The puzzle
Dictators hold elections. They have done so since the late 19th century, and in many instances they have allowed the opposition to participate. Today, multi-party elections are the rule rather than the exception in authoritarian regimes. While non-electoral authoritarian regimes still exist, the majority of autocracies today have recently held a national-level election in which parties from outside the ruling front fielded candidates and were allowed to run. While dictators also win these elections thanks to various means of repression and manipulation – they are dictators, after all – the effects of elections on authoritarian regime stability are disputed.
In the aftermath of the Serbian parliamentary and presidential elections of September 2000, hundreds of thousands of protesters stormed the federal Parliament building in Belgrade. While the electoral commission abandoned the tallying of votes as they realized that the results were not in favor of incumbent President Slobodan Milosevic and a second round was hastily prepared, the people took to the streets to protest electoral manipulation (Birch 2002, 505). Coal miners went on strike, thus threatening the continued running of major power plants, and key elites of the authoritarian regime defected (Kuntz and Thompson 2009, 167–8; Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 110–11). Within weeks of the elections, Milosevic had given up power in what became known as the “Bulldozer Revolution.” The dramatic events allowed observers to link the holding of non-democratic elections with the breakdown of the authoritarian regime.
Although perhaps less dramatic, the Senegalese President and dictator Abdou Diouf also gave up power in the context of elections in the very same year. In Senegal, the process was slower as “the gradual creation of democratic institutions precede[d] and contribute[d] to political culture change” (Vengroff and Magala 2001, 129). After a string of authoritarian elections, manipulated and won by the rulers, and a gradual process of reform, the opposition won the second round of the democratic elections in 2000, and Diouf graciously handed over power to opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade. The authoritarian regime had broken down and a process of democratization had started, exemplified by the competitive elections in 2000.
These and numerous other cases, including the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia, the “People Power Revolution” in the Philippines, and the gradual liberalizations in sub-Saharan Africa, have spurred a belief in elections as a force for transforming dictatorships. In this research tradition, elections are theorized to destabilize and sometimes even democratize authoritarian regimes (e.g., Lindberg 2006, 2009; Howard and Roessler 2006; Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler 2006; Kuntz and Thompson 2009).
While some autocrats have given up power following a manipulated election or have gradually liberalized elections to the degree that they have become democratic, other rulers show no signs of conceding power in spite of multi-party elections; quite the contrary. From Asia to the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, multi-party elections have been used to sustain authoritarian rule. In Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe, to the surprise of many observers, cemented his rule by winning the heavily manipulated yet relatively peaceful 2013 elections. The ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front’s (ZANU[PF]) 62% majority robbed the largest opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T), of 30 parliamentary seats and sent the opposition into a tumultuous period of internal squabbles. Disagreeing over electoral tactics and blaming the electoral loss on opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai, the opposition split in April 2014, leaving ZANU(PF) as Zimbabwe’s strongest party in spite of a looming succession crisis.1 Similar dynamics have been witnessed in cases as different as the party regimes of Malaysia and Singapore, Egypt under Hosni Mubarak, and Mexico in the 20th century. Although some of these regimes eventually collapsed, the rulers used regular multi-party elections to their advantage, sabotaging the opposition, creating legitimacy, and demonstrating superiority. Such cases have led many scholars to conclude that authoritarian elections are just another tool adopted and adapted to sustain authoritarian rule (e.g., Magaloni 2006; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Blaydes 2011).
The two claims are paradoxical: authoritarian elections both stabilize and undermine authoritarian rule. The paradox of authoritarian elections is the topic of this book. But rather than arguing that the effect of authoritarian elections on regime stability always works in a particular direction, the book asks: Why do multi-party elections sometimes stabilize authoritarian regimes and at other times lead to their demise?
The argument
I argue that the effect of authoritarian elections on regime stability depends on the central capacities that the rulers have at their disposal. Such capacities enable autocrats to carry out strategies of electoral manipulation that shape the choices of key actors, thus impacting the long-term effects of elections. Specifically, I argue that higher levels of administrative and coercive capacity, jointly referred to as state capacity, and control over the economy increase the probability that authoritarian multi-party elections will stabilize the regime. Where these capacities are lacking, the regime is more likely to succumb in the face of elections.
In the parliamentary elections in Malaysia in March 2004, the party regime drew on both its strong administrative and coercive force and control over the economy to dominate the election and control its long-term effects. Its strategies were targeted at voters, opposition, and internal elites. Leading opposition figure Anwar Ibrahim was in prison, convicted of sodomy. His opposition Reformasi movement that had challenged the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in the late 1990s had partly been co-opted into the regime, and the remaining opposition was split (Welsh 2005, 154–5). The media was biased (Case 2005), and opposition campaigning was obstructed by police and special branch personnel (Lee 2007). The ruling group’s control over resources was abused to persuade voters to support the party, and in case this was not enough to secure a supermajority victory, the electoral commission was dominated by UMNO loyalists, and constituency boundaries were drawn to the advantage of the ruling coalition (Wong 2005, 317). In the end, the Barisan Nasional (BN), the coalition dominated by UMNO, secured 63.9% of votes, its largest majority in 25 years, and no major post-electoral protests occurred.
Only two years later in Singapore, a similar scenario played out. The ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) relied on its state capacity and economic monopoly to limit opposition activity and lure voters into supporting the ruling party. Although the coercive apparatus was less visible, one of the major opposition parties was sued for defamation, leading to a rupture of its campaign and deterring others from representing the opposition (Chin 2007, 704–5). Gerrymandering of districts and ethnic quotas have traditionally been used to restrict the opposition, and the ruling party’s control over resources was used to secure votes, as housing upgrades were reserved for districts that supported PAP (Ong and Tim 2014; Chin 2007; Tan 2013). As a result, the ruling party won over 66.6% of votes and 82 out of 84 seats.
These dynamics stand in contrast to the elections that toppled dictators in the post-communist world in the 2000s. In Georgia, incumbent President Eduard Shevardnadze was unable to curb elite defections, and former Minister of Justice Mikheil Saakashvili headed the opposition in the 2003 parliamentary elections. The ruling elites’ attempts to take over the media and to inhibit opposition parties’ ability to gain parliamentary seats through changes to the constitution failed (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 156–7). Instead, the rulers relied more heavily on visible and blatant electoral fraud (OSCE/ODIHR 2004), thus spurring the post-electoral protests that became known as the “Rose Revolution.” Facing angry citizens and with pro-opposition media broadcasting the “revolution” 24 hours a day, the poorly paid security forces proved disloyal and defected (Mitchell 2004; Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 165). Within weeks of the election, President Shevardnadze had resigned, and the opposition took over power.
These contrasting cases illustrate the argument that the capacities available to ruling elites, namely levels of state capacity and control over the economy, condition the effect of authoritarian elections. Such capacities enable and constrain electoral strategies aimed at affecting choices made by internal regime elites, opposition candidates, and ordinary citizens, and in turn affect the likelihood that the regime stabilizes through elections.
The literature on electoral authoritarianism has increasingly recognized the paradox of authoritarian elections. Schedler argues that elections are arenas of struggle between regime and opposition actors. Where the regime wins, elections may serve to stabilize its rule. But if the opposition comes out victorious, elections cause change (Schedler 2013). I agree with Schedler’s notion that elections are a double-edged sword, holding the potential to both sustain and subvert authoritarian regimes. However, I disagree with Schedler’s main claim that the result of this struggle between opposition and regime, playing out in the context of authoritarian uncertainty, is determined primarily by actors’ choices (Schedler 2013, 141). I argue that deeper-running factors affect the probability that elections support authoritarian regimes because they affect the choices made by central actors. Just as Svolik argues that the occurrence of personalist rule is not only a function of the individual leader’s ambitions and personal abilities to concentrate power or the elites’ attempts to reign him in, but depends on the conditions of authoritarian rule (Svolik 2012, 55), this book presents the claim that the effect of authoritarian elections is shaped by the circumstances under which the elections play out. This approach turns the “paradox” of authoritarian elec...
