William L. Rowe on Philosophy of Religion

Selected Writings

William L. Rowe, Nick Trakakis

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9780754655589
• eBook ISBN: 9781351872805
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: Religion

William Rowe is one of the leading thinkers in contemporary philosophy of religion. Although he is best known for his contributions to the problem of evil, he has produced innovative and influential work across a wide array of subjects at the interface between philosophy and religion. He has, for example, written extensively on the existentialist theologian, Paul Tillich, on the challenging problem of divine freedom, and on the traditional arguments in support of the existence of God. His work in these areas is distinguished by its clarity, rigour, originality, and sensitivity towards the claims of his theistic opponents. Indeed, Rowe's work has played a pivotal role in the remarkable revival of analytic philosophy of religion since the 1970s. The present collection brings together for the first time Rowe's most significant contributions to the philosophy of religion. This diverse but representative selection of Rowe's writings will provide students, professional scholars as well as general readers with stimulating and accessible discussions on such topics as the philosophical theology of Paul Tillich, the problem of evil, divine freedom, arguments for the existence of God, religious experience, life after death, and religious pluralism.

CHAPTER ONE
Tillich’s Concept of God

PAUL TILLICH’s doctrine of God is at once both religious and philosophical. The religious aspect is expressed by the statement “God is that which concerns man ultimately” (ST, 1:211). The philosophical aspect of his doctrine of God is expressed by the statement “God is being-itself” (ST, 1:235). The task of elucidating Tillich’s concept of God is largely one of explaining these two basic theistic statements. It is best, I believe, to begin with the statement “God is that which concerns man ultimately.”

The key notion in the statement expressing the religious aspect of Tillich’s doctrine of God is ‘ultimate concern.’ Tillich describes ultimate concern as the abstract translation of the great commandment: “The Lord, our God, the Lord is one; and you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength” (ST, 1:11). From this and other remarks he makes, it would seem that ultimate concern is roughly equivalent to ‘utter devotion’ or ‘complete commitment.’ ‘Devotion’ or ‘commitment’ expresses the element of love mentioned in the commandment. ‘Utter’ or ‘complete’ embraces two ideas. First, it means that the commitment is not divided between God and something else; it is not partial. Second, as expressed in the commandment, the commitment is complete in the sense that all man’s dimensions participate in the commitment—the mind, the heart, the soul, etc. Tillich elsewhere expresses this by saying that ultimate concern is a “centered act.” “Faith as ultimate concern is an act of the total personality. It happens in the center of the personal life and includes all its dimensions.... It is not a movement of a special section or a special function of man’s total being. They are all united in the act of faith.”¹ Thus to be ultimately concerned about x is to regard x as infinitely important, to be completely committed to x. However, the notion of complete commitment does not quite capture all that Tillich packs into the concept of ultimate concern. To be ultimately concerned about x is not simply to be deeply committed to x; it is also to experience x as holy. “What concerns one ultimately becomes holy” (DF, 12–13). What is it to experience or regard x as holy? Refusing to identify holiness with moral perfection, Tillich turns to Rudolf Otto’s The Idea of the Holy, pointing out that for Otto the awareness of the holy is the awareness of a presence “which remains mysterious in spite of its appearance, and it exercises both an attractive and a repulsive function on those who encounter it” (DF, 13). The holy object is experienced with awe, mystery, dread, and yet one is fascinated by it, irresistibly attracted to it. Tillich contends that these feelings are not peculiar to some one religion, but can be found in all religions “. . . because they are the way in which man always encounters the representation of his ultimate concern” (DF, 13). To be ultimately concerned about x, then, is not only to be absolutely committed to x, but to experience x as divine or holy (in the sense explained above). Unless I am mistaken, ultimate concern about x as including absolute commitment to x and certain feelings about x (awe, mystery, etc.), summed up under “experiencing x as holy or divine,” is for Tillich a necessary and sufficient condition for x to be a sacred object (religious symbol). I see nothing essentially wrong with this procedure. To identify an object as a religious object is not to identify some property or properties that the object possesses independently of the way in which men react to that object. An object becomes sacred by virtue of becoming the content of ultimate concern.

What must God be for Tillich if He is that about which men are ultimately concerned? The appropriate answer would seem to be “Almost anything.” For, given our explication of ‘ultimate concern,’ it seems reasonable to believe that almost anything could be an object of ultimate concern. At least it is true that human beings and movements (e.g., communism) qualify as objects of ultimate concern. But this creates a difficulty in our attempt to understand what ‘God’ means for Tillich. For Tillich wishes to equate God with whatever is the object of man’s ultimate concern. But, as we shall see, Tillich is not satisfied with a view which ultimately identifies God with a human being or a political movement. This means either (a) Tillich is mistaken in speaking of God as that about which we are ultimately concerned, or (b) he must have a more complex view than I suggested of what it is to be ultimately concerned. The second point b is the more fruitful alternative to explore.

Point b allows several possibilities: (1) Tillich could have a special sense of ‘ultimate concern’ which is such that one is ultimately concerned only about being-itself. The point here is that ‘ultimate concern’ would be so defined that ‘x is ultimately concerned’ would entail ‘x is ultimately concerned about being-itself.’ (2) Tillich could be holding that, while we can be ultimately concerned about almost anything, the only satisfactory or appropriate object of ultimate concern is being-itself. If this is his view, then God need not be the only object of ultimate concern. (3) Tillich could be maintaining that ultimate concern—which is defined in terms of certain feelings and attitudes focused on specific objects—is basically directed toward being-itself. Point 3 differs from 1 in that it makes the connection between ultimate concern and being-itself a metaphysical connection, rather than an analytic necessity following from a special definition of ‘ultimate concern.’ It is quite difficult to determine which of these (if any) is Tillich’s view. Point 2, more than 1 or 3, fits in best with some of Tillich’s statements about idolatry. However, there are passages strongly suggesting 1 or possibly 3:

... for that which concerns us ultimately must belong to reality as a whole; it must belong to being. Otherwise we could not encounter it, and it could not concern us. Of course, it cannot be one being among others; then it would not concern us infinitely. It must be the ground of our being, that which determines our being or not-being, the ultimate and unconditional power of being (ST, 1:21).

Here Tillich seems to be denying that we can be ultimately concerned about anything less than the ultimate, being itself. (’Ground of being,’ ‘power of being’ are both synonymous with ‘being-itself [ST, 1:236].) Anything less than ultimate can be a matter of concern for us, but not of ultimate concern. The clearest expression of this point is as follows:

The unconditional concern ... is the concern about the unconditional. The infinite passion ... is the passion for the infinite. . . . The ultimate concern is concern about what is experienced as ultimate (DF, 9).

These two quotations seem to make the same general point. We can be ultimately concerned only about what is ultimate, beyond all finite limitations, for only in this way could it have the power of determining our being or non-being. It seems, then, that ultimate concern is a kind of total commitment or complete devotion to the ultimate, being-itself.

But immediately a difficulty emerges. What is it like to be totally committed to being-itself? It may make sense to speak of someone’s being totally committed to a person (e.g., Napoleon) or a political movement (e.g., communism), but what sense does it make to speak of someone’s being totally committed to being-itself? To clear this up we must explore Tillich’s claim that the concrete content of this total commitment (ultimate concern) to being-itself is the religious symbol. In making this point Tillich seems to recognize our quandary over what it could mean to be committed to being-itself.

The phrase “being ultimately concerned” points to a tension in human experience. On the one hand, it is impossible to be concerned about something which cannot be encountered concretely, be it in the realm of reality or in the realm of the imagination. . . . On the other hand, ultimate concern must transcend every preliminary finite and concrete concern. It must transcend the whole realm of finitude in order to be the answer to the question implied in finitude. But in transcending the finite the religious concern loses the concreteness of a being-to-being relationship. It tends to become not only absolute but also abstract, provoking reactions from the concrete element. This is the inescapable inner tension in the idea of God (ST, 1:211).

This means that we must amend our statement that ultimate concern is total commitment to being-itself, the ultimate. For the focus of our ultimate concern (total commitment) is something concrete. Without some concrete content we cannot be ultimately concerned. Yet Tillich wants to say also that we cannot be ultimately concerned about what is not the ultimate—and anything that is concrete is not the ultimate. This is beginning to look like a contradiction. Consider these three statements: (1) every concrete thing is less than the ultimate; (2) we can be ultimately concerned only about something concrete; (3) we are ultimately concerned about the ultimate. We cannot assert all three statements without contradiction. Tillich wants to assert something like these three statements, but avoid any contradiction. Let us focus our attention on 2 and 3.1 have suggested that the former is necessary if we are to make sense out of ultimate concern as total commitment or complete devotion. To be ultimately concerned is to be totally committed to something. The point here is that the object of total commitment (ultimate concern) must make some demands on us, must be able to promise some sort of fulfillment. In Dynamics of Faith Tillich says that that which is our ultimate concern demands total surrender, requires the sacrifice of every other claim to it, promises total fulfillment. It is easy to see how one could love, be devoted and committed to something that can demand total surrender and promise total fulfillment. But what sense does it make to speak of loving, being devoted to being-itself? How does being-itself promise total fulfillment? Napoleon can demand total surrender. Communism can promise total fulfillment. But is it not a mistake to think of being-itself doing these things? Only something concrete can perform these functions and be a direct object of love or devotion. Hence, if we understand ultimate concern as total devotion or complete commitment, we can see the necessity of arguing, as Tillich does, that we can be ultimately concerned only about something concrete.

We must now ask what leads Tillich to the view that we are ultimately concerned about the metaphysical ultimate, being-itself. One possibility, suggested by Alston, is that Tillich is misled by the verbal ambiguity of ‘ultimate.’ Thus, in his penetrating essay “Tillich’s Conception of a Religious Symbol,” Alston remarks:

... as Tillich explained ‘ultimate concern,’ the ultimacy is psychological; it consists in the supremacy of that concern in the psychic structure of the individual. It is in a quite different way that being-itself is thought by Tillich to be ultimate. It is onto-logically ultimate by virtue of the fact that it is the ultimate ground of all being. Once this distinction is made, we can see that there is no reason to suppose that (psychologically) ultimate concern must be concern directed to what is (ontologically) ultimate. But the verbal identity may make the transition seem obvious.²

Alston is certainly correct in pointing out that the psychological considerations mentioned in defining ultimate concern do not necessitate that the metaphysical ultimate be the object of such concern. If one did think so, he most likely would have been misled by the use of ‘ultimate’ both for what is psychological and for what is metaphysical. However, it is not clear that Tillich is being misled here, and even if he is he has other reasons for holding that we are ultimately concerned about the metaphysical ultimate. This being so, pointing out that he may be misled by the ambiguity of ‘ultimate’ will not dispense with his claim unless we also show either that his reasons are not good ones or that they rest on this same ambiguity (which is just a special case of showing that they are not good reasons). Hence, it is necessary to examine the considerations leading Tillich to claim that we are ultimately concerned about being-itself.

A complete account of the considerations which lead Tillich to the view that we are ultimately concerned about being-itself would necessitate a careful discussion of the role of being-itself in his ontology—a discussion that must be left for the next chapter. However, as a preliminary account, we may note the following two claims that Tillich makes: (a) we are ultimately concerned about what determines our being or nonbeing—only being-itself can do this; (b) we are ultimately concerned about that which can provide an answer to the question implied in finitude—only being-itself can do this since everything else is bound by the conditions of finitude. What a and b come to, I think, can be set forth in a series of statements.

1. Man is infinitely concerned (anxious) about his being.
2. The source of his anxiety is nonbeing, for nonbeing is what threatens his being.
3. This infinite concern (anxiousness) about his being produces an infinite quest, longing, for that which can overcome this threat to his being.
4. That which can overcome the threat of nonbeing is being-itself, for only being-itself is not exposed to that threat.
5. Man, therefore, is seeking for being-itself, for some vital contact with that reality which possesses the power of overcoming the existential threat of nonbeing.
6. Since man can encounter being-itself only through the concrete, his infinite quest for being is focused on something concrete through which the power of being is experienced.

Concerning 1, it is important to recognize that by a man’s ‘being’ Tillich does not mean simply his existence in time and space. Rather, when a man is concerned or anxious about his being he is basically concerned about the significance or meaning of his life. Thus Tillich says, “.. the term ‘being’ means the whole of human reality, the structure, the meaning, and the aim of existence” (ST, 1:14). The source of this human concern about one’s being is, as stated in 2, nonbeing. The concept of nonbeing is a fundamental one in Tillich’s existentialist ontology of man, as well as in existentialist literature generally. In The Courage to Be Tillich endeavors to explain his use of this concept and to suggest the various ways in which non-being is experienced as a threat to one’s being. Nonbeing, he remarks, threatens our being in three ways:

Nonbeing threatens man’s ontic self-affirmation, relatively in terms of fate, absolutely in terms of death. It threatens man’s spiritual self-affirmation, relatively in terms of emptiness, absolutely in terms of meaninglessness. It threatens man’s moral self-affirmation, relatively in terms of guilt, absolutely in terms of condemnation. The awa...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• William L. Rowe on Philosophy of Religion
• ASHGATE CONTEMPORARY THINKERS ON RELIGION: COLLECTED WORKS
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• I: THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH
• 1 Tillich’s Concept of God
• 2 Religious Symbols
• II: THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
• 3 The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism
• 4 The Empirical Argument from Evil
• 5 Evil and Theodicy
• 6 Paradox and Promise
• 7 Ruminations about Evil
• 8 William Alston on the Problem of Evil
• 9 The Evidential Argument from Evil
• 10 In Defense of ‘The Free Will Defense’*
• 11 Grounds for Belief Aside, Does Evil Make Atheism More Reasonable than Theism?
• 12 Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil
• III: Replies to Critics on the Evidential Problem of Evil
• 13 Evil and Theistic Hypothesis: A Response to Wykstra
• 14 Response to Linda Zagzebski
• 15 Reply to Plantinga
• 16 Skeptical Theism: A Response to Bergmann
• 17 Reply to Howard-Snyder and Bergmann
• IV: Divine Freedom
• 18 The Problem of Divine Perfection and Freedom
• 19 Evil and God’s Freedom in Creation
• 20 Can God Be Free?
• V: The Cosmological Argument
• 21 Two Criticisms of the Cosmological Argument
• 22 The Cosmological Argument
• 23 Cosmological Arguments
• VI: The Ontological Argument
• 24 The Ontological Argument
• 25 Modal Versions of the Ontological Argument
• VII: Other Writings in the Philosophy of Religion
• 26 Augustine on Foreknowledge and Free Will
• 27 Religious Experience and the Principle of Credulity
• 28 The Rationality of Religious Belief
• 29 Religion within the Bounds of Naturalism: Dewey and Wieman
• 30 Religious Pluralism
• William L. Rowe: A Bibliography
• Index