Transforming the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

From Mutual Negation to Reconciliation

Herbert C. Kelman, Philip Mattar, Neil Caplan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN:
  9781138592629
• eBook ISBN:
  9781351692076
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book is a collection of essential essays on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by eminent social psychologist Herbert C. Kelman.

Few experts or practitioners know the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as Kelman, and for over forty years he has conducted interactive problem-solving workshops at Harvard University and elsewhere, engaging more than one hundred Israeli, Arab and Palestinian political activists, journalists and intellectuals in constructive dialogue. Spanning the years 1978 to 2017, the essays gathered here are still relevant today, and attest to the author's broad empathy for Palestinians and Israelis and his passionate pursuit of a resolution of their conflict based on consistent principles that satisfy the essential psychological needs and minimum political interests of both. The selected essays are not only insightful academic papers, but also serve as snapshots-in-time of the ebb and flow of conflict and peace efforts as well as guideposts for future would-be negotiators and facilitators.

This volume will be of much interest to students of Middle Eastern politics, peace and conflict studies, and international relations, and will help would-be negotiators and mediators in practice.

Part I

The road to mutual recognition

In the early and mid-1970s, a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was not on the agenda. The Israeli Labor Party and most other peace forces favored withdrawal from the territories occupied by Israel during the June 1967 war and returning them to Jordan and Egypt, respectively—but they did not contemplate the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in these territories. The Palestinian national movement, under the leadership of the PLO, called for a Palestinian state in all of Palestine, replacing the State of Israel.

The Sadat initiative in 1977, which led to the Egyptian–Israeli peace agreement in 1979, encouraged new thinking on both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides. Israelis became hopeful about the possibility of peace with their Arab neighbors, but also worried that the process might not fulfill itself in the absence of a solution of the Palestinian issue. Some establishment figures, such as Abba Eban and Yehoshafat Harkabi, began to write about the necessity and possibility of establishing an independent Palestinian state. Some leading members of the Israeli peace camp met secretly with PLO officials to explore the possibility of a two-state solution.

On the Palestinian side, the Egyptian–Israeli peace process created concerns that Egypt—possibly followed by other Arab states—may proceed to make peace with Israel without a settlement of the Palestinian issue. Even before the Sadat initiative, Yasser Arafat made statements to the effect that Palestinians would be willing to establish an independent state in any part of Palestinian territory that was liberated. These statements reflected a readiness for a two-state solution, as evidenced by the fact that they were severely criticized by the rejectionist camp within the PLO. The clearest statement of this readiness appeared in a 1978 article in Foreign Affairs, entitled “Thinking the unthinkable: A sovereign Palestinian state,” by Walid Khalidi, a leading Palestinian intellectual, who was intimately familiar with the thinking of Yasser Arafat and other PLO leaders.

Despite the significant political developments of the 1970s and the evidence of change in the parties’ political thinking, it proved extremely difficult to bring them to the negotiating table and to persuade them of the possibility of a negotiated solution to the conflict. Starting with a 1978 article in International Security, which appears as Chapter 1 in this volume, I wrote policy papers and op-ed pieces in which I tried to address the issues of how the parties could be brought to the negotiating table and to forge a peace agreement there. My analysis draws heavily on the unique opportunity that I have had to listen for many hours to the interactions between politically engaged and other influential Israelis and Palestinians in problem-solving workshops and other meetings that my colleagues and I have organized, starting in 1971. These observations are framed by a social-psychological analysis of international conflict, which has been a central focus of my professional work from its beginning.

The central theme of my analysis in Chapters 1, 2, 4, and 5 is that the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has taken the form of a zero-sum conflict over national identity and national existence. To enter into negotiations and come to an agreement, each party needs acceptance and recognition from the other—but is afraid to offer acceptance and recognition to the other. These chapters offer ideas for overcoming the resulting barriers to the negotiation of an agreement.

Chapter 3 is an article published in Foreign Policy late in 1982. At the time of the Lebanon war in 1982, which led to the defeat of the PLO and Yasser Arafat’s departure from Beirut, I became concerned that Arafat might be killed or politically marginalized, because—on the basis of two long and wide-ranging conversations with him in 1980 and 1981—I had concluded that he was prepared to accept a two-state solution and to make peace with Israel. I first wrote an op-ed piece for the New York Times, which they entitled “Requirement for peace: Politically intact PLO,” and then published the article in Foreign Policy, reprinted as Chapter 3. The article was heavily criticized, but interestingly it enhanced my credibility as a third party—not only among the Palestinians (including some of the rejectionist elements in the PLO), but also among Israelis seeking a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

1 Israelis and Palestinians

Psychological prerequisites for mutual acceptance (1978)¹

Herbert C. Kelman

Many observers of the Middle East conflict now regard the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza as a promising long-run solution to the Palestinian problem. Such a state would live side by side with an independent Israel, based more or less within its pre-1967 boundaries. This solution envisages a Palestinian state that would be free to decide for itself what kinds of links, if any, it wants to establish with Jordan or with any other country. It further assumes that the state would offer opportunities for citizenship and leadership to Palestinians in the diaspora, including elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), provided they accept the principle of peaceful coexistence with Israel.

As of the moment, this two-state option is rejected both by the Israeli government and by the PLO. In Israel, the concept of an independent Palestinian state is considered unacceptable not only by the Begin government, but also by the Labor Party opposition. The Labor Party clearly differentiated itself from the Likud prior to the 1977 elections by declaring its readiness to withdraw from parts of the West Bank and Gaza, and it has continued to press this point while in opposition. However, it has consistently concurred with the Likud in rejecting the two-state option. The PLO, for its part, has never officially accepted this option, despite various hints that it was ready to do so. The resolutions of the 1977 Palestinian National Council (PNC) did show some movement in this direction by speaking for the first time of the Palestinians’ right “to establish their national independent state on their national soil” without insisting on the entire national soil. At the same time, however, the PNC reaffirmed the official PLO position against acceptance of Israel. In a recent interview with Anthony Lewis, Yasir Arafat repeated his hints that the PLO would agree to a Palestinian state alongside of Israel, but gave no clear indication of accepting the two-state option as a permanent solution (Lewis, 1978).

The rejection of the two-state solution by both sides reflects their continuing reluctance to accept the other or to acknowledge the other’s right to a national existence. Such acceptance is clearly required if negotiations are to produce a stable two-state solution (i.e., in effect, a partition of Palestine) or any other settlement that will meet the needs of the two parties. To be sure, a settlement could be imposed from the outside but, in the absence of mutual acceptance, it could not create a stable, peaceful relationship between the parties. This is not to say that mutual diplomatic recognition is necessary before negotiations can begin and other agreements can be worked out. Such recognition may well represent the end of the negotiation process rather than its beginning. At the psychological level, however, at least a minimal degree of mutual recognition is essential if Israelis and Palestinians are to enter into serious negotiations, with some confidence that these negotiations will ultimately lead to mutual recognition at the diplomatic level.

Starting with this assumption, this article explores the psychological conditions and processes that are necessary if each side is to accept the reality and legitimacy of the other’s national existence. More specifically, it discusses the barriers to mutual acceptance, the meaning of acceptance to each side, and six psychological conditions that would have to be created in order to bring about mutual acceptance.

Dual perspective

My analysis attempts to look at the problem of acceptance from the perspective of each of the two parties, asking how each perceives the issues. In a sense, then, it is what Ralph White has called “an exercise in empathy” (White, 1965 and 1970). It starts with the assumption that a lasting and just settlement must be responsive to the needs and anxieties of both parties. It is essential, therefore, to understand the perspective that each party brings to the conflict and to enable their differing perspectives to confront each other.²

The formulations of the concerns and perceptions of the two sides presented here should be viewed as hypotheses, not as formal research findings. They are not based on standardized interviews with representative samples of Israelis and Palestinians, yielding percentage distributions of responses to specific questions. Rather, they are intended to provide a composite view, based on the conversations that my colleagues and I had with a variety of individuals and groups—including government officials, parliamentarians, community leaders, scholars, writers, and students—on both sides of the conflict. Our respondents are located along the entire spectrum of political opinion, although “moderates”—i.e., Israelis and Palestinians willing to consider an accommodation with each other—tend to be overrepresented. Our discussions were often intensive, and many took place in problem-solving workshops and other situations in which Israelis and Palestinians were in fact interacting with each other. In those situations, I was able to hear not only what Israelis and Palestinians say to me, but also what they say to each other. Another unique feature of my experiences is that I have been working with a team of social scientists of both Arab and Jewish origin, who have been organizing workshops and other meetings together, traveling in the Middle East together, and jointly engaging in interviews and discussions with Israelis, Palestinians, and other Arabs. These activities have not only given us access to unique data, but have also afforded us the opportunity to share each other’s perspectives as we review our joint experiences and the insights we have derived from them.³

The analysis derived from these various experiences focuses to a large extent on parallelisms in the perceptions, the apprehensions, and the identity concerns of the two sides. There are many differences in the situations in which the two sides find themselves and there is certainly no perfect symmetry in their problems or resources. There are several reasons, however, for placing special emphasis on the parallels that do emerge.

First, the inherent dynamics of a conflict interaction have an impact on the way in which each party perceives itself, its adversary, and the conflict between them. As a result, many (though by no means all) of the images developed by the two parties tend to be mirror images of one another (see Bronfenbrenner, 1961; White, 1965 and 1970). We have found many examples of such mirror images in our conversations with Israelis and Palestinians. One interesting example is that each side describes the conflict as asymmetrical—to its own disadvantage. The Palestinians see the conflict as asymmetrical in that the Israelis hold all the cards: they are in possession of the land, while the Palestinians are trying to acquire it. The Israelis see the conflict as asymmetrical in that, in contrast to the Arabs (though not specifically to the Palestinians), the very existence of their state is at stake. Thus, one of the parallelisms we have found is that both sides insist that their situations are not parallel.

Second, one of the main points that the present analysis is designed to highlight is that—whatever differences there may be in their situations—both sides have genuine concerns and profound anxieties, including anxieties about their national existence. Both perceive themselves, for understandable reasons, as highly vulnerable and each sees great risk in accepting the other. The parallelisms at this fundamental level are at the heart of the analysis.

Finally, the emphasis on parallelisms is more consistent with the impartial approach that is crucial for the present analysis. I want to avoid any implication that I am passing moral judgments or concluding that one side has a more valid case than the other. Thus, it seems better to err on the side of overstating parallelisms rather than differences, without pretending that the two sides are in identical positions.

In addition to the bias in favor of parallelism, the analysis is also marked by a bias in favor of optimistic scenarios. That is, it proceeds from the assumption that there is at least a possibility of finding a mutually satisfactory resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The approach might be called a “best case analysis,” in contrast to the “worst case analysis” that strategic thinkers customarily employ. The latter is justified when the analyst wants to avoid the danger of inadequate defense against any possible threat. In the search for a settlement, however, the dangers to be avoided are self-fulfilling prophecies that a satisfactory settlement is unattainable and failure to recognize when opportunities for peace present themselves. These are the dangers that a “best case analysis” is designed to minimize. By envisaging the positive outcomes that might occur under the most favorable circumstances, it encourages the parties to seek ways of creating those circumstances.

It is important to stress that the analysis is not intended to advocate any particular solution or to encourage either side to take any particular action. This does not mean that I pretend to be addressing these issues as a value-free social scientist. I have a strong commitment to the idea that it is better to search for a peaceful solution than to rely on continuing wars; to the importance of finding a solution that is responsive to the concerns for justice on both sides; and to dialogue as a means in the search for such solutions. I therefore do have certain value preferences—certain ideas about better and worse solutions, and better and worse procedures for attaining such solutions. At the same time, I feel that there may be a variety of specific arrangements congruent with the requirements of peace and justice.

My main reason for not advocating any particular solution is the strong conviction that solutions must emerge from the parties themselves. I am particularly cognizant of the fact that whatever actions are taken by either party entail real risks for it. I take very seriously the concerns of each side and thus I do not minimize the risks for Israel in accepting the PLO or the risks for the PLO in accepting Israel. Since they have to live with the consequences of their actions, they are the ones to decide what risks they are prepared to take. They must be reminded, however, that whatever action they take entails risks: There are risks involved not only in the decision to accept the other side, but also in the continuing refusal to do so.

The current situation: mutual denial of national identity

We cannot understand the Israeli–Palestinian conflict unless we realize that we are dealing with two nationalist movements, each struggling for its right to national identity and to national existence. What is especially pronounced, if not unique, about this conflict is that it is marked by a principled non-recognition at a very basic level. Neither side fully recognizes the other’s national identity and its right to exist. Indeed, the very peoplehood of the other has been at issue and, to varying degrees, continues to be so. Thus, the core element of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is mutual denial of the adversary’s national identity.

On the Palestinian side, the PLO—which, as of now, is the only recognized representative of Palestinian nationhood—denies the legitimacy of Israel as a fundamental tenet of its ideology. One symbolic illustration of this denial is the total absence of the word “Israel” in the resolutions of last year’s Palestinian National Council, presumably because the use of the word might imply acquiescence in the legitimacy of the Jewish state. But the rejection of Israel goes beyond the state; it encompasses the very concept of a Jewish nation. Thus, for example, the Palestinian National Covenant explicitly states that “Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own” (The Palestinian National Charter).

Since the very idea of Jewish nationhood is denied, there is no conception that Jewish nationalism might be the driving force behind Zionism, behind the creation of Israel, and behind the identification of world Jewry with Israel. Various conceptions of Zionism and Israel that are offered—such as those describing Zionism as a form of racism or Israel as a settler state or outpost of Western imperialism—evade the fact that Zionism is a nationalist movement and Israel the political expression of that movement.

The tendency to deny Jewish national identity is not unique to Palestinians, but is quite common in the Arab world. Among the many Arabs to whom I have spoken, including intellectuals and political officials, I have found very few who accepted the right of Israel to exist. There are many who, of course, accept Israel as a reality and stress that it is an established fact that must be acknowledged. There are some who go beyond this view to express sympathetic understanding of the Jews’ search for a haven in response to their experience of persecution. They see this search, however, in humanitarian rather than in national terms—as the action of a group escaping from persecution, not that of a nation establishing its national homeland, i.e., a political state expressing its national identity. The rejection of Israel’s right to exist is accompanied, on the part of most Arabs to whom I have spoken, by great difficulty in conceiving of the Jews as a nation. The denial of Jewish nationhood is no doubt linked directly to political opposition to a Jewish state: If there is no Jewish nation, then the whole concept of a Jewish state—the basic assumption of Zionism—becomes irrelevant, artificial, and fraudulent. This view of the Jews is probably reinforced, however, by the historical experience of Arabs with Jews in the Arab world. They tend to see these as the “true Jews”—a religious minority who lived happily in the Arab world until the foreign and inauthentic intrusion of Zionism.

To Israelis—and indeed to most Jews around the world—the definition of Jews as a purely religious group constitutes a denial of an obvious reality, rooted in their personal experience and their national consciousness. They can see it only as a blatant effort to undermine the legitimacy of Israel as a state designed to give expression to Jewish national identity.

Turning now to the other side of the coin, Israeli recognition of Palestinian nationhood tends to be reluctant and half-hearted. Golda Meir’s statement some years ago, in which she rhetorically asked, “Who are the Palestinians?” and in effect denied their existence as a national group, is often taken as an indication of Israeli views on the matter. Actually, there has been considerable change in Israeli thinking since the time of Meir’s statement. One concrete indicator of the c...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Editors’ introduction
• PART I The road to mutual recognition
• PART II The opening of negotiations and the Oslo process
• PART III The breakdown of negotiations and efforts to revive them
• Index