The 'Metaphysica' of Avicenna (ibn S?n?)

A critical translation-commentary and analysis of the fundamental arguments in Avicenna's 'Metaphysica' in the 'D?nish N?ma-i 'al?'?' ('The Book of Scientific Knowledge')

Parviz Morewedge

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781317366102
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Teología y religión
• Subtopic: Religión

In this book, first published in 1973, Professor Parviz Morewedge, an expert on Islamic philosophy and mysticism, provides a critical exposition of one text of ibn Sina (Avicenna), the great Persian philosopher who lived from 980 to 1037. The text is his Metaphysica in the Danish Nama-I 'ala'I ( The Book of Scientific Knowledge ). In addition to a translation of the text from Persian into English, this edition includes a critical commentary on the major arguments found in the text, and notes and references to other texts of ibn Sina as well as to relevant texts of Greek philosophers, particularly Aristotle, Plotinus and Proclus. There is also a glossary of the key terms used in the Metaphysica, with their Persian, Arabic, Greek and Latin equivalents where necessary. This book is concerned primarily to show that although in the text ibn Sina resorts to the Aristotelian vocabulary and Neo-Platonic themes, and appears to be in accord with the Islamic tradition, there is evidence that many doctrines expressed by him may be considered non-Greek and non-Islamic. These include his peculiar doctrine of Self ( nafs ) and the doctrine of the Necessary Existent ( wajib al-wujud ). The author attempts to clarify the extent to which salient features of ibn Sina's position are in agreement with what may be regarded as Sufic doctrines.

Part 1 The Text

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Blessing be upon His Prophet Muḥammad and on all his descendants.

The Text

1. The beginning of first philosophy¹

First Chapter: the number of philosophical sciences

For each science² there is a subject matter (chīzī) the condition of which is investigated by that science.³ Subject matter is of two kinds: the one which depends for its being on our action (fi‘l), and the other which does not depend for its being (hastī) on our action. An example of the first is our behaviour; examples of the second are the earth, the heaven, animals, and plants. Thus, intellectual sciences are of two kinds. The one which informs us of the condition of our action (kunish) is named practical science (‘ilm-i ‘amali), because its purpose is to inform us of what we should do in order to organize our affairs in this world properly and to insure that our affairs in the other world will be according to our hopes. The other informs us about the nature of the being of objects (hastī-i chīzhā) so that our soul (anima; jān; rawān; nafs; psychē) may find its own proper form (ṣurat) and may be fortunate in the other world, as we shall explain at the proper place. This science is named speculative science (‘ilm-i naẓarī).⁴

From each of these two sciences we derive three sciences. There are three practical sciences. The first is the science of public management (tadbīr-i ‘āmm) which assures us about associations (anbāzī) for which there is a need to be orderly. And this is of two kinds. The first concerns the nature of religious laws (chigūnagī-isharāyi’), and the second concerns the nature of the science of politics (siyāsāt). While the science of religious laws is the root (aṣl) of the science of politics, the latter is the branch (shākh) and the substitute for the former.⁵ Another is the science of house-hold management (tadbīr-i khāna) which is meant to regulate the associations taking place in a house between husband and wife, father and child, and master and slave. The third is the science of the self (khwud), specifying how man should be with his own self (nafs-i khwish). Since it is man’s condition to be alone or to be in association with others, and since associations are either with members of a household (ham khānagān) or with fellow citizens (ham shahrīyān), there are three kinds of practical sciences governing these associations: that of civic management (tadbīr-i shahr), that of household management (tadbīr-i khīna), and finally that of management of the self (tadbīr-i khwud).⁶

The speculative science (naẓarī) is of three kinds: one is named first philosophy (barīn), the science of primordials (pishīn) of that which is beyond nature (sipas-i ṭabī’at); another is an intermediate science (miyāngīn) which is called the science of syntax and mathematics (farhang wa riyāḍat); it is also called an instructive science (‘ilm-i ta’līmī); the other is called a natural science or inferior science (‘ilm-i ṭabī‘ī; zīrīrīn). The tripartite division of these sciences is due to the fact that things are classified only into three kinds. Either (i) their being (i.e. that of the subject matter of these sciences) is in no way connected (basta) to sensible matter, mixture (āmīzish), and motion (junbish). Hence, they can be imagined (taṣawwur) without being united (paiwand) with matter and motion, such as intelligence (‘aql), being (hastī), unity (waṭdat), being a cause (‘illatī), being an effect (ma‘lūmī), and whatever is similar. These conditions (ḥālhā) are conceivable (taṣawwur) without sensibles. Therefore, it is possible to conceive of subject matter independent of sensibles. Or (2) there are other kinds of subjects whose beings are not separated (judā) from sensible matter and things in motion. The imagination can separate these, however, because, by definition, they are not necessarily connected to a body of sensible matter nor to what is susceptible to motion. Examples of these are triangularity, squareness, roundness, and length, which can be predicated of gold, silver, wood, or clay. However, humanity and whatever resembles it cannot be defined by such an idea (ma’na) because humanity is related to a determinate matter and cannot be separated from matter by means of the imagination. Triangles or squares, however, cannot exist (maujūd) without being in a body. It is nevertheless possible to define them and to imagine them without reference to matter. Or (3) other kinds of subjects are such that their being is in materials, and defining and imagining them are related to matter and to the nature of motion, as was clarified by means of our previous example.⁷

There is, then, a science that investigates the nature of entities which are not in a constant state of dependency (niyāzmand) on matter and movement. Thus, it is possible that there is (buwad) among the subjects one kind that is never united (pawand) with matter, such as intelligence and truth (‘aql wa ḥaqq), as shall be known.⁸ There are entities which may be mixed (āmzish) with matter and movement, but their nature is not necessarily related to matter and to movement. An example of these subjects is causality (‘illati) which can either be in a body or be a property of an intelligence. That science having such a subject matter is first philosophy (‘ilm-i harān). And that science is called the science of mathematics (‘ilm-i riyāḍt) which knows the nature of those subjects which in their state of being (hastī) have no choice but to be united with matter, although no particular matter is specified for them, such as figure (shakl) and numerosity (shuwār), which are conditions known by the science of axiomatics (angārish). And the third is natural science (‘ilm-i ṭabā‘ī). In this book our discourse (sukhun) and our observations (nigarish) are directed towards these three kinds of speculative sciences.

2. Finding the subject-matter (mauḍū’āt) of these speculative sciences so that the subject-matter of first philosophy may be discovered

Among these three sciences, natural science is closer to man and most comprehensible to (yāft) him, although it contains more uncertainties than other sciences. The subject-matter of this science is sensible matter which is to be investigated from the point of view of its states, such as being movable, being changeable, having parts (pāra-hā), and having boundaries (kanāra-hā). The other science is the science of mathematics about which there are very few uncertainties and disagreements (tashwīshwa ikhtilāf) because it is removed from motion and change. Considered in general terms its subject matter is ‘quantity’ (chandī) and, considered in detail, its subject-matter is ‘size and numerosity’ (andāya washumār).¹ The science of geometry, the science of arithmetics, the science of astronomy (hai’āt-i ‘ālani), the science of music, the science of optics (‘ilm-i manāẓir), the science of mechanics (‘ilm-i athqāl). the science of mobile spheres (‘ilm-i ukar-i mutaḥarrik), the science of observations by means of instruments (‘ilm-i ḥiyal), and any science that is similar to these belongs to mathematics. The subject-matter of philosophy, however, is not a particular (juz’ī) thing; rather, it is absolute being (hastī-i muṭlaq), and thus first philosophy is absolute.² Its problems result from those conditions whose being arises out of itself and has essence, as was discussed under the doctrine of demonstration (burhān). The ‘whichness’ (kudāmi-i) of these states is determined by those states (ḥāl-hā) in which being an existent (maujūd) and having being are not due to (qibal) quantity nor to movement (ḥaraka). All in all, the subject-matter (mauḍu‘) of this one science (i.e. first philosophy), is different from the subject-matter of the other two sciences since its subject-matter is that aspect of being which is being-qua-being. We shall cite examples of these three states.³

Being even, being odd, being round, being three-sided, or being long, is not primarily due to its state of being-qua-being since there must first be numerosity (shumār) for a being in order that there may be oddness or evenness. There must be measurability in order that there may be circularity, three-sidedness, or length. But turning a being white or black is not related to its state as a being, nor to its numerosity or measurability, but it is related to its being a matter susceptible to change and to motion (junbish).

Whereas the states of being a universal (kullī būdan), being a particular (juz’ī būdan), being a potentiality (baquwwat būdan), being a necessity (har āyinagī būdan), being a cause (‘illat būdan), being an effect (ma‘lūl būdan), being a substance (jauhar būdan), and being an accident (‘araḍ būdan) are (primarily) related to being-qua-being, they are not due to being a quantity, nor to being susceptible to motion (junbish padhīrī). Similar to these is being one (yakī būdan), being many (bisyār būdan), being in agreement (mauwāfiq būdan), or being in disagreement (mukhālif būdan), and whatever is analogous to these.

For this science it is necessary to consider those causes which belong to the entire realm of being – not just those belonging to the mathematical or to the natural sciences alone.⁴ The recognition (shinākhtan) of the creator (āfrīdagār) of all things, his unity (yagānagī-i), and the union (pawand) of all things with him belong to this science. That part of this science which investigates the unity of God (tauḥīd) in particular is called the science of metaphysical theology (‘ilm-i ilāhī), or the science of the sovereignty of God (‘ilm-i rubūbāya).⁵ The foundations of all other sciences are built upon this science. Traditionally this science is taught last, although in reality (ḥaqīqa) it comes first. We, however, shall make an effort to teach it first and to make it comprehensible subtly by means of the power of God, the Exalted, whose glory is majestic.

3. The primary analysis of the nature (ḥal) of being (hastī), its application to numerous things (uftādan), and an introduction to the exposition of substance

Being (hastī) is recognized (bashināsad) by reason itself (kh iradkhwud) without the aid of definition (ḥadd) or description (rasm). Since it has no definition, it has neither genus (jins) nor differentia (faṣl) because nothing is more general (’dmmtar) than it.¹ Being does not have a description since nothing is better known (ma’rūf) than it. It is possible that one can recognize its name in one language by means of another language. Thus, by some means, it is possible to acquaint someone with what is meant by a term like being. For example, if being appears in Arabic, it can be explained in Persian, and one can indicate (ishārat) that it is that from which all other things are derived.

In its first division (awwalīn qismat), being is prima facie of two kinds: the one is called substance (jauhar) and the other accident (‘araḍ).² Accident is that whose being subsists in something else, so ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Foreword
• Preface
• Note on the Text
• Transliteration Symbols
• Abbreviations and Sources
• Introduction
• Part I The Text
• Part 2 Commentary
• Glossary to Key Terms
• Name Index
• Subject Index