Yemen: the Search for a Modern State

J.E. Peterson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138184367
• eBook ISBN: 9781317291459
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Scienze sociali
• Subtopic: Studi regionali

The development of North Yemen in the twentieth century was one of the most interesting features of the Arabian Peninsula. After the traumas of the civil war which embroiled Nasser's Egypt, the country emerged from its traditional tribal heritage into the modern world. Sandwiched between Saudi Arabia and Marxist South Yemen, the country had an awkward and delicate problem in balancing its political affiliations and in resisting external pressure on its internal affairs. This book, first published in 1982, traces the history of the Yemen from the 1930s and looks at the way in which the traditional political structures were modernised and how the country coped with these strains both internally and externally.

1 BACKGROUND TO CHANGE IN THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

There are many faces to Yemen: the lofty mountain peaks, the steep hillsides swept by cascading terraces, the tiny clusters of stone houses perched on craggy buttes, the African-appeariiig villages of the coastal plain, the slender ornamented minarets of the many mosques, the narrow, twisting lanes and multistoried buildings of the walled cities. Yemen, long a citadel closed off from the encroaching world, is a land of deep traditions and a fiercely independent people. But its traditions have been challenged by new winds of change disrupting the old order of the society and economy. The longheld antipathy towards any government, however, renders the role of central authority difficult; the situation being made even more precarious by the pressures of new demands generated by the rapid pace of change.

There have been many governments in Yemen’s nearly three thousand years of recorded history. Few of them have been able to exercise effective authority over all or even most of Yemen; fewer still have been able to claim the allegiance of all those within their jurisdiction. The Yemen Arab Republic continues to share these problems. It is a young, weak and uncertain state, more at home in the cities and towns than in the unresponsive and sometimes uncontrollable countryside. It is buffeted on the north by conservative and intrusive Saudi Arabia, and on the south by the Marxist and equally insistent People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Conflicting pressures are just as intense internally, between those who cling to the patterns and practices of the past and those who seek to transform Yemen’s politics to cope with the new demands of ‘modernisation’.

Created in 1962, the YAR inherited many of the problems and limitations of its immediate predecessor, the Zaydi Imamate of the Hamid al-Din dynasty. One of these was the restriction of the YAR’s territory to only the central part of the area most Yemenis consider to be Yemen. The northern regions of ‘Asir, Jizan and Najran were absorbed into Saudi Arabia earlier in this century. To the south, the British occupation of Aden in 1839 and the gradual expansion of control over its hinterland eventually resulted in the creation of a second Yemeni state in 1967, one which remains in competition with the YAR despite the desire of most Yemenis to see unification in one state. This political division tends to lead to inevitable confusion in the use of the terms ‘north’ and ‘south’. Traditionally, the ancient capital of San’a’ has been the dividing line between ‘al-Sham’, the north or upper Yemen, and ‘al-Yaman’, the south or lower Yemen. But the modern political division of the country has led to the use of the terms of north Yemen and south Yemen to refer to the YAR and the PDRY respectively.

This work is concerned with political change in north Yemen, concentrating on the mechanics of and differences between its two principal forms of national government in the twentieth century: the Imamate and the Republic. In 1962, a military coup d’etat brought an end to the thousand-year history of the Imamate and instituted the ‘revolutionary’ regime of the YAR. Seemingly, Yemen had awakened from its centuries-long slumber and embraced the modern world or, as an observation of the time had it, Yemen found itself rushing headlong into the fifteenth century. But despite outward appearances, the political transformation of Yemen neither began with the revolution of 1962, nor did the revolution result in a completely or even substantially reconstituted system. The contrast between the old and new was more in tones of grey than black and white: the Imamate of the twentieth century was only partially ‘traditional’; the Republic has turned out to be far from ‘revolutionary’. This is not to say that major differences do not exist between the two systems. Most of these differences, however, gradually appeared over the course of decades, rather than constituting a sharp break as the result of a single event.

The extent of change and the pervasiveness of continuing patterns in Yemen’s politics can best be illustrated by analysing both systems in some detail. Chapter 2 concentrates on the 1930s and 1940s, a period which saw the attempt of a strong-willed Imam to mould a centralised national government within the garb of the old Imamate. Chapters 4 and 5, on the other hand, examine the workings of the Republic during the 1970s, the first decade after the civil war and the first real opportunity to govern all of north Yemen. These ‘cross-sectional’ studies are bridged by Chapter 3, which analyses some of the principal causes, and results, of changes in Yemen’s political arena. While some of these causes are direct and obvious, as in the 1962 coup d’état, many of the changes having the greatest impact have occurred as a result of the basic socio-economic transformation of the country, a far deeper and continuing process than the simple replacement of political institutions. While the institutions have changed, there remain basic affinities in the political dynamics of the two systems and Yemen still relies on the role and force of dominant personalities at the expense of more enduring and legitimate structural institutions. It is a country in transition but one that is still heavily influenced by and dependent on its traditional values and environment.

The Traditional Setting

Part of the difficulty in governing Yemen lies in its quintessentially rural and isolated nature, a characteristic dictated in large part by its rugged topography. Physically, there are three major zones to the YAR. Adjacent to the Red Sea is the dry, largely barren coastal plain of the Tihama, which extends from the southernmost tip of the YAR at the Bab al-Mandab strait (the southern entrance to the Red Sea) up into Saudi Arabia. The Tihama is largely desert, with little rainfall or vegetation and cursed by stifling heat and humidity in the summer. Apart from the burgeoning city of al-Hudayda, Yemen’s only modern port, the Tihama’s sparse population is concentrated in coastal fishing villages and a few scattered towns, which include such well-known medieval centres of trade and education as Zabid and Bayt al-Faqih. The 10-to-30 mile expanse of the Tihama gives way on the east to the craggy peaks and steep valleys of central Yemen.

The mountainous backbone of the Yemeni highlands parallels the Tihama along a north-south axis and stretches the full length of the country, reaching heights of more than 12,000 feet. The majority of Yemen’s population is concentrated in its valleys and plateaux, predominantly in the myriad of picturesque, isolated and fortified settlements. The multiplication of these villages and hamlets is due to overwhelming dependence on subsistence agriculture, sustained only by marginal rainfall, limited irrigation and the diligent labour required in many instances to maintain the extensive terraces covering many mountain-sides. Here are Yemen’s two other cities: Ta’izz, the centre of the southern YAR, surrounded by the country’s most densely populated areas; and San’a’, the capital located in the centre of the country. In the middle of a high plateau, San’a’ is Yemen’s largest settlement and one of its oldest. Its old walled city still stands but is all but eclipsed by the rapidly growing environs; thus graphically illustrating the Yemen that is torn between the old and the new. These cities are complemented by other historical, religious and cultural centres: Sa’da, Shahara, Hajja and Kawkaban in the north; Dhamar, Rada’, Ibb and Jibla in the south.

Not all of these towns are in the mountains, strictly speaking, but also on their eastern slopes and plateaux. The eastern escarpment gradually gives way to plains and then the sandy expanse of the great Rub‘al-Khali desert. This, the third major geographical region, is also the least populated. Ironically, it was also the home of some of Yemen’s ancient and celebrated civilisations, including those of Saba and Ma‘in. Some of the most impressive reminders of Yemen’s pre-Islamic heritage are to be found at such sites as Zafar (near Yarim), Baraqish (north-east of San‘a’) and Ma‘rib (in the far east). But the Mashriq, or the eastern desert area, is no longer a centre of importance and it supports only a small number of people. The town of Ma‘rib, despite being the centre of one of the YAR’s eleven governorates, has less than a thousand inhabitants. The desert, of course, is home to most of Yemen’s Bedouin or nomads, although some live in the mountains or in the Tihama. But, as is the case throughout most of the Arab world, the Bedouin have only marginal political, social or economic importance. Even in the Mashriq, the majority of the people are sedentary.¹

The nature of the terrain, the effect of tribal organisation, the dependence on subsistence agriculture, which employs three-quarters of the work force, and the limited availability of water have all had their effect in scattering Yemen’s population into more than 50,000 settlements. The cities and towns receive most of the attention but the average settlement size is less than 90 people.² Despite a total population of approximately six million, the YAR has only three settlements with a population greater than 50,000, only six with more than 10,000 and only 134 with more than 1,000; altogether these comprise less than 13 per cent of the total population.³ The self-sufficient and inward-looking attitude of the people produced by these factors has been reinforced by the absence of any strong central government for most of Yemen’s history.

The citizens of the YAR are principally Arab and Muslim. Most are Qahtani or south Arab, rather than ‘Adnani or north Arab. The Qahtani Arabs are considered to be the original Arabs, with the purest line of descent from the founders of the legendary pre-Islamic Arab civilisations. The division between Qahtani and ‘Adnani has been used to explain physical, cultural and even political differences throughout the Arab world, including Yemen. While the Imams of Yemen claimed to be Qahtani, they were also sayyids, descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, which made them more identifiably ‘Adnani and as such vulnerable to charges that they were foreigners in Yemen even after a thousand years of residence.⁴ Yemen joined the fold of Islam during Muhammad’s lifetime and remained a part of the Islamic caliphate until the dissolution of the original Islamic empire. The successor states which ruled Yemen, like their subjects, were generally Sunni, i.e., from the mainstream of ‘orthodox’ Islam. As a result, more than half of the Yemenis today are Sunni, and generally adhere to the Shafi‘i school of Islamic law. But their numbers are nearly matched by several branches of Shi‘a, the largest subdivision of Islam to break away from the Sunni majority. The Shi ‘is themselves are divided into a myriad of subsects.⁵ Beginning in the ninth century, one of these subsects, the Isma‘ilis or Seveners, established bases in central Yemen and especially the Tihama, which continued for several centuries. Their lasting effect on the population, however, is today marked only by the continuing existence of small Ism‘aili enclaves around Jabal Haraz (in the mountains halfway between San‘a’ and al-Hudayda) and among the Yam tribes of the Najran region (straddling the interior Saudi-Yemeni border).

The people of the northern and central highlands of the YAR are predominantly Zaydi, a Shi‘i subsect closer to Sunnism in belief and practice than other Shi‘i strains. There is little of the mysticism or belief in the liidden’ or semi-divine Imams which characterises the Isma‘ilis and Ithna ‘asharis, and Zaydi law and theology has been receptive to Sunni sources.⁶ While the Zaydi Imam must be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad through his nephew and son-in-law ‘Ali, as well as fulfil various other criteria, he is freely elected by the Zaydi ‘ulama’ (religious scholars).⁷ Not only a religious leader, the Imam is also the head of state. The first Zaydi Imam appeared in Yemen at the end of the ninth century AD, at the invitation of the northern tribes which sought a mediator for their fratricidal disputes. But as a state, the Zaydi Imamate suffered from a number of limiting factors. Throughout the next thousand years, the Imams continued to mediate between the Zaydi tribes rather than govern them. Their strongest claim to political authority came only in leading the tribes in jihad or holy war against non-Zaydis, and physical control of non-Zaydi territory ultimately rested on the Imamate’s power of coercion. Thus, for much of the last millenium, the sway of the Zaydi Imams has been restricted to all or even just part of the Zaydi highlands; only occasionally have they successfully extended their control over Sunni Yemen. The success of Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din (r. 1904-48) in expanding his jurisdiction over the territory now encompassed by the YAR was exceptional and depended in large part on his being able to present himself as a Yemeni nationalist leader as well as Imam. But this twentieth-century manifestation, or modification, of an ancient institution was almost doomed to failure. Two principal reasons were the long history of Zaydi oppression of Shafi‘i areas and the impossibility of transforming the fragile, sectarian institution of the Imamate into a modern nation-state.

Yahya Hamid al-Din was elected Imam following the death of his father Muhammad at a time when most of Yemen had been absorbed into the Ottoman Empire. Much of the considerable esteem and respect that Yahya came to enjoy over his long reign was due to his aggressive campaigns against the Turks. By 1911, the Ottomans not only confirmed Yahya as ruler of the northern highland areas already under his control but also gave him a recognised status as spiritual leader of the entire Zaydi community of Yemen. The success of this Zaydi-Turkish condominium was helped by their common opposition to the British in the south and the Idrisi amir in ‘Asir to the north; the partnership came to an end only after the Ottoman defeat in World War I and the Turkish departure from Yemen. Although the Zaydi Imamate was internationally recognised as a successor state to the Ottoman province of Yemen, its writ was initially restricted to the highlands. The Tihama passed indirectly from Ottoman control to that of the weak Idrisi amirate. Not until the mid-1920s were Yahya’s armies able to supplant Idrisi administration there. But the Imamate’s efforts to absorb the remainder of the Idrisi amirate in the northern Tihama and ‘Asir were thwarted by defeat in the 1934 warwith Saudi Arabia. Thus, by 1934, the Imamate (and thus the present-day Republic) basically assumed its permanent boundaries.

Imam Yahya’s attention was then directed to consolidation of control over the state within his own hands and that of the Hamid al-Din family, less in the manner of the traditional Imamate than in that of an absolutist monarchy. This development provoked the opposition of both the conservative traditionalists and the newly-emerging modernists: Imam Yahya was assassinated in 1948 and his place briefly taken by an Imam from another family before Yahya’s son Ahmad was able to recapture San‘a’ and the throne. In many ways, Ahmad’s reign resembled that of his father as he enforced his personal control over every aspect of the government and futilely attempted to isolate the country from the forces of modernisation. But there was increasing opposition to his rule and several near-successful attempts to oust him. Ahmad died of natural causes in 1962 and was succeeded by his son Muhammad al-Badr, who enjoyed only one short week of tranquillity before a military-organised coup d’état established a republican government in San‘a’. The simultaneous attempt to kill Badr failed, however, and the Imam escaped to lead his followers in a long civil war against the new San‘ani state, resulting in a deep national division which only ended with the ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• 1. Background to Change in the Yemen Arab Republic
• 2. The Politics of the Imamate
• 3. The Process of Political Change
• 4. The Political Dynamics of The Republic
• 5. State-Building and Socio-Economic Development
• 6. Dilemmas of the 1980s
• Appendix A: Glossary
• Appendix B: Chronology of Events (1918–1981)
• Bibliography
• Index