India--Myanmar Relations

Changing contours

Rajiv Bhatia

• Publisher: Routledge India
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781317399155
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book provides a comprehensive evaluation of India's multi-faceted relations with Myanmar. It unravels the mysteries of the complex polity of Myanmar as it undergoes transition through democracy after long military rule. Based on meticulous research and understanding, the volume traces the trajectory of India–Myanmar associations from ancient times to the present day, and offers a fascinating story in the backdrop of the region's geopolitics. An in-depth analysis of 'India–Myanmar–China Triangle' brings out the strategic stakes involved.

It will be of great interest to researchers and scholars of international relations, peace and conflict studies, defence and strategic studies, politics, South and Southeast Asian studies, as well as policy-makers and political think tanks.

Chapter 1

Changing Myanmar

Our heritage is proud and strong, but our true history lies ahead.

– U Nu¹

International relations is a vast and ever-evolving subject that covers global, regional and subregional issues. But one of its most basic segments is the study and analysis of relations between two or more states. Understanding and interpreting relations between two neighbouring countries in the light of regional and international developments; social, cultural, economic, political and strategic factors; and the history of evolution of those relations constitutes its essential part.

Relations among neighbouring nations are much at stake, including security, peace, development and well-being of the peoples concerned. In the case of individuals, neighbours, like relatives, are a given; unlike friends, they cannot be chosen. This applies to nations too. Hence investing in strengthening the relations with neighbours is wise. Such endeavours are moulded not only by the two neighbours in question, but also by other nations in the region and outsiders. What is noteworthy is that often management of ties between them transcends the domain of foreign policy, thus taking us into a deeper realm of national psyche, belief, identity, perception and mutuality of interests that bind the two societies and the two peoples. Bilateral relations thus are not merely a foreign policy matter; they touch upon a more fundamental layer of bonds.

India’s relationship with Burma/Myanmar is a case in point. At its root lies an enduring affinity created by geographical contiguity, civilisational linkages, cultural interaction and shared political experiences. A commonality of strategic, political and development perspectives impacts as well as sustains their relations or what may be called their linked destiny.

Defining South Asia

In South Asia, there exists, buried under a thick blanket of diversities, differences, disputes and dogmas, an innate sense of unity, created by the region’s clearly defined geographical features, shared spiritual and cultural heritage and common historical experience. A continuing jostling between the two elements – unity and diversity – and the failure of the region’s leaders and elites to achieve an adequate harmonisation between the two elements as a basis of common action might explain why the region is yet to begin playing the role that it should, on the world stage.² From this perspective, a study of India’s relations with its neighbours enjoys an extraordinary importance that goes well beyond the region.

The significance of India’s neighbours in its foreign policy cannot be overemphasised. As Muchkund Dubey, former foreign secretary, aptly put it: ‘… a country is judged by the world through the prism of its neighbours’ perception. And India is no exception to this.’³

Even a fleeting look at South Asia’s map is enough to convince one that the region is bigger than the geographical spread of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and that the country with two names – Burma and Myanmar – forms as much a part of South Asia as of Southeast Asia. Hence it has rightly been depicted as ‘the gateway’, ‘the bridge’ between the two regions or ‘the crossroads’ where India, China and Southeast Asia ‘meet’, creating an array of linkages as well as risks and opportunities for various stakeholders.

Among India’s seven ‘immediate’ or ‘next door’ neighbours in SAARC and Myanmar (which has the status of ‘Observer’ in the regional grouping), it is possible to point to a special subcategory of four nation-states that were linked uniquely in the past. They are India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. The first three were one country – ‘India’ – until the partition in 1947 when Pakistan emerged as a new state. In 1971, East Pakistan broke away from Pakistan to emerge as Bangladesh. What is often forgotten is that pre-partition India had Burma as its component for 52 years from 1885 when the Raj annexed it to British India, governing it first from Calcutta and then from Delhi. This ended in 1937 when Burma became a self-standing British colony, having been separated from India after considerable debate and agitation.⁴

In recognition perhaps of this historical legacy and of Myanmar’s status as an immediate neighbour with which India shares both land and maritime borders, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) gives to its eastern neighbour a special position. The ministry’s Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Myanmar (BSM) division, unlike those divisions that handle bilateral and regional issues relating to other member-states of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), was supervised directly by the foreign secretary. As the highest ranking civil servant in the ministry and its chief coordinator, he or she reports to the political leadership in discharging his or her responsibility to manage relations with all the states in South Asia, as defined by the ministry.⁵

Mutual importance

Although often in discussions on India–Myanmar relations, more attention is paid as to why Myanmar is important to India, one may begin by examining first the nature and magnitude of India’s importance to Myanmar.

Religion and ethnicity may be considered as the most powerful factors in this context. To those living in Yangon and thus exposed to the heartland of Bamar or Burman (i.e. the majority ethnic group) culture, it is evident that the Buddhist connection has been the most compelling and lasting bond between the two societies. The legend of the Shwedagon Pagoda – that in its womb are buried strands of Lord Buddha’s hair, gifted by him to two Burmese merchants – lives on.⁶ The belief that Buddha visited the land, that India’s King Ashoka built pagodas in the country and the knowledge that Buddhism originated in India are widely shared. The dream of an average Buddhist in Myanmar is to visit, pray and pay obeisance, at least once in a lifetime, at Bodh Gaya in Bihar, the site where Siddhartha achieved enlightenment, thus becoming the Buddha over 2,500 years ago. History tells us that Buddha relics, Buddhist texts and monks, brought later from Sri Lanka in the eleventh century, contributed to the revival and spread of Buddhism. Theravada Buddhism became the dominant faith. This makes Sri Lanka, too, a special partner and friend for the Burmese, but India undoubtedly enjoys the pre-eminent position as a truly sacred land, the fountain of the path to spiritual salvation – nirvana.

A collective memory of interaction and exchanges – philosophical, spiritual, cultural and commercial – between the two lands persists. The connections established during the Raj and freedom struggle as well as after the attainment of independence are remembered. The presence of a large Indian origin population in Yangon and other urban centres and villages is a reality that cannot be ignored. Respect for India as a rising power and a fast-growing economy is acknowledged widely.⁷ From a geopolitical viewpoint, Myanmar has always been aware of the risks of proximity to its giant neighbour in the north – China. Relations with India, on the one hand, and with ASEAN, on the other, represent critical elements in the country’s endeavour to maintain its independence. A combination of multiple factors thus motivates Myanmar’s policymakers as well as the Burmese people to recognise that India is highly relevant to the country’s national interests.

Seen from India, Myanmar’s importance may be somewhat unclear, but it has been explained very well by experts. Dr Rupakjyoti Borah, an academic, listed five specific reasons in this context.⁸ J. N. Dixit, former foreign secretary, identified five different factors, calling them the ‘truisms of Indo-Myanmar relations of contemporaneous history’.⁹ Myanmar’s relevance to India is best appreciated by measuring the weight of geographical contiguity and ethnic affinity. Long before the two countries became independent nation-states, diverse tribes such as Mizos, Nagas, Kukis, Tangkhul and Paites living in the border regions enjoyed – as they do even now – close familial, community-related, linguistic, religious and cultural ties. They visited and traded with each other freely, shifted residence, shared farming and grazing fields and generally helped each other in times of need or adversity. Only when the British arrived to govern the region, the modern concept of national borders was introduced.

Myanmar’s military and strategic significance for India can hardly be overemphasised. If this country were to be under the control of another power, it could pose a serious threat to India’s security. Writing in 1943, at the time of Japanese occupation of Burma, K. M. Panikkar, the renowned scholar-diplomat, observed:

the defence of Burma is in fact the defence of India and it is India’s primary concern no less than Burma’s to see that its frontiers remain inviolate. In fact no responsibility can be considered too heavy for India when it comes to the question of defending Burma.¹⁰

Many years after India and Burma had attained independence, international boundaries were finalised and demarcated. But the inexorable logic of geography and ethnicity and their strong combined impact on history continues to be felt today, leading to a widely held view that the security, stability and socio-economic development of India’s North East Region (NER) are inextricably linked to those of western Myanmar, especially parts of the Sagaing division, Kachin, Chin and Rakhine states that are situated along the four Indian states – Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram.

Myanmar’s attractiveness in India’s eyes has gone up considerably in the past two decades, particularly after the South Block turned its gaze eastwards, launching India’s Look East Policy (LEP).¹¹ It is neither an accident nor a coincidence that both the LEP and the strategic shift from India’s exclusive engagement with the pro-democracy movement to stepping up the level and range of relationship with the military government in Myanmar came around the same time, that is in the early 1990s. All these developments are attributed aptly to the then prime minister P. V. Narasimha Rao. Myanmar’s position within ASEAN has strengthened progressively. With the ASEAN chair for 2014 held by Myanmar, the country’s appeal for India increased further. Moreover, while looking at the larger region, India and Myanmar have continued to strive for stronger connectivity and cooperation within various subregional frameworks.

‘The China factor’ operates from both sides of the India–Myanmar border. Given an essentially adversarial relationship between India and China, which is also marked by substantial elements of cooperation and competition, it is quite natural for India – as indeed for China – to be engaged in a continuing process to seek Myanmar’s friendship. For India, it is not merely a question of winning political or economic advantage; it impacts directly on India’s national security. Myanmar is perceived as ‘a buffer state’, one that should not be used as a base for activities injurious to internal security or to India’s defence against external threats. Of late, the traditional concepts of security and defence appear to be evolving in the direction where they are seen as linked to, and dependent on, economic development of the region concerned. The argument of this school of thinking is that instead of raising walls, it would be desirable to bring them down and ensure integrated development of the border areas, involving all relevant neighbours – Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar and others. The case for broader, transborder connectivity and joint development projects is a compelling one, but it is not backed by consensus yet, least of all in India. Nevertheless its time may be approaching, particularly with China and India having reached a broad agreement on the BCIM Economic Corridor.¹²

Another factor explaining Myanmar’s significance for India has been the former’s size and economic attractiveness. It is not a small neighbour (Map 1). Myanmar’s land area is about 20 per cent of India’s, and its population is less than 5 per cent of India’s 1.2 billion people. Traditionally Indians, especially those living in Myanmar, refer to Burma as ‘the land of Lord Brahma’,¹³ endowed with richness and creativity, and also as a part of ‘the Suvarnabhumi’ or ‘the Golden Land’.¹⁴ For centuries, Indians travelled to this fabulous land. In British times, hundreds of thousands of Indians were taken there, to be employed as labourers and farmers. Others went there on their own volition, attracted by the economic opportunity it offered, to work as government officials, professionals and private entrepreneurs. The lure of the market becko...