Social Work Values

An Enquiry

Noel Timms

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781138371156
• eBook ISBN: 9780429764899
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

Originally published in 1983 Social Work Values is a sustained enquiry about the present situation of social work. It describes the treatment of social work values in the social work literature and in research, and pursues three distinct avenues towards an improvement on the present unsatisfactory treatment. First, the book introduces and encourages more philosophical reflection on the customary 'lists' of social work values. Second, it investigates three social work controversies: between the Charity Organisation Society and 'the Socialists'; between the Functionalist and the Diagnostic schools of social work; and between 'radical' Marxists and 'the rest'. Third, and finally it explores the treatment of 'value' and 'values' in economics, sociology, ordinary usage, and philosophy, in order to establish the distinctive elements to which the term 'values' is applied.

1

An overview

In any discussion of welfare a term that is bound to come up is value. . . . And we may start upon our enquiry by premising that welfare consists of ordered, organised values. This, it may be complained, does not carry us far, for value seems an even vaguer and more attenuated concept than welfare. Yet we cannot clarify our conception of human welfare without some classification and assessment of those distinguishable elements to which the word ‘value’ is applied.

J. A. Hobson, Wealth and Life: A Study in Values (1929)

Summary of argument and approach

This book is about a particular grouping of seemingly ordered and organised values, namely social work values. One of its main arguments is that these values should always be considered in a context wider than that supplied by ideas of social work – social work within the context of social welfare is but one example. Much more usually, social work values are exhibited rather than analysed and are treated as commodities domestic to social work itself. For this reason, and also because I wish to argue the case of complexity in the problems raised in systematic discussion of social work values and in their resolution, this book begins with a summary of the main arguments and the general approach, despite the risk – as Moses said when reading the Tablets, ‘So much is lost in the summary.’

Those writing about social work and those practising it refer frequently to values. It may be that values figure in accounts and conversation in this occupation more frequently than in others, but, in my view, the frequency of reference is neither accidental nor purely ornamental. Those elements discussed under the single rubric ‘values’ are crucial to the conception and practice of social work. However, it is difficult to see how crucial they are, the kind of importance they have, because we try to work with ‘values’ as a completely undifferentiated notion. The word ‘value’ is indeed applied to ‘distinguishable elements’; problems arise because they are so rarely distinguished. Almost any kind of belief and obligation, anything preferred for any reason or for no apparent reason at all, any objective in the short or the long run, any ideal or rule, is heaped into a large pantechnicon carrying the device ‘Social Work Values – will travel anywhere’.

This suggests that while we can apply to social work values the central importance Hobson assigned to values in social welfare generally, his reference to ‘ordered, organised values’ may appear optimistic. The distinguishable elements fail, as we have just seen, to make obvious logical order – ideals do not function in the same way as rules, valuations differ from obligations. They also are difficult to recognise as organised. Just as the list of social work values that is treated as customary lacks coherence either as a code of practice or as a summary of principles derived from one or more traditions of practice, so a consideration of the history of social work suggests that what are usually articulated are fragments rather than the story as an organised whole. The current programme to encourage belief in the unitary nature of social work activities easily conveys interested assumptions about both ‘value consensus’ amongst contemporary social workers and also the unified nature of the traditions leading to modern social work. However, ways of working in social welfare and the ways in which practitioners have viewed men and women and society have often been in conflict even in what appears to be the same tradition. The kind of careful historical work required to establish such a view is exemplified in Pullan’s study (1971) of philanthropy in Renaissance Venice. He warns, for example, against the dangerous assumption that ‘at any given time one can distinguish a single, unitary Catholic attitude to the problem of the poor – in the sixteenth century, the views of Mendicants in Flanders and Spain differed radically from those of Ignatius Loyola, of Italian Jesuits’ (p. 199, italics added). Historical work of this detailed kind cannot be attempted in this book, but a consideration of three controversies in the history of social work will attend to the possibility of conflict both within and between traditions of practice, as well as seeking to anchor ‘values’ in differing historical contexts.

Establishing the vagaries of the present use and usage of social work values and the disordered treatment of ‘values’ in contemporary discussion and in our understanding of the history of social work constitutes an important set of arguments in this book. They also mark a foundation for the remaining argument that we should move towards a remedy for an unsatisfactory situation through a combination of historical and conceptual enquiry. The book does not present a revised list of social work values – indeed, it is central to the argument that the idea of ‘list’ should be treated as problematic as should the notion of values that somehow belong specially to social work. Rather the argument is directed towards a reorganisation and reconstruction of ‘values’ around the basic idea of practices concerned with human functioning and development. ‘Social work values’ should be reinterpreted as notions of what constitutes human fulfillment, what aids or hinders it, what duties it entails, what ideals it encapsulates and what valuations may be indicated in particular situations. It is not assumed that social workers can be brought to agreement on all or any of these elements and much work remains to be done to save these elements from unhelpful abstraction, but in such a perspective the importance of argument about social work would become more clear, the tools for pursuing argument more obvious, as indeed would the point of engaging in argument at all.

Some possible objections to the enterprise

This book is concerned with the current status of value-talk in social work, with delimiting some of the problems raised by such talk and with working towards some remedy for these. Such objectives may be criticised at least initially on a number of grounds. Talk about talk may appear simply a diversion from more important matters in social work; a critical approach to social work values may emphasise at an inopportune time the deficiencies of the profession; overelaborate analyses are unnecessary and a no-nonsense stipulation of how values will be treated on any particular occasion will solve all problems. Finally, it may be objected that concern with values, whilst legitimate, is important only to those adopting a moral stance in relation to social work. These are not trivial reactions and I shall briefly discuss each of them before proceeding to the overview of the book.

The objection of diversion can be most succinctly voiced in some words of Octavia Hill. She once observed in Beatrice Webb’s company that there was too much ‘windy talk’ about social welfare; what was required was more day-by-day work amongst the poor. Such a statement might gain recognition, even a ‘knowing’ approval, in other periods. There is little reason to suppose that the sentiment expressed by Octavia Hill, or support for it, is confined to the late nineteenth century. Indeed, it is echoed in the current single-minded emphasis in official circles on the inculcation of social work skills at the expense of ‘more academic’ considerations. The present book, however, is precisely taken up with a study of talk, that kind of discussion in and about social work which I have briefly described as ‘value-talk’, and one of the main arguments is that this kind of talk requires more sustained attention and more serious analytical treatment rather than the usual pious reverence or simple toleration. How, then, to defend it against a charge of diverting attention from more important activity? The proof is, of course, mainly in the reading, but at this point two main reasons for the book will be stated. First, ‘values’ quite simply abound in any discussion with social workers or about social work, and problems in relation to values, usually seen as moral, are frequently explicitly mentioned or referred to in a more implicit manner. Second, if, as I shall shortly illustrate, ‘values’ play a central role in the illumination, conception, justification and practice of social work, it follows that one of the main skills of the social worker consists in the ability to grasp the concepts involved. Social work is not just a simple matter of achieving results; it is also concerned with the manner in which they are achieved and under what description, of agent, recipient, and act. Neither ‘social worker’ nor ‘client’, nor what they are trying to achieve together (or in partial conflict), can be adequately treated as ‘value-free’. In addition, ‘social work values’ may hold a significance for practitioners beyond the occupational. At certain times in the history of social work the values apparently realised and extolled in the practice of social work have formed for many practitioners part of a distinctive and satisfying way of life, the equivalent for C. S. Loch, for example, almost of a religion.¹ The notion of a way of life is one to which we shall return more than once in this study.

So, in understanding and in pursuing professional practice, social work ‘values’ are treated as and appear indeed to be of crucial significance. Yet, at the present time, a book dealing with such questions may easily be misunderstood, particularly if its main thrust is critical. Social work in contemporary Britain is a beleaguered occupation and social workers seem unsure of, or in basic disagreement about, what it is they practice. In this situation it may appear that what is required is a rallying call rather than analysis. Certainly, the present book has no directly missionary intent, and its purpose is not to ensure that the familiarly inscribed banner of commonly espoused Social Work Values (Acceptance, Self-Determination and so on) is simply and as such more confidently advanced. However, the purpose of questioning accepted formulations is not in any way negative; the aim is not somehow to demonstrate that social work values are either vacuous or constituted of simple stuff inflated by pomposity. The intention is to increase the confidence of social workers (and others) in their grasp of ‘value-talk’ in social work, though this does entail facing the fact that the treatment of ‘values’ in social work has been insufficiently imaginative and sharp. The book aims at a critical description of ‘values’ in social work, and at understanding and developing the role of value-talk through a historical and a conceptual approach.

Is such an elaborate procedure necessary? Would not all problems be resolved through a stipulative definition of ‘values’ so that it was immediately clear how social work values were to be understood in the particular circumstances? Usage of ‘value’ – to be discussed more fully in a later chapter – suggests that the straightforward, down-to-earth solution of stipulative definition has its drawbacks. In a study of the place of values in the social work curriculum, Pumphrey (1959), seeing apparently little problematic in the nature of her subject, stipulates that values are to be considered in terms of preferences, but this ignores the different grounds on which preference might be based (e.g. aesthetic, moral, as advancing certain interests, or as prudential) and the force of considerations other than those of preference, such as principle or duty. Preference is simply not satisfactory as the sole basic unit of evaluative discourse. Macintyre (1981) has recently pointed this argument by emphasising the importance in human life of the idea of reasons for action. He contrasts statements of personal preference with every kind of evaluative expression, including the moral. Statements of personal preference may have what Macintyre calls reason-giving force but this depends on who says, for example, ‘Do this because I wish it’, to whom it is said, in what situation and so on. Evaluation, on the other hand, derives its reason-giving force independently:

the appeal is to a type of consideration which is independent of the relationship between speaker and hearer. Its use presupposes the existence of impersonal criteria – the existence, independently of the preferences or attitudes of speaker and hearer, of standards of justice or generosity or duty. The particular link between the context of utterance and the force of the reason-giving which always holds in the case of expressions of personal preferences or desire is severed in the case of moral and other evaluative utterances, (p. 9)

This provides an important criticism of one proposed definition, but in our present state of confusion any stipulation would amount to an arbitrary decision to exclude many different clues to the complexity of the subject of the enquiry.

Finally, what of the objection that value-talk is of proper interest to those who emphasise social work as a particular kind of moral stance; others should feel free simply to get on with the job? The next chapter will establish the importance, frequency and range of references to values in social work and the varied work ‘values’ are expected to accomplish, but at this point it is appropriate to illustrate that the importance of ‘values’ does not depend on the acceptance of a particular model of social work. I wish to illustrate, not any apparently common values, but a shared view on the importance of values, whether we are concerned with explicit or more implicit social work statements. I also hope to indicate by some brief, preliminary comment that value-talk in social work often raises more questions than it settles. This is an objective of some importance in view of the assumption that there is nothing seriously problematic about ‘values’ in social work: all that is required is, as Octavia Hill might have argued, their day-to-day recognition or realisation.

Explicit reference to values

In relation to explicit statements I shall briefly refer to two approaches to social work: that which sees any imperative governing social work as concern with results, and that which sees the substantive effort of social work revolving around ideas of the morally ‘good’ social worker and of ‘good’ social work judged according to moral criteria. Social work, in the first perspective, is good only if it effects some externally validated result; in the second perspective, the results of social work are seen as a moral good achieved within the relationship of social worker and client.²

Fischer may be taken as representative of the view that what is essential about social work is not so much what goes into practice but what comes out as a result. He is, in other words, primarily concerned with developing an effective technology, and he argues that

Research on the effectiveness of social casework can provide a bridge between two of the basic values of the social work profession: (1) a commitment to competence and (2) a commitment to the scientific method. The first value . . . refers to a concern about effectiveness: doing everything possible to be certain that professional services are being translated into demonstrable benefits for clients. The second value . . . refers to the belief that a process of rational, systematic and orderly enquiry is the best way yet devised by man to organise, understand and accumulate knowledge. (1976, p. 5)

This passage uses a term often referred to in informal discussions of social work values, commitment, but to what social workers may be committed is at least mentioned. Simple references to commitment to social work or to social work values have to be pursued. Simply saying that ‘social workers are or should be committed’ or that ‘they should or do feel commitment’ conveys no information at all. One is always committed to a particular belief or set of beliefs, and some specification of these is required before we can know whether or not someone is ‘committed’. Commitment to a person, from which social work usage probably derives, depends on some relevant specification of the person in question. It is doubtful whether the two beliefs selected by Fischer would be generally accepted by social workers as ‘basic’, but this is not the place to develop that argument. His words stand here as an illustration of the importance of ‘values’ in an orientation to social work that is largely instrumental.

Social work as a morally serious project has, of course, a comparatively lengthy history. It is not surprising that ‘values’ usually qualified as ‘moral’ are acknowledged, but the extent to which they are explicitly depicted is perhaps surprising in view of the frequent mistaken association of moral seriousness with the moralistic approach of an earlier social welfare. The view of social work as a moral, rather than scientific or technical enterprise, takes two forms, but in either the crucial role of ‘values’ is evident. First, the primary concern is seen to reside in the development of a distinctive moral character. This is more usually considered in terms of the social worker, but it is difficult to see why the distinctive moral character should not logically also be developed in clients. Hugman (1977) proposes, in an exhortatory passage, that

the business of being a good helper is essentially bound up with being a good person, that is to say, thoughtful, generous, sensitive, relatively unselfish, relatively accepting of self, liberated in spirit, tolerant, reliable, acquainted with weakness and inconsistency, caring, committed, purposeful, capable of joy and sadness, and faithful to a belief in the humanity of all people.

This passage raises, of course, a number of questions: how, for example, can we tell that the moral character has been fully described, and how can the ambiguity be resolved in ‘the business of being a good helper is essentially bound up with being a good person’? (This means either that being a good helper is connected in important ways with being a good person or that to be a good person is to be a good helper.)

Second, social work is viewed as concerned

to make and assist in the making of moral judgments in ways that are directly helpful to clients and citizens that ‘do good’. . . Clients need to be helped to apply ethical principles in t...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Acknowledgments
• Table of Contents
• 1 An overview
• 2 The function and treatment of ‘values’ in social work
• 3 Conscience in social work: towards the practice of moral judgment
• 4 Traditional values and neglected disvalues
• 5 Three controversies
• 6 Values, valuations and value judgments I
• 7 Values, valuations and value judgments II
• 8 Conclusions
• Notes
• References
• Subject index
• Name index