forms of national mobilization, and targeting a number of controversial aspects of globalization. In addition, the technological innovations in the IT field and the changes in social behavior, such as the proliferation of higher education and the expansion of international travel, have enabled CSOs to play more incisively cross-border politics. The economic growth of the ’60s and early ’70s generated in many countries a new bourgeoisie, the urban middle class in particular, which in subsequent years was the main provider of political activists. The spread of knowledge and the building of new, reliable transnational relations increased the awareness of social inequality and the political mechanisms underpinning it, thereby providing the basis for mobilization (Smith and Wiest, 2012, 168). Citizens felt empowered and confident enough to mobilize at the national and international level. Subsequent successes simply reinforced such self-confidence by sharing best practices and reciprocal support.

Second, non-state actors have increasingly become protagonists at the national and international level. Their relevance had been a subject of study already by the 1970s (Keohane and Nye, 1971, 1977). In the 1980s it was relatively marginalized because of the revival of neoliberal institutionalism. In the 1990s non-state actors were again the subject of important studies (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen, 1995) but remained subordinated to interaction with states. It is only in the last decade that it has become evident that non-state actors are able to influence national and global politics in an autonomous way. The current national and global governance arrangements allow for the participation of a number of different political actors considered to be relevant stakeholders. From the UN to the EU, many IOs and national governments have provided political and financial support for the growth of transnational CSOs. Bilateral official aid agencies have been especially conducive to transnational mobilization by supporting the flourishing of different kinds of CSO under the aegis of assisted self-reliance and participatory development. This has created a significant opportunity for the inclusion of civil society organizations in what was previously behind closed government doors (Hale and Held, 2011; Higgott, Underhill, and Bieler, 2000; Joachim and Locher, 2009; McKeon, 2009). In addition, the broader international system, based as it is primarily on liberal Western principles, has created an environment conducive to the development of these kinds of activities (Boli and Thomas, 1999; Smith and Wiest, 2012, 163). The widespread recognition of the transnational value of human rights, civic participation, accountability, good governance and democracy, social empowerment, and gender equality, has made it more possible for CSOs to gain space and legitimacy in the international system outside the traditional framework of state-based representation.

Third, governance is increasingly more private (Hall and Biersteker, 2002). While traditional authority relied on the principle of delegation and was embedded in an institutional form, today we increasingly witness the consolidation of new forms of authority that are far more privatistic. Authority is thus recognized in private subjects not on the basis of delegation through mostly electoral mechanisms, but on the basis of expertise (e.g., technocrats acquiring increasing power in decision-making processes) (F. Fisher, 1990), or on the basis of moral credibility (consider, for instance, the prestige enjoyed by NGOs or celebrities) (Busby, 2007; Kapoor, 2012), or on the basis of the ability to accomplish a specific duty (take, e.g., the mercenaries contracted to wage armed conflicts, or the NGOs working on cooperation and development) (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). Undoubtedly the privatization of functions previously performed by the state cleared new political space for CSOs. The state’s financial resources declined in the 1980s and 1990s and its overall role in national and international affairs was consequently reduced. At the same time, the increasingly discredited ability of the overloaded and over-bureaucratized state to deliver fundamental services mounted up, as did a number of differing ideological perspectives (including not only neoliberalism and the Third Way, but also the principle of subsidiarity) – all of which suggested that the value of non-state actors as constituting, at times, a better functional substitute, was being recognized. Public welfare spending was considered detrimental, a sort of rival to the personal responsibility, entrepreneurship, and private investment essential in times of economic slowdown. The model of new public management was adopted through the hollowing of the state and its de-bureaucratization (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). The collapse of socialism yielded even more support for the rise of the third sector. As a consequence of this new context, CSOs were able to mobilize resources both from the state itself (which opted for the cheapest and most effective way of subcontracting its tasks, mainly to NGOs) and from other private and public sources, in order to perform collective functions previously in the hands of public institutions (Hulme and Edwards, 1997).

It is within this political constellation, which has facilitated the growth and consolidation of civil activism, that we need to locate the interaction between public institutions and CSOs as a specific type of relationship between public institutions and private actors (Marchetti, 2016).

Cooperation vs. competition

State–NGO relations are situated on a continuum between cooperation and competition. These two modes represent the two key types of interaction that are usually implemented in this relationship. As Figure 1.1 shows, these two actors can enter into very different kinds of relations. At one extreme, CSOs can be created by governments (so called GONGOs) or by IOs (so called IONGOs). At the other extreme, CSOs may end up posing a threat to public institutions and entering into a violent relation with them. Underpinning these different types of relations there is the dichotomy cooperation vs. competition with the type of “indifference” in the middle to mark the division.

Figure 1.1 Range of relationships between public institutions and CSOs

Source: Author’s elaboration

In the cooperative mode, formulated by Montesquieu and Hegel, CSOs are usually performing different functions within national politics (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). They provide technical inputs through the provision of information and advice, by bringing unique knowledge and experience to shape policy and strategy, and identifying and building solutions. They support state functions through the implementation of development projects and the provision of services. They support capacity building through the provision of support to other CSOs, including funding. Overall, CSOs are usually expected to provide expertise, capacity to deliver, and public credibility to institutions. And by doing that, they are expected to increase both effectiveness and legitimacy of the political system.

Different theories of interest groups have analyzed the role played by such organizations within the political system. Pluralist interpretations see group interests generating social balancing, socialization, and autonomy of society from the state. Neo-corporativist readings perceive interest groups as a permanent part of the political system and generate stable compromises. Elite theory focuses on the prominent role of business and political elites in shaping public life. Finally, instrumental Marxism understands the state representing the executive committee of the ruling capitalist class.

In particular, for what concerns the relation between civil society and democracy, CSOs are usually seen as democracy enhancers. Accordingly CSOs are expected to play a significant role in the different phases of the democratic transition. In the moment of liberalization of the autocratic regime, CSOs are usually united in the strategic fight against the ancient regime. In the phase of institutionalization of democracy, they tend to cooperate for the building of the new regime. And finally, in the process of consolidation of democracy, CSOs are understood as schools of democracy, contestation, and pluralism, as in the reflexive function. The standard assumption is that CSOs bridge the gap between transparency and accountability by (1) accessing, interpreting, and distributing information to multiple stakeholders in usable and accessible formats; (2) demanding accountability of government directly; (3) supporting and encouraging formal oversight actors to demand accountability (such as legislatures, auditors, judiciaries, etc.); (4) supporting and encouraging other actors to demand accountability (such as executive insiders, political parties, and donors) (van Zyl, 2014). It has ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Notes on contributors
• 1 Dynamics of interaction between governments and civil society organizations
• PART I Africa
• PART II Asia
• PART III Europe
• PART IV Middle East and North Africa