Multiparty Democracy and Political Change

Constraints to Democratization in Africa

John Mukum Mbaku, Julius O. Ihonvbere

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781138323858
• eBook ISBN: 9780429835759
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

First published in 1998, This book is written by seasoned scholars of African Studies and it intended to make a significant contribution to the debate on democracy and democratization in the continent. It contains a rich mixture of analytical ideas and views on the transition to accountable, participatory, and democratic governance structures in Africa. It provides both students of African political economy and policymakers in the continent and in-depth analysis of the post-independence experience of African countries with institutional reforms. Specifically, it looks at the struggles of Africans, since independence, to provide themselves with more appropriate and viable governance structures and economic systems that enhance the ability to entrepreneurs to create wealth. The Book breaks new ground in that it places significant emphasis on the reconstruction of the neo-colonial state as an important first step to a successful transition to democratic and more accountable governance structures.

1 General introduction

Julius O. Ihonvbere and John Mukum Mbaku

Africa, like other third world regions, has experienced and continues to experience political changes of monumental proportions. Monumental, not in terms of the drastic restructuring of socio-economic and political spaces, but in the introduction of new forms of politics with potential for 'political deepening.' If we compare Africa's political landscape today to what it was at the beginning of the 1980s, one would almost fail to recognize it as the same continent. Not only have the contexts of politics and social action been altered significantly, but the discourse of politics has changed substantially. In fact, in many countries, the sites of politics have so profoundly affected that one can speak, though guidedly, of a 'political earthquake.' In paces such as Malawi, Benin, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, and Mali, new questions are being asked, new issues are being raised, civil society is being gradually invigorated, new leaders are emerging, and the older order is under increasing pressure.

To be sure, these developments have been profoundly affected by developments in the global system, in particular, the demise of the Soviet Union as a nation and super power, the triumph of the market, and more importantly, the end of the Cold War. The latter has eliminated (or in some cases, reduced) the traditional Cold War inspired support by the West and the Soviet bloc, of authoritarian leaders whose excesses were accommodated at the expense of the people. Of course, external developments, contrary to some opinions, only complemented internal alignments and realignments of political and social forces. Failed economic programs, the unequal distribution of the pains and costs of orthodox stabilization and structural adjustment programs, the delegitimization of the violent neo-colonial state, frustrations with existing institutions, and a new desire to end decades of oppression, violence, intimidation, waste and corruption, were some of the factors which galvanized communities to struggle for democracy. In these struggles, the people demanded national sovereign conferences, open elections, sharing of power, the overthrow of the old order, an end of military rule and patrimonial regimes, and constitutional engineering.

The political elites responded in different ways. Some resisted the calls for democracy and tried to discredit the opposition (Malawi, Kenya, Togo, and Cameroon). Others made concessions but tried to manage the concessions in such a way that the old order would survive intact and continue to monopolize the supply of legislation (Cameroon, Togo, Niger, and Tanzania). Still in other situations, incumbents conceded to national conferences in the hope that it would keep the opposition busy while the incumbents captured lost ground (Benin, Zaïre, and several other francophone countries). Yet, other ruling elites simply threw opposition leaders into jail and charged them with treason while making public statements as to how they planned to destroy the opposition (Malawi, Zambia, Kenya and Nigeria). In Ghana, and more recently, in the Gambia and Niger, the military leaders followed a trend set earlier by Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, Gnassingbe Eyadéma in Togo, and Ahmed Kerekou in Benin, of civilianizing themselves and trying to run a civilian agenda. In a few cases, some constitutional concessions were made, political prisoners released, cabinets were reshuffled, and salaries were increased for workers. These things were done in an effort to relegitimize the state and its agenda. Whatever the results-successful national conference in Benin and a stalemated one in Zaïre; ousting of the one-party regime in Zambia; civilianization of the junta in Ghana; and so on-all concessions showed a significant departure from the past and a steady, even if uncertain step towards an alternative political future.

Of course, the successes have been mixed. In Malawi and Zambia opposition forces succeeded in altering the leadership. In Algeria, the military terminated the rapid political rise of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). In Kenya, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Togo, the old order survived all pressures. In Cote d'Ivoire, the old order was slightly modified but kept intact. In Nigeria, the zig-zag process was stalemated and the political landscape was remilitarized with the General Sani Abacha coup. In Ghana, Jerry Rawlings civilianized himself and retained control of the political order. In Zimbabwe, the weakness and fragmentation of the opposition, coupled with the manipulative and repressive style of the Robert Gabriel Mugabe regime, ensured the retention of the old order. Of course, in South Africa, Nelson Mandela's election as president marked the political end of the minority apartheid regime. The fact is that in practically all African states today, opposition movements exist, mostly overtly, and in a few cases, covertly. This, certainly is indicative of a new birth for Africa.

It is important, however, to recognize the limitations of many of these movements and new opposition parties. Not one of them (except, perhaps the ANC in South Africa) can clearly and openly claim to have had nothing to do with the terrible past, which was characterized by exploitation and marginalization of the peasantry, suffocation of civil society, and economic plunder. Many of these parties remain urban-based, with very little or no room for women, and are generally conservative and status-quo oriented. As well, many have not been original or creative in their programs while they exhibit a poor ability to mobilize the people. Their politics have been superficial, opportunistic, personality-based, and diversionary. Elections have come to be equated with democracy and the search/struggle for raw power is evidence of dangers ahead. Many of the new movements are not just undemocratic, but they are impatient with democracy and all its rules and processes. Hence, it is not surprising that what starts off as a 'political earthquake' more often than not, settles into a minor 'ripple' as the old dictators recapture lost ground, domesticate and incorporate the opposition leaders, and reduce their political turf to the capital cities (Kenya, Cameroon, Togo, and Nigeria). The opposition parties and movements have been so divided, mostly over mundane and power issues that at the moment, they present very little or no threat to the incumbent dictator. Thus, in on instance have elections been able to drastically alter the status quo and deepen the political process significantly enough to give the people much hope for the future.

The international system itself has let Africa down significantly. Having imposed economic and political conditionalities on repressive and corrupt juntas in the continent, they have failed to follow these up with significant political, economic, and other resources needed for organization, mobilization, training, institution-building, and for politicking. Even Western-based election monitoring organizations have often failed to rally to the side of the opposition and to defend the elections they monitored as is illustrated by the Nigerian case. Even where legitimate elections are annulled, as in Nigeria, Western governments continue to do business as usual or simply impose weak and ineffective sanctions. Such double standards or weak responses have only encouraged the current manipulative restoration of military fragmentation of the prodemocracy movements, and the steady return to the status quo.

The situation in Africa therefore, is not unusual from developments in other developing regions, though it does have its own specifics. Change is taking place yet the status quo appears to be constant. The landscape is being opened up but the people remain in poverty and deprivation, and their communities marginalized. Civil society is expanding, yet it is home to all sorts of violent and primordial contradictions and pressures. Political opening is taking place, yet the room for participation remains rather constrained. The political environment is being liberalized yet the economy continues to deteriorate. New political parties are emerging, but they remain weak and elitist. Sacrifices are being made all over the continent but support from the international system remains small and unreliable. Do these developments necessarily mean that democracy has no future in Africa?

As the contributors to this volume show, there is hope for the future. The present might look confused, unsteady, uncertain, and still under the control of the old order. The reality however is different. The challenges which the regimes have faced in the last decade show clearly the reassertion of popular interests. The significant alignment and realignment of political forces also show that it is being realized that the challenge to the status quo requires new ideas and strategies. The institutions of authoritarianism, marginalization, and terror are being assaulted all over Africa through a complex variety of covert and overt strategies of resistance and protest. The mere fact that in many countries people can organize and independently seek new sources of support internally and abroad show that things are no longer at ease and certainly not the same. The critical challenges for the future in Africa will be how to deepen the present and articulate the necessary agenda for transcending existing contradictions within the opposition. The contributions to this volume provide the necessary insights into this.

Isolating critical themes and questions

Discussions on current political liberalization in Africa must avoid the pitfalls of the past. Such dialogue must avoid the repackaging of the old modernization themes and instead concentrate on addressing issues of specificity and relevance. It is equally important to transcend the cataloging of the so-called preconditions for democracy which are hardly applicable to the continent. An undue focus on the elite-led dimensions of the struggle for change must be avoided so that we can explore and relate to the dynamic processes of change within and between communities in their confrontations with the institutions of the old order. While the prodemocracy movements and opposition parties continue to seek aid and political support from abroad, they must be able to maintain their autonomy, originality, and refuse to adopt wholesale pre-packaged political programs and methods. Unfortunately, this is not happening at the moment as many African opposition groups see themselves more as affiliates or branches of donor organizations! This has made it necessary to identify some of the more critical issues identified and discussed in this volume. Here we simply draw attention to them so that readers can be sensitive to them. They are not necessarily in order of importance as what is of immediate importance in one country might not be of immediate criticality in another:

• The character of the opposition movements and new political parties: who formed them, how democratic are they, what are their programs, how integrated are such programs, what new issues/ideas do they address, and what new and creative alliances have they forged?
• The new leaders: what are their constituencies, how have they distanced themselves from the status quo and the past? What new issues do they bring into the struggle? How much of the styles of the past have they discarded in the ways they see politics, popular constituencies, the state, and the global environment?
• The economic and social agenda: are these merely replicas of the IMF and the World Bank orthodox stabilization and adjustment packages? How much safety nets have they thought of and what are their specific and broad programs for moving their respective social formations forward? What are the economic reform programs for rural areas, science and technology development, agriculture, industrialization, strengthening the market and other economic institutions?
• The repressive and non-hegemonic neo-colonial state: what should or can be done with the state? Given its past, what sort of reconstruction and engineering are required to ensure that that state does not continue to asphyxiate civil society and serve as an obstacle to democracy?
• The democracy/democratization debate: How much of this is clear in the programs and discourses of democracy? Are the movements and organizations as well as new leaders capable of deepening the processes of change to the level of democratization? In other words, can the present crop of leaders effectively engage in the systematic and steady empowerment of the people and their communities in a way that empowers them to dictate, determine, and shape the processes of change?
• The international community: how is this understood and related to by forces and institutions on the ground? How is the international environment and its component actors-donors, leaders, the UN, the multilaterals, transnational corporations, international NGOs, financial markets, and so on, shape the struggles at the local levels?
• Primordial loyalties, contradictions, and conflicts: issues of ethnicity, religion, region, and gender. How do these come into play in the liberalization processes? How are popular organizations and the new parties and leaders responding to these contradictions? What levels of ingenuity can we deduce from their programs to avoid the emerging cases of violence and intolerance?
• Constitutionalism and constitutional engineering: is liberalization taking place within the context of past political arrangements? If changes are to take place, how will constitutional engineering address issues of inequality, marginalization, and domination? Will minorities be accorded better treatment? How will hitherto excluded communities and constituencies be incorporated into the political and economic system without creating new basis for conflict and violence?
• Gender/women issues: how do the new movements address issues of gender imbalances, especially in terms of property rights, the rules of inheritance, and opportunities within the political and social system? How do these leaders address the specific case of women who have been marginalized for so long in the political process? What room for participation do women in the new movement and political parties?
• Civil society: how is this conceptualized? What programs are being initiated to strengthen civil society? Is it treated in a dynamic or instrumental sense? Do the new movements realize that civil society is not always good, that it is not a 'good guys' versus 'bad guys' issue and that civil society can also be the home of violent, opportunistic, corrupt, and intolerant activities?
• The old leadership: how is it adjusting to the pressures for change? Is it willing to make concessions, contest for authority under new rules, and willing to respect the will of the people? How is it trying to contain, mediate, domesticate, or eliminate the opposition? Will such strategies culminate in transition, violence, stalemate or accommodation?
• The military: what is its current role in the political process? How solid is its unity? How has it served as supporter or obstacle of the liberalization process? What can we anticipate its role to be in the future? What suggestions do the new parties and movements have to contain the military and make it subordinate to civil order?
• The trade unions, student unions, peasant associations, churches, and other popular constituencies: what role do they play in the liberalization process? Have they been suppressed in the past and what overt and covert strategies have they adopted in the past to survive state repression? Are there critical political intersections in which they intervened and pushed the political process forward?
• Consolidating new democracies: what is/are required to consolidate the new democracy? Are there structural and institutional obstacles to regime consolidation? What contributions are needed from the outside to consolidate the new democracy and what are the internal obstacles?

These are just some areas which are addressed by the contributions to this volume. It is the expectation of the editors and the contributors that the issues raised here, while not definitive in any respect, in terms of being the final word, will further the debate of Africa's democratization.

2 Where is the third wave? A critical evaluation of Africa’s non-transition to democracy

Julius O. Ihonvbere

After raising hopes of a major political renewal, Africa's 'second wave' of democratization seems to be running out of steam. Afro-pessimism is again in fashion and many feel that the emergent trends are better captured by the incessant bloodshed in Liberia, Somalia, and Burundi than by the few success stories represented by South Africa, Botswana, and Benin (Lemarchand, 1995, p.1; see also Le march and, 1992, pp.178-85).

Just as it was during the struggle for independence, there is a contradiction between the deepest aspirations of the masses who constitute the rank and file of the democracy movement and the narrow class interests of its leadership (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1995, p.2).

Now that the euphoria over the so-called 'second revolution' or the 'third wave' of democracy in Africa is dying down somewhat, we are beginning to see more cautious or nuanced examination and interpretations of the dynamics and patterns of politics in the continent. It is increasingly being realized that while some form of political liberalization is taking place in the continent—certainly a breath of fresh air— the underlying dynamic of the process has not resulted in a drastic or radical restructuring of the context and content of politics (Ake, 1993, 1991a, 1991b). At one level, it is correct to say that 'Africa has ever since witnessed the growth of a new social movement for political change. In many ways, this movement bears resemblance to the struggle for independence in the 1950s and early 1960s. While 30 or so years apart, the two movements have in common a deep popular aspiration for a better life economically and socially (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1995, p.1). However, this is only at a superficial level. Of course, the nationalists of the 1960s, save for a few exceptions, sought first the political kingdom and failed to achieve any substantial progress on economic, social, and cultural levels. By the mid-1960s, they had degenerated to levels which were similar to or much worse than what the colonial state represented. Repression, corruption, mediocrity, violence, manipulation of primordial interests, economic decay and subservience, and the concentration of resources in a few places, came to characterize African social formations. In no country did the elites live up to the promises of the nationalist struggles. Thus in large measure, contemporary, 'new' world order liberalization processes resemble in everyway, the struggles of limited objectives in the 1960s which culminated in the consolidation, rationalization, and reproduction of unequal and exploitative neocolonial relations (Africa News, 1992; Chazan, 1992; Joseph, 1991).

The on-going processes represent the interests of the corrupt and very irresponsible African elite; hardly challenge the structures and interests of the repressive neo-colonial state; are excessively focused on the capture of raw political power; have very little room for women; are largely urban-based; and unduly personalize the fundamental political contradictions in the respective countries. In this chapter we raise some of these issu...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Tables
• List of contributors
• About the African Studies and Research Forum
• Acknowledgments
• 1 General introduction
• 2 Where is the third wave? A critical evaluation of Africa's non-transition to democracy
• 3 Structural adjustment programs and democratization in Africa: the case of Mauritania
• 4 Bureaucratic corruption and the crisis of political reforms in Africa
• 5 National conferences and democratization in Francophone Africa
• 6 Nigeria: how to derail a transition program
• 7 State collapse and democratic construction: prospects for Liberia
• 8 Women and political participation in Kenya: evaluating the interplay of gender, ethnicity, class and state
• 9 Democracy and democratization in Cameroon: living with the dual heritage
• 10 How not to consolidate a democracy: the experience of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in Zambia
• 11 South Africa's first democratic elections and their political context
• 12 Beyond Mobutu: the opposition and the struggle for democracy in Zaire
• 13 Assessing the future of democracy in Africa: internal and external challenges