Violence in Post-Conflict Societies

Remarginalization, Remobilizers and Relationships

Anders Themnér

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2011
• Print ISBN: 9780415579223
• eBook ISBN: 9781136708268
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This book compares post-civil war societies to look at the presence or absence of organized violence, analysing why some ex-combatants return to organised violence and others do not.

Even though former fighters have been identified as a major source of insecurity, there have been few efforts to systematically examine why some ex-combatants re-engage in organized violence, while others do not. This book compares the presence or absence of organized violence in different ex-combatant communities – former fighters that used to belong to the same armed faction and who share a common, horizontal identity based on shared war-and peacetime experiences – in the Republic of Congo (ex-Cobras, Cocoyes and Ninjas) and Sierra Leone (ex-Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, Civil Defense Force and Revolutionary United Front). The main determinants of ex-combatant violence are whether former fighters have access to elites and to second-tier individuals – such as former mid-level commanders – who can act as intermediaries between the two. By utilizing relationships based on selective incentives and social networks, these two kinds of remobilizers are able to generate the needed enticements and feelings of affinity, trust or fear to convince ex-combatants to resort to arms. These findings demonstrate that the outbreak of ex-combatant violence can only be understood by more clearly incorporating an actor perspective, focusing on three levels of analysis: the elite, midlevel and grass-root.

This book will be of much interest to students of peacebuilding, civil wars, post-conflict reconstruction, war and conflict studies, security studies and IR.

1 Once a soldier, always a soldier?

Introduction

We were made promises about what would happen to us after we were disarmed but the promises were empty. Now we are powerless but we are angry.

(Ex-combatant in Sierra Leone, IRIN 6 Sep. 2007

After the arrival of peace, why do some ex-combatants re-engage in organized violence while others do not? In 2004, former soldiers of the Haitian army took to arms and participated in the ousting of the incumbent President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Having been discharged from the army after the US-led invasion in 1994, the ex-soldiers saw their chance to reestablish themselves by joining an insurrection spearheaded by former supporters of Aristide. In El Salvador in 1992, fighters from the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) handed over their weapons and returned to their local communities after FMLN had signed a peace accord with the government. Despite the immense challenges of reintegrating approximately 8,000 ex-rebels, former FMLN combatants have refrained from taking to arms, instead choosing to embrace peace. Similar divergences are found between former combatants in countries such as Niger and Timor-Leste on the one hand, and post-2002 Angola and Indonesia (Aceh), on the other. Whereas ex-fighters in the former two have resorted to arms, demobilized combatants in the latter have abstained from using violence.

Within the literature on conflict resolution, the need to deal with the threat posed by former fighters has been identified as a key factor in achieving durable peace. The reason why ex-combatants are viewed as a major source of insecurity in post-conflict societies is that they have the ‘military know-how, the experience, the tools, and often the will to turn again to violent means of achieving change’ (Humphreys and Weinstein 2004: 39). According to Stedman (2003: 109), ‘[b] eyond overcoming the threat from spoilers, the demobilization of soldiers and their reintegration into civilian life is the single most important sub-goal of peace implementation.’ Former fighters pose the gravest threat to post-conflict societies when they participate in organized violence as members of illegal armed groups operating openly, yet outside the confines of the law. This type of violence not only inflicts the greatest loss in lives and property, but also has the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the new peace order. At worst, ex-combatant violence may even have a detrimental effect on regional security. A telling example is the experiences of soldiers of Mobutu Sese Seko’s Presidential Division. After the ousting of the Zaïrian regime in May 1997, many of these fighters ended up in the Republic of Congo as refugees. However, with the outbreak of the Congolese civil war a few months later, large numbers rallied to Denis Sassou-Nguesso’s Cobra militia, providing important reinforcements during the battle for Brazzaville.

Given the harmful effect that former fighters can have on post-conflict stability, the international community has increasingly come to view the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) as a key component of both peace- and statebuilding. In fact, international actors have been engaged in no fewer than 60 DDR processes in societies as diverse as Cambodia, Guatemala and Liberia between 1989 and 2008 (Muggah 2009: 6–7). The growing importance accorded to this peacebuilding tool is also reflected in the number of international initiatives – such as the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) and the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration (SIDDR) – that have recently been launched to systematically collect and analyse best practices on DDR.

In order to address the problem posed by former fighters, there has simultaneously been an upsurge in academic literature concerned with the issue of how to deal with ex-combatants in post-conflict societies (e.g. Berdal 1996; Berdal and Ucko 2009; Colletta et al. 1996; Collier 1994; Humphreys and Weinstein 2007; Kingma 2000; Knight and Özerdem 2004; Muggah 2009; Özerdem 2009; Spear 1999, 2006). However, two things are generally lacking in this literature. There is, first, little systematic research on why demobilized fighters resort to violence. So far, scholars on DDR have largely confined themselves to making general statements and assumptions on this subject. Much of the focus has instead been on finding ways to facilitate the reintegration of former fighters, usually defined as their economic and social assimilation into society. However, before debating how to reintegrate ex-combatants, it is first necessary to establish why they resort to arms. Only then can efficient conflict-prevention tools be developed. Second, the few assumptions that scholars do make about why ex-combatant violence erupts mainly revolve around structural explanations. By focusing only on such aspects as former fighters’ access to economic assistance, personal security, political influence, small arms or security vacuums, little is said about how these factors are translated into violence; in other words we do not get an idea of which causal mechanisms are at work. The overall purpose of the book is therefore to fill this research gap by explaining why ex-combatants re-engage in organized violence.

Ex-combatant communities and organized violence

One of the main objectives of DDR processes is to disband the military structures of armed groups and make ex-fighters functioning members of society. By releasing ex-combatants from military service and providing them with alternative livelihoods, peacemakers strive to detach ex-fighters from their armed units and make it more difficult for former belligerents to return to war. However, despite the good intentions of national and international actors, ex-combatants often continue to live quasi-militarized lives long after demobilizing. It is, for example, not uncommon that ex-fighters of the same faction continue to fraternize long after leaving their armed units. Studies in South Africa have shown that almost 10 years after demobilization 53 per cent of all ex-combatants met with their former comrades on a daily basis (Lamb 2003). In many war-torn countries, ex-fighters with the same military background even live together. For instance, while whole sections of slums in certain Namibian cities were inhabited by either ex-rebel or militia fighters, deserted factory complexes in Monrovia became the home of groups of ex-combatants living with their old comrades from the 1989–96 war (Preston 1997: 469; Utas 2003: 20, 235–6). Hanging out together, even living in close proximity to each other, means that ex-fighters that fought for the same side often constitute a distinct social group in society – or an ex-combatant community (all the former fighters that used to belong to the same armed faction and who share a common, horizontal identity based on shared war- and peacetime experiences).

For many ex-fighters, their most salient identity is the group identity they share as members of an ex-combatant community. Not only can factional identities continue to give demobilized fighters a sense of belonging long after the fighting has come to an end, they can also provide ex-combatants with a lens through which they can interpret their post-conflict surroundings.¹ This identity is largely a product of history. Studies have, for example, shown that group identities become especially salient during times of conflict or, as expressed by Lyons (2005: 43–4), ‘as insecurity grows, solidarity and appeals to some form of identity often become an increasingly important course of protection.’ Hence, with the eruption of civil wars, people tend to shift from personal to group identities. Once individuals have internalized a group identity they are often reluctant to dispose of it, with the result that wartime identities often continue to flourish long after the cessation of hostilities (Kostić 2007). The creation of wartime identities has an especially profound effect on former fighters. Living under difficult circumstances, close ties often appear between combatants of the same faction. This military comradeship is partly a function of fighters’ being dependent on each other for mutual security, and partly a result of the need to give meaning to the violence that is being committed (Kostić 2007; Nilsson 2005: 89–90).

The collective identity found within ex-combatant communities is, however, not only a product of the previous war. It is just as much a result of social interactions in post-conflict milieus. In fact, when former fighters fraternize with each other, as well as with other war-affected groups in society, factional identities are often reinforced. This is best understood by referring to social identity theory. According to Tajfel (1974), social identities appear when a group of individuals (the in-group) not only come to the conclusion that they have more in common with each other than with members of other groups (the out-group), but also begin to award positive traits to their group. It is, however, usually only by making comparisons with other groups that membership in the in-group gains meaning – often resulting in out-groups’ being awarded negative traits. Social identities are therefore highly relational in character, arising from dynamic interactions between in- and out-groups as they define each other (Brewer 1997; Kecmanovic 1996; Tajfel 1974).

In a post-conflict setting, this means that factional identities can become entrenched by active decisions by ex-combatants (in-group), by stereotypes awarded to them by society at large (out-group) or by an interaction between the two. Often ex-fighters adhere to their factional identities, because membership in the ex-combatant community offers psychological and social benefits that are desirable. One such benefit is friendship. As many ex-combatants spend years in the bush together, they may not have any social acquaintances other than their former military comrades. For ex-combatants, meeting and socializing with former fighters of the same faction can therefore be an important way to deal with the difficulties inherent in making the transition from a soldier to a civilian (Nilsson 2005: 89–90). Other demobilized combatants may give greater value to other benefits, such as the opportunity to strengthen their self-esteem. By continuing to befriend their wartime comrades, they can reproduce and strengthen collective images of having played a positive role during the war – as liberators against foreign occupation, revolutionaries spearheading social reformations or fighters championing the cause of ethnic groups. At times such views can result in former fighters projecting negative attitudes towards the wider community; for example if other groups are deemed to be ungrateful for the sacrifices ex-combatants have made during the previous conflict.² There are often also more practical and materialistic benefits to be made, by adhering to one’s factional belonging. Some scholars have shown that ex-combatant networks can provide opportunities for information sharing, security and even employment (Buxton 2008: 31). In Lebanon, for example, many former militiamen found jobs in restaurants, security companies and the construction industry thanks to the intervention of their wartime comrades (Karamé 2009).

The factional identities of ex-fighters are, however, just as often influenced by perceptions coming from other groups. In many post-conflict societies, people continue to label former fighters according to the armed group they used to belong to. Sometimes such identification can have a positive connotation due to the role ex-fighters had in defending local communities (Nilsson 2005: 51, 90). However, more often than not such labelling has negative overtones. This can, for example, be the case when former fighters have committed serious atrocities during the previous conflict. This was apparent in northern Uganda where some former child soldiers of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) experienced resentment and verbal abuse as they returned to local communities who had suffered heavily from LRA attacks (Annan et al. 2009: 652–3).

For disgruntled ex-fighters, the group identity found within ex-combatant communities constitutes a collective identity to mobilize around. A strong finding within the causes-of-war literature is that groups of individuals contemplating engaging in organized violence have a much greater chance of succeeding if they share a common identity. Without such an identity, be it ethnicity, religion, regionalism, ideology or something else, distressed individuals will not perceive that they are facing a common problem, which they can collectively work to overcome (Ellingsen 2000; Gurr 2000; Tilly 1978; Zartman 1995: 5). Another way of framing this issue is that ‘aggrieved people might have the resources and opportunities to protest, but they still need to construct a politicized collective identity to engage in collective political action’ (Klandermans 2003: 675). The relevance of these assertions is underlined when examining the behaviour of ex-combatants in Liberia. After the arrival of peace in Liberia in 1996, former fighters of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia – Kromah faction (ULIMO-K) all suffered from lack of reintegration assistance and eventually resorted to arms. If factional identities and military comradeship were unimportant, NPFL and ULIMO-K ex-combatants could have engaged in violence together. However, despite their common problems, most ex-NPFL and ULIMO-K fighters joined different armed factions. While the former fought to defend Taylor’s regime, the latter joined a new rebel group, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) (ICG 2002a: 3, 5, 2004: 2).

Owing to the central role that ex-combatant communities play in the life and mobilization of former fighters, it is difficult to study ex-combatants – defined as individuals who have taken direct part in hostilities on behalf of an armed group and have either been discharged from, or voluntarily left, the military faction they were serving in – without taking their factional identities into consideration. By simply comparing entities such as social or biological categories (age, geographical origin, rank, ethnicity, sex) or geographical areas (all the former fighters in one country, province or municipality), crucial information about the group dynamics affecting the outbreak of ex-combatant violence is lost. The purpose of this book is therefore, more specifically, to investigate why former fighters of some ex-combatant communities re-engage in organized violence, while those of other such communities do not. By answering this question, the aim is to present a theory that identifies which factors are responsible for generating ex-combatant violence, explains how they interact with each other and clarifies which the causal mechanisms are.

The significance of using former combatants’ factional affiliation as a starting point is also underlined by the observation that there are important differences in the tendency of ex-fighters to take to arms depending on their military background. In Mozambique, for example, some Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) ex-guerrillas joined a group called Chimwenje, attacking Mozambican army posts in 1995 (AC 5 Jan. 1996). No such activity has been observed among former Mozambican government soldiers. Thus, not only do aggrieved ex-combatants tend to remobilize with their old wartime comrades, but their propensity to resort to violence seemingly depends on which faction they used to belong to.

For the purpose of this study, organized violence is defined as a situation in which ‘at least two organized groups of specialists in coercion confront each other, each using harm to reduce or contain the other’s capacity to inflict harm’.³ These armed groups may operate in the ex-combatants’ home countries or in neighbouring ones. As we have seen, having a regional perspective is necessary.

For example, in 2001 former combatants of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) played an instrumental role in spearheading the Albanian minority’s rebellion against the Macedonian authorities (ICG 2001a: 1, 5). The presence of armed bands of former fighters operating in neighbouring countries is not only a threat to the security of the host countries, but there is also the risk that ex-combatants will redirect their attention to their home countries and use their host states as bases for cross-border attacks.

Since the focus of the present study is on organized violence that threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the new peace order, it is necessary to establish the type of armed actors that can have such a negative influence. Here it is possible to receive some guidance from Call and Stanley (2003: 212), who argue that ‘[a] basic goal of any civil war settlement is to re-establish a legitimate state monopoly over the use of force in society, under terms agreeable to the parties to conflict.’ From this statement, it is possible to conclude two things. It is, first, essential that there be no organized armed actors operating outside the control of the state. It would therefore be an especially acute problem if former fighters were to enrol in non-state groups such as guerrilla forces, oppositional militias, bandit groups or even organizations fighting as mercenaries for opponents of the regime. Since armed groups such as these openly challenge the state’s monopoly on violence, there is an acute risk that the presence of such groups will undermine the legitimacy of the new peace order.⁴ Second, the term legitimate state monopoly implies that not all forms of state violence are conducive to peace. A special problem in weak, conflict-prone societies is the role of pro-government militias and paramilitaries. Thanks to their semi-dependent status, governments can use them against domestic opponents, without having to take responsibility for the abuses that they commit (Höglund and Zartman 2006; Spear 1996: 401). This makes it difficult for citizens to demand accountability from their governments, as they can at least partly do for actions committed by the police or armed forces. Ex-combatants fighting on behalf of pro-government militias or paramilitaries should therefore also be seen as a form of violence that threatens the legitimacy of the new post-war order. The study is therefore confined to organized violence in which ex-combatants are members of illegal armed groups that operate openly, such as guerrilla forces, militias, paramilitaries, roving bandits or organizations engaged in mercenary activities. These different categories of organized groups will from now on be referred to as armed groups (the terms ex-combatant, ex-combatant community and organized violence will be further discussed in Chapter 3).

From analytical framework to testable theory

To address the research question why only former fighters of some ex-combatant communities resort to arms, the book develops an analytical framework that combines the structural factors stressed by scholars on DDR with more actor-oriented explanations found in the causes-of-war literature. More specifically, the frame-work holds that ex-combatant violence can best be understood by analysing the interaction among three clusters of factors – remarginalization, remobilizers and relationships – operating on three different levels of analysis – elite, mid-level and grass-root. In short, the framework holds that if ex-combatant communities are remarginalized after the arrival of peace, because of a lack of political influence, personal security or economic assistance, there should be an increased preparedness amongst its members to take to violence. However, as former fighters often lack resources and leadership skills, they are likely to be dependen...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• 1. Once a soldier, always a soldier?
• 2. Remarginalization, remobilizers and relationships
• 3. Cases, concepts and questions
• 4. The Republic of Congo
• 5. Sierra Leone
• 6. Probing the cases
• 7. Wrapping it all up
• Notes
• List of interviews, correspondence and conversations
• Bibliography
• Index