The Hybrid Age

International Security in the Era of Hybrid Warfare

Brin Najžer

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9780755602520
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: National Security
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Humankind has always sought out innovative and new ways of waging war, establishing new forms of warfare. Set against a background of global strategic instability this process of innovation has, over the last two decades, produced a new and complex phenomenon, hybrid warfare. Distinct from other forms of modern warfare in several key aspects, it presents a unique challenge that appears to baffle policymakers and security experts, while giving the actors that employ it a new way of achieving their goals in the face of long-standing Western conventional, doctrinal, and strategic superiority. The Hybrid Age analyses the phenomenon of hybrid warfare through theoretical frameworks and a range global case studies from the 2006 Lebanon War to the Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014. This book aims to establish a unified theory of hybrid warfare, which not only outlines what the term means, but also places it in its context, and provides the tools which enable an observer to identify and react to a future instance of hybrid warfare.

1

Theory of hybrid warfare

The academic discipline of IR is incredibly diverse and far reaching. From relatively humble beginnings in the aftermath of the First World War, it has expanded to become one of the flagships of social sciences. Interestingly, it is a relatively recent academic discipline partly due to the fact that, before the First World War, everything that is now subsumed under the term ‘international relations’ was taken to be completely self-evident. Relations between states were entrenched in hundreds of years of traditions and history with relatively little or no impetus for change. War was regarded as the domain of soldiers and international politics was the purview of diplomats. Neither group could be challenged on their expertise in their field. Furthermore, there was a lack of intellectual interest and scholarly debate about what the soldiers and diplomats were doing.¹

The destruction brought upon society and the disappearance of distinctions between civilian and military society caused a rethink; the self-evident truths were suddenly open to interpretation. From this extreme shift in history developed the two key schools of thought within IR, liberalism and realism. The fact that it was a war that caused this series of developments is important, as IR, as a discipline, is largely devoted to answering the question of why states go to war with each other,² or, to put it another way, why the international system is based on conflict and coercion. When a new kind of war-related phenomenon emerges, as in the case with hybrid warfare, it is within the field of IR that answers must primarily be sought in order to gain a better understanding. However, in such a wide field, there are a number of approaches available.

For the purposes of this research the approach of choice will be strategic. Strategic studies, a sub-field of security studies, is an important and finely focused speciality of IR, dedicated specifically to answering the questions regarding the role of coercion, in particular military power. While its focus might be sharp, the framework is not, since an understanding of the field requires a multidisciplinary approach, containing history, politics, economics, psychology and geography, to name a few, in addition to military knowledge.³

This chapter will provide a theoretical framework in which the concept of hybrid warfare will be examined and developed. It will tackle the contentious issue of the causes of wars and the concept of the use of force. Both of these will be examined more closely, to understand the meaning of coercion in international politics. Following these base observations, the concept of hybrid warfare will be examined through a realist lens in order to place it into a theoretical framework on which the book is anchored. This is a crucial first step in creating a solid and comprehensible definition of the phenomenon which will then be used to further develop the book.

The causes of war and the pursuit of security

While an attempt to answer the question ‘Why states go to war?’ could be a book in itself, for the purposes of this research, a brief overview will be sufficient. A useful starting point is Thucydides’s work The History of the Peloponnesian War in which he established three base reasons for war: prestige (honour), fear and self-interest.⁴ While Thucydides talks specifically about the causes of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, his thoughts on the matter have retained their relevance throughout history. Even in the present day, scholars are referring to the ‘Thucydides’s Trap’ that can lead to conflict between an emerging and a hegemonic power. While it may sound implausible to modern observers that a state would go to war over prestige, it is far from impossible, particularly when combined with fear. Deep resentment over past humiliations, perceived unfair treatment or simply conviction that the international system is ‘rigged’ to support the established great powers at the expense of others are all rallying cries that can be heard on the streets (and in government buildings) in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. The formally announced grievances might be more finessed, but, as Thucydides points out, that does not hide the real reason behind them.⁵ An emerging power will, almost always,⁶ attempt to challenge the hegemon of the day for dominance and the hegemon will likely resort to war once other options run out, or become too costly. Both are acting out of a combination of prestige (the emerging power wishes to gain more of it while the hegemon feels the need to defend it) and fear (the emerging power fears being attacked and destroyed or reduced in status by the hegemon while the hegemon fears that its power will not suffice to maintain its position) and are fuelled by self-interest (both desire the political, economic and social benefits that come with hegemony).

As the hegemon of the day is currently the United States, it is unsurprising that other aspiring great power challengers are competing with it; most notably China,⁷ but also Russia. This notion is of course not limited only to the global hegemon, but can take place in a regional setting as well. Good examples of this viewpoint are Israel, which is arguably the sub-regional hegemon of the Middle East, and NATO in Europe, challenged by Russia. Since the hegemons of the day tend to be technologically and militarily very strong, the challenges might come in a different form from open war, with hybrid warfare being the most recent and preferred type of challenge.

In modern times, particularly in the West, wars are seen as something abnormal, and the historical record of wars as the norm for the conduct of foreign policy is perceived as amoral or even criminal. And yet, war, as an instrument of state policy, persists in ever more refined forms both within, but particularly outside, the Western world. Building on the legacy of Thucydides, Michael Howard offers a valuable insight into the causes of war. War should not be regarded as pathological and abnormal, but, at its core, simply as a form of conflict among a particular social grouping, that is, sovereign states. So without states ‘one would have no wars, as Rousseau rightly pointed out – but, as Hobbes equally rightly pointed out, we would probably have no peace either’.⁸ Wars occur through a perception of fear, with Howard echoing Thucydides, but are initiated by a set of conscious, rational decisions or, as Howard put it:

Men have fought during the past two hundred years neither because they are aggressive nor because they are acquisitive animals, but because they are reasoning ones: because they discern, or believe that they can discern, dangers before they become immediate, the possi bility of threats before they are made.⁹

Wars are therefore not caused because the human race is inherently bellicose or because they crave the possessions of others; war can be so risky that it is only resorted to for rational reasons, no matter how convoluted or disreputable. Nor is this calculation limited to one side in a conflict as it requires at least two states to wage war with ‘conscious and reasoned decisions based on the calculation, made by both parties [emphasis in the original], that they can achieve more by going to war than by remaining at peace’.¹⁰

Of course, the international system is now different in some ways from what it was in 1984 when Michael Howard published The Causes of Wars, and even more so from it was in the time of Thucydides.¹¹ However, as the former so succinctly put it, the revulsion to war that seems to characterize society is only useful if it is universal. If it is not, and the post-Cold War world offers many examples to support such an assumption, then ‘societies which continue to see armed force as an acceptable means for attaining their political end are likely to establish dominance over those which do not’.¹² The advent of hybrid warfare connects both sides of this argument. As it aims to avoid open war, hybrid warfare can be said to be a form of conflict which suits an international order which does not wish its members to engage in large-scale war but nevertheless gives states the means to achieve their aims through a distinctive brand of coercion.

Building on the core assumption that the international system is anarchic, questions arise about how states, as the most important actors, seek to secure the ultimate prize they seek: security. The answer is twofold; states primarily use the prospect of coercion or the actual use of coercion to attain their goals, and they do so through the application of strategy. The two terms are inextricably linked and form the basis of interstate relations and statecraft.

First, some definitions are in order. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines ‘coercion’ as ‘constraint, restraint, compulsion; the application of force to control the action of a voluntary agent’.¹³ A more functional definition by Art characterized the relationship between international politics and coercion as ‘the necessary, but not the sufficient precondition for its effective functioning’.¹⁴ As it quickly becomes evident, the key component of coercion is force, which is usually described in terms of military power or capabilities. How integral such use of force is to the study of IR is best summed up by Waltz’s statement: ‘In politics force is said to be the ultima ratio. In international politics force serves, not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed as the first and the constant one.’¹⁵ However, coercion has a more general meaning, which is not limited solely to the use of military force. States have many power assets, including their population, geography, governance, values, wealth and leadership.¹⁶ In a similar line, Rob de Wijk defines ‘coercion’ as ‘the deliberate and targeted use – or threat to use – of power instruments to manipulate and influence the politico-strategic choices of an actor, or player, defined as an entity that plays an identifiable role in international relations’.¹⁷ How effective states are in utilizing their assets depends on the effectiveness of their strategy.

The word ‘strategy’ is often used in a variety of settings, most of which are, unfortunately, misuses, particularly in the world of management and economics, but increasingly also in politics and IR. Most definitions of strategy will describe it as a method of connecting ways, means and ends. Colin Gray’s definition is a good example, with strategy defined as ‘the attempted achievement of desired political ends, through the choice of suitable strategic ways, employing largely the military means then available or accessible’.¹⁸ Alternatively, Gray offers a narrower definition, based on the use of force in which strategy is ‘the use that is made by force and the threat of force for the ends of policy’.¹⁹ Connecting the ways and means with ends can sometimes be very simple and, although it could qualify as a strategy, as Lawrence Freedman points out: ‘When the ends are easily reached, when inanimate objects rather than people are involved, and when very little is at stake, this barely counts as strategy.’²⁰ Strategy is not merely a synonym for a plan; it comes into play when there is actual potential for conflict. Human affairs are notoriously unpredictable and often lead to frustration due to the number of different, even opposing, views and interests. A plan is based on the predictability of events that lead to an expected conclusion, while a strategy must assume that opponents will do everything they can to prevent that from happening. It must therefore be much more flexible and imaginative.²¹ Plans may be instruments of strategy, but they are not strategy.

In principle then, building on the logic of the chapter, in order to achieve security in an anarchical system, a state will identify a list of national interests that it must pursue and employ, primarily, coercive and non-coercive means against other states and actors in order to do so. Cooperation between states should be kept to a minimum, as other states cannot be trusted to act in one states’ individual interest, but all states exist in a position of strategic interdependence where none has complete control over its own fate. The relative gains of one state, however, outweigh the absolute gains of all. States use the best combination of their power assets in order to gain an advantage which is achieved through the proper use of a correct strategy. In a largely hegemonic system, the tools they use must be adapted, for fear of the hegemon overreacting. In such an environment, hybrid warfare has emerged and flourished.

Realist theory and hybrid warfare

As an examination of the concept of hybrid warfare deals primarily with the political use of coercion, its natural habitat lies wi thin the realist domain. Power relations and politics, coupled with coercive, primarily military, force among states or state-like actors, are the foundations of realist thinking. It makes logical sense then, that realist theories are best suited to explain not only the emergence of hybrid warfare but also its uses, implications and future impact. With that in mind, it is also important to note that the responses to hybrid warfare from individual states are not always based on realist thinking. In Europe and the wider Western world particularly, policymakers often try to avoid realist approaches, which are seen as unethical or amoral by their domestic constituencies, and they portray the opponent as the clear aggressor in the eyes of world public opinion. In such an environment, liberal and constructivist tenets have gained more traction within the realm of foreign and defence policy. Nevertheless, the approach to hybrid warfare, for the purposes of this volume, will be strategic, and will consequentially rely heavily on the realist school.

Towards a theory of hybrid warfare

While it is impossible to create an absolute theory of war, or any specific kind of war, it can be useful to create a set of theoretical characteristics that can signal a certain form of conflict. The theory of hybrid warfare described later is an attempt to create a prescriptive model of conditions and circumstances that can lead to hybrid warfare. Its purpose is to alert theoreticians and practitioners to the possibility of hybrid warfare occurring, rather than create absolute predictions. As such, it forms the theoretical basis for further examination of the concept itself and the preconditions necessary for its implementation. The practical implications of this theory will be explored further in the following chapters, and the conclusion will sum up both the theoretical and practical parts into one unified theory of hybrid warfare.

There are two levels of characteristics that influence a...