Leibniz on Freedom and Determinism in Relation to Aquinas and Molina

Didier Njirayamanda Kaphagawani

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9780429813801
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

First published in 1999, this volume considers the 17th century philosopher Leibniz and his views on Freedom and Determinism, aiming to show that his solution is in many respects superior to those of Aquinias and Molina. The author thoroughly explores Leibniz in the light of Aquinas and Molina, first examining their positions on freedom and determinism, followed by Leibniz on freedom, contingency and determinism, the denial of freedom of pure indifference, freedom and divine foreknowledge and major interpretations of his philosophy.

1 Introduction

1.1 Approach to Leibniz

Leibniz is a seventeenth century philosopher and therefore belongs to the history of philosophy. Hence writing a work on his views on freedom and determinism presupposes, among other things, making assumptions as to how the history of philosophy in general is to be approached. It is therefore necessary to spell out, at the outset, the approach taken in this book towards the history of philosophy is general, and to Leibniz in particular.

One of the dominant approaches to the history of philosophy in the twentieth century Anglo-American tradition has been that in which considerable emphasis is laid on the tenability of the philosopher’s views and doctrines, insisting on their truth or falsehood, and disregarding the intellectual atmosphere in which the philosopher in question operated. This approach, as rightly pointed out by Ross, G.,¹ takes philosophy to be radically different from its history, thus divorcing the history of philosophy qua philosophy from its history qua history. Russell, Professor Strawson, and Professor Mates have championed this position. Indeed in the Preface to his book on Leibniz, Russell makes it quite clear that:

there remains always a purely philosophical attitude towards previous philosophers - an attitude in which, without regard to dates or influences, we seek to discover what are the great types of possible philosophies, ... and among his opinions, when these have been ascertained, it becomes desirable to prune away such as seem inconsistent with his main doctrines, before these doctrines themselves are subjected to a critical scrutiny.²

In this same vein, Mates maintains that any philosopher in the history of philosophy should be subjected ‘to the most careful and penetrating scrutiny of which we are capable, using every distinction and insight no matter its source, that has any merit’.³ And a still more radical example of this same approach is that held by Strawson. In Individuals he explicitly says, of Leibniz’s theory of monads:

I refer, with a certain qualification, to Leibniz’s system of monads. The qualification is this: that when I refer to the system of Leibniz, I shall not be so much concerned if the views I discuss are not identical at all points with the views held by the historical philosopher of the name. I shall use the name ‘Leibniz’ to refer to a possible philosopher at least very similar to Leibniz in certain doctrinal respects; whether or not they are indiscernible in these respects matters little.⁴

Thus what becomes apparent from this extraordinary remark of Strawson is that what he presents as Leibniz’s philosophy is not necessarily Leibniz’s, but rather what he believes Leibniz ought to have held. This is one of the major difficulties of an anti-historic approach to the history of philosophy. It runs the risk of failing to make a distinction between what the philosopher ‘himself actually intended, and perverse interpretations imposed upon his writings by anti-historical commentators’.⁵

However, to point out these risks to which this approach is susceptible is not at all to assert that past philosophers should not be interpreted critically. Rather, it is merely to point out that in spite of the role interpretation has to play in the history of philosophy, it runs the risk of making ‘much past philosophy seem wrong-headed and unintelligible’.⁶ As Mates’ remark above makes quite clear, this approach boils down to assessing the past philosophers from our perspective, with all the benefit of hindsight, and not ‘in their own terms’. Taking Leibniz as an example, it is misleading for any commentator to employ the analytic-synthetic distinction precisely because this distinction is post-Leibnizian. For although Leibniz might be said to have prepared the way for the Kantian distinction by his analytic definition of truth, the crucial difference between Leibniz and Kant lies in the fact that Leibniz recognized only the concepts of individuals in God’s mind, whereas Kant assumed that human concepts are only universals, and incomplete in the case of individuals.

Besides, this anti-historistic approach assumes mistakenly that the commentator has a better conceptual framework than that within which the past philosopher operated.⁷ In making this presumption, this approach runs the danger not only of eliminating ‘precisely the element of conceptual difference which is essential for conserving that which has not been incorporated in the new’,⁸ but also of overlooking the fact that it ‘is no compliment to major figures of the past to pretend that they were trying to align their thoughts with those of perhaps lesser thinkers of a later age’.⁹ Indeed, as Professor Brown has rightly observed, although particular attention needs to be given to coherence and consistency in the past philosopher, in this case Leibniz, ‘much is lost if the twentieth century student of Leibniz refuses to look at Leibniz in his own terms’.¹⁰

However, to insist that past philosophers should be examined ‘in their own terms’, is not at all to suggest that their doctrines should be treated rather like unexamined parcels, changing hands from one commentator to another; it is to seek to capture as closely as possible what the past philosopher actually meant. To do that is not at all to retrieve philosophical truths from a historical scrap heap; it is merely to be as sympathetic as possible to the past philosopher.¹¹

Thus the approach adopted in this study is a synthesis between taking Leibniz as much on his terms as possible, presenting him as ‘a model of what philosophy might be’,¹² and evaluating his views critically.

1.2 Aims of the Study

The main aim of this study is to show that, despite the difficulties Leibniz’s conception of freedom raises for his metaphysics, his solution of the problem of freedom and necessity is in many respects superior to those of Aquinas and Molina. Chapters 2 and 3 are expositions of Aquinas’ and Molina’s views on freedom and determinism respectively.

Now, it is important to point out here that, although Leibniz was indeed vehemently opposed to some of the positions of the Reformers, we have not discussed them in this study in order to stay clear of pure theological controversies, and to keep the discussion within manageable limits. This also applies to the exposition of Molina’s doctrine of Scientia media in Chapter 3. True, Molina propounds this doctrine within the theological issues of simultaneous divine concourse, prevenient grace, efficacious grace, sufficient and congruous grace. But in this study not much attention has been given to all these theological variants of the doctrine, emphasizing only its philosophical aspects.

Now, to write on Leibniz’s views on freedom and necessity is not at all to suggest that nothing has so far been written on this topic. Rather, it is to fill in a gap in the literature on Leibniz. Leibniz’s views on freedom and necessity have indeed been considered and examined in recent works. For instance Professor Parkinson’s Leibniz on Human Freedom covers this topic in detail, but it does not examine Leibniz’s conception of freedom in relation to his philosophical doctrines.¹³ However, Ross’s¹⁴ Leibniz and Brown’s Leibniz'¹⁵ and Mates’ Philosophy of Leibniz do examine Leibniz’s conception of freedom in relation to his other doctrines; but what is lacking in them is an examination of the significance of Leibniz’s conception of freedom in relation to those of Aquinas and Molina. Indeed, Leibniz’s treatment of the problem of freedom and necessity very much hinges on finding a synthesis of what is right in his predecessors. It is this gap in the literature that this study intends to fill. For, as this study is to show, the ingenuity of Leibniz’s conception of freedom lies in his account of the nature of pure possibles on which contingency hinges.

However, it should be admitted that difficulties abound in Leibniz, and this is no surprise considering the intellectual front he sought to advance. Thus we have attempted to present Leibniz as fairly as we possibly could, defending him against the many criticisms that have been levelled. Taking Leibniz as we have done has the advantage of highlighting the ingenuity of his solution to the problem of freedom and necessity in the light of those of Aquinas and Molina. However, empathizing with him in this way runs the danger of excessive partiality towards his position; but we have not hesitated to criticize his position where appropriate.

1.3 Structure of the Study

Chapters 2 and 3 are respectively an exposition and discussion of Aquinas’ and Molina’s views on freedom and determinism. These chapters are all- important because Leibniz regarded his conception of freedom and determinism both as a synthesis of Thomism and Molinism, and as a clarification of a coniusion inherent in both libertarianism and necessitarianism.

On the problem of freedom and necessity Leibniz distinguished three categories of his predecessors and contemporaries. On the one extreme were what he called ‘blind or absolute necessitarians’, and on the other, absolute libertarians. Between these two extremes were, for lack of a better term, what could be termed ‘quasi-necessitarians’ or determinists.

According to Leibniz, Luther, Calvin and Spinoza were absolute necessitarians who professed a thoroughgoing blind necessity, rendering obsolete and meaningless the notion of freedom. Leibniz has these in mind when he writes:

These are the philosophers who have maintained that there is nothing possible except that which actually happens. These are those same people who thought or could have thought that all is necessary unconditionally. Some were of this opinion because they admitted a brute and blind necessity in the cause of the existence of things.¹⁶

This category of philosophers never won Leibniz’s admiration. In fact, Leibniz was so opposed to them that he continues, after the above passage, to say that ‘it is these I have most reason for opposing’. And again, while admitting the obscurity and prolixity of Spinoza on the issue of the divine will and divine intellect, Leibniz ridicules Spinoza by remarking: ‘We will not waste time here (in the Theodicy) in refuting an opinion so bad, and indeed so inexplicable’.¹⁷

To the quasi-necessitarians, Leibniz was to some extent quite sympathetic. According to him these were not necessitarians of the Spinozistic sort; rather they ended up with necessitarian conclusions due to a misconception of some fundamental terms. In this category Leibniz ha...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Thomas Aquinas on Freedom and Determinism
• 3 Louis Molina on Freedom and Determinism
• 4 Leibniz’s Conception of Freedom
• 5 Leibniz on Contingency and Determinism
• 6 Leibniz’s Denial of Freedom of Pure Indifference
• 7 Leibniz on Freedom and Divine Foreknowledge
• 8 Leibniz and Major Interpretations of his Philosophy
• 9 Concluding Remarks
• Bibliography
• Index