Politics and Revolution in Egypt

Rise and Fall of the Youth Activists

Sarah Rennick, Sarah Anne Rennick

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN:
  9781138738119
• eBook ISBN:
  9781351732710
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Politique du Moyen-Orient

In the years since the 2011 revolutions, Egypt and the Arab countries in general have moved from a profound moment of hope and democratic potential to deepened authoritarianism and outright war. Among the many political actors who have seen their political prospects rise and fall are youth activists, the revolutionary vanguard who spearheaded the transition process.

This book offers a detailed analysis of Egypt's revolutionary youth as a collective and non-institutionalized political actor since 2005, bringing forth in particular the organizational, ideational, and strategic dimensions of the social movement. It offers insights into the origins of the movement and its evolution over time, the activists' claims and objectives, and the rationale behind their actions/interactions in the greater political arena. Proposing a theoretical framework that lies at the nexus of practice theory and social movement theory, the book demonstrates how the foundational practices of "youth" and "revolutionary" acted as the movement's internal culture, shaping the activists' claims and goals, their organizational structures, and their choice of strategies and repertoires of contention. In the context of a defunct Arab Spring and the region's descent into deepened authoritarianism and ultra-violent conflict, the book sheds light on the Egyptian uprising and the reasons for its increasingly grim outcome by providing a detailed analysis of one of its key players and both the exogenous and endogenous reasons why the revolutionary youth activists failed to achieve their goals.

As the first book to assess the revolutionary youth as a social movement distinct from other forms of activism and other youth groups/parties in Egypt, it will be a valuable resource for anyone with an interest in Middle East Studies, the Arab Spring, or social movements more generally.

1 Generational Activism and Radical Change

Given their fluid and internally heterogeneous nature, it can be difficult to pinpoint the exact moment when social movements are born: should origins be traced back to key events, or the precursors to such events? Should the foundation of a social movement be linked to the establishment of formal collectives, or are the individual initiatives of leaders more important? In the case of the revolutionary youth movement, tracing the genealogical origins is rendered somewhat difficult given the different pathways of the movement’s most senior individual activists. The life of activism for some commenced with early mobilization efforts on behalf of the Palestinian plight, stemming directly from university campuses to the streets. For others, activism saw its origins in the more formal political sphere, through participation in groups such as the al-Ghad party or the Muslim Brotherhood. These various points of departure attest to the ideologically and organizationally diverse backgrounds of the movement’s earliest activists.

More useful than considering the individual biographies of the movement’s original members, then, is instead to consider when the community of practice that would form the basis of the social movement first began to emerge. Although the revolutionary youth social movement was in its nascent stages of development, the years 2005–2010 saw the flourishing of “youth” as a form of political practice, based on the perception of distinctive generational differences in activism, derived from both multigenerational interaction as well as private exchange within the generational unit itself. These interactions promoted the expression of a specific generational consciousness and the internalization of a common code of practice—a manner of “doing” activism and contestation. The activists who would eventually form the revolutionary youth movement from the outset did not see themselves as distinct from older generations of political opponents; on the contrary, they were united by shared grievances and goals that transcended age gaps. However, within very short order, the budding movement developed a distinct notion of youth as a form of practice which was unique from that of previous generations. This sentiment of political generation and youth practice was further entrenched through the creation of distinct social movement organizations that allowed for youth consciousness and identity to solidify. The dimensions of youth practice that emerged during this period placed emphasis on: non-affiliation and non-alignment with any one political ideology; decision-making based on consensus and power-sharing; the rejection of figureheads and cults of personality; the values of solidarity and non-violence; and altruism as the basis for action—all of which would play a crucial role in the construction of the social movement.

The Generational Encounter and the Development of Youth Practice

The last decade of Mubarak’s rule saw innovation in the field of contestation, with the entrance of new players into Egypt’s political arena and a noticeable change in the tone and degree of opposition. This included the legalization of the al-Ghad party in 2004 and the bid for presidency of its leader, Ayman Nour, as well as the return of Mohamed ElBaradei to Egypt in 2010 and his establishment of the National Association for Change—an activist platform and signature campaign that sought seven key reforms that would enfranchise voters, render electoral instances free and fair, and end the State of Emergency (see also Piazza 2010 and Collombier 2013). While such initiatives certainly played important roles in fissuring the authoritarian structure of the Mubarak regime, it was the Egyptian Movement for Change, a heteroclite opposition coalition better known under its popular slogan “Kifaya!” (enough!) which provided the most innovative and transformative source of opposition. The seeds of a distinctly youth community of practice within the field of activism and contestation during the waning days of Mubarak’s presidency can be traced to the generational encounter that occurred within Kifaya, and specifically the interactions between Youth for Change (the de facto youth arm of the coalition) and the older generation of opposition forces.

Kifaya was launched in late 2004 under the basic shared demand for an end to Mubarak’s rule and in order to prepare the terrain for the country’s first multi-party presidential election in 2005. Commencing with a silent demonstration, the group would eventually organize a wide variety of protests, meetings, marches, campus activities, and other forms of mobilization in 2005 and 2006, as well as a signature campaign against the extension of Mubarak’s presidency and the efforts to pass the position along to his son, based initially around the simple, singular message “no to extension, no to inheritance.” Over time, Kifaya’s political demands became more extensive and precisely defined, advocating broader changes and democratization efforts, focusing almost exclusively on domestic issues (for more on Kifaya’s discursive content and claims, see Vairel 2006; Shorbagy 2007; and El-Mahdi 2009). The group called for the divestment of power outside the hands of the executive, the establishment of rule of law and an end to the country’s notorious emergency laws, and a revision of economic policy and wealth redistribution. In this sense, Kifaya did not advocate surface-level reforms or concessions from the regime but rather sought the radical transformation of Egyptian politics—without recourse to Islamist discourse. The group’s unauthorized mobilization efforts, which directly protested against the president, represented the first of their kind under the Mubarak regime (Shabaan 2007).

Beyond this bold discursive content, Kifaya also differed from previous forms of opposition in its organizational format. The group did not seek contestation via the institutionalized path of creating a political party but rather aimed at political inclusiveness and grass-roots action. One of the most notable—and novel—aspects of Kifaya was its non-traditional organizational structure. The group, which was formed as a political movement based on specific grievances and an agreed-upon set of demands, was founded by 1970s-era activists and political leaders stemming from across the political spectrum, including Marxists, liberals, Nasserists, and Islamists as well as civil society leaders and public intellectuals—a coalition that had been previously inconceivable in Egyptian politics. Indeed, Kifaya provided the first model of political collaboration that effectively broke the Leftist–Islamist divide. In addition, through a horizontal organizational structure and decision-making mechanism based on consensus, Kifaya was at least able partially to break from the top-down and hierarchical form of organization that marked Egyptian political parties (details of Kifaya’s innovative leadership and operational structure can be found in Oweidat et al. 2008).

Kifaya’s contestation strategy was built around the dual efforts of street action as well as an Internet and media presence. Protests, demonstrations, marches, and rallies were held in highly visible public spaces, carried out with strict adherence to the principle of non-violence. Within the virtual world, Kifaya utilized its website as well as a network of bloggers to gather a constituency and disseminate information regarding instances of mobilization. The group’s website became a forum where the general public could air grievances, document examples of abuse or corruption, or discuss other aspects of the state’s performance; independent bloggers sympathetic to its message also became vectors for the transmission of information regarding Kifaya activities. In addition, Kifaya voiced its message across the independent press and Western and pan-Arab media as a means to pressure the regime. At its height, Kifaya had representation of some sort in nearly every governorate of the country and attracted members and supporters from a broad cross-section of society.

Despite initial success, Kifaya failed to achieve the changes it sought and by 2006 was largely in decline (although never formally disappeared). The group faced intense repression from the regime and its security sector, which relied on tactics of abuse, detention, and torture along with various forms of public humiliation to deter street action. This alone, however, does not account entirely for the waning of the group. The organizational model of consensus and collaboration across the political spectrum eventually proved a double edge sword: while highly effective in stimulating the initial advance of the movement and garnering diverse support, the Leftist–Islamist divide was ultimately insurmountable, with Islamists preferring to exit altogether (Oweidat et al. 2008). Moreover, organizational difficulties also debilitated the movement. Though the group strove for non-ideological collaboration and consensus decision-making, the lack of effective organizational experience prevented the building of a long-term agenda, while the movement’s political message was never able to find mass support among average Egyptians, who were more concerned with their own socio-economic problems. Despite these shortcomings, Kifaya’s lasting success was to transmit a message of rights and duties to the general public—a generalized claim that the state and the regime had failed to meet their responsibilities and citizens’ expectations. This logic of rights and responsibilities would be adopted by a number of Kifaya spin-off groups that would continue to mobilize, even after the original group’s decline, allowing the initiative to continue through a multiplier effect. Discursively focused on the possibility of change, these spin-off groups were often associated with specific professions, spawning for instance Doctors for Change, Writers and Artists for Change, and Journalists for Change. Among the most important of these was Youth for Change, where the story of the revolutionary youth begins. Given its status both as an independent organization with membership drawn largely along age-related lines as well as its constant contact—and indeed maneuvering—by Kifaya and the associated political parties therein, Youth for Change proved a crucial venue of the generational encounter.

Youth for Change was launched in 2005, comprising around 50–100 core activists in Cairo and perhaps as many as 500 in total (Onodera 2009). Although officially an independent group with its own decision-making structure and set of procedures, Youth for Change nonetheless maintained close contact and coordination—verging on outright control—with its progenitor. As a result, Youth for Change activists were in relatively close contact with the intellectual elites of the opposition as well as key members from major political opposition parties and currents. The group actively disseminated the banner and visual materials of Kifaya and promoted its activities, in particular within the online world where younger activists animated Kifaya’s network of blogs; nonetheless, it also maintained a degree of operational independence through the organization of protests, demonstrations, and other forms of street action that were tactically and spatially distinct. For example, on June 15, 2005, Youth for Change organized a protest in front of the mosque and shrine of Sayyida Zaynab, a revered site located in a working-class district south of Cairo’s downtown area and relatively removed from the normal space of protest.

Almost from its outset, the members of Youth for Change began to utilize a phrase to sign their statements, communications, and calls to mobilize: “the generations who have always lived under the emergency law.” As Hassabo argues, this phrase succinctly captured the shared awareness that the activists within Youth for Change—all born around the same time, near the start of Mubarak’s presidency or shortly thereafter—had known no other political order than that of the State of Emergency and the Mubarak regime more generally, and that this shared lived experience formed the basis of their uniqueness as a political generation (Hassabo 2009). In other words, in its initial interpretation, the notion of political generation as held by the activists was linked to this generationally specific common destiny that transcended any other differences (ideological, sectarian, and the like) existing within the cohort—a sentiment in fact reiterated in interviews. Over time, however, and through repeated interaction with Kifaya and representatives of the 1970s-era of activists and political actors, the notion of youth and the sentiments of the political generation became linked to differences in repertoires of contention.

Early on, the utilization of new technologies separated Youth for Change from Kifaya: the use of the Internet as a communication tool, as well as the willingness and energy for street action, demonstrated a certain gap in the manner of carrying out contestation and activism. This was eventually combined with accumulated frustrations that would translate into an understanding of youth in a much broader sense, based on a different way of doing activism and contestation altogether and not simply on alternative approaches to protest and mobilization. The members of Youth for Change were critical of the decision-making apparatus of Kifaya as well as the attempt to promulgate the ideological programs and specific political platforms by its various member organizations and parties. Youth for Change activists perceived a democratic deficit as well as a lack of loyalty to non-ideological contestation within the previous political generation. Graver still, the activists began to see the older generation as more interested in their own political projects than the greater good for the Egyptian people, referring to 1970s generation and the political parties more generally as opportunistic in their approach and more accepting of the power status quo. For the activists, the older generation of opposition figures, who were major political players in their own right, were willing to work within the “red lines”¹ as determined by the regime rather than jeopardize their personal status.

Perhaps the most important element driving the sense of political generation based on practice, however, was the activists’ experience of repression and prison. In April and May 2006, Youth for Change participated in protests in front of the Cairo Judge’s Club in an act of solidarity with the judiciary independence movement, leading to the arrest and detention of some sixty members (Onodera 2009). This shared experience forged a strong sentiment of solidarity, both between those imprisoned (who often shared the same cells) as well as with those who escaped detention. This production of solidarity, however, did not extend to the older generation of activists, who many within Youth for Change felt did not do enough to assist them. The importance attached to solidarity in times of crisis would become a key theme in the construction of the revolutionary youth movement.

The Judge’s Club incident would mark the last major mobilization of the group, who would disband thereafter. Generational encounters and their impact on the collective interpretation of generational practice, however, did not stop after the demise of Youth for Change. In addition to continuing interaction with Kifaya, many members went on as well to (re)join political parties or other oppositional groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood and eventually the ElBaradei campaign and the National Association for Change. In adhering to these structures, the activists found themselves confronted with hierarchical organizational models and an inability to influence decision-making, as well as “cults of personality” in which excessive emphasis was placed on the elite leader at the top. The frustration with these rigid structures—especially after the experience of Youth for Change—greatly influenced their interpretation that politics as practiced by the older generation was overly individualized, opaque, and concerned with personal glory as opposed to achieving actual change. For the activists, there was a clear problem with the personalization of politics: both political parties as well as opposition forces had become linked to individuals located at the top of closed-off, top-down structures, where decision-making failed to consult or take into account the positions of other members. These encounters thus not only shaped this perception of generational practice, but also helped push the creation of separate organizations where youth consciousness and identity would flourish.

Youth Consciousness in New Activist Groups

The development of youth consciousness and a specific identity of political generation increased throughout the period of 2005–2010 as new activist groups were established precisely to respond to the desire for autonomy and the capacity to practice generational politics. Although by 2007, Youth for Change’s activists had largely gone their separate ways,² new organizations and virtual networks were emerging as specific vectors of youth activism and contestation. In the case of more traditional social movement organizations, membership was tightly controlled in order to maintain the youth profile of the group, as well as to prevent infiltration by the authorities or traditional political forces. In the case of virtual spaces in which the movement operated, such as blogs and Facebook, while not necessarily established with the intention of autonomy from older generations, the utilization of new technologies served as a natural gatekeeper, as access to such networks naturally attracted younger populations and remained somewhat beyond the reach of the political elite or 1970s generation. As such, these various organizational venues of youth activism were by and large detached from supervision or direct influence by the older generation of political activists and opposition forces. The April 6th Youth Movement and the Facebook group We Are All Khaled Said—two of the most important organizations of the revolutionary youth movement during the Mubarak period—represent critical spaces where this consciousness of political generation and notion of youth as distinct political category would be publicly put forth.

Launched in 2008, the April 6th Youth Movement emerged out of a Facebook initiative in solidarity with a workers’ strike. From 2004–2010, Egypt witnessed the unprecedented mobilization of workers, and whereas strikes from previous decades mainly entailed laborers in state-owned enterprises, the 2000s saw the movement spread to private industry and the bureaucracy (Shehata 2011; Beinin and El-Hamalawy 2007). The heart of the oppositional labor movement was located in the textile sector and in particular the public company, Misr Spinning and Weaving, in the industrial town of al-Maḥala al-Kubra. The three-day strike organized by the company’s workers in December 2006 represented the largest and most politically important workers movement to have taken place in decades, and provoked a spin-off effect throughout the country (Beinin 2009). By 2008, the Maḥala movement was once again active, calling for a strike on April 6th in favor of workers’ socio-economic conditions. Though severely repressed, the day of demonstration managed to move beyond the factory premises to include mobilization by the city and its citizens more broadly.

The 2008 Maḥala strike resonated with a group of Cairo-based activists, who had cut their teeth in Youth for Change. In an act of solidarity with the workers, these activists established a Facebook page calling for a nationwide strike under the title “6th of April, Day of Rage”—the first time social media had been utilized in this fashion in Egypt. The on...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Note on Transliteration
• Introduction: Generation, Prefiguration, and the Revolutionary Youth
• 1 Generational Activism and Radical Change
• 2 Tahrir Square and the Revolutionary Ideal
• 3 Generational Battle and the Transition to Nowhere
• 4 Counter-Revolution and the Decline of the Revolutionary Youth
• Conclusions
• Index