SCM Briefly

David Mills Daniel

• Publisher: SCM Press
• Year: 2012
• Print ISBN: 9780334040361
• eBook ISBN: 9780334048404
• Topic: Théologie et religion
• Subtopic: Christianisme

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) wrote his most controversial work, On Liberty in 1859, the year in which Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species was also published. On Liberty contains a rational justification of the freedom of the individual in opposition to the claims of the state to impose unlimited control, and has become a classic of libertarian philosophy. Warning against the tyranny of the majority, this treatise argues that in the past the danger had been that monarchs held power at the expense of the common people and the struggle was one of gaining liberty by limiting such governmental power. But now that power has largely passed into the hands of the people at large through democratic forms of government, the danger is that the majority denies liberty to individuals, whether explicitly through laws... or more subtly through morals and public opinion.

Detailed Summary of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty

Chapter I (pp. 5–19)

Introductory

The subject of this essay is not the ‘Liberty of the Will’, but ‘Civil or Social Liberty’: the ‘nature and limits’ of the power which society can legitimately exercise over the individual (p. 5). Recent social changes make it urgent to address this rarely discussed, but divisive, question.

The ‘struggle between Liberty and Authority’ is one with which study of the history of Greece, Rome and England makes us familiar (pp. 5–6). However, in the past, it took place between governments and their subjects, with the latter seeking ‘protection against the tyranny’ of the former (p. 6). Generally, the position of a country’s rulers was seen as ‘antagonistic’ to that of its subjects (p. 6). To protect the weak against the strong, it was necessary to have ‘an animal of prey stronger than the rest’, but, as rulers also preyed on the weak, ‘patriots’ sought to limit their powers (p. 6). One way of doing this was to obtain ‘political rights’, infringement of which would justify ‘rebellion’; another, the creation of ‘constitutional checks’, so that government acts required the ‘consent’ of a representative body (p. 6). Most European rulers were eventually ‘compelled’ to concede the first ‘limitation’ of their power, but the second has proved harder to achieve (p. 6).

However, a time came when it ceased to seem inevitable that the interests of ruler and ruled should be opposed; the best protection against abuse of power would be to have elected governments (p. 6). This became the objective of ‘popular’ parties, and, as the ‘struggle proceeded’, the view gained ground, particularly within ‘European liberalism’, that there would be no need to limit the powers of such governments (p. 7). As they exercised ‘the nation’s own power’, they could be trusted not to abuse it (p. 7).

However, success reveals problems that failure might have concealed. The establishment of ‘elective and responsible’ governments showed that ‘such phrases as “self-government”, and “the power of the people over themselves”, do not express the true state of the case’ (p. 8). Rulers and ruled are not ‘always the same people’, while the ‘will of the people’ is that of its ‘most numerous’ or ‘most active part’ (p. 8). It became clear that it is important to limit the powers of ‘accountable’ governments over individuals, and to establish safeguards against the ‘“tyranny of the majority”’ (p. 8).

Such tyranny is still generally held to operate through governments, but, when ‘society is itself the tyrant’, it often takes the form of ‘social tyranny’ (p. 8). This can be worse than ‘political oppression’, because ‘prevailing opinion’ penetrates so ‘deeply into the details of life’ (pp. 8–9). Protection is needed against society’s tendency to impose ‘its own ideas and practices’ on those who do not share them (p. 9). It is as important to set (and maintain) limits to ‘the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence’ as it is to resist ‘political despotism’ (p. 9).

But, although the enforcement of ‘restraints’ on others’ actions is what makes existence ‘valuable’, there is still (apart from a few obvious cases) a lot of work to be done on the question of where to set these restraints (p. 9). No two periods of history have ‘decided it alike’, but ‘the magical influence of custom’ has prevented doubt about the rules of conduct which have been adopted (p. 9). As people have been encouraged to regard their feelings as the best guide on this issue, they believe that others should be required to act as they ‘would like them to’ (p. 10). And, for the ‘ordinary man’, there is no better justification for his ‘notions of morality, taste or propriety’ than that they are his own preferences (p. 10). Indeed, this is his ‘chief guide’ in most matters, including interpretation of his ‘religious creed’ (p. 10). Of course, if there is an ‘ascendant class’, a large part of a country’s morality comes from its ‘class interests’ (pp. 10–11). Other factors determining acceptance of rules of conduct are the ‘supposed preferences or aversions’ of rulers or gods, or the interests of society (p. 11).

However, the rules of conduct a society adopts often have more to do with its ‘likings and dislikings’ than anything else. And those with new ideas are usually more concerned with ensuring their general acceptance than with defending freedom, or addressing the issue of whether or not what society prefers ‘should be a law to individuals’ (p. 11). The only exception has been in religion. Although most of the opponents of the Roman Catholic Church were also intolerant of religious differences, in situations where it was clear that no one religious group was going to be dominant, it was recognized that there would have to be agreement to differ. So, it is in relation to religion that the ‘rights of the individual’ have been asserted on ‘grounds of principle’; and it is claimed that no one is accountable to others for his religious beliefs (p. 12). However, in practice, full religious freedom is only found where there is ‘religious indifference’; even in countries where there is toleration, most genuinely religious people have reservations about it (p. 12).

England differs from most continental countries: while the ‘yoke of opinion’ may be heavier, ‘that of law is lighter’ (p. 12). This is not so much due to respect for individual independence as to the view that the government and public have ‘opposite’ interests (p. 13). However, attitudes in England could change if people come to regard the government as representing their opinions and interests. Further, opposition to government ‘interference’ is indiscriminate, because there is no ‘recognized principle’ for testing its ‘propriety or impropriety’ (p. 13).

The ‘object of this Essay’ is to propose ‘one very simple principle’, by which to regulate society’s ‘dealings’ with individuals, whether through the law or ‘the moral coercion of public opinion’ (pp. 13–14). It is that, ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’ (p. 14). His own good, whether physical or moral, is not a ‘sufficient warrant’ (p. 14). While there may be good reasons for trying to persuade people into, or out of, actions that may cause good or harm to themselves, there is no justification for coercion or punishment. In conduct which affects only himself, the individual’s ‘independence is, of right, absolute’; he is only accountable to society for conduct ‘which concerns others’ (p. 14). Of course, there are exceptions, such as children, those who need the care of others, and ‘backward states of society’ (p. 14). The principle of liberty does not apply where people are incapable of improvement by ‘free and equal discussion’ (p. 14) ‘Despotism’ is an acceptable form of government for ‘barbarians’, provided it is aimed at their improvement (pp. 14–15).

This argument for individual freedom is not based on any ‘idea of abstract right’ (p. 15). The ‘ultimate appeal’ in ethical matters is ‘utility’; but it must be ‘grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being’ (p. 15). These interests permit ‘external control’ of the individual only in relation to actions that affect others’ interests (p. 15). However, there are social duties which individuals should be required to perform, such as giving evidence in court or defending the country: a person may do harm by his inaction as well as his actions.

The ‘appropriate region of human liberty’ consists of ‘the inward domain of consciousness’, covering freedom of conscience, thought, feeling and opinion on all matters, including moral and theological ones (p. 16). Expressing or publishing opinions seems to be in a different category, because it concerns others, but it is ‘practically inseparable’ from freedom of thought (pp. 16–17). We must be free to pursue our own way of life, even if others disapprove of it, provided it does not harm them. Also, with the same proviso, people must be free to join with others for any purpose. A society which lacks these liberties is not free. The only worthwhile freedom is that of pursuing our own good in whichever way we choose.

This doctrine may not be new, but it goes against the tendency of ‘existing opinion and practice’ (p. 17). The ‘engines of moral repression’ are used more energetically to prevent divergences from prevailing opinion in ‘self-regarding’ than in ‘social matters’ (p. 18). Religion has been one of the most important factors in shaping moral opinion, and religious leaders have usually wished to control ‘every department of human conduct’; but so, too, do many modern reformers, such as ‘M. Comte’, even though they are no friends of religion (p. 18). Further, the trend of both public opinion and legislation is to ‘strengthen society’ at the expense of individual freedom (p. 18). Indeed, people’s desire to ‘impose their own opinions’ on others is kept in check only by their inability to do so (p. 18).

It will be convenient to consider one aspect of freedom: ‘Liberty of Thought’, from which freedom of speaking and writing cannot be separated (p. 19). Of course, these freedoms are part of the ‘political morality’ of all countries that ‘profess religious toleration and free institutions’ (p. 19). However, the ‘philosophical and practical’ grounds on which they rest are not as well understood as might be thought (p. 19).

Chapter II (pp. 20–61)

Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion

It is to be hoped that no arguments are necessary in defence of press freedom, or against governments prescribing the opinions which people should hear. In England, although the laws in relation to the press remain ‘servile’, there is little danger of their being enforced; indeed, in ‘constitutional countries’ generally, there is little likelihood of governments trying to control the press, except where such action reflects the ‘intolerance of the public’ (pp. 20–1). But such ‘coercion’ is ‘illegitimate’, even when it is in line with ‘public opinion’ (p. 21). If only one person held a ‘contrary opinion’ to everybody else, this majority would be no more entitled to silence ‘that one person’ than he would be to silence the majority (p. 21). An opinion is not a mere ‘personal possession’ (p. 21) To prevent its expression is to rob ‘the human race’: future generations as well as the present one, and those who disagree with it as well as those who agree (p. 21). If the opinion is right, they are unable to exchange ‘error for truth’; if it is wrong, they are denied the opportunity of having the truth of their view confirmed by its ‘collision with error’ (p. 21).

Those who wish to suppress an opinion are not ‘infallible’ (p. 22). They confuse ‘their certainty’ with ‘absolute certainty’ (p. 22). Sadly, while everyone recognizes their fallibility, few ‘take any precautions’ against it, or admit that a particular opinion they hold might be wrong (p. 22). Even those accustomed to having their opinions challenged place ‘unbounded reliance’ on the opinions they share with other members of their political party, religious denomination or social class (p. 22). And this attitude is not affected by the knowledge that other groups hold, or previous generations have held, different opinions. People insist on the rightness of the opinions of their particular ‘world’ against ‘the dissentient worlds of other people’ (p. 23).

It is argued that preventing the ‘propagation of error’ does not involve a greater ‘assumption of infallibility’ than any other act ‘done by public authority’ (p. 23). Governments and individuals should reach the ‘truest opinions they can’, and should not ‘impose’ them on others, unless they are sure of their correctness (p. 23). But they would be wrong to allow the circulation of views they believe to be ‘dangerous to the welfare of mankind’, just because, in the past, people have been persecuted for expressing what are now accepted as true opinions (p. 23). Governments make mistakes in all sorts of areas, but the possibility of error does not mean that they should not levy taxes or declare war.

But this will not do. There is a big difference between accepting an opinion as true, because it has not been refuted, and ‘assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation’ (p. 24). Indeed, it is the possibility of having our opinions contradicted or disproved that ‘justifies’ our assuming their truth for ‘purposes of action’ (p. 24). Why is it that, on the whole, most human opinions and conduct are ‘rational’ (p. 24)? It is because human beings are able to correct their mistakes through ‘discussion and experience’ (p. 25). The only way that human beings can approach complete knowledge of a subject ‘is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion’ (p. 25). Only when we have defended our opinions against every possible objection are we entitled to consider them better than those ‘who have not gone through a similar process’ (p. 25). The only ‘safeguard’ of the beliefs in which we place most confidence is ‘a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded’ (p. 26).

It seems strange that people should acknowledge the need for free discussion, but only on ‘doubtful’ subjects (p. 26). To hold an opinion as certain, while not allowing those who wish to challenge it to do so, is to make ourselves ‘the judges of certainty’ (p. 26). These days, people are not so much sure of their opinions as sure that they would be lost without them. Some beliefs are thought to be so important and useful to society that governments, supported by ‘the general opinion of mankind’, are asked not to allow them to be questioned (p. 27). However, the issue of an opinion’s usefulness is itself a matter of opinion, while its truth is ‘part of its utility’ (p. 27). And can any untrue belief be ‘really useful’ (p. 27)?

But let us consider the ‘concrete’ example of opinions about the existence God (p. 28). People might ask whether I am arguing that it is ‘assuming infallibility’ to be sure of God’s existence (p. 28). No: but deciding the matter ‘for others’, without allowing them to hear any opposing arguments, is (p. 28). And it makes no difference how much public support there is for banning expression of these opposing views. We should remember the case of Socrates. We now regard him as one of ‘the most virtuous’ of men, but he was put to death for ‘impiety and immorality’, because he denied the existence of ‘the gods recognized by the State’ (p. 29). What about Jesus, who was executed as ‘a blasphemer’ (p. 30)? Indeed, his contemporaries mistook him for ‘the exact contrary of what he was’ (p. 30). And those who condemned him were not ‘bad men’ (p. 30). Rather, they represented all ‘the religious, moral and patriotic feelings of their time’, and were just as sincere in their beliefs as ‘respectable and pious’ people today (p. 30). ‘Orthodox Christians’, who think that they would have acted differently, should remember that St Paul was a leading persecutor of the early Christians (p. 30).

The example of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, one of the most ‘enlightened’ rulers in history, also illustrates my point (p. 30). In character, he was a ‘better Christian’ than many so-called ‘Christian sovereigns’ (p. 31). However, he ‘persecuted Christianity’, because he thought that this new religion would undermine existing religious beliefs, which were holding society together (p. 31). We need to recognize that there is no contemporary Christian more convinced of the social dangers of atheism than Marcus Aurelius was of those of Christianity. Of course, we might follow Dr Johnson, and claim that persecution is an ‘ordeal through which truth ought to pass’ (p. 32). But it is not acceptable to reward the discoverers of ‘new truths’ with ‘martyrdom’ (pp. 32–3). Further, it is simply not the case that ‘truth always triumphs over persecution’ (p. 33). Christi...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title page
• Copyright page
• Contents
• Introduction
• Context
• What is On Liberty?
• Some Issues to Consider
• Suggestions for Further Reading
• Detailed Summary of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty
• Chapter II Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion
• Chapter III Of Individuality, as One of the Elements of Well-Being
• Chapter IV Of the Limits to the Authority of Society Over the Individual
• Chapter V Applications
• Overview
• Glossary