1. Management and Governance: A Qualitative Overlay to Investment Decisions
Introduction
Why does all this matter?
In this chapter we hope to address the more qualitative area of our approach to analysis, corporate governance, and the examination of overlapping groups within corporate executive and non-executive teams. We give examples of how this approach can be a valuable tool in assessing the likely actions of management teams ā actions which can, in our view, be the deciding factor in the long-term credit standing of the corporation concerned. We explore the nature of a corporation and the blurring of its identity with that of those who run it. We argue that the actions of these individuals can be more important in determining the trajectory of a corporationās credit standing than those of its owners.
We also examine a range of ownership structures with the aim of ascertaining whether one form or another is better aligned to the interests of the credit investor. We look at the response of regulators to the more egregious abuses of agency that have come to light in the past two decades and examine their effectiveness to date. We then tie these themes together from a credit perspective and give four case studies from corporate life that illustrate some of the more important aspects.
From the outset our perspective is that a grasp of these interconnected factors is the key to understanding credit transition early ā which is where the investor will make or avoid losing money ā yet this more narrative-based, qualitative side of credit assessment is often demoted to a distant second place by mathematical modelling and number-crunching, methods far better at inspiring confidence in investment committees. This is a serious omission. How meaningful can a numerical projection be if it is not viewed from a perspective that is also informed by managementās motivations?
1. The nature of the corporation
āNeither bodies to be punished nor souls to be condemnedā
Consider the following headlines:
āAdidas seeks criminal probe into Reebok India irregularitiesā
āJ.P. Morgan and taking responsibilityā
āCentrica warns of higher gas costsā
āEurostar eyes expansion across Europeā
ā3i set to appoint ex-City banker as chiefā
Do you notice anything? In each of these headlines, one could substitute the companyās name with that of a human being without compromising meaning:
āInspector Morse seeks criminal probe into Reebok India irregularitiesā
āWilliam Murdoch warns of higher gas costsā
āGeorge Osborne set to appoint ex-City banker as chiefā
We are accustomed to talking and thinking of corporations as people. For example, beverages multinational Diageo, in the āSustainability and Responsibilityā section of its website, states that it is ā[a]cting with integrity in everything we doāā something to which most individuals would aspire. US auto behemoth Ford āhas supported thousands of programs that strengthen communities and improve quality of lifeā and in 2012/13 gave $30m to US-based nonprofit organisations. Just like an individual giving money to United Way or working for his or her local Rotary Club; indeed, āFord believe commitment to community is an important part of who and what we are.ā (Note the use of the pronoun āweā.)
But who or what are they? Do these corporations have a right to make assertions that could plausibly come from a human individual?
A fundamental ambiguity
Companies do bear some similarities to people in the manner in which they operate in the legal and economic sphere. Individuals pay taxes; so (for the most part) do corporations. Individuals can enter into contracts (including credit contracts) and end up before the court if they renege on them; so can corporations. Individuals can own and trade in property; so can corporations. Individuals may commit manslaughter and murder; so, in some jurisdictions, may corporations be charged with crimes of corporate manslaughter or homicide although, in reality, convictions under such legislation are few and far between. Individuals in most liberal democracies can express political views through campaign contributions to political parties; indeed, in many societies, such a right is held inalienable and enshrined in constitutional law. And, in the US at least, following the US Supreme Courtās ruling in 2010 in the case of Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission, corporations can do the same through contributions to āelectioneering communicationsā.
Can it be right to think of corporations as persons? In a word, no. The sine qua non of personhood is sentience and, with a few basic tests, we can dismiss the idea that a corporation is a sentient agent. Can a corporation feel? No. Can it perceive? No. Is it conscious? No. Does it experience subjective conscious experiences? Again, no. To cite Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield of the eponymous ice cream: āIām Ben, Iām a person. Iām Jerry, Iām a person. Ben & Jerryās Ice Cream? Not a person.ā
The relationship between senior management and corporate identity
But go back to the beginning of this chapter. If, as a corporation, J.P. Morgan lacks intentionality, how can it take responsibility? How can 3i make any appointments? How can Adidas seek a criminal probe or Centrica warn about anything?
Herein lies the true nature of corporate personhood. The corporation itself has no intentionality but the individuals who run it ā the senior-most executives frequently identified as the āC-suiteā (chief executive officer, chief financial officer, chief operating officer) and, to a limited extent, the corporationās board of directors (more about them later) most definitely do.
It is these individuals who steer the companyās strategic direction. They commit resources to expand in some areas, while withdrawing them to contract in others they deem less profitable. They decide what markets to be active in and where to locate facilities. They hire their immediate reports, determine their remuneration and establish their performance criteria; in so doing, they determine the working environment and set the ethical tone of the organisation, since their appointees will, most likely, share some of the values of management (which presumably attracted them to this employer as opposed to another) and will, in turn, hire and set performance criteria which enable them to meet the goals set for them by the C-suite, and so on down the chain. The C-suite will also hire lobbyists to persuade politicians (or, as we have seen in some cases, do a bit of persuasion themselves). They forge, or at least approve, the companyās standard operating practices. Of particular interest to credit investors, they decide the companyās policies on capital allocation and funding, its appetite for leverage, its willingness to engage in mergers and acquisitions, and its generosity towards shareholders.
Good credit analysis examines the C-suite
These individuals make or approve all the decisions that affect a corporation and its interaction with all other stakeholders. Thus, when we analyse corporations as credit investor...