African Personhood and Applied Ethics

Motsamai Molefe

• Publisher: NISC (Pty) Ltd
• Year: 2023
• Print ISBN: 9781920033699
• eBook ISBN: 9781920033712
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

Recently, the salient idea of personhood in the tradition of African philosophy has been objected to on various grounds. Two such objections stand out ñ the book deals with a lot more. The first criticism is that the idea of personhood is patriarchal insofar as it elevates the status of men and marginalises women in society. The second criticism observes that the idea of personhood is characterised by speciesism. The essence of these concerns is that personhood fails to embody a robust moral-political view. African Personhood and Applied Ethics offers a philosophical explication of the ethics of personhood to give reasons why we should take it seriously as an African moral perspective that can contribute to global moral-political issues. The book points to the two facets that constitute the ethics of personhood ñ an account of (1) moral perfection and (2) dignity. It then draws on the under-explored view of dignity qua the capacity for sympathy inherent in the moral idea of personhood to offer a unified account of selected themes in applied ethics, specifically women, animal and development.

1

Personhood as a moral theory

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to proffer an interpretation of personhood as a moral theory. I will articulate personhood as an agent-centred theory of value — an African theory of virtue. As an agent-centred theory of value, I will argue that personhood embodies a perfectionist moral view that enjoins the agent to realise her true humanity. I start by discussing the agent-centred facet of personhood as a moral theory, as opposed to the patient-centred one, for two reasons. Firstly, I do so because it tends to feature significantly in the literature in African philosophy (see Menkiti 1984; Gyekye 1992; Wiredu 2009; Ikuenobe 2016; Oyowe 2018). It will be crucial, therefore, for me to be clear regarding how I construe personhood as a moral theory. Secondly, I do so because this discussion will lay the foundation for the next chapter on dignity, which will be pivotal for the rest of the book. I believe the exposition of personhood as a theory of virtue is important insofar as it is one side of the coin of the ethics of personhood.

To articulate the agent-centred theory of value associated with personhood, I structure this chapter as follows. I will first draw a distinction between being human and being a person. Secondly, I will consider the content of what it means to be a person in the moral sense. I will submit that personhood embodies a perfectionist moral theory. I will then proceed to consider four moral considerations associated with the perfectionist theory of morality qua personhood, namely: (1) the character-focused nature of morality; (2) the moral individualism inherent in it; (3) its egoism; and (4) the place and role it assigns to social relationships. I will proceed to articulate how this theory accounts for the rightness of actions. Finally, I will conclude by considering two criticisms of the moral theory that I put forward.

I advise the reader to remember that this chapter is not predicated on the assumption that the idea of personhood promises the most plausible moral view. It is based, rather, on a humble exploratory and expository approach, where I aim to share the moral-theoretical content, and the consequences, of taking the idea of personhood seriously in African moral philosophy.

Personhood as an agent-centred theory of value1

The aphorism definitive of ubuntu ethics — ‘a person is a person through other persons’ — is generally understood by cultural practitioners and scholars to embody an African moral worldview. It brings to mind three distinct facets that constitute an African moral view, namely: (1) the fact of being human as the basis for morality; (2) the essence and goal of morality; and (3) the essential role of social relationships in the pursuit of the moral goal. Below, I explicate personhood as a moral theory by elaborating (1) and (2) and I will come back to (3) when I consider implications of (2).

The first reference to personhood in the aphorism points to the fact of being human — what in the literature is captured as the ontological notion of personhood (see Oyowe 2014a; Ikuenobe 2006, 2016). Scholars of African moral thought have, in several ways, brought to our attention that morality in the discourse of personhood is predicated on some distinctive features of human nature. This comment by Ramose in Bewaji and Ramose is informative –

…the concept of a person in African thought takes the fact of being a human being for granted. It is assumed that one cannot discuss the concept of personhood without in the first place admitting the ‘human existence’ of the human being upon whom personhood is to be conferred.2 (2003, 413; emphasis mine)

This comment by Ramose makes sense when interpreted in the light of the distinction between the ontological and normative concepts of personhood in African philosophy (Wiredu 1996a; Behrens 2013; Ikuenobe, 2016). The ontological notion refers to the fact of being human, what Ramose refers to above as ‘human existence’, constituted by certain descriptive features such as having a body, and so on (Kaphagawani 2004). The normative notion refers to the reflexive process of moral becoming, where the agent adds dimensions of moral virtue to her own humanity (Eze 2018; Menkiti 2018). Understood in the light of this distinction, the comment by Ramose may be construed as making the point that the moral discourse of personhood takes the fact of being human as a point of departure, at least some crucial features of it are necessary for the possibility of moral-becoming. This point is put more appositely by Oyowe (2018, 784) when he states that the fact of being human is a necessary but insufficient condition for personhood. In other words, certain facts of human nature are required for human beings to be able to pursue personhood. It is also crucial to notice that these ontological facts, in and of themselves, do not constitute personhood — something else is required for personhood to emerge.

The reader may here wonder about the ontological considerations that inform the moral discourse of personhood. Let me highlight three of these. Firstly, scholars of African metaphysical and moral thought tend to conceive of human nature in a positive light. In other words, human beings are not considered to come into the world with a warped or corrupted nature (see Gyekye 1995, 2010). When human beings come into the world, they emerge as morally neutral beings. Moral corruption or guilt is entirely a function of human agency. A human being comes into the world with a nature that can go either way in terms of moral conduct. The direction is dictated almost entirely by the decisions and conduct of the agent. This view of human nature is completely at odds with the Catholic view of original sin or the idea that human beings have a fallen nature (Gyekye 2010). The African view of human nature associated with personhood is also at odds with the view of human nature that is associated with the idea of the state of nature — psychological egoism. That metaphysical view understands human nature to be essentially selfish, which tends to serve as a metaphysical grounding for the idea of the state of nature (see Wolf 1999).

Secondly, in the discourse of personhood, human nature and human personality are conceptualised in relational terms. Human nature is understood to be wired for social relationships. This idea is well captured by John Mbiti’s (1969) famous assertion that — ‘I am because we are’. Here, the dominant view is to make sense of human existence, socialisation and personal identity in terms of social relationships. Menkiti’s comment regarding this maxim by Mbiti is illuminating –

Its sense is not that of a person [human being] speaking on behalf of, or in reference to, another, but rather of an individual, who recognizes the sources of his or her own humanity, and so realises, with internal assurance, that in the absence of others, no grounds exist for a claim regarding the individual’s own standing as a person. (2004, 324; emphasis mine)

The crucial point to notice is that one’s status as a human being traces its source to social relationships with others. Without social relationships with others, the very project of being human is put in jeopardy. It should therefore not come as a surprise when Tutu (1999, 35) avers that ‘my humanity is caught up, [it] is inextricably bound up in yours’. The metaphysical view propounded here is that one cannot imagine one’s humanity apart from social relations with other human beings (see Dandala 2009; Mothlabi and Munyaka 2009). A plausible metaphysical view embodied in the discourse of personhood is that we should recognise that we experience our humanity in terms of being-with-others (Louw 2004). This point is accentuated by Gyekye (1992, 104) when he notes that ‘the fundamentally relational character of the person [human being] and the interdependence of human individuals arising out of their natural sociality are thus clear’. The idea here is that we should appreciate the social nature of being human. In other words, the high value placed on the group in African cultures and in African socio-moral theorisation is an outgrowth of a particular philosophical anthropology, one where human beings are conceived of as beings designed for and wired to function and thrive in social relationships (see Paris 1995; Mbigi 2005).

We now come close to that feature of human nature that makes personhood possible. Before we get to that feature, we must first note that human nature is believed to have the capacity to grow or diminish morally. This point is captured as follows by Sebidi –

For Africans, human nature is capable of increasing or decreasing almost to a point of total extinction. There are actions…that are conducive to the enhancement or growth of a person’s nature, just as there are those which are destructive of a person’s nature. (1988, 48)

Here we see the crucial point that human nature is conceived in terms of its capacity to morally grow or deteriorate. In other words, in our nature we are wired with capacities that make us susceptible to morality or, more specifically, to pursuing and achieving personhood. It is for this reason that Gyekye (1992, 109) is correct to assert that ‘much is expected of a person (human being) in terms of the display of moral virtue [achieving personhood]’ in African moral cultures. For Gyekye, this moral expectation for human beings to pursue and possibly achieve personhood [moral virtue] is grounded on his conception of human nature, which is that ‘the practice of moral virtue is intrinsic to the conception of person’ (1992, 109; emphasis mine). There is a metaphysical view that informs the moral expectation for a human being to be able to achieve the status of personhood. To say that the practice of virtue is intrinsic to the conception of personhood [human nature] should [plausibly] be construed to mean that human beings have the ontological faculties required to lead morally virtuous lives, and not [implausibly] that it is automatic and guaranteed that human beings will lead virtuous lives (see Gyekye 2010 – the section in the entry titled: ‘Moral Personhood’). I will be more specific regarding the intrinsic capacities that make the pursuit of personhood possible in the next chapter, where I will elucidate the conception of dignity associated with the idea of personhood.

In the light of these adumbrations on the fact of being human, we come to the following observations. Human beings come into the world without the burden of inheriting the sins [moral liabilities] of their forebears. They come guilt-and-praise free. They come with a nature teeming with moral possibilities and, all things being equal, the agent is ultimately responsible for her own moral destiny, whether it will be a moral success or failure (Wingo 2006). Her moral destiny is in her own hands because she has the ontological capacities and features that make personhood possible.

We need to proceed to consider the second reference to personhood in the aphorism — remember, ‘a person is a person…’ The second instance of personhood refers to the moral goal posited by ubuntu as a moral view. The goal of morality is to convert the moral possibilities of human nature into moral reality by ‘decorating’ one’s humanity with moral excellence. Menkiti’s thoughts in this regard are informative –

We must also conceive of this [human] organism as going through a long process of social and ritual transformation until it attains the full complement of excellencies seen as truly definitive of man. (1984, 172)

Here we are informed that the pursuit of personhood is a socio-moral process of transformation, where the agent pursues, espouses, and ultimately exhibits moral excellence. It is crucial to notice that the idea being considered here is normative insofar as Menkiti talks of excellencies seen as truly definitive of a man. The idea of personhood refers to a moral state attained by human beings that are leading genuine human lives (see Metz 2010, 83). Notice that Menkiti refers to the acquisition of personhood as a long process. This is because it takes a long time to morally actualise raw human capacities to reach a point where they are characterised by excellence (Wiredu 2009). The aim of this process is to lead to ‘ethical maturity’ or a ‘widened maturity of ethical sense’ (Menkiti 2004, 325; 2018, 165). To achieve moral maturity the agent must be consistently engaged in the process of moral ‘self-creation’ or the ‘ingathering of the (moral) excellencies’ (Menkiti 1984, 172; Agada and Egbai 2018, 149).

In this light, to call someone a person is to make a moral judgement about the quality of their character. It is to judge the moral agent’s character to be characterised by ‘moral practice’ or even moral ‘excellence’ (Menkiti 1984, 172; Gyekye 1992, 113). It is also crucial to notice that the language used by scholars of African thought in speaking of personhood is that of virtue, which signals the idea of character (see Van Niekerk 2007, 2013). For example, Tutu (1999, 35) associates ubuntu with the virtues of kindness, friendliness, compassion, sharing and so on. More or less the same list of virtues can be seen in Wiredu (1992); Gyekye (1992); and Mokgoro (1998). It is important to notice that the virtues associated with ubuntu/personhood in this grab-bag list of virtues are exclusively relational by nature. In other words, these are other-regarding virtues, which embody duties and responsibilities, with almost no explicit mention of self-regarding virtues or duties (see Metz 2012a). Hence, we note that a human being characterised by personhood is one that relates positively to others. This positive relation to others takes place in the context of the consistent instantiation of the other-regarding virtues.

From the above, it emerges that the idea of personhood presupposes a particular kind of moral theory. Wiredu captures this insight thus –

But such evaluation [that one is a person or a non-person] presupposes a system of values. Since the context of such evaluations is nothing short of the entire sphere of human relations, the system of values presupposed cannot be anything short of an ethic… (2009, 15)

Here, Wiredu informs us that personhood embodies a particular system of values, or an ethical perspective. Gyekye (2010) also informs us that ‘the concept of a person in African tho...

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