The Centre-left and New Right Divide?

Political Philosophy and Aspects of UK Social Policy in the Era of the Welfare State

Steven R. Smith

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9780429764776
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

First published in 1998, this volume offers some solutions to the inherent difficulties with moving from philosophical generalities to specific policies, by exploring how a bridge might be built between political philosophy and social policy analysis. In light of these findings, Steven R. Smith evaluates the relationship between the Centre-Left and the New Right, focusing on the way in which concepts of individual autonomy and equality are used by political philosophers and social policy makers. Smith explores post-1945 training, education, social security and community care policy within the United Kingdom.

Part I
Building a Bridge between Social Policy and Political Philosophy

Introduction to Part 1

In Part 1 I critically assess the existing state of the literature encompassing various aspects of social policy analysis and political theory/philosophy. This assessment will form the basis for identifying how a bridge might be securely built between social policy analysis and political philosophy. InChapter 1 I outline some of the controversy surrounding the definition of political philosophy, as well as highlighting the complexities involved in defining what is meant by social policy and its analysis. I then classify, under two broad headings (the descriptive and the theoretical), various types of literature and material relating to social policy analysis. Although I am not suggesting that all the material falls neatly into either of these two categories, or that there are good methodological reasons for making this distinction, historically the literature tends toward the descriptive or the theoretical (with an undue emphasis on the former). Consequently, serious misconceptions about the role and validity of normative debate within social policy analysis have arisen-misconceptions which are largely a result of naive positivist and utilitarian type arguments.

In parallel to the descriptive and theoretical divide above, in Chapter 2 I classify the political philosophy literature under the two main headings of positivism and non-positivism. Again, I am not suggesting that theorists can be/ought to be neatly categorised by this classification. However, by tracing the development of contemporary political philosophy, I will highlight the way descriptive and normative paths have been artificially divided by positivist positions. This division has been severely criticised within philosophy and political philosophy, but the legacy of positivism is still acutely felt in the 'social sciences', including much social policy analysis. Therefore I will align myself to the non-positivist theorists, arguing that one of the principal reasons why a bridge has not been built between social policy and political theory/philosophy is because of a commonly-held assumption that moral philosophy is not relevant to the pursuit of so-called 'political science'. However, in recent years this assumption has been undermined from numerous quarters, which has allowed the possibility of bridge-building between social policy and political philosophy. Despite this potential, I will explore why the construction of such a bridge has proved a difficult task, mainly because of the considerable problems associated with moving from philosophical generalities to specific social policy.

Finally, I explore what a good bridge should look like and what it might do, based on the broad assertion that the central attributes of a good bridge are both its philosophical coherence and its applicability to the detail of social policy. However, in order to draw out the more substantive implications of these attributes (and expanding the analogy further) I will also establish: (i) why in the first place the divide is considered worth crossing according to the non-positivists; (ii) at exactly what point the crossing will be made, by identifying where political philosophy is placed in relation to other theoretical enquiry which has had a bearing on social policy; and (iii) what kind of traffic might cross the bridge, by speculating as to the kinds of issues/debates which it will be expected to bear. I then outline how the above applies to my central hypothesis, that although there are different emphases of value between the New Right and the Centre-Left regarding social policy, these differences in value commitment do not constitute radical disjunctures as is so often asserted.

1 Defining terms and the different approaches to social policy analysis

1. Definitional complexities-political philosophy and social policy

Before assessing the literature I need to explain what is meant by social policy and its analysis, and by political theory/philosophy. This is not only because inevitably there are arguments within each area about what are legitimate focuses of concern, but also because when commentators from the other discipline refer to political theory/philosophy and social policy they often over-simplify and/or use equivocal definitions.

Within political theory/philosophy the definitional controversy is on at least two levels. First, there is a conflict over how the term politics is defined. I do not want to discuss the definitional debate itself, but simply to highlight that there is a dispute which has a bearing on how political philosophy is understood. Connolly argues that concepts within political study are highly contestable, including the term politics which has many conflicting and competing meanings.²⁶ This is based on Gallie's earlier philosophical conclusions that many concepts are 'essentially contested'²⁷ i.e. there are "fundamental differences of attitude, of a kind for which no logical justification can be given".²⁸ Second, the definition of the 'theory' of politics has also been controversial. For example, there is argument over the extent to which moral philosophy should be a part of political theory.²⁹ Within social policy analysis, definitional conflict also exists on more than one level. First, there is debate as to which policy areas the term 'social' might include. Indeed, Titmuss thought that: "The greatest semantic difficulty arises... with the word 'social'."³⁰ Second, there has been considerable dispute over the way social policy is best analysed. For example, Hood discusses the range of theoretical frameworks which have been applied to the study of Public Administration (which would include social policy). He argues that this has led to considerable analytical confusion regarding what is the proper concern of this subject area.³¹ The above controversies and complexities have led to political philosophers/theorists and social policy analysts using equivocal and oversimplified definitions when addressing the other's concerns. For example, Pierson has observed that the study of social policy has been increasingly colonised by political theory and the 'new political economy'.³² This has in part led to:

"... increasing support for the claim that the advanced capitalist societies are undergoing a process of transformation which is carrying them toward social and political arrangements which are, in some sense, beyond the welfare state."³³ (his emphasis)

However, Pierson's exploration of political theory mainly focuses on theories of the state and political/economic processes in relation to contemporary industrial capitalism.³⁴ Although these encompass a number of branches of political and economic theory, normative and philosophical considerations are not necessarily included Of course, I am not claiming that Pierson himself is unaware of this. However, it could be interpreted from his analysis of existing political theory literature that social policy has already been 'done' by political theory. This will have the effect of masking the limited application of philosophical considerations to this debate within social policy analysis. For example, part of Pierson's argument is critical of the assertions from political theory that we have gone 'beyond the welfare state'. Many of these assertions are seen as inadequate explanations of social policy development because, amongst other things, they exaggerate the choice between the welfare state and market economies.³⁶ Many of my arguments in Parts 2, 3 and 4 concur with these conclusions. However, I believe that political philosophy/normative debate (being an aspect of political theory) can provide explanations as to why the choice between the welfare state and market economies has been exaggerated. For example, it is inaccurate to assume that the welfare state can only exist in spite of market economies, because welfare state normative justifications often support and reflect the normative justifications of market economies. However, because issues often 'change weight' between social policy and political philosophy these shared justifications are often disguised.³⁷

Similarly, political philosophers have used over-simplified definitions when referring to social policy analysis and recommendation. For example, Goodin argues that if the New Right from the United States (US) and the UK extended its rationale to its logical conclusion, it would completely roll back the welfare state safety net³⁸ However, I argue throughout Parts 2, 3, and 4 not only that very few (if any) New Right proponents want to conclude this, but also that Goodin's philosophical understanding of the New Right's position underestimates the different types of specific policies the New Right have implemented and the various unexpected effects which these have had (effects which, I will argue, are nevertheless consistent with New Right normative beliefs). During recent Conservative administrations the level of funding of welfare programmes has remained more or less constant compared with Labour Government policies of the 1970s, but there have been various shifts in who provides the welfare, from the public to the private sector³⁹ It is important, therefore, to make a distinction between public finance and public provision of welfare programmes when understanding the development of UK social policy.⁴⁰ The rolling back or Restructuring of the welfare state has not happened in the way suggested by Goodin, rather there has been a restructuring of the provision of welfare. This restructuring has bolstered the private, voluntary and informal sectors as providers of welfare, to the detriment of the state as provider, but not to the detriment of the state as funder.

Taking into account the above complications, I will now provide a broad definition of social policy. It refers to policy which the state promotes, funds and/or provides, in regard to areas directly relating to the social welfare of its citizens.⁴¹ In the UK the social policy areas which the state is directly concerned...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• PART 1: BUILDING A BRIDGE BETWEEN SOCIAL POLICY AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
• PART 2: INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL POLICY: JUSTIFICATIONS FROM THE CENTRE-LEFT AND THE NEW RIGHT
• PART 3: EQUALITY AND SOCIAL POLICY: JUSTIFICATIONS FROM THE CENTRE-LEFT AND THE NEW RIGHT
• PART 4: THE CENTRE-LEFT AND THE NEW RIGHT: CONSENSUS OF WHAT AND WHY? - DEALING WITH VALUE CONFLICT
• Appendix Further explanatory details of matrix in Chapter 9
• Bibliography
• Index