Defence Diplomacy

Strategic Engagement and Interstate Conflict

Daniel H. Katz

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• eBook ISBN: 9780429648588
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book analyzes examples of strategic engagement in order to identify the factors which contribute to the success or failure of defence diplomacy in preventing interstate conflict.

For more than a century, nations have engaged in defence diplomacy to cultivate mutual understanding and mitigate conflict. A subset of defence diplomacy is strategic engagement, defined as peacetime defence diplomacy between nations that are actual or potential adversaries. This book analyzes three cases of strategic engagement in order to elucidate the factors which contribute to the success or failure of this diplomacy in preventing conflict. It uses an inductive framework to compare strategic engagement in the following cases: Anglo– German defence diplomacy prior to World War I; U.S.–Soviet defence diplomacy during the Cold War; and post-Cold War U.S.–China defence diplomacy. Based upon archival, literature, and personal interview research, the book argues that defence diplomacy can mitigate the risk of interstate conflict between potential adversaries. The lessons learned from this book can be employed to discern the significant elements conducive to achieving a successful outcome of strategic engagement and averting conflict or even war.

This book will be of much interest to students of defence studies, diplomacy studies, foreign policy and international relations.

1 Introduction

Historically, diplomatic and military affairs have often been interrelated. Conceptions of the military evoke notions about soldiers, sailors, and airmen employing decisive force and representing the hard power of a nation-state. Diplomacy conjures up images of suit-clad civilians composing long cables home in exotic capitals and mingling at embassy functions. A primary reason for the perceived distinction between diplomacy and the military is bureaucratic, whereby diplomatic affairs are the domain of ministries of foreign affairs and defence matters fall under ministries of defence. Nonetheless, leading strategist Carl von Clausewitz affirmed the proposition that politics and war were inextricably linked.

The convergence of diplomatic and military affairs dating back millennia can be seen in the concept of “naval diplomacy.”¹ Leading maritime historian Geoffrey Till has outlined the peacetime functions of navies and naval diplomacy, a key component of which is naval presence.² According to Till, “naval diplomacy is a spectrum, a continuum, in which the boundaries between the functions are inherently fuzzy. The activities they lead to may differ not in type, but merely in degree.”³ Navies possess a unique quality that other elements of a country’s military power do not, namely “the more benign, coalition-building aspects of naval diplomacy.”⁴ Naval diplomacy is particularly relevant because it is a key component of strategic engagement, the main focus of this book.

In the seventeenth century, “many aristocratic envoys held military posts in wartime, and peacetime diplomacy was therefore an aspect of fairly continual service to their monarchs, as well as providing a role for these men.”⁵ In the eighteenth century, “the appeal of diplomats with a military background remained strong, and notably at certain courts, especially Berlin.”⁶ This was primarily due to the fact that “war, its presence, changes and consequences, set the pace for the diplomacy of all states.”⁷ In the early twentieth century, the alliance blocs that maintained peace in Europe collapsed and ultimately led to the outbreak of World War I. There were diplomatic attempts to curb the naval competition between Britain and Germany, including the clandestine Haldane Mission of February 1912 to Berlin. British Secretary of State for War Lord Richard Haldane failed to convince Kaiser Wilhelm II to curb the German naval buildup.⁸ Though the outbreak of World War I was due to a multitude of factors, the intense Anglo–German naval competition and the linked German desire for a British guarantee of neutrality were notable elements of the buildup to general war. It is worth considering whether a successful Haldane Mission would have changed the course of later events. The Anglo-German naval competition was an important, but not determinative factor, in the ultimate outbreak of World War I.

Many countries have maintained for over a century a system of military attachés.⁹ A defence attaché was “from the beginning … something of a hybrid in the world of international relations. He was part diplomat, part scout, and perhaps, as Lord George Curzon suggested, not entirely welcome.”¹⁰ In addition to their role as soldier-diplomats, “military attachés were the Nation’s eyes and ears abroad in the days before satellite photography and sophisticated electronic collection techniques.”¹¹ Despite major technological advances in intelligence collection, human intelligence in the form of attachés remains one of the best sources for information gathering. The responsibilities of defence attachés differ depending on the nature of the bilateral relationship between their home country and their host country. If the host country is a military ally or partner, their duties could involve foreign military sales, capacity-building or promoting interoperability. Should the host country be a potential adversary of the attaché’s home country, their role focuses more on military intelligence. However, defence attachés also serve as working-level contacts between military establishments.

From the end of World War II until 1989, the predominant global security challenge was the Cold War superpower competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. The bipolar order that emerged divided the world into competing blocs for American and Soviet influence. The level of strategic risk was so high at times that there was a real prospect of war that could lead to a nuclear exchange. However, despite the exceedingly high tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the civilian and military leaders of both countries’ national security establishments arrived at a number of important agreements, most notably the 1972 U.S./USSR Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (INCSEA) as well as the U.S.–Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) established in December 1972. The agreements and the associated military-to-military consultations brokered during the détente era of the 1970s held despite a renewal of competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the 1980s under U.S. President Ronald Reagan. INCSEA, the SCC, and other confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) served as useful risk mitigation mechanisms throughout the Cold War. The Soviet Union began to crumble in 1989 and formally dissolved by 1991.

In the post-Cold War period, similar forms of diplomatic interaction between the defence officials and practitioners of potential or actual adversaries have occurred to mixed effect. Examination of these efforts, which will be referred to as “strategic engagement,” is the core subject of this book.¹² Despite the anticipated peace dividend of the post-Cold War period and hopes for the emergence of a new world order characterized by peace and stability, security tensions between China and its regional neighbors as well as the U.S. have steadily grown in the last two decades and have become particularly acute since 2010. Nonetheless, personnel of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have met and participated in exchange activities with their counterparts from countries including the United States, Japan, and Australia.

China has arguably emerged as the closest approximation to a peer competitor to U.S. global economic and military primacy. China surpassed Japan to become the world’s second largest economy and its military capabilities, particularly in the naval domain, have increased substantially alongside its growing economic prowess. The PLA is the world’s largest military in terms of number of fielded forces. Its budget has increased by double digits between 2001 and 2011, albeit from a relatively modest base.¹³ Its annual military budget is now second only to the U.S. Major concerns within Asia regarding Chinese military modernization have grown. Some countries who have had historical or territorial disputes with China responded to this challenge by participating in various forms of engagement with the PLA. The defence establishments of the U.S. and China have been interacting regularly since the early 1990s, though such engagement has been subject to periodic suspensions. Though there have been no recent major combat operations in the Asia-Pacific theater, the risks of inadvertent conflict or escalation from a minor incident remain high and merit preventive measures.

The peacetime work of militaries receives far less attention than their activities in wartime. Military personnel and defence ministries spend more time planning for possible contingencies and maintaining preparedness than actually deploying in combat operations. Therefore, the nature of peacetime engagement between potentially adversarial defence establishments is worthy of examination and is the subject of this book.

The goal of exploring strategic engagement

National security establishments of most states in the world survey their strategic environment and assess the allies (de facto and de jure) and adversaries (actual and potential) that may pose a challenge to their national security. Frequent interaction between allies is sensible and contributes to the state’s own security.

However, engagement between adversaries is an important component of international relations. Throughout the twentieth century and continuing into the twenty-first century, strategic engagement has selectively occurred, though it is unclear what drives these encounters. The motives and objectives of strategic engagement differ depending on the particular bilateral context. The quality or success of strategic engagement between adversaries has varied greatly over the past century, and explaining such variation is the central objective of this book.

The book seeks to illuminate the following issues:

• The reasons why potential adversaries pursued strategic engagement with each other
• The factors which contribute to the success or failure of strategic engagement between potential adversaries
• The lessons which can be gleaned from success or failure in each of the historical case studies that can be applied to contemporary strategic engagement between the U.S. and China, and whether these are applicable to strategic engagement between other potentially adversarial countries

Definition of key terms

Strategic engagement is meant to encompass a subclass of what is more commonly referred to as defence diplomacy, specifically between actors who are potential adversaries. Strategic engagement is defence diplomacy which leads to the establishment of instruments that allow otherwise adversarial states to manage their relationships with the ultimate goal of diminishing the risk of interstate conflict. The preferred use of strategic engagement in referring to defence diplomacy in the Anglo–German, U.S.–Soviet, and U.S.–China contexts is due in part to the extensive international relations literature on engagement, but also to the use of the term engagement by countries such as the U.S. and China, particularly in the post-Cold War period, to refer to their mutual interactions. Although not a diplomatic term of art, engagement refers to “a willingness to talk directly with those with whom it may not be possible, or even desirable to agree.”¹⁴ Mel Gurtov asserts that “engagement is a long-term strategy that may involve negotiations but embraces a good deal more, including unilateral steps, multilateral formats, and exchanges below the official level.”¹⁵ Evan Resnick has distinguished the term engagement from the alternative approaches of appeasement, containment, and isolation.¹⁶ Resnick defines engagement as “the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural).”¹⁷

Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster defined defence diplomacy as “the peacetime cooperative use of armed forces and related infrastructure (primarily defence ministries) as a tool of foreign and security policy.”¹⁸ Two countries that are “former or potential enemies” are involved in strategic engagement when they participate in these efforts.¹⁹ Of the 10 defence diplomacy activities enumerated by Cottey and Forster, the U.K. and Germany, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and the U.S. and China have performed at least several of these activities with each other: “bilateral and multilateral contacts between senior military and civilian officials,” “appointment of defence attachés to foreign countries,” “contacts and exchanges between military personnel and units, and ship visits,” and “bilateral or multilateral military exercises for training purposes.”²⁰ (See Appendix 2 for the range of possible defence diplomacy activities and those which constitute strategic engagement.)

Strategic engagement is defence diplomacy between actors that will not participate in all defence diplomacy activities due to their mutually competitive posture. Therefore, strategic engagement is a subset of the generalized phenomenon of defence diplomacy, in which a wide range of activities transpire. More traditional defence diplomacy is often conducted between allies in order to build capacity or interoperability. The goals of defence diplomacy and strategic engagement are not identical due to the divergent nature of the relationship between the actors. Strategic engagement is also broader than strategic dialogue since it sometimes goes beyond discourse to working-level contacts between defence attachés, educational visits, ship visits, and other activities. While strategic dialogue can occur between allies and potential adversaries, strategic engagement is often reserved for countries whose relationships may be poor and in need of improvement. The goals of strategic engagement vary depending upon the countries involved and the p...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Defence diplomacy: a conceptual overview
• 3. Anglo–German pre-World War I strategic engagement
• 4. U.S.–Soviet Cold War strategic engagement
• 5. U.S.–China post-Cold War strategic engagement
• 6. Compare and contrast
• 7. Conclusion
• Appendix 1: Framework
• Appendix 2: Defence diplomacy activities
• Appendix 3: Typology of strategic engagement outcomes
• Appendix 4: Treaty text – INCSEA
• Appendix 5: Standing Consultative Commission regulations
• Appendix 6: Interactions between the U.S. National Defense University and the Chinese National Defense University, 1986–2012
• Appendix 7: Excerpt from Section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2000 provision relating to U.S. military contacts with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
• References
• Index