Towards Korean Reconciliation

Socio-Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation

Gabriel Jonsson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781351144384
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Despite historic summits and spectacular acts of reconciliation between the rival neighbours, promises of improved cross-border relations between North and South Korea have been slow to materialize. In this insightful book, Gabriel Jonsson examines the impact that increased levels of socio-cultural contact has had on inter-Korean relations, the concrete results that have been achieved and how such contact has contributed to closer relations and offers the prospect of reconciliation. With reference to lessons from the German and Yemeni unification, the book examines the development of inter-Korean relations and presents a fascinating view of South Korean perceptions of their neighbours. The book also details the wider political sphere of influence with an analysis of the positions of the United States, Japan, China and Russia on Korean unity. Based primarily on Korean language sources, this volume provides completely unique perspectives on Korean unity.

Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Purpose

Korea is generally considered to be the world's only divided nation following on the unification of both Germany and Yemen, in 1990. According to the South Korean scholar O Ki-sông (1999), Korean unification remains an aspiration due to unique forms of nationalism singularly inherent to both states. The South Korean scholar Park Young-Ho and his associates wrote in (2002) that unification is asserted primarily, as a should-do task whereby the myth of "One People. One Nation" has become a widely popularized catch-cry. The former North Korean diplomat defector Hyôn Sông-il writes (1998) that unifying North and South is the greatest wish of the Korean people.¹ Whether this aspiration for unification is actually reflected in the detail of public policies or not will be a primary subject for investigation in this book.

Political and economic issues dominate amongst the vast body of literature concerning eventual Korean unification. However, there can be no doubt that in addition to these, socio-cultural exchanges and cooperation encompassing the fields of science, culture as well as the arts, religion, sport, media and publishing, popular culture, tourism, South Korean aid to North Korea, exchanges of divided families, all in their totality, amount to a multi-faceted patchwork which actually characterizes inter-Korean relations.² Firstly, the South Korean scholars Cho Han Bum and Ko Yong-gwôn (2002) argue that such contacts contribute to an overcoming of the heterogeneity created by partition and which more specifically contributes towards a sense of statist and indeed collective homogeneity. Neither of these authors define in concrete terms what they mean by "heterogeneity" and "homogeneity" however, as their compatriot scholar Choi Jinwook and his associates point out (2003), Koreans' long experience of living as a unified people within a unitary culture has contributed towards a certain familiarity in terms of homogeneity. In this study, homogeneity and heterogeneity refer only to opinions regarding socio-cultural characteristics as experienced in the context of the two Koreas.

Cho argues that to overcome heterogeneity as a social factor, common characteristics have to be recalled and replenished so as to create a lasting basis for a new, unified society. Socio-cultural exchanges and cooperation it is argued, must be seen to break away from the kind of constraints inherent to government-led contacts and economic cooperation. This, it is argued, is necessary so as to overcome socialized heterogeneity and in the final analysis, create a socio-cultural community on the peninsula, prior even to actual systemic reunification. A successful outcome from socio-cultural exchanges and cooperation are in themselves vital stepping stones for the establishment of peaceful relations as well as contributing to a wider sense of social unity, nation-wide. In his view such contacts offer the most realistic prospects of ultimately overcoming the Cold War structures pertaining on the Korean Peninsula, in the pursuit of peaceful coexistence.³ Whether this opinion holds water or not will also be the subject of some considerable investigation here.

Nonetheless, scholars' opinions on homogeneity versus heterogeneity in the Korean context tend to differ considerably. The American anthropologist Roy Richard Grinker (1998) argues against the concept of "homogeneity" (tongjilsông). which he claims is one of the most important, as well as one of the most taken-for-granted concepts pertaining to eventual unification. Since unification is often presented as "recovering homogeneity" (tongjilsông hoebok); progress on unification is hindered: North and South Korea are after all not homogeneous, he argues. He even claims that, while admittedly it would probably cause intense disagreement, "Koreans have never been homogeneous and never will be". The word used to explain cultural and political difference (ijil) contains a negative connotation which implies weak interest in or acknowledgement, of diversity. He also argues that while South Korean politicians frequently boast that South Koreans are themselves homogeneous, there remain long-standing regional tensions within the wider nation.

However, in spite of partition, Korea may indeed be a more homogeneous society than the aforementioned views would appear to imply: O (1999) argues that a combination of a lengthy joint history from 668 to 1945, as well as the usage of a common language ultimately contributes towards not only a sense of unity, but indeed a unified culture. This common language and these shared historical traditions create a symbolic mechanism for eventual re-integration of the currently heterogeneous ways of life pertaining on both sides of the border. The influence of Buddhist culture for more than 1,000 years as well as Confucian culture for hundreds of years constitutes, in itself, a homogeneous cultural layer. North and South Korea maintain mostly without exception, common traditional values such as an acceptance of patriarchal authority, the maintenance of the family as a social institution, children's respect for their parents and the prioritization of parental ambitions regarding the next generation's educational development. Other common cultural characteristics include acceptance and respect for authority, a sense of interdependence among neighbours widely identified as a social virtue, and is further typified through the culinary culture and a widespread pride over Hanbok (national dress). While acknowledging these characteristics, he argues that regardless of whether heterogeneity has come about as a result of capitalism versus socialism or as a by-product of inevitable albeit separate processes of modernization; the two Korean states have, nonetheless, become heterogeneous through a process of socialization stemming from an illusionary sense of heterogeneity.

The South Korean scholar Kim Pyông-no (2000) diverges from Grinker and O's analyses and argues that both North and South Korea need to confront and acknowledge that culture, arts and sports in the two states have indeed developed differently throughout recent history, providing an obstacle for those who oppose notions of heterogeneity. Values and attitudes that recognise heterogeneity as a valuable form of diversity need to be established and indeed be promoted to a level whereby genuine coexistence begins to emerge. At the end of the day, the differing characteristics of North Korean art need not be rejected or be disregarded as being inferior, but need to be understood as being simply different.⁴ We will return later to many of these differing views on the socio-cultural basis for unity.

Secondly, we should recall that German unification in 1990 was facilitated by the expansion of people to people exchanges on many different levels. The Basis of Relations Treaty signed by East and West Germany in 1972, promoted in the words of the South Korean scholar Kang Suk Rhee (1993), "value integration". The term describes promotion of a feeling of a common race, language, culture, history and set of customs and traditions revolving around shared concepts of peace, freedom and prosperity. He argues that both North and South Korean leaders have by and large, ignored the question of value integration at the expense of structural integration.⁵ The author shall return to this point later in the book.

Although value integration was indeed an important factor in the case of Germany, we should remind ourselves of the interpretation applied by Grinker (1998) who wrote that:

South Koreans risk repeating two mistakes made by the former West Germany prior to German unification: failing to discuss practical and specific dimensions of unification until after it occurs, and ignoring the extent to which half a century of division can produce significant social and cultural differences between the two sides of a nation.⁶

Consequently, preparing for unification and encouraging human exchanges are indeed important tasks; however, whether Grinker's writing is congruent with current social realities, has yet to be fully put to the test.

In the context of this background, the book aims to contribute to the literature on Korean unification through focusing on socio-cultural exchanges and cooperation between the two Koreas, so as to find out what actual impact they have had on cross-border relations, what concrete results have stemmed from them and how these could eventually contribute to the creation of closer contacts with unification in mind. Inter-Korean socio-cultural exchanges and cooperation have been extensively studied by South Korean scholars, in particular by Cho Han Bum whose works have indeed been indispensable on the subject, in addition to several other studies which have also been disseminated. However, there are but a few studies published in English in this field, and this book aims to fill this glaring gap.

1.2 Theoretical framework

Since functionalism was promoted by the Kim Dae Jung Government (1998-2003) as a means of theoretically legitimizing public policy towards North Korea, it has naturally constituted this study's essential theoretical framework.⁷ Functionalism was conceptualized by Professor David Mitrany (1888-1975) in the 1930s and 1940s, in the aftermath of the disastrous experiences of the First World War and the Great Depression. He explained functionalism as an approach to the problems of international relations primarily; it has since become central to the study of international integration theory. Thus, transforming formerly tense inter-state relations into peaceful ones is a matter of long-term concern not alone on a practical level but of course also on a theoretical one.

Functionalism's primary concern is with the development of a "working peace system" or, to quote from his book The Functional Theory of Politics, "The historical task of our time is not to keep the nations peacefully apart but to bring them actively together". The core of functionalism's agenda is the prioritization of human needs or public welfare in contrast to the supremacy of the nation-state or the celebration of any particular ideology. In Mitrany's view, the organization of the world into states generated damaging dogmatic tendencies. Instead, a functionalist mantra has come to be summarized in the belief that, "form follows function": since human needs change over time and vary across space, institutional solutions have to be both open-minded as well as flexible.

Functionalism's central principles are grounded in the belief that man can be weaned away from his loyalty to the nation state by the experience of beneficial international cooperation, stemming from international organizations and regimes in accordance with mutually agreed areas of activity which ultimately increase common welfare rewards to individuals beyond the level, obtainable within the context of the nation state. This shift away from loyalty towards the nation state, he believed, would ultimately reduce the risks of international conflict.

If individuals and groups began to recognize the benefits of this cooperation, they would become increasingly enmeshed in international cooperation; mutual interdependencies would develop and in turn be sustained by expanding international cooperation. These interdependencies have, over time, been seen to promote the impetus for further integration in other fields, which ultimately undermine the most fundamental basis for the nation state. The successful application of the functional approach could ultimately spell the death knell for national governments, as a dense network of interlocking cooperative ventures evolve, as witnessed partially in the context of the European Union. In addition, the loyalties of the citizens as an important pillar for the nation state would be progressively weakened through the development at the popular level, of a social-psychological community stressing overlapping "cooperative" goals. Nonetheless, these goals posed no apparent threat to the existent cultural attachments of groups and individuals, Mitrany acknowledged.

He recognized that economic development created interdependencies between groups which could indeed bind them together more closely. Through the establishment of cooperative ventures across national frontiers the dangers stemming from the intrinsic isolation of states could yet be avoided. Instead, it was suggested that states could be brought closer together, further reducing the risk of inter-state conflict. In the mid-1970s, it could be questioned if the experience of common activity really served to change attitudes radically and indeed if international cooperation really encouraged those who were affected by it, to question their sense of loyalty towards their national governments or other symbols of the nation state. Yet it has been frequently claimed that the available evidence regarding the outputs and benefits of this type of cooperation as it impacts upon public attitudes offered no decisive challenge to functionalism theoretically.⁸

Notwithstanding this, functionalism has, nonetheless, been criticized on a number of grounds. The first criticism relates to the theory's basic assumption that the determination of needs is an objective and technocratic exercise. As a political task, it is in the final analysis an inherently unstable basis for progress. Administration of public communications is one thing, however, coordination of production, trade and distribution is made incomparably more complex due to the intensely competitive nature of their practice. Mitrany disliked laissez-faire capitalism. He endeavoured to apply functionalist principles to the multi-faceted spheres of production, finance and trade, claiming that there was a requirement for fundamental alterations to the behavioural logic of firms, markets and financiers.

The second criticism criticises the very functionality of functionalism in terms of being hopelessly naïve and resting upon unreasonable assumptions about the ability of people and governments to move in rational directions. Functionalists' technocratic emphasis led to an underestimation of the continuing salience of politics: technocracy is of course a deeply political process. Functionalist reasoning contains universal assumptions about the capacities and probable outcomes in terms of cognitive change. This indicates that the objective fulfilment of needs will almost always automatically generate support for the institutional forms used to address those needs. But the mechanisms through which needs are identified in the first place are often underestimated and tend to be poorly identified. Further, a communicative theory of how actors come to believe certain things about the world is entirely absent. The ultimate recourse to an objective rationality is not sufficient in itself, in terms of cognitive application of current social science.

A third criticism is that functionalism has a poor record of prediction: things have not turned out the way Mitrany envisaged. But it should be noted that his work concerned advocacy rather than prediction extending a theoretical context which offered a possible systemic solution. Until his death, Mitrany advocated a functionalist world order using his working theory as an active form of political intervention rather than a theory based one on the production of law-like generalizations: to this extent there was a predictive element within his understanding of functionalism. By emphasizing the progress and nature of social change, Mitrany's recommendations for international organization reflected assumptions about the evolution of human needs and the tendency of different forms of governance to reform and adapt normatively.

The fourth criticism concerns the lack of scientific rigour: functionalism has no foundational theoretical statement. Actually, Mitrany's position as a public figure meant that his audience tended to be, more often than not, a more general public audience as opposed to an exclusively academic one. For Mitrany, theoretical rigor was a problematic aspect in terms of denoting practic...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables
• Acronyms
• Acknowledgements
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Lessons from German and Yemeni Unification
• 3. Inter-Korean Relations
• 4. Inter-Korean Socio-cultural Exchanges and Cooperation
• 5. Case Studies of Inter-Korean Socio-cultural Exchanges and Cooperation
• 6. Views of North Korea, Unification and the Great Powers
• 7. General Conclusions
• Chronology
• Bibliography
• Index