Soft or Hard Borders?

Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe

Joan DeBardeleben

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781351899055
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: National Security
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Bringing together leading European and North American experts, this timely volume answers questions about the implications and management of the new external borders of the European Union following another phase of enlargement. Implications of the EU's new external border, especially its eastern border with Russia and Ukraine, will be a key issue for the new member countries, for the EU, and for the new neighbouring regions. The contributors address this emerging question from two perspectives. They examine whether an expanded Europe will create a new dividing line in Europe between 'insiders' and 'outsiders', and also consider the concrete problems of border management and how the issues will be handled. The book will be of particular value to those concerned with European politics and the expansion of Europe, and to those with an interest in political sociology.

Chapter 1

What Borders for Which Europe?

Nanette Neuwahl

Introduction

People travelling by car between Germany and France may be struck by the absence of frontiers between these countries. Are there no borders anymore between the two? Or between Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg? Between France, Austria, and Italy? Indeed, there are no physical borders and no border checks between these countries, in conformity with the Single European Act. This legal document, signed by the European Community (EC) member states in 1986 (and in force from July 1987), has as its objective the establishment of a single European market, defined as an area without frontiers in which the free movement of goods, services, people, and capital is ensured. However, some member states still perform border controls on intra-European traffic, and all of them do so in their relations with third states because they believe that this is a good way to guarantee security inside their own territories. Border checks are the most tangible evidence of the existence of borders in the European Union. Why are there border checks between some European countries but not between others? What is the function of borders in the European Union? How will it be after enlargement? What border restrictions will there be in an EU of 25, 28 or more member states?

A broad reflection on the significance and functioning of the borders of the European Union, as is proposed in this chapter, should deal with at least two sets of issues:

(1) Where are the borders of the EU?

(2) What kind of borders are they?

In this chapter we look first at the definition of borders and consider where the borders of the European Union are or will be in the foreseeable future, focusing in particular on the EU’s eastern enlargement. Only thereafter will we reflect on what these borders should look like – and who determines this. There may or may not be a relationship between these questions. There are ‘hard’ (hostile, difficult, closed) borders and there are ‘soft’ (user-friendly, open) borders. One hypothesis is that the location of borders, in a geopolitical sense, may determine their nature, for example, whether they are ‘hard’ or ‘soft’. Another approach might emphasise subjective factors, that is, differences between countries, their cultures, or even their leaders. Finally, the global nature of economic and political processes may mean that there is only a very weak linkage between the location of borders and their nature. One thing is certain: in this era of globalisation it is no longer appropriate to think of borders as a panacea against all evils, as physical borders provide less protection against outside dangers than in the past and they cannot prevent troubles that originate within a national territory.

Definitions

As Jan Zielonka has pointed out, the concepts of frontiers, borders, and territory are historically determined. They have carried different meanings at different times and have been employed for different historical purposes.¹ At the heyday of the nation-state they stood for sharp lines between centrally governed nation-states, and their function was seen as that of guaranteeing the coincidence of administrative borders, military frontiers, cultural traits, and markets.² Over time, and especially with the advent of the European Union, the function of borders has become much less clear. Although in some cases physical frontiers have disappeared, the concept of the territorial state has not. At the same time, the advent of globalisation and, before that, supranational integration have made inroads into their importance, and the concurrence of administrative borders, military frontiers, cultural traits, and markets has eroded. In the European Union in particular, each state enshrines a multitude of cultures, there is a multi-tiered system of government, and administrative borders do not coincide with national frontiers but rather with functional divisions and tasks, both in the field of high and low politics.

If one is to adopt a working definition of borders, one may borrow from Stefano Bartolini³ who uses the concept to denote the outlines of political-administratively organised territories defined in geographical terms. In this context ‘frontiers’ are the linear borders or physical barriers that used to be accompanied by central repressive and extractive agencies, such as immigration, customs, and even exchange controls. The concept of ‘frontiers’ is associated with ‘hard’ or bold physical borders. A country can have ‘soft’ or open borders with one country and ‘hard’, deterring borders with another.⁴ Also, as Olga Potemkina points out, borders can have open and closed characteristics at the same time.⁵ For instance, a country may have a lenient visa policy but insist on strict border controls. It is tempting to suggest that the EU should have ‘hard’ external borders and ‘soft’ or no internal borders, but that is not possible for a number of reasons that need to be investigated.

Before we look into the question of the character of the EU’s borders – particularly now that the EU is enlarging to the East – we shall first deal with the question of the EU’s territorial scope in the foreseeable future and the relevance of its borders.

Where are the Borders of the European Union?

I will not deal with the current geographical confines of Europe, but rather with the future borders of the EU, an entity that currently includes most of Western Europe⁶ and Greece, and in 2004 was extended by the inclusion of Central Europe,⁷ the Baltic states,⁸ plus Cyprus and Malta.

The Confines of the EU in 2004

Where the territorial confines of the EU are at the time of the 2004 enlargement is fairly well-known, although there is some lack of clarity, notably with regard to Cyprus and Latvia. The division of Cyprus into two parts (which occurred when the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, TRNC, declared independence from the Republic of Cyprus) has created a definite ambiguity for future EU borders. With only the Republic of Cyprus recognised by most nations in the international community, its accession to the EU results in an ambiguous outcome on the island. The exclusion of the TRNC from the scope of application of the EU Treaty has permitted the EU to be silent with regards to the territorial boundaries of the Republic of Cyprus, even though it is implicit in the accession documents that, with time, the EU Treaty may apply to the whole of Cyprus. For the time being, until a settlement on the island is reached, the UN Green Line zone will act as a kind of frontier running across the island, thus ensuring the non-application of the economic provisions of EU law to the North.

The Latvian case is less complicated. Although the borders of Latvia with Belarus and Russia have not been definitively established (as is discussed by Juris Gromovs later in this book), the situation is less hotly debated than the Cyprus case. So, judging on the basis of the Cyprus problem and the Latvian case, fuzzy edges do not seem to be an obstacle to enlargement. In a political sense fuzzy edges may matter, but legally, there is no problem with applying EU law without making controversial territorial claims because there is a difference between the geographical scope of the EU Treaty and the geographical area of the member states. This presupposes, however, geostrategic stability in the area and a cooperative attitude of the states involved.

The Future Territorial Confines of the EU

The future extent of the EU is as yet unclear. Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and the Balkans are ‘knocking at the door’. Applications for membership have been presented in the past by some of the southern Mediterranean states as well, but these have not been accepted. Romania and Bulgaria have been accepted as candidate countries and are expected to join the Union in 2007 if they fulfil the so-called Copenhagen criteria for accession. For Turkey, no date has been fixed but in December 2004 accession negotiations will start without delay if this country fulfils the Copenhagen criteria. Since the 2004 enlargement, the EU’s new neighbours are Ukraine, Belarus, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro, while the border with Russia will be extended. The accession of Bulgaria and Romania will bring new borders with Moldova and Macedonia (FYROM), and will bring the EU to the shores of the Black Sea. Turkey’s accession would add an array of new countries bordering the EU, including such uncomfortable neighbours as Syria, Iraq, Iran, Armenia, and Georgia.

Regarding the Balkans – a region which now denotes Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania – Mr. Romano Prodi, president of the European Commission, stated on 10 January 2003 that with time they all will be able to become members: ‘Il faudra beaucoup de travail, mais au final tous les pays des Balkans peuvent devenir members’.⁹ Indeed, Croatia officially registered its application for membership under the Greek presidency in the first half of 2003.¹⁰ No decision on Croatia’s application has as yet been taken, but it is clear that the 2004 enlargement will not be the last one.¹¹

Where will the EU end? Will it one day have fixed territorial boundaries? A clear definition of the territorial boundaries of the EU is not foreseen in the draft treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, elaborated by the European Convention chaired by Mr. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing: ‘The Union shall be open to all European states which respect its values and are committed to promoting them together’.¹² One may note that this is a positive declaration, not a negative one. Declarations about the territorial boundaries of the EU by Eurocrats are occurring more and more frequently. Mr. Giscard d’Estaing at one stage rather imprudently declared that Turkey would not be part of Europe,¹³ and his view was echoed by several German politicians. On 6 December 2002 Mr. Prodi, in a speech to the World Congress of the European Community Studies Association entitled ‘The Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability’, declared that one country would certainly not become part of the EU: ‘La Russie est bien trop grande pour faire partie de l’Union européenne, elle serait un trop gros morceau à digérer pour l’Union européenne. Néanmoins, l’Union européenne veut garder les meilleures relations avec la Russie tout en restant un État-tiers’.¹⁴ Apparently, with this speech, Mr. Prodi was staking out the European Commission’s policy with regard to a number of countries surrounding it.¹⁵ Indeed, on 11 March 2003 the European Commission presented a significant communication, entitled ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for our Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’.¹⁶ The new ‘neighbourhood’ envisaged by this document comprises Russia, the western Newly Independent States or NIS (Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus) and 11 countries and territories called the ‘Southern Mediterranean’.

What are the aims of the Wider Europe document? The communication reflects the consideration that the EU needs both to enlarge and to keep good relations with the rest of Europe. In order to prevent these countries from feeling rejected or unjustly discriminated against, in spite of their reform process, a partnership is being proposed based on association agreements.¹⁷ The relations with the new neighbours are important for the stability and the prosperity of the EU and for the security of its own citizens. The declarations of the EU are therefore intended to be reassuring for the new neighbours, but they also insist on their preparedness to promote policies of convergence and gradual integration in the social and economic structures of Europe’.¹⁸ We shall come back to this issue later. However, it is this neighbourhood policy that sets the current enlargement apart from the previous ones. None of the previous enlargements required the strategic consideration of a new ‘near abroad’.

The Wider Europe document does not hold out the same prospects of membership as the Commission extended to Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, where accession discourse helps to muster the popular support necessary for policy changes in countries with developing democracies and economies in transition. Membership is most clearly being used as a ‘carrot’ in the cases of Cyprus and Turkey but also in the Balkans.¹⁹ Whereas Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have joined the EU in May 2004, membership is not explicitly offered to the other countries of the former Soviet Union, Russia, or the southern Mediterranean. The implication is that EU enlargement in these areas is excluded, at least for the time being.²⁰ Thus, the advantage that goes along with an implicit or explicit invitation or promise of future membership may be lost on these countries.

But an offer of membership does not always serve as an incentive for desired behaviour nor is it always wanted. Some East European states, Belarus for example, would not dream of EU membership, especially when they are dependent on Russia for their trade and energy. EU receptiveness to one country may even backfire, as it may alienate neighbours further away who are not included. Negative effects may also occur if the promise cannot be kept and membership is not awarded.²¹ Slippage in the date of membership for Romania and Bulgaria, for example, could have a negative impact on the economic climate in those countries as well as on the relations between the European countries concerned.

This may explain why the European Commission in general dislikes committing itself even to opening accession negotiations, and sometimes discourages membership discourse. However, Bulgaria and Romania were admitted into the ‘applicants’ club’ because of their role in the Kosovo crisis, not because they were deemed particularly suitable for membership in light of the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey has maintained special relations with the EU for many years, but these intensified recently because of Turkey’s key position in the eastern Mediterranean and its role in the EU accession of the Republic of Cyprus in 2004. Thus...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• About the Authors
• List of Acronyms
• Introduction
• 1 What Borders for Which Europe? Nanette Neuwahl
• PART I: ENLARGEMENT AND THE ‘WIDER EUROPE’
• PART II: ENLARGEMENT AND EU BORDER POLICIES
• PART III: MANAGING NEW BORDERS IN THE RUSSIAN PERIMETER
• Index