SCM Briefly

Davild Mills Daniel

• Publisher: SCM Press
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780334041313
• eBook ISBN: 9780334048428
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: Christianity

Presents a support resource for students being introduced to philosophical texts and to philosophy in general. This work contains a glossary of terms relating to the philosopher's use of terms.

Overview

The following section is a chapter-by-chapter overview of the five books of Aristotle’s The Nicomachean Ethics, summarized in this Briefly. It is designed for quick reference to the detailed summary above. Readers may also find it particularly helpful for revision.

Book I

The Object of Life (pp. 3–30)

i Every rational activity aims at some end or good. One end (like one activity) may be subordinate to another (pp. 3–4)

Every art and action aims at some good, so the good is what all things aim at. Ends differ, as some are activities, while others are results distinct from the activities. Where ends are distinct from actions, the results are superior to the activities. There are many actions, arts and sciences, so there are many ends. However, many arts come under a single faculty (making bridles, for example, comes under horsemanship, which comes under military science), and the ends of the latter are more important, as the former are pursued for their sake. If activities have an end, desired for its own sake, this must be the good, the supreme good, and it will help us greatly in how to conduct our lives, as we are more likely to achieve our aim with a target.

ii The science that studies the supreme good for man is politics (pp. 4–5)

Politics seems to be the most authoritative science, as things like war and property management come under it, and it determines the subjects taught in states. As it lays down what we should, and should not, do, this end must be the good for man. Even if the good of individual and community coincide, that of the latter seems finer. So, the aim of our investigation is a kind of political science.

iii Politics is not an exact science (pp. 5–6)

The account of this will be adequate, if it is as clear as the subject-matter allows. Instances of morally fine and just conduct, which are the concern of political science, vary greatly, and may be thought to be so by convention, not nature. Goods also vary, and can be hurtful, as when people’s courage destroys them. A broad outline of the truth must suffice. The educated mind does not look for more precision in a subject than its nature permits.

The student should have some general knowledge and experience of life (p. 6). Everyone judges rightly what he understands, so one with a general education is a good general critic. Lacking experience of the practical business of life, a young man is unfit to study political science. He follows his feelings, and will not benefit from it, as the object is action, not knowledge. But it will be a great help to those, whose actions are based on a principle of knowledge.

iv The end is no doubt happiness, but views of happiness differ (pp. 6–8)

Ordinary and cultured people agree that happiness is the highest practical good, and identify it with living well, but they differ as to what it is. The former think it is something like pleasure or money, while a person may change his opinion, saying it is health, when he is ill, and money, when he is hard up. Some have held that, above particular goods, there is something good in itself, which causes goodness in all the others.

Learners must start from beliefs that are accepted or at least familiar (pp. 7–8). Plato rightly pointed out the difference between arguments from and to first principles. Things are known in two ways: to us and absolutely; and we must begin with the former. A serious student of ethics and political science needs training in good habits, for fact is the starting-point. If this is sufficiently clear, there will be no need to find the reason why.

v The three types of life. Neither pleasure nor public honour seems to be an adequate end; the contemplative life will be considered later (pp. 8–9)

The masses believe good or happiness is pleasure. The three main types of life are the one referred to, the political and the contemplative. The masses prefer to live a bovine existence, as do many in positions of power. Cultured people identify the good with honour, the goal of political life. But this is a superficial answer: honour depends on the giver, not the receiver, whereas the good is something proper to its possessor. Also, men seek to be honoured for their goodness, regarding it as superior, so perhaps this is the end pursued in public life. But possessing goodness seems compatible with being asleep, or an inactive life. The contemplative life is considered below. Wealth is only a means to something else, and is not the good we seek. The other suggestions, being appreciated for themselves, are more likely, but are nonetheless inadequate.

vi There cannot be a universal good such as Plato held to be the culmination of his theory of forms (pp. 10–13)

The universal needs to be examined, although the forms make this more difficult. This theory’s proponents did not put forward ideas of classes, in which they recognized degrees of priority.

However, things are called ‘good’ in the categories of substance, quality and relation, and, as what exists in its own right, substance, is by nature prior to the relative, there cannot be any common idea in these cases. Also, as things are called ‘good’ in as many senses as they are said to exist (as in the various categories), there cannot be a single universal common to all cases. It would also mean there would be one science of all good things, but there are more than one, even in things coming under one category. Again, it is difficult to see what is meant by a thing-itself. If the definition of ‘man’ is the same in man and man-himself, the good and the good-itself will not differ as good, while good will not be made any more so by being eternal. Further, only things good in themselves, which are pursued or esteemed in their own right, are called good in virtue of one form; those that are just a means to good are called so in a different sense. The two need to be distinguished, to determine whether they are called good in virtue of one idea. Many things, like sight, pleasures and honours, are regarded as good in themselves, but the question arises as to whether they are or whether nothing is good in itself, except the idea. But, if this is so, the class is purposeless. Further, if they are good in themselves, the definition of good would have to be the same for all, but as they all have different definitions in respect of goodness, good is not a common characteristic corresponding to one idea. Perhaps, all goods derive from or contribute to one good, or are good by analogy, but even if the goodness that is predicated in common is one, separately existing thing, it cannot be acquired by human beings. Maybe, we should get to know the goods that can be acquired, which are good for us, but this clashes with the way the practical sciences work: they aim at a good, but not knowledge of it. It would not benefit a joiner to know this good-itself.

vii What is the good for man? It must be the ultimate end or object of human life: something that is in itself completely satisfying. Happiness fits this description (pp. 13–17)

The good we are seeking seems to vary with the action or art, the good of each (it is health in medicine, for example) being the end for which everything else is done; and if one thing is the end of all actions, it is the practical good. However, some of our chosen ends, like wealth, are means to something else, and, unlike the supreme good, not final ends. An end that can never be chosen for the sake of another is more final than those that can. The end that is chosen only for its own sake is final without qualification. Happiness, which is chosen for itself, and never for anything else’s sake, is regarded as such an end, whereas things like honour are chosen for themselves, but also for its sake. Again, the perfect good is one that, by itself, makes life desirable, and happiness does. Addition of another good does not make it more desirable: it is the end to which our actions are directed.

But what is happiness? If we consider what the function of man is, we find that happiness is a virtuous activity of the soul (pp. 15–16). We can define happiness by grasping the function of man. The goodness of any group of people (like sculptors), who perform a specific activity, is its performance. Just as the limbs have a function, human beings do, over and above particular ones. Man’s proper function is not nutrition and growth, or sentient life, which he shares with plants and animals, but an activity of the soul, in accordance with a rational principle. Now, the function of an individual, and a good individual of the same kind, is generically the same: a harpist’s function is to play the harp, that of a good one to play it well. If a man’s function is as stated above, that of a good man is to lead this kind of life well. The good for man is an activity of the soul in accordance with (the best kind of) virtue, and this must take place over a complete lifetime.

This sketch can be elaborated later, but great precision is not to be expected (pp. 16–17). This is only an outline account of the good. We must look for only the degree of precision the subject-matter permits, and not allow side issues to swamp the main ones.

viii Our view of happiness is supported by popular beliefs (pp. 18–20)

This principle must be examined in the light of what is commonly said about it. Our definition is supported by the fact that goods have been put into three classes: external, of the soul and of the body, of which the second are good in the fullest sense. It is also right to say that the end consists in certain actions, putting it among the goods of the soul. Our definition is also supported by the belief that the happy man lives well, as we have described it as a kind of good life. It also includes all the required constituents of happiness, which some believe to be virtue, others prudence, and so on. An important point is whether the supreme good is to possess or exercise virtue, for the former, unlike the latter, could be present in someone, but produce no good result. Virtuous actions are pleasant in themselves, and give the lover of virtue pleasure, so nothing needs to be added to his life. One who does not delight in fine actions is not good, for such actions are good and fine in the highest degree. Thus, happiness is the best, finest and most pleasurable thing of all, but it needs external goods, as it is hard to do fine deeds without resources, while people are not happy if, for example, they are solitary, suggesting that it requires some prosperity.

ix How is happiness acquired? (pp. 20–2)

Happiness would be a suitable gift from the gods, but if it is acquired through moral goodness and training, this would mean it is widely shared, as it is attainable by anyone, not incapable of goodness. This view fits in with the definition of happiness as a kind of virtuous activity of the soul, whereas other goods serve as its instruments. We have said that political science’s end is the highest good, and its main concern is to make citizens virtuous and ready to do fine deeds. Animals, who are incapable of it, and children, who are too young (happiness requires a complete life), cannot be happy.

x Is it only when his life is completed that a man can rightly be called happy? (pp. 22–5)

Perhaps, no one is happy while alive, but, having defined happiness as a kind of activity, it seems paradoxical to say people are really happy, when dead. It is difficult to deny that the dead are happy, given the popular belief that good or evil touches them, and the absurdity of maintaining that they are unaffected by what befalls their descendants. But, if someone is called happy, not because he is, but was, it would be equally absurd to deny that it can be truly stated of him when he is. Changes of fortune are immaterial, because success and failure in life do not depend on them: it is virtuous activities that determine our happiness. The happy man will be happy throughout life, as he will spend most of it in virtuous conduct and contemplation.

He cannot become miserable, for he will never do hateful and mean things, and ordinary misfortunes will not disrupt his happiness. He is active in accordance with complete virtue, and has enough external goods through a complete life and when he dies, for happiness is an utterly final and complete end. Thus, the living, who have these qualifications, are supremely happy, but with a human happiness.

xi Are the dead affected by the fortunes of those who survive them? (pp. 25–6)

Thinking the dead are unaffected by their descendants’ fortunes is against accepted beliefs. Someone’s misfortunes, or those of his friends, may influence his life powerfully or trivially, so it is debatable whether or not the dead participate in the good or its opposite. They are probably affected to some extent by loved ones’ fortunes but the effect will be slight.

xii Is happiness to be praised as a means or valued as an end? (pp. 26–7)

Should we praise or value happiness? Things are praised, when related to something else, as virtue is praised for the effects it produces. If praise belongs to the relative, the best things demand something greater and better, as when the gods are called ‘blessed’. Eudoxus said that pleasure’s not being praised shows its superiority to other goods. Happiness is a first principle: we do everything else for its sake, and hold that the first principle and cause of what is good is precious and divine.

xiii To understand what moral goodness is we must study the soul of man (pp. 27–30)

Examining the nature of virtue will enable us to form a view about happiness. The true statesman studies the former thoroughly, as he wants his fellow-citizens to be good and law-abiding. Our concern is with human goodness, the goodness of the soul, for we are interested in the good or happiness for man. The statesman needs to study the soul, but with a view to politics and sufficiently for that purpose.

The several faculties of the soul distinguished (pp. 28–30). The findings of psychology can be used. The soul is partly rational and partly irrational, and the vegetative part of the latter has no part in human goodness. There is another irrational element in the soul, which fights against the rational, as in the urges of those lacking self-control. But it seems to be amenable to reason: in self-controlled people, it obeys reason, and is in harmony with it in the brave and temperate. So, the appetitive part of the soul responds to reason by obeying it. On the other hand, if the appetitive part is classed as rational, there are two rational parts, with the relation of the appetitive to the rational part proper being that of a child heeding its father. There are two corresponding classes of virtue: intellectual, like wisdom, understanding and prudence, which are referred to when someone is praised for his state of mind; and moral, like liberality and temperance, which relate to character.

Book II

Moral Goodness (pp. 31–49)

i Moral virtues, like crafts, are acquired by practice and habituation (pp. 31–2)

Either virtue is intellectual, resulting from instruction, or moral, resulting from habit. Human beings are constituted to receive the moral virtues, but their full development is due to habit. As with the arts, we acquire the virtues by exercising them. People become just by performing just acts, and every legislator’s aim is to make his citizens good by habituation. The means of bringing about any form of excellence are the same as those that destroy it. People become good or bad builders by building well or badly, and the same is true of the virtues. The sort of habits we form from the earliest age matter a lot.

ii In practical sciences so much depends upon particular circumstances that only general rules can be given (pp. 33–5)

As we are studying how to become good men, not what goodness is, we must think about how to perform our actions, as these determine our dispositions: we should act according to the right principle. It is as difficult to lay down hard and fast rules about conduct as about what is healthy, and, if this is true of the general rule, it is even more so with its application to particular problems. We have to think about what the circumstances demand.

A cardinal rule: right conduct is incompatible with excess or deficiency in feelings and actions (p. 34). However, just as eating and drinking too much or too little destroys health, moral qualities are destroyed by deficiency or excess. One who fears everything and stands up to nothing turns into a coward, while one who fears nothing at all becomes foolhardy. Temperance and courage are destroyed by excess and deficiency, and preserved by the mean.

Our virtues are exercised in the same kinds of action as gave rise to them (pp. 34–5). Just as the same sort of actions promote and destroy the virtues, the activities that flow from them will also be the same sort of actions. We become temperate by refraining from pleasures, and can best refrain from pleasures when we are temperate.

iii The pleasure or pain that actions cause the agent may serve as an index of moral progress, since good conduct consists in a proper attitude towards pleasure and pain (pp. 35–7)

The pleasure or pain accompanying people’s acts indicates their dispositions. One facing danger gladly is brave, whereas one feeling distress is a coward. Moral goodness is about pleasures and pains: the first make us behave badly, the second deter us from fine actions. Plato pointed out the importance of being educated to feel joy and grief at the right things. Punishment uses pleasures and pains, and people become bad through them, by seeking, or shunning, the wrong ones. Three factors, the fi...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title page
• Copyright page
• Contents
• Introduction
• Context
• Detailed Summary of Aristotle’s The Nicomachean Ethics (Books I–III, VI and X
• Book II Moral Goodness
• Book III Moral Responsibility: Two Virtues
• Book VI Intellectual Virtues
• Book X Pleasure and the Life of Happiness
• Overview
• Glossary