Immanuel Kant

A Very Brief History

Anthony Kenny

• Publisher: SPCK Publishing
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780281076543
• eBook ISBN: 9780281076550
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Modern Philosophy

'Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration... the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.'

Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804) remains a major influence in philosophy, especially in the areas of epistemology, ethics, theology, political theory and aesthetics. This brief history helpfully explains the development of Kant's thought, and highlights its contemporary relevance, by considering each of his major works in their order of appearance.

The book has a brief chronology at the front plus a glossary of key terms and a list of further reading at the back.

1

Kant’s early life

Immanuel Kant was born in 1724 in the town of Königsberg near the eastern coast of the Baltic. A thriving centre of international trade, Königsberg was then part of the young kingdom of Prussia, which was just beginning its long competition with Austria to become the leading German-speaking nation. The town has now changed its name to Kaliningrad and sits in an enclave of the Russian federation, rarely visited by foreigners except when Russia is hosting the World Cup.

Kant’s father was a master harness maker, prominent in the local guild. He brought up the young Immanuel as a Lutheran. Among Luther’s main doctrines were that the human race was so corrupt by nature that it was impossible for a human being to keep all the commandments of God; and that it was only through faith in the merits of Jesus that a human being could be saved by the grace of God. The first of these doctrines, but not the second, remained a lifelong strand in Kant’s thought.

The Kant family belonged to a distinctively devout group of Lutherans known as Pietists. In later life Immanuel acknowledged a debt to the seriousness of the moral education he had received at home, though he disliked the introverted religiosity of the Pietist school to which he was sent.

During the years when Kant was at school two events stand out. In 1737 his mother died at the age of 40, having caught smallpox while on an errand of mercy to a sick friend. Three years later King Frederick William I of Prussia died, leaving the throne to his son, the future Frederick the Great. The new king was a paragon of enlightenment in the study and a ruthless aggressor on the battlefield. It was during his 46-year reign that Kant’s major works were written.

In 1740 Kant entered the town’s university, the Albertina. He was by all accounts a sober and industrious scholar, lacking both the means and the inclination for the excesses of his fellow students. In philosophy the dominant influence in the university was the thought of Leibniz, as codified by his acquaintance Christian Wolff. The professor of logic and metaphysics, Martin Knutzen, instructed Kant in the intricacies of the Wolffian system. More importantly, he allowed his pupil the use of his own copious scientific library and awoke his interest in the physics and astronomy of Isaac Newton.

In 1746 the death of Kant’s father left him responsible for the upkeep of two sisters and a brother. He left Königsberg and for the next seven or eight years was a tutor to various families in nearby villages. His last post was with the family of Count Kaiserlingk, whose wife was a philosophy enthusiast who had translated Wolff into French. Kant found time to write a book, The Estimation of Living Forces, which was an attempt to mediate in a debate between René Descartes and G. W. Leibniz about the measurement of force. It was published in German, not Latin, and was not submitted to the university as a dissertation.

In 1754 Kant returned to Königsberg and shortly after submitted a doctoral thesis on the topic of fire (De Igne). He still had 15 years to wait before being appointed to a professorship. During this period he earned his living by lecturing as a Privatdozent. Holding forth on many scientific topics as well as on philosophy, he became a popular and indeed witty lecturer, inserting jokes and funny stories into set texts. Initially poor, he refused to allow his friends to buy him a new coat when his old one wore out; but after a few years he was prosperous enough to become a generous host and something of a dandy. However he was not rich enough, in his own estimate, to marry, in spite of his fondness for the company of women.

Kant continued to publish on scientific subjects. The most significant work of this period is his 1755 General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens. According to this, matter was created by God but initially lacked motion, which was produced by the natural forces of attraction and repulsion. The development of the universe from an initial state took millions of years, and will continue for ever. Our solar system arose when a cloud of material around the sun contracted and fragmented into a plane. This nebular theory was independently given magisterial mathematical formulation at the end of the eighteenth century by the French astronomer Laplace.

In 1758, in the course of the Seven Years War, Russian soldiers occupied Königsberg, where they remained for nearly five years. The occupation seems to have made little difference to Kant’s life, and he lectured to, and dined with, Russian officers. When in due course the Russians left, Kant was happy to give tutorials to the Prussian officers who replaced them, and their General Meyer became his regular dining companion.

In this period, Kant’s philosophical position was undergoing radical change. The influence of Wolff was replaced by those of David Hume (whose Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding had appeared in German in 1755) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (whose Discourse on Inequality appeared in the same year). Kant later acquired an engraved portrait of Rousseau, the only picture he ever possessed. Meanwhile, younger German philosophers came to sit at his feet. J. G. Hamann, a disenchanted child of the Enlightenment, complained that in order to get into Kant’s 7 a.m. lecture it was important to arrive an hour earlier. The romantic philosopher J. C. Herder wrote that in his lectures Kant ‘though in the prime of life, still had the joyful high spirits of a young man, which he kept, I believe, into extreme old age’. Herder’s notes on Kant’s lectures have survived and exhibit the influence of Rousseau.

It would be another 11 years before Kant produced the work on which his fame principally rests, the Critique of Pure Reason. But already in this pre-critical period, while still only a private lecturer, he published in 1762 a work that is still worth close examination: The Only Possible Argument in Support of the Existence of God.

2

Early natural theology

Throughout his life, Kant believed in the existence of a personal God who was the wise governor of the universe, and he thought it necessary that everyone should share the same belief. He changed his mind over time, however, as to the best way of reaching and supporting that belief. He also varied in his attitude to the proofs of God’s existence that had been offered by previous philosophers. In his earl­iest venture in this area, The Only Possible Argument in Support of the Existence of God, he offers what appears to be a proof of the divine existence. He does not claim that it is a demonstration, by which he seems to mean a proof presented in syllogistic form and involving the rigorous definition of terms. Undoubtedly, though, he felt that his work prepared the way for such a demonstrative proof. But he warns us that the task involves a venture into the depths of metaphysics – ‘a dark ocean without coasts and without lighthouses’ (WM, 111).

Kant divides would-be proofs of God’s existence into two classes: those that start from experience of the actual world, and those that start from concepts of the merely possible. He names the former ‘cosmological arguments’ and the latter ‘ontological arguments’. The best-known cosmological arguments – though Kant does not mention them – are St Thomas Aquinas’ Five Ways. The best-known ontologic­al argument is Descartes’ claim that since God contains all perfections, and existence is a perfection, God must exist. Kant devotes much energy to exposing the weakness of this proof.

The key point of his criticism is that existence is not a predicate. Consider, he says, all the predicates that are true of Julius Caesar. ‘Combine in him all his conceivable predicates, not even excluding those of time and place, and you will quickly see that with all of these determinations he can exist or not exist’ (WM, 117). Of course it is natural to say that lions exist and unicorns do not; but what that really means is that among the things that exist, some fall under the concept lion but none falls under the concept unicorn.

We can use the word ‘is’ in two different ways. If we say ‘God is omnipotent’ we are simply coupling a predicate to a subject: an atheist can agree that omnipotence is a property of the God whose existence he denies. If we say ‘there is a God’ we are doing something different: Kant calls this ‘positing’. To posit God is to state that he exists. Kant warns us, however, that saying ‘God is an existing thing’ is misleading; the more accurate expression is ‘Something exist­ent is God’, or even more precisely ‘Those predicates taken together that we signify by the expression “God” belong to an existent thing.’

If existence is not a predicate at all, then it is certainly not a predicate indicating a perfection, and so Descartes’ argument that existence must belong to the most perfect being falls to the ground. But Kant goes on to offer a different argument from ‘possible being’, an argument which therefore by his definition counts as ontological. Kant’s onto­logical argument goes as follows.

First we must distinguish between logical possibility and real possibility. A square circle is logically impossible because there is a contradiction between the notions of square and circle. A right-angled triangle is logically possible because there is no corresponding contradiction involved. But it is not only logically but also really possible, or as Kant sometimes puts it, materially possible: ‘The triangle as well as the right angle are the data or the material of this poss­ible thing’ (WM, 123).

We next ask whether it is possible that nothing whatever exists. This seems to be logically possible, since the hypothesis contains no internal contradiction. But real possibility depends upon the presence of data or material, and if all exist­ence is denied, then no such data or material are available. Thus, if all existence is denied, there is no real possibility, and if anything is to be possible something must be actual.

There must be something which is not only actual, Kant goes on to argue: it must also be necessary.

All possibility presupposes something actual in which and through which everything conceivable is given. Accordingly there is a certain actuality whose removal would take away all intern­al possibility. But something whose removal or negation destroys all possibility is absolutely necessary. Accordingly there is something that exists in an absolutely necessary fashion.

(WM, 127)

Kant goes on to argue that the necessary being must be single, simple, immutable, eternal, spiritual, and indeed possess all the attributes of God. There is no need to follow these later details of his argument because already at this point it can be seen to be flawed. From the premise ‘Every possibility necessarily supposes some actuality’ Kant draws the conclusion ‘Every possibility supposes something that is necessarily actual’. But this is a fallacious move which starts from a true premise to arrive at a dubious conclusion.

Consider a parallel case. In a knockout competition, such as the Wimbledon tennis tournament, if there are to be any winners, then necessarily there are to be some losers. But this does not mean that there are some people who are necessarily losers. Whether any individual player is a winner or a loser depends on how he or she plays on the day. This shows how the placement of the word ‘necessarily’ may make all the difference between a valid and an invalid argument.

In the second and third sections of the book, Kant turns to the arguments which at this point in his life he calls ‘cosmological’. He devotes most attention to the claim that the exist­ence of purpose in the world means that it is the product of an intelligent designer. He has – and will retain through his life – a great respect for this contention, and he is willing to concede that there are countless structures in nature whose immediate ground must be the final intention of their creator. He himself is anxious to engage in what he calls ‘physico-theology’ – the method of ascending from observations of nature to the knowledge of God. He is indeed anxious to stress the limitations of current physico-theology, but with the aim of strengthening it rather than undermining it.

First, Kant points out that it is wrong to think that if some element or structure is useful to humans, that utility must have been what motivated its designer. Water tends to hold itself level; it is absurd to suggest that this is in order that humans can mirror themselves in it. The moons of Jupiter are useful to navigators with telescopes, but were they created only to give men a handy means of ascertaining their longitude?

Second, there is no need to invoke the intention of a designer when purely mechanical causes suffice to explain a phenomenon. Kant imagines a designer who wishes the coasts of tropical countries to have a bearable climate. He accordingly invents a sea breeze. But it will not do for this wind to blow at night as well as in the daytime. So he must devise a mechanism to arrange for seaward winds to return in the middle of the night. But one might worry about the further consequences of any such device. Any such worry, Kant suggests, is foolish. ‘What good providence would order on the basis of considered choice, the air itself performs according to the universal laws of motion’ (WM, 141).

Appeal to the immediate ordering of providence is often just a lazy way of avoiding research into the immediate causes of phenomena. To show the way in which such research should be carried out, Kant sketches accounts of the origin of mountains and of the construction of river channels on this earth, and also of the source and motions of the heavenly bodies in the solar system. His scientific writing, though inevitably superannuated in some respects, is always well informed and insightful.

Kant emphasizes that the attempt to explain effects by the operation of mechanical causes rather than by the voluntary fiat of a designer in no way diminishes the value of the argument from design. Indeed he thinks it has a greater appeal than his own ontological argument from possibility. It is inadequate, however, as a proof of the existence of God, because it leads not to a creator but to an architect: a superhuman intelligence that gives the world system, order and teleology.

3

Kant the professor

In 1763 the Berlin Academy set as a prize question ‘whether metaphysical truths can be demonstrated with the same certainty as truths of geometry’. Kant’s (unsuccess...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Immanuel Kant
• Contents
• Preface
• Abbreviations and conventions
• Chronology
• Part 1 THE HISTORY
• 1 Kant’s early life
• 2 Early natural theology
• 3 Kant the professor
• 4 Kant’s Copernican revolution
• 5 The transcendental aesthetic
• 6 The deduction of the categories
• 7 The system of principles
• 8 The transcendental dialectic
• 9 The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
• 10 The Critique of Practical Reason
• 11 The analytic of the beautiful
• 12 Teleology in nature
• 13 Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
• 14 The Metaphysics of Morals
• Part 2 THE LEGACY
• 15 Idealism and empiricism
• 16 Logic and epistemology
• 17 From physics to metaphysics
• 18 Freedom and morality
• 19 Religion and politics
• Glossary
• Further reading
• Index