Kurdistan in Iraq

The Evolution of a Quasi-State

Aram Rafaat

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9781351188814
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The Kurdish-Iraqi conflict lies in the fact that Kurdistan is a nation-without-a-state and Iraq is a non-nation state, each possessing a nationhood project differing from and opposing the other. Iraqi-Kurdistan is an outward looking entity seeking external patronage. Though external patronage has played a pivotal role in the evolution of the Kurdish quasi-state, a lack of positive patronage has prevented it from achieving independence.

This book looks at how the Kurdish and Iraqi quests for nationhood have led to the transformation of Iraqi Kurdistan into an unrecognised quasi-state, and the devolution of the Iraqi state into a recognised quasi-state. This is done by examining the protracted Iraqi-Kurdish conflict and by analysing the contradictions and incompatibilities between the two different nationalisms: Iraqi and Kurdish. The author explains that Kurds as a nation without a state have their own nationhood project which is in opposition to the Iraqi nationhood project. Each has its own identity, loyalty and sovereignty. The book answers the question as to how the Kurdish quest for nationhood has been treated by successive Iraqi regimes. Furthermore, it fills in the literary gaps which exist in relation to the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict by specifying and categorising the cardinal conditions that drive ethnic and nationalist conflicts which lead to the creation of separatist entities.

Drawing upon a vast amount of untapped Kurdish and Arabic primary sources, the book draws on prominent theories on nation-states and quasi-states. It will particularly appeal to students and scholars of international relations, political theory and Middle Eastern Studies.

1 Recognised and unrecognised quasi-states

There is no single and universally accepted meaning of the term quasi-states. On one hand, different and often non-synonymous terms are used by scholars to describe some recognised and unrecognised states around the world. For example, concepts such as quasi-states, artificial states, cleft states, failed states, rogue states, non-nation states, and pseudo-states are used for recognised quasi-states, and terms such as quasi-states, de facto states, pseudo-states, and secessionist or rebel territories are used for unrecognised quasi-states. On the other hand, scholars on quasi-states do not agree on which form of states can be categorised as quasi-states. For example, a quasi-state in Jackson’s model is a state that is internationally recognised as a sovereign state, but clearly lacks the internal legitimacy. For him, a de facto non-sovereign state which is not recognised internationally does not fit in this category.¹ In contrast, for Kolstø, Kosienkowski, Caspersen, Steinsdorff, and Fruhstorfer, states that lack international recognition but enjoy internal legitimacy are quasi-states; and those that enjoy such recognition but lack internal legitimacy are failed states.² Thus, the term quasi-state, in its classical use, remains vague and problematic; some scholars use the term exclusively to refer to recognised, and others to unrecognised, quasi-states.

This study attempts to tackle the terminological confusion which developed in the study of quasi-states in two ways. First, fundamental distinctions between the two types of states, and between them and other political entities, including real severing nation-states or states with dual sovereignty (SWDS), will be highlighted. Second, using the Iraqi and Kurdistan regions as case studies, new criteria which go beyond the traditional understanding of the quasi-states and statehood are created. This work provides two sets of criteria, and this allows a clear line to be drawn between these entities. Criteria for RQs and UQs are designed to distinguish RQs from UQs and the two forms of states from SWDS. This distinction between the three forms of states helps to illustrate the ambiguities surrounding the concept of quasi-states. It also can be seen as an attempt to standardise and re-categorise these different entities in a manner which reinforces their contemporary significance to our understanding of the quasi-states.

Theories regarding states and quasi-states need to be examined in order to explore the behaviour of the KRI and Iraq. In this regard, Weber’s and Smith’s perspectives of state are relevant. States, according to Smith and Weber, are autonomous institutions in a given territory, monopolising “coercion and extraction” (Smith), and/or “the legitimate use of force” (Weber).³ However, in their respective definitions the international status of the state is unknown. Therefore, three other theories (namely, the declarative, the constitutive, and Jackson’s quasi-state theory) may be used to complement the Weber-Smith theory in order to bring about a fuller and more nuanced understanding. These theories may be useful to explain attributes that distinguish states from other political entities and to explain the similarities and differences between unrecognised quasi-states (UQs) and recognised quasi-states (RQs).

The declarative theory is useful to further understand UQs, and the constitutive and Jackson’s theories to recognise RQs. The declarative theory suggests that a state must meet four criteria specified in the Montevideo Convention, adopted in 1933 by the International Conference of American States. The first qualification is a permanent population linked to a particular territory. The second and third qualifications are a defined territory and a government that exercises its powers on it. The forth qualification is the ability to enter into relations with other states. The three forms of states – UQ, RQ, and SWDS – all meet all declarative criteria. The three groups of states are similar in terms of their claim to sovereignty and administrative monopoly over a territory with fixed population and demarcated boundaries. The three forms of states, however, differ in their ability to enter into relations with other states. Both SWDS and RQ enjoy complete relations with international community. Though UQs are not recognised as part of the international state system, many UQs have managed to establish low-key bilateral relations with several states and informal contacts with regional organisations. For example, Taiwan, the Kurdistan region, Palestine, Northern Cyprus, and Somaliland established their representatives in dozens of countries and many countries reciprocated by opening consulates in these ‘countries’. Being established for more than two decades, many quasi-states have demonstrated their capabilities for acting within the international arena.

The declarative theory qualifications, however, are key attributes that distinguish states from other political entities. These criteria are indicators of the existence of a state in practical terms and are preconditions for statehood and its primary foundation. Establishing maintaining authority and administrative monopoly over a territory and people is closely connected to the formation of territorial states. Without a territory, a government, a permanent population, and relations with the outside world, a state or any political entity, sovereign or non-sovereign, cannot be imagined. One would have to include all these qualifications in order to be able to talk about any kind of regime in the first place. The declarative statehood, in fact, is an ‘empirical’ rather than ‘juridical’ statehood. In other words, criteria presented by the declarative theory are prerequisites of the existence of statehood, rather than the quality of the state. Highlighting their empirical status, many UQs reference the declarative doctrine to legitimise their claims for recognition as a de jure state and international recognition.

In contrast to the declarative theory, the constitutive theory defines statehood as a juridical rather than empirical entity. Oppenheim, one of the earliest theorists of the constitutive theory, suggested that “a new state before its recognition cannot claim any right which a member of Family of Nations has.” He also emphasised that “through recognition only and exclusively a state becomes an international person and a subject of international law”.⁴ Thus, the constitutive theory focuses on the external legal rights and duties. The fundamental assumption of the constitutive theory is that states are international legal persons with defined rights, privileges, duties, and immunities. In other words, states are subject to international law and statehood is contingent on recognition from other states. Recognition by other states becomes a precondition of statehood and an entity is only considered as a state if it is recognised as sovereign by other states.

There is a key difference between the declarative and the constitutive theories; the former focuses on the conditions of statehood (recognition of a state), while the latter focuses on the conditions of recognition (recognition as a state). According to the declarative theory, a sovereign state can exist without being recognised by other sovereign states. For the adherents of the constitutive theory, states do not exist in international law until recognised. The declaratory theory focuses on the internal factual situation, namely: territory, population, government, and relations. For the constitutive theory, by contrast, an entity can be considered as a state without these requirements as long as it is recognised by other states.

Despite fundamental differences between the constitutive and the declaratory schools, the two theories are relevant to the question of the RQ and the UQ and help to understand the distinction between the two forms of quasi-states. The constitutive statehood is similar to recognised quasi-states and the declaratory statehood resembles the characteristics of the unrecognised quasi-state. An RQ is an entity which enjoys international recognition but fails to function as a nation-state and develop the necessary infrastructure capacity. Similarly, the key to the constitutive theory is not an entity’s attainment of de facto statehood, but rather, prior international acceptance of its asserted right to independence. A constitutive statehood is based on the international recognition and disregards the internal reality. By the same token, the main characteristics of the declarative statehood are the same for UQs. A declarative statehood is an entity that has successfully established a set of institutional forms of governance and maintained an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries. Its status, however, has not been sanctioned by international law. In other words, UQs resemble normal states, but they lack international recognition. The declarative theory of state defines an entity as a state if it possesses a permanent population, a defined territory, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with the other states.

The two theories are also useful to redefine the real sovereign nation-state. Since both the declarative and the constitutive views are theories of statehood, both theories are complementary to each other. In fact, a real sovereign state is the state that meets the definitions of both declarative and constitutive theories of statehood. The constitutive statehood enjoys recognition but may lack capabilities, whereas the declarative statehood possesses capabilities but may lack recognition. The nation-state or a state with dual sovereignties (SWDS) enjoys both international recognition and internal capabilities. Accordingly, a SWDS enjoys all qualifications of the declarative and the constitutive theories. A SWDS is a person of international law with a defined territory, a permanent population, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations. This state enjoys a clear recognition as sovereign by other states and the international community. In other words, a real state is both a legitimate and a legal entity. The legitimacy of a real state is driven from the established internal capability and its legality comes from the legal prerogatives of sovereignty.

In his development of quasi-states theory Jackson re-identified state and sovereignty. He argues that not all existing states in the world are ‘real’ states. Jackson identifies two forms of states: ‘real’ and ‘quasi’. A positively sovereign government, according to Jackson, is one which possesses rights of non-intervention and the wherewithal to provide political goods for its citizens. Put another way, the responsibility of a sovereign government is both external to other sovereign states and internal to its citizens.⁵ Hence, a sovereign state enjoys double sovereignty: external, vis-à-vis other states, and internal, vis-à-vis its own citizens. Jackson classifies external sovereignty as a negative aspect of sovereignty and internal sovereignty as a positive form of sovereignty. Negative sovereignty, for Jackson, is the legal foundation upon which formally equal states fundamentally rests. It can therefore be defined as freedom from outside interference: a formal-legal condition. The positive aspect of sovereignty, however, presupposes capabilities which enable governments to be their own masters. Negative sovereignty is a formal and legal condition that is endowed by the international community. Positive sovereignty is not a legal but a political attribute.⁶ In other words, international community provides governments with negative sovereignty through the act of general recognition, while positive sovereignty depends on the action and resources of internal governments and their populations.

A real sovereign state is a state that enjoys double sovereignties, organised domestic reality and not merely by international law. A quasi-state, in contrast, is a state in which “its sovereignty is derived not internally from empirical statehood but externally from the state-system whose members have evidently decided and are resolved that these jurisdictions shall not disappear.” Therefore, the quasi-state is upheld by an external covenant among sovereign states. Because this form of statehood enjoys an internationally guaranteed independence, it does not require positive sovereignty.⁷ Hence, quasi-states, from Jackson’s perspective, are states that only enjoy external (negative) sovereignty but lack the internal (positive) sovereignty.

Jackson’s theory, however, is inadequate. One of the main weaknesses of Jackson’s theory is that positive sovereignty is an absolute rather than a relative concept. On one hand, no state enjoys ultimate positive sovereignty and no state totally lacks it. On the other hand, there is a huge difference between a state that totally lacks internal sovereignty and that ultimately enjoys it. The internal legitimacy of many developed European states, according to Jackson, demonstrates real sovereignty, though they are rejected by many minority groups. Similarly, many post-colonial states that Jackson classifies as quasi-states enjoy some form of internal legitimacy and support at least by a faction of society. For example, the Iraqi state enjoyed internal legitimacy vis-à-vis its Sunni community until 2003, and its Shia community after the invasion. Put another way, no state around the world totally lacks or totally enjoys internal support and legitimacy. In addition, states differ in their capacities, state-structures, and abilities to deliver services and goods to their constituencies.

Recognised quasi-states (RQs) and criteria for recognised quasi-states (RQC)

To overcome these generalisations and confusion, and drawing on Smith’s and Weber’s definitions of state, this work introduces four criteria that a recognised state must satisfy to qualify as a quasi-state. To distinguish a state that meets these criteria from a ‘real’ sovereign state, it will be called a recognised quasi-state (RQ); and criteria that have been used to classify such a state will be referred as recognised quasi-state criteria (RQC).

The first criterion of a quasi-state is a state that exercises the illegitimate use of force and that violates, instead of imposes, the rule of law and threatens some of its citizens. For the purpose of this study, this criterion will be referred to as (RQC-I). The second criterion is a state that loses monopoly over the legitimate use of force in a given territory. This also includes the state’s failure to collect taxes or to deliver public services to all or a portion of its population in a given territory. This criterion will be referred to as (RQC-II). Another criterion is the case of a state that is too weak to confront a separatist region without external support. Due to its weakness, the state seeks external patronage from a stronger state to enable it to challenge the separatist region. This criterion will be identified as (RQC-III). The final criterion is a state that, in addition to lacking internal sovereignty, suffers violation of its sovereignty from external powers. This criterion will be referred to as (RQC-IV). Criteria RQC-I and RQC-II pertain to the internal affairs of the state, while RQC-III and RQC-IV are related to the state’s status vis-à-vis other states. A state that enjoys external recognition but fulfils these four criteria will be classified as a recognised quasi-state (RQ).

First and second criteria for recognised quasi-states (RQC-I and RQC-II)

The first two criteria are interconnected so that one criterion leads to another. Therefore, it will be useful to scrutinise RQC-I and RQC-II at once. Jackson suggests that internal sovereignty is an ‘empirical’ rather than ‘juridical’ aspect of statehood and falls within the internal affairs of the state. International society can only provide governments with legal status through the act of general recognition.⁸ It is the citizens of the state, rather than the international community, that endow the state and its rulers with domestic authority and power. This endowment represents the marks and merits of empirical statehood. Internal sovereignty is a function of the state’s ability to protect its citizens and to provide other services, such as health and education. In many ways, Jackson’s understanding of internal sovereignty is similar to Max Weber’s definition of internal legitimacy. Weber defines the state in relation to its monopolisation of the legitimate use of force. A state, according to Weber, is an entity that “successfully lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory”.⁹ Two key variables in Weber’s statehood are the state’s monopoly on force and the legitimate use of it. The question is who determines whether the state’s use of force is legitimate or not. Weber suggests that legitimacy can be achieved if the state manages to maintain its control over the means of violence and its ruler enjoys traditional authority, charisma, and legality.¹⁰

Two important conclusions may be drawn from Weber’s definition of the state and legitimacy. First, the state’s monopoly of the use of force is conditional and subject to the legitimised use of force, and the legitimacy of the government is a precondition for the legitimacy of government-sanctioned violence. Second, Weber’s criteria for the legitimacy of the state are more aligned with the internal affairs of the state rather with its international status. Control over the means of violence, traditional authority, charisma, and legality are internal characteristics of the state. Simply put, for Weber, the provision of security to citizens is synonymous with the notion of legitimacy of the state. Thus, in Jackson’s thesis, internal sovereignty is intimately related to the notion of internal legitimacy in Weber’s theory of the state. In fact, sources of internal sovereignty in Jackson’s model are the same as legitimacy in Weber’s thesis, namely the population under the state’s jurisdiction. In other words, the state that possesses internal legitimacy also enjoys internal sovereignty.

The difference between Weber’s and Jackson’s definition of state is that Weber’s state is empirical rather than juridical, de facto rather than de jure, while Jackson’s state is both empirical and de jure. However, both emphasise that internal legitimacy is an ‘empirical’ rather than ‘juridical’ aspect of statehood. Weber defines empirical statehood primarily in terms of its ability to monopolise the legitimate means of force. Jackson suggests that the international recognition of an entity is not enough to consider it as a real state; an entity can only be considered as a state if it enjoys external and internal sovereignty. The state that lacks internal sovereignty is not a state but rather is a quasi-state. By implication, the state that lacks internal legitimacy is a quasi-state. Thus, the Weberia...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of abbreviations
• Glossary
• Introduction
• 1 Recognised and unrecognised quasi-states
• 2 The context of two quasi-states in Iraq
• 3 The two contradictory nationhood projects in Iraq
• 4 The monarchy-Kurds relations
• 5 The first unrecognised Kurdish quasi-state (1961–1975)
• 6 The case of negative patronage
• 7 The rise and fall of Kurdish insurgency (1976–1988)
• 8 Iraq’s failure to govern Kurdistan (1975–1991)
• 9 The second unrecognised Kurdish quasi-state (1992–2003)
• 10 The third unrecognised Kurdish quasi-state after the 2003 invasion
• 11 Oil for external patronage and financial independence
• 12 Independence referendum and the case of negative patronage
• References
• List of news and newspaper sources
• Index