The Danube Frontier

The Danube Frontier

Michael Schmitz

• Publisher: Pen and Sword Military
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781473865563
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Ancient History
• Index: History

The Roman conquests of Macedonia in the 2nd century BC led directly to the extension of their authority over the troublesome tribes of Thrace to the south of the Danube. But their new neighbor on the other side of the mighty river, the kingdom of the Dacians, was to pose an increasing threat to the Roman empire. Inevitably, this eventually provoked Roman attempts at invasion and conquest. It is a measure of Dacian prowess and resilience that several tough campaigns were required over more than a century before their kingdom was added to the Roman Empire. It was one of the Empire's last major acquisitions (and a short-lived one at that). Dr. Michael Schmitz traces Roman involvement in the Danube region from first contact with the Thracians after the Third Macedonian War in the 2nd century BC to the ultimate conquest of Dacia by Trajan in the early years of the 2nd Century AD. Like the other volumes in this series, this book gives a clear narrative of the course of these wars, explaining how the Roman war machine coped with formidable new foes and the challenges of unfamiliar terrain and climate. Specially commissioned color plates bring the main troop types vividly to life in meticulously researched detail.

Chapter 1

Illyricum: The Push Towards the Danube

This is a matter not to be lightly passed over, but deserving the serious attention of those who wish to gain a true view of the purpose of this work and of the formation and growth of the Roman Dominion.

Polybius, II.2.1

The First Illyrian War

It is the region of pre-Roman Illyricum and the first trans-Adriatic war of 230 BC that Polybius is referring to in the above passage. This war marked the beginning of Rome’s contact with the people of the Danube and the inevitable Danubian conquests to follow.1 Geographically, Illyricum at this time included three distinct areas: the Dalmatian coastline situated directly opposite the Italian peninsula, the Dinaric Alps which separate the coast from the hinterland and which can be crossed only via a few passes, and finally the Pannonian plains which directly bordered the Danube. Although no concerted effort was made to occupy and annex any of these regions until Octavian’s Illyrian war between 35 and 33 BC, which is the subject of the next chapter, Roman contact began with the first trans-Adriatic war some 200 years earlier. Roman interests in the region of Illyricum were primarily sparked because of Rome’s need to bring an end to the continued Illyrian piracy in the Adriatic. Rome saw the most powerful Illyrian king to date, with a larger navy and army than any previous Illyrian monarch, situated just across the Adriatic, which was too close for comfort. To make matters worse in the view of Rome, the Illyrian king Agron apparently had links with Demetrius of Macedon, another ruler in the region that Rome was not on good terms with.

The fact that the Illyrians were capable of and willing to expand along the Adriatic coastline made them a potential threat to Rome, and unquestionably to Roman shipping in the region.2 Piracy was a major issue in the ancient world, particularly to nations such as Rome who were very heavily reliant on shipping for the delivery of staples such as wheat, and required serious attention.

Illyrian expansion along the Adriatic coastline began because Demetrius of Macedon had bribed the Agron to relieve the siege of the town of Medion.3 The Aetolian League were attacking this town because they had tried to convince Medion’s inhabitants to join their league, but because they had been rejected they sought to force these people to join them through military action, something Demetrius was opposed to.4 Whilst the Aetolians were besieging the town, Agron sailed 100 boats at night, carrying a force of 5,000 Illyrians, down the Adriatic coastline to lift the siege.5 The Illyrian vessels used by Agron’s forces, known variously as lemboi, pinnaces or liburnians, were single-decked vessels apparently capable of carrying fifty troops each in addition to the oarsman required to row them.6 They had a single bank of oars and were reputedly very fast and manoeuvrable. After engaging with the Illyrians, the Romans would adopt these vessels themselves. Apparently Octavian favoured them and used them against Antony and Cleopatra at the famous battle of Actium, his opponents preferring the more traditional heavier quinquereme. The Illyrian vessels might not have been able to withstand a head-on battle against the heavier warships but their real strength lay in their speed and manoeuvrability, as repeatedly demonstrated by the Illyrians.

Octavian’s use of these vessels at the battle of Actium gives a clear indication of how they could be utilized against heavier opposition. It appears that the captains of Octavian’s lemboi decided against using their rams to attack Antony and Cleopatra’s fleet of larger ships as they were concerned that the lighter vessels would come off worse in a head-on engagement. Additionally, Antony’s crews had been struck down by malaria which had resulted in many deaths leaving the vessels undermanned. Octavian’s lighter vessels exploited their speed and manoeuvrability to sail at the heavier vessels, loose their missiles at the opposing crew and reverse course rapidly, moving out of the quinqueremes’s range. The Macedonians also made use of this type of vessel, again not for open battle but rather to rapidly transport and land troops in strategically or tactically valuable positions. Additionally, it is clear that these fast light vessels were ideal for the national occupation of the Illyrians, piracy.7 In both cases it was the troop-carrying capacity of these vessels that made them invaluable. This was further demonstrated when prior to the first Illyrian war, whilst the Illyrians were attacking Corcyra, a Greek force of ten warships was sent against them.8 After a relatively indecisive action where seven regular warships belonging to the Illyrian’s allies fought the Greek squadron, the Greek forces turned on the lighter Illyrian vessels in the hopes of crushing them. The Illyrians made inventive use of their lighter ships against the heavier Greek vessels, roping four of these vessels together and presenting their side to the oncoming Greek warships, inviting and allowing them to ram the lighter vessels.9 The Greeks, much to their misfortune, took the bait and when the Greek vessels rammed the lashed-together Illyrians, the Greek warships became fouled and the Illyrian warriors, vastly outnumbering the hoplite contingents on board the Greek vessels, would board and capture them. On average a Greek warship would carry as few as fourteen hoplites and four archers, whereas each of the lighter Illyrian ships carried approximately fifty warriors.10 As a result of the Illyrians’ innovative tactics, the Greeks lost half of their ships.11

At Medion the Illyrian forces were well led. Having arrived during the night, they anchored as close to the town as was possible and landed their troops at daybreak. Immediately they formed into battle order and advanced on the Aetolian camp. Although surprised by the sudden appearance of the Illyrians, the Aetolians had sufficient time to form up, placing the bulk of their heavy infantry and cavalry on level ground near the camp and their light infantry and remaining cavalry at high points in front of their camp.12 The Illyrian troops charged the light infantry and forced them from their positions largely due weight of numbers. This in turn compelled the cavalry that had been stationed with the light infantry to retreat, as failure to do so would have left them vulnerable to flank attacks by the Illyrian forces.13 The retreating cavalry ran straight into the Aetolian heavy infantry on the plain, disrupting its formation.

Having taken the high ground, the Illyrians made use of this advantage against the Aetolian heavy infantry, rapidly routing the League’s forces with the assistance of the Medionians who, upon seeing the Illyrian success, joined in the attack from the city.14 Many of the Aetolians were killed and an even larger number were taken prisoner. The Illyrians captured all of the abandoned Aetolian arms and baggage, collecting as much booty as they could and immediately sailing home. Agron was so pleased with his victory against the Aetolian League that according to the sources he embarked on excessive celebrations which led to his death in just a matter of days.15 This left his infant son Pinnes to succeed him on the throne. However, because of Pinnes’s age his mother Teuta ruled in his name. It was with Teuta that the Romans were to go to war in 230 BC.

With Teuta as queen, Illyrian privateers were given permission to take any ship they came across. Furthermore, she assembled as large an army as her husband had and instructed her commanders that all countries should be treated as enemies.16 Polybius’s account is clearly biased by a misogynistic perspective common to the ancient authors and needs to be taken with a pinch of salt, particularly in his descriptions of the motivations of Queen Teuta. Polybius’s suggestion that Teuta had no concept of the geo-political circumstances Illyria found itself in are perhaps a result of this bias. What is clear is that up until then the Romans had not interfered with Illyrian activities on their side of the Adriatic and it is quite likely that after Agron’s successes Teuta felt that conquest of a larger proportion of the Adriatic coastline was a real and viable opportunity to expand Illyrian domination in the region.

In 230 BC the Illyrian forces laid siege to the island of Issa, which would provide the Romans with the excuse they needed to begin what became known as the First Illyrian War.17 Unfortunately for Teuta, the rapid expansion of the Illyrians came to the attention of the Romans after the people of Issa sent an embassy to Rome requesting assistance. Although initially the Romans sent an embassy to investigate the situation, the murder of a Roman ambassador, seemingly on orders from the Illyrian queen, was what eventually convinced the Roman people to declare war.18

Interestingly enough, the Roman people were far from keen in becoming involved with the Illyrians, the plebians demonstrating this by initially voting against the war when the issue was raised by the Senate. At this time in Roman history, before the formation of the Empire, the Roman citizens who formed the Comitia Centuriata made the final decision as to whether or not Rome would go to war. Another war, not long after the conclusion of the First Punic War and when its privations were still being suffered, would not have been popular. It was only the death of the Roman envoy, who had been sent to determine what was happening at Issa, apparently on the orders of Teuta, and the argument that if they did not fight the Illyrians in their homeland then the Illyrians would likely attack them in Italy, that persuaded the plebians to vote in favour of military action against the Illyrians.19

229 BC saw the continuation of Illyrian aggression on the Adriatic coast, one contingent of Illyrian ships sailing to Epidamnus.20 When asked what their purpose was by the local authorities, the Illyrians claimed that they were just stopping to resupply their ships. However, when they disembarked in order to collect water the Illyrians, having treacherously concealed weapons in their water jugs, surprised the guards assigned to protect the port and seized one of the city’s towers, from where they were soon able to capture many of the walls around the town, and only after valiant resistance by the local inhabitants were the Illyrians eventually ejected from the city.21 After this defeat, the Illyrian force made its way south to join with a second Illyrian contingent which had been sent further down the coast. This force, under the command of Demetrius of Pharos, had sailed through the Corcyran Straits and besieged the city of Corcyra.22 The Corcyran and Illyrian forces engaged in an indecisive land battle resulting in the continuation of the siege, which eventually culminated with Corcyra’s surrender to Demetrius. The Illyrians then returned to once again lay siege to Epidamnus.

It was at about this time the first force of Romans left Italy with its immediate goal being to lift the siege at Corcyra, but unfortunately the city had already been taken, which the Roman commanders only learned upon their arrival.23 Fortunately for the Romans, however, it appears that Demetrius had had a falling-out with Queen Teuta and as a result was prepared to surrender Corcyra and Pharos to them.24 In return the Romans made Demetrius a friend of the Roman people and he was allowed to retain control of Pharos. A second Roman fleet left Italy with a large army that was landed near Apollonia, where the first Illyrian force that had taken Corcyra met them. The united Roman forces then proceeded to Epidamnus, where they lifted the siege, and then carried on to the island of Issa, which they also freed.25 Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus and Issa all made friendship agreements with Rome,26 although no formal commitments were made by any of the parties.

The Romans had sent a considerable force against the Illyrians, totalling some 200 warships manned by what were now veteran crews who had only recently finished fighting in the first Punic War which had ended in 241 BC. The Illyrians themselves probably had a very similar number of ships to the Romans, but it must be remembered that these were much lighter vessels not intended to be used in head-to-head combat against a fleet of larger vessels and in reality they stood very little chance against such a large and experienced Roman force. At first glance, the Roman fleet may even seem somewhat excessive. However, the Romans certainly bore in mind that the Illyrians were allies of the Macedonians, so it could well be that the size of the fleet was at least in part intended to dissuade the Macedonians from joining the fray. Additionally, unlike their opponents, it should also be remembered that these waters were unfamiliar to the Romans and their decision to send such a large fleet can in part be ascribed to their desire not to be caught by surprise.

The issues facing the Romans in the Adriatic were as much economic as they were strategic. Economically, Illyrian piracy threatened seaborne trade. Strategically, Illyrian control of the Adriatic and their alliance with the king of Macedon could have been very bad for Rome geopolitically. After having been thoroughly defeated by the Romans, Queen Teuta requested a peace treaty and an end to the war. The Romans agreed to grant her a treaty in 228 BC but in turn obliged the Illyrian forces to leave all those places that had been liberated by the Romans and furthermore they were not to sail past Lissus with more than two unarmed ships for any reason.27 Teuta, left with little choice, accepted these terms. The treaty conditions make it clear that the conquest and annexation of the eastern Adriatic coastline was not a priority for the Roman state at this time, which is further highlighted by the fact that the Romans did not seek to directly maintain control in the region after they had defeated the Illyrian Queen with the help of the traitor Dem...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• Chapter 1 Illyricum: The Push Towards the Danube
• Chapter 2 Julius Caesar
• Chapter 3 Octavian’s Illyricum
• Chapter 4 The Danube as the Northern Frontier
• Chapter 5 The Pannonian Uprising of AD 6 to 9
• Chapter 6 The Dacians: an Emerging Empire
• Chapter 7 The Flavian Danube
• Chapter 8 Trajan’s Dacian Wars
• Chapter 9 Hadrian
• Chapter 10 The War of Many Nations
• Conclusion: ‘The Best Defence is a Good Offence’?
• Notes
• Select Bibliography
• Plates section