Asia's Nuclear Future

William H. Overholt

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9780429726521
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Future historians are very likely to see nuclear proliferation—or the averting of nuclear proliferation—as one of the central determinants of international politics in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Certainly the development of an independent nuclear deterrent by the People's Republic of China and the possibility that Taiwan, Korea, Jap

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The Next Phase in Nuclear Proliferation Research

Lewis A. Dunn and William H. Over holt

For nearly a generation, research on nuclear proliferation has focused mainly on what are essentially intelligence compilations regarding the probability that particular countries would "go nuclear"—with "going nuclear" defined as setting off a single nuclear explosion.¹ Concomitantly, policy-oriented research has focused almost exclusively upon how to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The time has come for a new generation of nuclear proliferation studies, a generation appropriately divided from the past by India's detonation of a nuclear explosive device. Henceforth, the focus should shift:

• from a conception of proliferation as the detonation of a single nuclear explosive device to a more analytically powerful concept of proliferation as the acquisition of increasing levels of nuclear capability, ranging from basic nuclear research through detonation of a nuclear device to acquisition of delivery systems, the development of command, control, and communication procedures, and articulation of a strategic doctrine;
• from the discussion of the possible spread of nuclear weapons among the great powers to concern about their acquisition by politically unstable developing countries and eventually transnational terrorist organizations;
• from analysis of particular pressures for and constraints upon proliferation to increasing examination of the bureaucratic politics involved in the decision to go nuclear, possible triggering events, and global trends that could erode the present balance of those pressures and constraints;
• from reliance upon unconnected case studies of specific potential nth countries as a means of projecting possible proliferation trends to analysis of global sets of nuclear proliferation chains, delineating alternative routes, and their driving forces, to a more proliferated world;
• from abstract speculation about the problems of proliferation to careful delineation of the distinguishing features and risks of the regional and global strategic environments resulting from the increasing spread of nuclear weapons; and
• from exclusive efforts to design policies to prevent proliferation to an equal concern with policy options for managing, and possibly reducing the problems of a world of many more nuclear-weapon states.

This study illustrates what such a shift of focus in proliferation research would entail.

The Nature of Proliferation

Most references to nuclear proliferation or to a country's going nuclear have in mind the acquisition of a nuclear explosive device by a country or group previously without such a device. For some purposes such a conception of proliferation may be useful. It provides, for instance, a simple concept upon which to focus public discussion. But because that definition does not distinguish adequately among the diverse outcomes encompassed by the categorization "going nuclear," it fails to provide a powerful analytic tool. In contrast, we propose to define proliferation in terms of nuclear capabilities, delineating various levels of nuclear proliferation. Having delineated those levels, it is then useful to distinguish the scope of proliferation in terms of those levels. Thus, Table 1provides such a conception of proliferation in terms of levels and scope of nuclear capabilities.

Various analytic benefits flow from this conception of proliferation. To begin, analysis of the consequences of proliferation is facilitated, because those consequences would vary depending upon specific levels and parameters of proliferation. For instance, should many nth countries be unable to develop reliable and survivable command, control, and communication systems, the risk of inadvertent or preemptive nth country nuclear exchanges would increase significantly. Moreover, by using this broader concept of proliferation levels or outcomes, it is possible to analyze which choke points in the proliferation process are most subject to outside policy leverage. In turn, by emphasizing the proliferation outcomes higher up on the ladder than detonation of a nuclear explosive device, this expanded conception of proliferation facilitates a policy approach designed to influence those out-comes and to shape critical parameters of future nth country nuclear-weapon programs. Finally, utilizing the preceding conception of proliferation, it is more readily possible to analyze the nuclear-weapon potentials and capabilities of specific countries and to estimate the timing of future possible proliferation.

Categories of Proliferators

Various means of distinguishing among potential nth countries could be adopted. Is the particular country a potential great power, an aspiring regional power, or a minor power? What is its level of technological sophistication and economic

TABLE 1. Dimensions and Measures of Nuclear Proliferation

Two Dimensions of Nuclear Proliferation
1.	Scope: the number of countries to which a given level of nuclear capability has spread.
2.	Depth: the level of nuclear capability achieved by a given country as measured by:
One Tentative Ladder Measuring Levels of Nuclear Capability
1.	Possession of basic nuclear knowledge.
2.	Possession of nuclear research or power reactors, followed in most cases by growth of a civilian nuclear power industry dependent upon foreign-supplied nuclear inputs and in some cases by eventual acquisition of nuclear self-sufficiency.
3.	Access to fissionable material that conceivably could be diverted for weapon purposes.
A.	Possession of rudimentary weapon-design "know-how"; chemical, metallurgical, and electronics industries; and some experience in managing large projects requisite to development of nuclear weapons.
5.	Possession of nuclear-weapon option, differentiated in terms of time necessary to build a bomb (1 year? 1 month?).
6.	Possession of unassembled, untested "bomb(s) in the basement."
7.	Explosion of nuclear device allegedly for peaceful purposes.
8.	Overt nuclear-weapon development program, based upon either abrogation of safeguards agreements or indigenous production of fissile material.
9.	Possession of a growing stockpile of more or less sophisticated fission weapons.
10.	Reliance upon "off-the-shelf" delivery systems such as nuclear-capable aircraft.
11.	Relatively unsophisticated command, control, and communication (C^3) systems and modes of protection against surprise attack.
12.	Initial articulation of strategic doctrine.
13.	Efforts to develop safe, reliable, and well-packaged fission weapons; sophisticated missile delivery systems; more reliable and redundant C^3; more sophisticated strategic doctrine and posture.
14.	Possession of fusion weapons.

development? Is it politically unstable? Is it an ally or a client of one of the superpowers?

One aspect which stands out in answer to these and similar questions is the extent to which many candidate nuclear-weapon states are politically unstable, less developed Third World countries. That is, one distinguishing feature of the second wave of proliferation would be the spread of nuclear weapons to countries whose domestic politics are unstable, frequently involving high levels of military intervention and periodic seizures of power. Each of the following potential nth countries has experienced at least one military coup d'etat since 1958: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Greece, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Korea, Syria, Turkey, Venezuela, and Zaire. Such "coup vulnerability" is likely to influence nth country nuclear-weapon programs and postures; conversely, the presence of a growing, if limited, stockpile of nuclear weapons can be expected to influence future patterns of military politics in these countries.²

In addition to differentiating among potential nth countries in terms of their military, political, economic, and technological characteristics, it would be valuable to identify the most critical candidate nuclear-weapon states in terms of impact upon the scope and pace of proliferation of their decision to go nuclear. For example, a Japanese decision to acquire nuclear weapons can be expected to have a major proliferation impact. To policy-oriented research, identification of such a set of most critical potential nth countries could be especially helpful, permitting a concentration of nonproliferation energies.

Finally, consideration of whether terrorist groups could come into possession of nuclear weapons is warranted, as is analysis of the purposes to which a terrorist bomb could be put. There appear to be various ways terrorists could acquire a nuclear weapon, ranging from theft—particularly in a Third World country lacking sophisticated command and control systems—to gifts or purchase from a radical government which thought its foreign policy purposes would be advanced by such a gift or sale. Nor should the presumption that such groups would have no rational purpose that could be served by having a bomb be accepted uncritically.

Pressures for and Constraints upon Future Proliferation

The scope and dynamics of possible future proliferation will be determined by changing patterns of interaction between the pressures for and constraints upon proliferation. A clear conception of these pressures and constraints is, therefore, necessary for later analysis of possible global proliferation trends. Pressures and constraints are analyzed most usefully from two perspectives. On the one hand, taking the perspective of the individual nation, pressures and constraints influencing particular nth countries can be distinguished. On the other hand, it is also possible to analyze the impact of broader proliferation environments upon the scope and pace of proliferation. Each is discussed briefly.

Underlying Pressures

Table 2provides a list of reasons or pressures for acquiring nuclear weapons. The categories are intended to be exhaustive, but are not mutually exclusive. Strategic military or security calculations constitute one set of important pressures for going nuclear. These range from the belief that even a rudimentary nuclear-weapon capability would allow a country to deter a nuclear rival, to a country's desire to but-tress its own bargaining position and resolve. For instance, an eventual decision to transform India's present nuclear-weapon option into a full-fledged nuclear-weapon program could be motivated by the belief that access to nuclear weapons may result in a more stable, long-term deterrent relationship with the People's Republic of China while strengthening India's bargaining resolve should a PRC-India confrontation erupt. Nor should a possible desire to intimidate or destroy a non-nuclear rival be excluded as a strategic military rationale. That is, future nth countries might not necessarily eschew more expansionist, non-status-quo oriented objectives, regarding nuclear weapons as providing a potential war-fighting advantage. Conversely, to countries such as Israel and South Africa, the threat or actual use of nuclear weapons might be deemed necessary as a last resort. In some cases the analysis underlying such decisions may be strategic but erroneous; nonetheless, such a rationale falls within this category. Finally, because virtually all decisions to go nuclear are likely to be justified by reference to alleged national strategic calculation and security needs, it is important to

TABLE 2. Pressures or Reasons for Proliferation

Underlying Pressures

1. Strategic military or security calculations

a. Deterrence of a nuclear rival

b. Provide warfighting advantage

1) Offense

2) Defense

c. Nuclear intimidation of non-nuclear rival(s)

d. Buttress to bargaining position

2. Influence and prestige

a. Quest for regional or international status or influence

b. Demonstrate national viability

c. Fashion

3. Bureaucratic factors

a. Strengthen military, scientific, and/or bureaucratic morale

b. Scientific-technological momentum

c. Pressures from military-industrial complex

d. Bureaucratic politics within governments and/or armed services

4. Domestic political and economic considerations

a. Strengthen domestic morale

b. Divert domestic attention

c. Budget pressures

Some Possible Precipitants or Triggering Events

1. Involvement in foreign crisis

2. Reduction of alliance credibility

3. Nuclearization of other countries

4. Weakening or breakdown of international constraints

5. Domestic crisis

6. Domestic political change

7. Increased availability of necessary materials, components, or knowled...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Tables and Charts
• Preface
• The Contributors
• 1 The Next Phase in Nuclear Proliferation Research
• 2 China as a Nuclear Power
• 3 Nuclear Arms and Japan
• 4 Nuclear Proliferation in Eastern Asia
• 5 India's Nuclear Program: Decisions, Intent, and Policy, 1950-1976
• 6 India, Pakistan, Iran . . .: A Nuclear Proliferation Chain?
• 7 A U.S. Nuclear Posture for Asia
• Notes