Deterrence, Choice, and Crime, Volume 23

Contemporary Perspectives

Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen, Cheryl Lero Jonson, Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen, Cheryl Lero Jonson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9780367410032
• eBook ISBN: 9781351112697
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Criminology
• Index: Social Sciences

Deterrence, Choice, and Crime explores the various dimensions of modern deterrence theory, relevant research, and practical applications. Beginning with the classical roots of deterrence theory in Cesare Beccaria's profoundly important contributions to modern criminological thought, the book draws out the many threads in contemporary criminology that are explicitly mentioned or at least hinted by Beccaria. These include sanction risk perceptions and their behavioral consequences, the deterrent efficacy of the certainty versus the severity of punishment, the role of celerity of punishment in the deterrence process, informal versus formal deterrence, and individual differences in deterrence.

The richness of the volume is seen in the inclusion of chapters that focus on the theoretical development of deterrence across disciplines such as criminology and economics. In an innovative section, the role of agents of deterrence is considered. Lessons are learned from the practical applications of deterrence undertaken in the areas of policing, corrections, and the community.

The closing section includes Michael Tonry's "An Honest Politician's Guide to Deterrence: Certainty, Severity, Celerity, and Parsimony, " a reminder of Beccaria's dictum that "it is better to prevent crimes than punish them." In the current environment, deterrence arguments are routinely used to justify policies that do just the opposite. Ray Paternoster, who contributed two chapters, passed away as this volume was being finalized. Fittingly, this book is dedicated to him and ends with Alex Piquero's poignant remembrance of Ray, a path-breaking deterrence scholar, beloved mentor, and ardent supporter of social justice.

Suitable for researchers and graduate students as well as for advanced courses in criminology, this book breaks new ground in theorizing the effects of punishment and other sanctions on crime control.

Part I

Theories of Deterrence

1

Classical Theory: The Emergence of Deterrence Theory in the Age of Enlightenment*

Gerben J. N. Bruinsma

The first philosophical and theoretical attention to deterrence emerged in the 18th century during the Age of Enlightenment by scholars who we now label as representatives of the Classical School in criminology and criminal law. The most prominent names are Italian Cesare Beccaria (1738–1794) and Englishman Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), the first an insecure and shy academic who accidently became involved in deterrence philosophy, the latter an eminent scholar who dedicated his entire life to scientific work in the discipline. Both grew up in a religious and unstable Europe in transition. Europe at the time was very unequally structured socially, politically, and economically and cruel to those who offended religious and criminal laws.

This chapter summarizes the existing historical, penal, and criminological literature and describes the emergence of deterrence theories as a consequence of developments in natural sciences and social philosophies in the 17th and 18th centuries. In many criminological textbooks, these scholars have been recognized for their “revolutionary” theories. After more than two centuries, “Dei delitti e delle pene” (On Crimes and Punishments) of Beccaria and The Rationale of Punishment of Jeremy Bentham can definitely be labeled as pioneering works that since then changed our thoughts on the criminal justice system fundamentally and that identified deterrence as one of the leading principles of law enforcement and justice in the world (Geis 1970; Mannheim 1972; Monachesi 1970). Both men were “products” of their time, who aimed to understand and reform the existing unjust and cruel criminal justice systems.

Unfortunately, revolutionary scientific discoveries do not occur in criminology in the same way as they do in the hard sciences, such as physics or biology (Kuhn 1970). Ideas in social sciences like criminology rather develop slowly in a linear line from A to Z. Previous publications influence other intellectuals’ thinking leading to critical rejection or acceptance of ideas, to new and innovative research. The development of science in the 18th century was based on its precursors of the 17th century when science (mathematics, physics, or medicine) made significant steps in discovering nature (Israel 2011; Merton 1938). The “new social philosophies” in the 18th century were in their way also impressive, not in the least because the church and those in power banned their ideas and prosecuted the authors for a very long time. The ideas of Beccaria and Bentham were built on the seminal works of other scientists who paved the way for their ideas and methods.

This chapter is not a critical review of the deterrence theories of the Classical School of criminology and criminal law, but rather presents a summarizing description of how their scientific works were embedded in a broader development of science and on the actual situation of Europe in that century. Thus, the chapter examines the political, economic, and social situation in Europe (neglecting all kinds of differences across countries, counties, cities, and rural areas) and then offers a description of the crime situation in Europe and how harsh criminal justice was organized based on deterrence and torture. That knowledge is essential to any understanding of why both Beccaria and Bentham were trying to humanize the criminal justice system. This century is also well-known under the label of Enlightenment (Israel 2011)—as a period during which rationality (reason) and progress became goals of humankind: “Reason was a goal as well as a method of Enlightenment thinkers. They believed it necessary to use reason, uninhibited by authority and tradition, in order to appreciate man, society and the universe and thus to improve human circumstances, an objective in which utilitarianism and the search for individual happiness could combine” (Black 1999: 246). Further, the personal lives of Beccaria and Bentham influenced their penal theories. Beccaria was raised by wealthy parents in a fragmented Roman Catholic Italy, and Bentham was of ordinary descent in Protestant England, the dominating power in the world of this century. The chapter closes with brief point-by-point summaries of Beccaria’s and Bentham’s deterrence theories.

Social and Political Developments in Europe in the 18th Century

Europe in the 18th Century

In the year 1738 when Cesare Beccaria was born in Parma, Italy, Europe transformed slowly but steadily into the period of what has been later called the Age of Enlightenment (White 1965). In the first years of the 18th century, Europe recovered from what is referred to as the “Age of Crisis” or “Age of Absolutism” characterized by many political- and religious-driven conflicts and wars between many small kingdoms, dukes, and counties, and between big countries such as France, Spain, England, Austria, Prussia, and upcoming Russia (Black 1999; Rosner and Theibault 2000). During the Seven Years’ War in the middle of the century (1756–1763), Prussia, Great Britain, Austria, France, Sweden, and Russia went to war in a series of battles to gain power over parts of Europe. Prussia lost almost 500,000 soldiers, which amounted to nearly 10 percent of its male population. France and Great Britain also waged wars in parts of the New World (later to be within the United States and Canada), while Spain lost a large amount of land to Great Britain.

Italy was divided into many small states; the Pope had his own political power and state, and the larger cities were greatly influenced by the interests of Spain and France. Europe was far from united. Monarchies dominated the continent, although at the end of the 18th century parliaments started to gain political power. The end of that period was marked by the violent revolution in France (the attack on the Bastille 1789),¹ giving more power to the political privileged citoyen (citizen).

The population in Europe grew in that century from about 118 million to 187 million by 1800. The increase was not evenly distributed: There were significant differences across areas due to epidemics and wars. Death was always present in daily life. Infectious diseases led to the death of tens of thousands in short periods, especially in cities where the hygiene was generally poor. The plague outbreak in the 16th century was more or less under control except in Eastern Europe. In Moscow, the plague had more than 100,000 casualties in 1770. Mortality figures showed that 52 percent of children born during this period died before they were five years old (Rosner and Theibault 2000). Johan Sebastian Bach (1685–1750), for example, had 20 children of which only eight survived to the age of five (Gardiner 2013). Despite the high death rates, the average age of dying increased in the 18th century from 30 to 54 years old. The average age women married varied across Europe: In Eastern Europe, the age was 17–20, and in northern, wealthier Europe, it was between 23–27 years old.

For the majority of the people, daily life was very local. Their geographical mobility was limited. The biggest handicap for economic and social development was the lack of reliable infrastructure. Most roads were muddy paths, and traveling was far from comfortable in carriages and peasant carts. Without the protection of soldiers, the chance of being robbed, raped, or murdered when traveling was high during these days. Later in that century, governments started to construct roads (although with toll) and to use rivers and canals for transport of goods. Given these conditions, it is astonishing that so many Europeans (about 1.5 million around 1750) immigrated in that period to the new world (later the United States and Canada).

During this time, social mobility was also very limited. If born in a small village or on a farm, individuals generally lived there for the rest of their life (unless being hired or kidnapped by armies to serve the king or noblemen). Almost all inhabitants of rural areas were not legally but factually the property of landlords and nobility. They were completely dependent of the whims of the powerful (e.g., to pay their taxes). The church also dominated their lives by its rules and regulations. Sons inherited the jobs of their father, and daughters helped by doing home work or cultivated the land for others while waiting to be married. Kinship and inheritance were most influential in how people organized their lives, where and how they lived as well the prescribed norms and daily routines. People flocked together in (extended) families, which were large to ensure there were always people who could work for economic survival in the future (no pension system, as we have now, existed). The houses (or better, small places with a roof) were dirty and without any comfort. Warm or hot water was unaffordable, and (clean) water needed to be taken by women from open sources far from the dwellings. People had no soap, and the same clothes were worn daily. Women were powerless legally and socially (Israel 2011). They were not allowed to commit themselves independently to legal obligations other than marriage. Their legal and social position depended fully on their father or husband.

Society was built on three classes with their own privileges and duties: the clergy, nobility, and people (about 95 percent). The economic distribution of property and real estate was highly skewed. Villages and their residents were more or less the property of the nobility and had few legal rights. Adults and children were expected to work hard for the owners of the land. Freedom to make one’s own decisions or of where to go to was not allowed. People were exploited in all respects, leading to a kind of fatalism to accept one’s destination (in rare occasions later that century, they rebelled more often against their landlords).

The economic prospects increased slowly due to international trade, especially by exploiting colonies, and due to new inventions and technological improvements, giving more opportunities to get control on circumstances that could not be handled in the past (e.g., steam engine). In England, for instance, around 1750, the three-field system in agriculture was exchanged by the four-field system, solving the problem of fallow land and low crops. The steam engine was a strong stimulus for industrial activities and for mining (keeping them dry). The start of the industrial revolution in the second part of the century was partly the consequence of new kinds of entrepreneurial economic activities. A banking system began to develop allowing new forms of loans. Harbors, larger warehouses, and seaworthy ships were built for international trade. Machinery took over the work of many people. In the middle of the century, industries (textile, coal mines, and iron) began to develop. The location of these industries far away from the villages led to the first labor-intensive settlements, separating the centuries-old connection between home and work. The first movements of people to new urbanizations started in the second half of the 18th century (Durkheim [1893] 1964; Tönnies 1887). The increasing prosperity, however, benefitted very few. The majority of people stayed poor and had few chances to improve their income. When crops failed (because of bad weather or crop diseases), hunger was the inevitable consequence for many. Instead of meat—which was unaffordable in the second half of the century—people consumed more bread and potatoes (high in nutritional value) that had been introduced in Europe after 1740 following the colonization of South America.

Religion had a dominant presence in Europe during the 18th century. Catholicism was the official religion in southern European countries and in France, Poland, and some German states. Protestantism (Lutheranism, Anglicanism, and Calvinism) was the official religion in the northern parts of Europe and Britain. In Russia, the Orthodox Church and, in the Balkans, Islam were the most popular religions. There is a common belief that the Enlightenment was a time of secularism. That is partly true. As I will discuss later, reason as the leading principle in science and other scientific and philosophical developments were becoming more influential (the United States was based on those new ideas of freedom), but among the illiterates, religion and witchcraft were still the ruling principles in daily life. There were more than 100,000 criminal cases against sorcery and witchcraft: The clergy preached respect for parents, obedience to church and monarchy, and a sober life and against free morals. Religions were also the cause of many conflicts and wars in Europe.

Protestantism (Lutheranism and Calvinism) increased its influence by a powerful invention: the printing press. That invention allowed the dissemination of their religious views by pamphlets without the permission of the Roman Catholic Church and those in power. Science also benefited from book printing. There was no freedom of speech in that century, and scientists experienced all kinds of troubles when openly expressing their views or publishing scientific work. Many of them were detained for that reason.² Despite the prohibition of free publishing, the 18th century became the age of the newspaper and magazine for those who could afford them and could read. For example, by the end of the century, London had 14 different early morning newspapers. However, the majority of the rural populations were illiterate and thus still not able to participate in any intellectual or political life: “Education that might undermine social harmony was considered dangerous and there was little notion of education as right” (Black 1999: 252). Very slowly, education consisting of vocational training, writing and reading, morality, and physical exercise improved for men (not for women), and an increasing number of citizens were able to write and to read later in that century (35–40 percent of the men in cities were literate and in the rural areas about 5 percent) (Black 1999).

Penal Climate and Criminal Justice in Europe

From a contemporary perspective, governmental administrations were weak and poorly organized in the 18th century. Tax collection was left to nobility and wealthy landowners. In practice, they collected more than officially required from the poor. Tax collection was subject to great randomness, with wide variations across countries, counties, and areas. Government jobs seldom paid a salary, leading to corruption and bribery. The jobs, including positions in the criminal justice system, were sold to the highest bid...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Part I. Theories of Deterrence
• Part II. Unpacking the Effects of Deterrence
• Part III. Agents of Deterrence
• Part IV. Final Thoughts
• Contributors
• Index